

Understanding Cyber-Warfare

Politics, Policy and Strategy



Christopher Whyte
and Brian Mazanec



Understanding Cyber Warfare

This textbook offers an accessible introduction to the historical, technical, and strategic context of cyber conflict.

The international relations, policy, doctrine, strategy, and operational issues associated with computer network attack, computer network exploitation, and computer network defense are collectively referred to as cyber warfare. This new textbook provides students with a comprehensive perspective on the technical, strategic, and policy issues associated with cyber conflict as well as an introduction to key state and non-state actors.

Specifically, the book provides a comprehensive overview of these key issue areas:

- the historical emergence and evolution of cyber warfare, including the basic characteristics and methods of computer network attack, exploitation, and defense;
- a theoretical set of perspectives on conflict in the digital age from the point of view of international relations (IR) and the security studies field;
- the current national perspectives, policies, doctrines, and strategies relevant to cyber warfare; and
- an examination of key challenges in international law, norm development, and the potential impact of cyber warfare on future international conflicts.

This book will be of much interest to students of cyber conflict and other forms of digital warfare, security studies, strategic studies, defense policy, and, most broadly, international relations.

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“This book is an important summary and tour-de-force of historical and contemporary Cyber issues. It is a go-to comprehensive reference for both students and policymakers interested in perhaps the most transcendent strategic topic of our time. The authors of this book have captured the core essence and components of this story.”

—Admiral William O. Studeman USN (Ret),
Former Director NSA and Deputy Director CIA

“This book is an absolute must-read for anyone looking to learn more about the critically important threat of cyber warfare. This text helps prepare readers for how to think about the historical, technical, and strategic context of conflict in this emerging new domain.”

—Samantha F. Ravich, Chair,
Transformative Cyber Innovation Lab, and Principal
Investigator, Cyber-Enabled Economic Warfare Project

“This remarkable effort represents the true first textbook of cyber conflict. The volume avoids the hype and bluster of the typical comprehensive accounts to accurately survey the issues, facts, and problems inherent in the cyber domain. A sure must-adopt for anyone teaching a cyber-security course.”

—Brandon Valeriano, Donald Bren Chair of
Armed Politics, Marine Corps University, USA

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Christopher Whyte and Brian Mazanec

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Any errors herein are solely those of the authors. Additionally, the views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not representative of any organization.

Brian Mazanec

Abbreviations

AI	Artificial intelligence
APT	Advanced persistent threat
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
AS	Autonomous system
C2	Command and control
CBM	Confidence-building measure
CCDCOE	Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence
CDC	Cyber Defense Command
CDMA	Cyber Defence Management Authority
CERT	Computer Emergency Response Team
CI	Critical infrastructure
CNA	Computer network attack
CNCI	Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
CND	Computer network defense
CNE	Computer network exploitation
CSIRT	Computer Security Incident Response Team
CSP	Cloud service provider
CYBERCOM	United States Cyber Command
DCIRT	Defence Computer Incident Response Team
DCSA	Defence Communications Services Agency
DDOS	Distributed denial of service
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DNS	Domain Name System
DoD	Department of Defense
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
ER97	Eligible Receiver 1997
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FPO	Federal Protective Service
FSB	Federal Security Service
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
GEOINT	Geospatial intelligence
GGE	Group of government experts
GRU	Main Intelligence Directorate
GSD	Korean People's Army General Staff Department
HTTP	HyperText Transfer Protocol
HUMINT	Human intelligence

IAB	Internet Architecture Board
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICT	Information and communications technologies
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
IESG	Internet Engineering Steering Group
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IMINT	Imagery intelligence
IoT	Internet of Things
IPv4	Internet Protocol (version 4)
IPv6	Internet Protocol (version 6)
IR	International relations
ISOC	Internet Society
ISP	Internet Service Provider
ISR	Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IT	Information Technology
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
JFCC-NW	Joint Functional Component Command—Network Warfare
JTF-CND	Joint Task Force Computer Network Defense
JTF-CNO	Joint Task Force Computer Network Operations
JTF-GNO	Joint Task Force Global Network Operations
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
MAC	Message authentication code
MASINT	Measurement and signature intelligence
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MSS	Ministry of State Security
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NRC	National Research Council
NSA	National Security Agency
OCO	Offensive Cyber Operations
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSINT	Open source intelligence
PDD-63	Presidential Decision Directive 63
PECU	Police Electronic Crime Unit
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
RA	Response action
RAT	Remote Access Trojan
RGB	Reconnaissance General Bureau
SIGINT	Signals intelligence
TCP/IP	Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TOR	The Onion Browser
UNIDIR	United Nations Disarmament and International Security Committee
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
WSIS	World Summit on the Information Society
WWW	World Wide Web

1 Introduction

The year was 1983 and President Ronald Reagan was relaxing on a weekend retreat in much the way that national leaders often do—by listening to some music or watching television in the background, while getting on with the grueling 24/7 task of reading reports, making policy plans with staff, and generally running government. This particular weekend, Reagan was watching a new movie, one that had just come out the previous Friday. In it, a young hacker accesses a military nuclear response system in the course of being generally mischievous. The only issue is that the hacker, played by Matthew Broderick, thinks he’s just found some sort of game. What follows is a harrowing series of events wherein the Americans and the Soviet Union move closer to nuclear war, all due to the hacker’s actions in the “game.” The next week, Reagan brought up the movie—*War Games*—in a meeting of his national security staff. After describing the plot in detail, he asked the room: “Could something like this really happen?” A week later, after some light inquiries had been made, his senior staff came back to him with a worrying answer: “The problem is far worse than we think.”¹

Reagan’s interest in threats like the one outlined in *War Games* was the first time that someone at the head of government really gave serious thought to the notion that computer security might impact upon real national security imperatives. Others, however, had given the matter a great deal of thought in the preceding decades. In 1983, the Internet still existed in a nascent form, and the predecessor of that global network of networks—the U.S. Department of Defense’s ARPANET—was barely 15 years old. Nevertheless, entire industries were already growing up around the Internet, particularly those that had come of age in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of the rapid development of computers in the years following World War II. Both the private sector and government institutions were engaged in the wholesale adoption of new technologies based around something (the Internet) that had been built to ensure greater efficiencies in communications. Herein lay the basis of the answer that Reagan was given regarding the challenge of what would come to be called cyber-security: “The problem is far worse than we think.”

The Internet and the computers that it connects are present everywhere in the world today, at every level and in every facet of modern society. Networked information systems have opened new doors for progress across every sector of business and government. The result of all of this has been a proliferation of security challenges that is largely premised on something related to how the Internet came into existence—it was not conceived of with security in mind. Those who collaborated to develop the web in its earliest forms aimed to resolve obvious problems with inefficiency in inter-computer

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communication in a world without network connections. Then, before security could be effectively addressed, commercial and governmental forces fueled an explosion of development of systems based around the new paradigm.

Because of this dynamic, the threat that concerned Reagan was very much a realistic one in the mid-1980s. Indeed, the decade or so that followed would see the manifestation of several threats that roughly took the form of what *War Games* described. In 1986, East German hackers would breach the MILNET (the U.S. Department of Defense's intranet) looking for military secrets to sell to the Soviet Union. In 1998, an Israeli hacker and two teenagers in California got into Air Force, Navy, Pentagon, NASA, and other government systems. And for several years in the late 1990s, the U.S. defense community was the target of an enormous, persistent espionage campaign in which Russian-based hackers systematically searched for sensitive national security information.²

Beyond the kind of direct attacks on government control systems fretted about by Reagan, however, the period since the late 1980s has *also* seen the manifestation of an incredibly broad range of national security threats enabled in new ways by action taken online. Digital weapons have disrupted the ability of countries to enrich uranium for the production of nuclear bombs. Malware has caused the disruption of electrical systems in Ukraine, causing blackouts that affected hundreds of thousands over a period of hours. Cyber attacks have been targeted in support of propaganda campaigns targeting a growing list of countries' political processes. And hackers have been seen to engage in broad-scoped campaigns to steal commercial and governmental secrets in what can only be described as the most significant series of economic espionage efforts since at least the early twentieth century.

Cyber conflict is almost ubiquitous in the world today. It not only occurs frequently and with increasing intensity; it is diverse in how it manifests. The upshot of this is quite simply that understanding cyber conflict is not simply the task of comprehending computer or network security challenges. Understanding cyber conflict demands discussion of the topic in the context of world politics. This book undertakes exactly this task, blending content regarding the form and context of cyber operations with the theoretical and empirical perspectives of the international relations (IR) field of study. It is our hope that in doing so, these issues—which appear to be at the same time everywhere in modern society and frustratingly inaccessible at times—will become more readily understandable to those interested in grasping how computers and the Internet are changing the world.

Aims of the book

Again, this book is not about cyber-security. Rather, it is about cyber conflict and the range of historical, empirical, theoretical, and policy issues that entails. The distinction between these different mission statements is meaningful for a number of reasons. Foremost among these is the much greater scope of the topics we must cover herein by focusing on cyber conflict—which today is often used to describe an immensely broad range of conflict forms that are being augmented by cyber actions—rather than simply on traditional issues of cyber-security.

Cyber-security is an inherently technical field. However, as any computer scientist will tell you, cyber-security is also inherently defined by the interaction of technology with socio-political institutions and systems, from the human users of

information technologies to the institutions that require their use. Cyber-security, in the broadest possible terms, is about the security of socio-technical systems emerging from or impacted by the information revolution. If the purview of our discussion were merely those issue areas at the heart of the cyber-security field, this definition would see us extend our gaze only to, say, the study of organizational hygiene (e.g. the mandate of better password practices among a company's employees) and the implications of network technologies for risk management procedures. As it is, our focus on cyber conflict involves systematically merging a study of cyber-security issues with assessments of human interactions from the lowest levels to the highest. It involves understanding how new information systems augment and alter political systems at the level of institutions, countries, and the global system itself.

Our aims in writing this book are fairly simple. As professors and researchers of cyber issues, we have been struck time and again by the lack of cohesive resources available for those attempting to impart knowledge about cyber conflict to students from a social science perspective. As we noted earlier, cyber-security is not merely a technical subject; indeed, the study of cyber conflict must naturally be a mixed course in comprehending technical foundations, significant historical context, international and national security theory, policymaking, and doctrine. And yet what resources exist from which to learn about cyber conflict virtually demand assignment alongside supporting readings. Instructors are called upon to construct syllabi around a hodgepodge of content that aims to support an interdisciplinary curriculum on cyber conflict. Often, such syllabi are excellent. But even those good examples force students to consume a narratively inconsistent set of works such that learning is hampered.

We certainly do not and cannot claim to cover every element of cyber conflict in the course of this book. Far from it. This topic is broad enough and varied enough that a compendium of extant knowledge on cyber conflict, even just from a political or social science perspective, would reach some thousands of pages in length. Rather, what we offer here is a great deal of context and in-depth introduction to key issues on the topic. We offer great historical context at times, scholarly discussion of relevant theories elsewhere, and robust empirical discussion of the actual conduct of cyber conflict as seen from the 30,000 feet vantage point often favored by scholars of world politics. More importantly, we aim to provide a consistent narrative voice such that this book serves as an excellent introduction to the field of cyber conflict studies for all levels of students.

What is cyber-security?

Asking someone to define what “cyber-security” means seems like a naturally deceptive act. In reality, there are few “cyber” terms (i.e. “cyberwar,” “cyberterrorism,” “cyberbullying,” “cyberspace,” etc.) for which there is universal agreement on what is exactly meant. Cyberspace, the nature of which we talk about in Chapter 2, is a particularly slippery concept. Cyber-security, likewise, would be tricky to define if you were to ask a diverse enough audience. From a purely technological perspective, cyber-security is constituted of all processes, procedures, design considerations, and actions concerned with the security of information systems. This means that anything bound up in protecting computer systems and the networks that connect computers

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from attack, disruption, and infiltration constitutes cyber-security. In reality, this definition is, roughly speaking, one likely to receive broad approval by practitioners and scholars across the fields concerned with cyber-security.

But it also naturally speaks to the technological drivers of the cyber-security field at the expense of any focus on the global context of the information revolution since the 1960s. Is security in the digital age just about the function of information systems and computers that now underwrite most major functions of twenty-first-century global society? Or is it also characterized by the ways in which the information revolution has affected non-technical features of IR, from the function of state militaries to the way in which humans approach problem solving? This book's sections and chapters grapple with these questions as uniquely relevant to questions on the nature of cyber conflict. As such, we adopt a more general format of definition for cyber-security from the start, arguing that cyber-security *as it pertains to cyber conflict* is simply constituted of all processes, procedures, design considerations, and actions concerned with the security of socio-technical systems.

What is the scope of cyber warfare and conflict?

Throughout this book, we will refer to different security layers of the digital world. Cyber-security issues are, in many ways, best understood as layered around basic mathematical, technical, and social principles. From basic issues of cryptographic security to the design of computer and network systems, cyber-security is constituted of an incrementally expansive sphere of security considerations. How might developers best approach issues of information privacy? How should man-made programming languages and hardware be adapted so as to minimize the subversion of computer systems? And how should organizations regulate their user base so as to achieve an optimal defensive posture?

At the same time, such security considerations themselves constitute only the foundation of cyber-security considerations from the perspective of the international security researcher. In many ways, it is useful to think of such considerations, the shape of which are described in detail in Chapter 2, as the most incremental level of analysis of cyber-security issues. Much in the same way that IR scholars teach students to think of human capabilities and psychology as the most fundamental possible category of explanations for why different things happen in world affairs, we emphasize that fundamental insecurities and threat realities bound up in cryptography and information technology design constitute the base category of explanations for why different cyber-security issues are of more or less importance for national and international security.

Beyond socio-technical issues of logic and design at that level, students of cyber conflict must seek to assess the manner in which different national institutions and non-state actors adopt information and communications technologies (ICT). National experiences with cyber-security have produced radically different approaches to doctrine, to policy, and to practice across intelligence, military, and law enforcement units the world over. Likewise, scholarship on non-state actors' use of ICT is increasingly emphasizing understanding of actor-specific characteristics—i.e. the different incentives that terrorists, criminals, and “patriotic” hackers might have to develop cyber capabilities and use them in conflict—as more critical than comprehension of technical factors for the construction of knowledge on different actors.

And beyond a focus on specific socio-technical systems and actors, students of cyber conflict must consider the broader shape of the digital world. Cyberspace is, in many ways, an artificial construct overlaid on top of the international system. It is, however, constituted of a basic terrain—a global infrastructure characterized by certain underlying features and organizing mechanisms. These macro features, as much as anything else, also drive the development of new trends in cyber conflict.

So what is the scope of cyber conflict? Much as might be said of conventional warfare, cyber conflict is constituted of everything from basic issues of computer network security to both the shape of those who operate in the digital world and the actions of every kind of political actor in attempting to govern its features. The task before students of cyber conflict studies is in teasing apart the different elements of a given issue and attempting to discern where—across different technical, social, political, or economic features—explanatory power lies.

In this book, we will be addressing questions like “does the law of armed conflict apply to cyber conflict?” and “is it possible for actors to use cyber ‘weapons’ to coerce others into changing their behavior?” Answering these questions will inevitably involve a differential assessment of the degree to which developments at different levels of analysis drive conflict dynamics. In other words, finding answers will mean adjudicating on whether or not conflict emerges more from technical complexities, institutional dynamics, strategic realities, or some other force acting on those who have chosen to operate in cyberspace. As such, the book addresses issues of cyber conflict from a range of perspectives.

Themes of the book

The ongoing information revolution—centered on computers and the Internet—has changed the world. This is, of course, a bold and likely overly grandiose statement. Indeed, it is a statement that might be challenged by many.³ For instance, the question of whether or not ICT constitutes a revolution in military affairs wherein a new paradigm of security applies today that did not several decades ago, is particularly hotly contested among political scientists. And yet, that debate is largely centered on the question of warfighting as a distinct political activity. We, the authors of this volume, do not argue that the information revolution has necessarily (and controversially) changed the way in which future wars will be fought to such a degree that conventional military strategy will never be the same again. But we do assert that the information revolution has altered fundamental features of international affairs. Information technologies constitute the wiring of global infrastructure and enable almost all human interaction in the technologically developed world (meaning most of the planet) today. As such, cyber conflict issues—regardless of whether one thinks that wars fought entirely online are possible or probable—are inevitably and enduringly relevant in a way that other topical conflict programs are not. This is not only because ICT constitutes the wiring of international affairs; it is also because information and computer security challenges manifest in such a way as to link social, political, and economic spheres that might previously have rarely touched. One need only consider the number of times in recent years that issues of cryptographic encryption or network privacy addressed in the context of cyber crime or terrorism have prompted national conversations about civil liberties to know what is meant in this regard.

The content in this book is intended as an introduction to the topic of cyber conflict and to key questions bound up in the history, practice, and study of warfare in the digital domain. As such, there are inevitably certain themes that recur throughout as we grapple with similar concepts or issues across different levels of analysis and in different settings (i.e. academic versus historiographical). Beyond the crosscutting nature of all things cyber, several of these are worth mentioning up front.

Enduring barriers between the digital and the real. A defining characteristic of security in the information age is the degree to which kinetic and digital actions are disconnected from one another in meaningful ways. With cyber conflict, it seems reasonable to assert that most experts would point to **attribution** problems—i.e. problems in accurately ascertaining responsibility for digital actions—as the foremost drivers of uncertainty and aggression in the digital domain. Even where it is possible to forensically describe cyber attacks, attributing cyber aggression to real-world actors—from individuals to terrorist organizations and state entities—is additionally difficult, particularly because evidence on who is responsible for cyber actions rarely reflects a record of the sociopolitical machinations at work behind such operations. Non-state hackers may actually work for state intelligence organizations or military institutions, while threat agents traceable to foreign military Internet Protocol (IP) addresses may actually be attempting to lay false blame at the feet of a third party. These issues are pervasive and have a number of implications for the incidence and likelihood of cyber conflict.

The physicality of the digital domain. Despite the reality that enduring barriers between the digital and real worlds exist to complicate cyber conflict dynamics, it is also worth noting up front that there is an underlying physicality to everything we talk about in this book. Many scholars and practitioners problematize and develop perspectives on cyber conflict that assume an essentially unlimited potential for digital actions that can affect national security processes. The truth of the matter, however, is that the digital world runs on physical infrastructure and logical programming implemented in reference to that infrastructure. We discuss this further, particularly in Chapter 2, but it is worth remembering from the start that physical circumstances have dictated and will continue to dictate the manner in which states, non-state actors, and private industry use the Internet for security purposes.

Exogenous development. Leading on from the broader point about physicality, the topography of the digital world is decentralized, and its development is driven by a large number of factors. Security dynamics are regularly determined by technological circumstances rather than by institutions that dictate technological conditions. Take, as an example, the logical processes set up to ensure that information from one person sent across the Internet to another makes it to the right place. At present, there are about 130 root servers controlled by 12 different private companies.⁴ Five of these companies are in Northern Europe; the rest are in North America. Root servers play an important role in Internet functionality, essentially controlling the process of registering website addresses to specific IP addresses (the identification digits given to each computer on the web). As a result of the current physical location of these servers—each of which operates with a great number of redundancies distributed around the world, admittedly—most Internet traffic around the world travels through the United States. That is to say that packets of data sent from one networked device to another invariably visit the United States before reaching its final destination.

This technological dynamic has been uniquely impactful in the development of cyber-security programs in the United States, as access to such through-traffic provides a number of opportunities to enhance the national security (and, particularly, intelligence) functions of government.⁵

But this will not always necessarily be the case. The number of root servers in the world has largely remained static because of the packet-level requirements of the IPv4 standard currently used to generate IP addresses. But the world has essentially run out of IPv4 addresses and is now in the early stages of transition to a new, longer standard called IPv6. Here, data packets can be bigger than was previously desirable. As a result, new standards of network reliability and performance will likely make new space for the addition of more high-level routing servers to accommodate more of the world's Internet traffic. Those servers need not be in the United States or Europe. Indeed, it is highly likely that many will be in countries with increasingly complex technology sectors and growing economic prowess, like China or Israel. Thus, the shape of the digital world will, in a reasonably fundamental way, shift over time and exogenously affect the security capabilities of some countries. This is but one example of the way in which the information revolution has fundamentally altered the wiring of the national and international security realms for states from the outside in.

Embeddedness leading to proliferation. The story we opened with here about Ronald Reagan serves a few purposes. One obvious one was to suggest that security challenges related to the Internet emerged in the way they did during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s because of the way in which governments and the private sector co-opted and innovated new products around network technologies. Simply put, the natural process of modern societies recognizing the immense promise of a new information technology and then moving to benefit from it has created a host of negative externalities that drive insecurity. Security engineers are encouraged to produce mediocre security systems so that customers are not hampered by the need for lengthier login wait times or significantly more powerful processors. Technology developers are not uniformly subject to regulation aimed at standardizing product security across countries. Thematically, this amounts to a dynamic that we've seen innumerable times in human history. Where new information technologies become extensively and rapidly embedded in societal functions, security challenges proliferate.

Inherent insecurity. What much of this amounts to is simply that the networked world is inherently insecure. This is the case on several fronts, but at the highest levels, again, this is so primarily because the history of network technologies is the history of people favoring convenience over security. The Internet was not conceived and thought of primarily with security management in mind. Indeed, the Internet is a beast of communications efficiencies. The basic difference between ICT and previous kinds of telecommunications technologies—which is discussed notably in Chapter 2—essentially dictates a form of information insecurity insofar as the process of sharing and accessing information across networks is a highly disaggregated and uncoordinated process. On top of this, the international community remains in a state of marked disagreement over the right approach to governing the digital world. At present, a broad range of non-profit entities govern the Internet's "address book" (more on that to come), technology standards' oversight functions and more, with help from a small subset of state-supported security units. The result is a ponderous global ecosystem that supports the function of a digital world overlaid on

top of the real one and constituted of systems inherently possessed of vulnerabilities. Moreover, the commercial dynamics of technology development have, over time, worked to create negative externalities in the system via the encouragement of practices that favor business convenience over the best security. This complex reality both enables cyber conflict in various forms and complicates questions of cyber-security cooperation at both national and international levels.

Plan of the book

This book is designed so as to lead students from general precepts and principles through typological discussion of cyber conflict to chapters focused on empirics and theory. The next two chapters of this book take aim at cyber-security foundations. Chapter 2 discusses technological foundations of the security dynamics we are grappling with in terms of cyber conflict, while Chapter 3 undertakes the task of contextualizing the information revolution from the perspective of IR's main theoretical perspectives. Chapters 4 and 5—entitled “Exploitation” and “Attack,” respectively—then take different approaches to grappling with the actual conduct of cyber warfare. Chapter 4 takes an historical approach to introducing students to the context of cyber conflict's emergence from the practices of intelligence communities in North America and Western Europe. Chapter 5 leads on from there and overviews military perspectives—particularly those of the U.S. **Department of Defense**—on cyberspace as a domain of warfighting, as well as the special characteristics of operating online. Then, it briefly (since cyber defense is naturally discussed in later chapters in the context of particular forms of cyber threat) outlines what is involved with cyber defense.

The latter half of the book turns to describe and explain the actual conduct of cyber warfare. Chapter 6 provides a (necessarily incomplete) history of cyber conflict incidents, while Chapters 7 and 8 debate the nature of cyber warfare as useful for major warfighting, coercive signaling and “not war” actions taken below the threshold of declared war. Chapter 9 then moves to discuss how the information revolution has affected non-state actors. Chapters 10 and 11 cover international cooperation, first by discussing how different national experiences with cyber-security have shaped approaches to cyber conflict practices and, second, by assessing the potential for future international cooperation and the development of constraining norms around cyber conflict. Chapter 12 then concludes with a look to the future.

Notes

- 1 For perhaps the best discussion of Reagan's experiences in grappling with computer security as a national security issue for the first time, see Kaplan, Fred. *Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016.
- 2 Though we cover these episodes in great detail in later chapters, a good narrative resource that unpacks the United States' early experiences with cyber conflict is Healey, Jason, and Karl Grindal, eds. *A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012*. Washington, DC: Cyber Conflict Studies Association, 2013.
- 3 For an overview of the arguments involved in this debate in the IR field, see *inter alia* Kello, Lucas. “The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft.” *International Security*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2013), 7–40; and Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan C. Maness. *Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

- 4 For an overview of the routing functions of the Internet in historical context, see Mockapetris, Paul, and Kevin J. Dunlap. "Development of the Domain Name System." Vol. 18, No. 4, 123–133. *ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review*, 1988.
- 5 Though, again, we discuss this unique issue in later chapters, Kaplan's *Dark Territory* provides more extensive narrative description of the manner in which this logical dynamic of Internet function has shaped national security processes in the United States.

Further reading

- Choucri, Nazli. *Cyberpolitics in International Relations*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012.
- Guiora, Amos N. *Cybersecurity: Geopolitics, Law, and Policy*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2017.
- Healey, Jason, and Karl Grindal, eds. *A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012*. Washington, DC: Cyber Conflict Studies Association, 2013.
- Reveron, Derek S., ed. *Cyberspace and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012.
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2 The technological foundations of insecurity in the digital age

In listening to presidents and pundits alike in recent years, one could be forgiven for thinking that all national security issues feed into broader problems of a cyber nature. And, indeed, there is some element of truth in that sentiment. If forced to elect a single theme for this book on cyber conflict, “crosscuttingness” wouldn’t be a bad one. In conversations about cyber policy, one often hears the use of paired terms—“tightly coupled” and “loosely coupled”—that are regularly used by engineers to describe the design of a given system. Simply put, tightly coupled systems are those where a disruption at one point is quickly felt at other points, such as when a pipe bursts in a house and water pressure tanks. Loosely coupled systems are those where this is far less the case. With national critical infrastructure sectors, for instance, one might think of possible disruptions and quickly see that agriculture sectors are far less tightly coupled than is the banking sector.¹ The thing is, no matter what kind of system one considers—political, infrastructural, economic, social—it is hard to avoid the reality that the information revolution has broadly acted to more tightly enjoin parts of state national security apparatuses. Not only do information technologies essentially constitute the “wiring” of most societal functions today, but security challenges in one vein invariably prompt logistical, legal, or moral challenges elsewhere, as common security foundations are meaningful beyond how technologies are applied more narrowly.

But what are these common security foundations? Put better, why are the systems and technologies that have emerged from the information revolution vulnerable to malicious actions? Answering these questions allows for focus on more specific questions that are more commonly the domain of political scientists and security studies scholars. Is it possible to design perfect information security systems or procedures? Is there a security dilemma in cyberspace? And to what degree is international cooperation on different cyber-security issues, from technology development standards and Internet governance to the weaponization of code, possible? As such, the task of explaining the foundational insecurities of the digital world is of central significance to students of world politics in the information age.

This chapter takes up the challenge of briefly and simply outlining the roots of the myriad security challenges that characterize life in the digital age. Chapters to come—particularly Chapters 4 and 5—go into greater detail on the history and dynamics of cyber conflict, but here the idea is to acquaint the reader with foundational concepts in an effort to lay the groundwork for further conversations about the nature of cyber threats.

Broadly, doing this involves selling the idea that cyberspace is inherently insecure. This is the case for a number of reasons, not least because the Internet was not designed with security management in mind and has proliferated to a point where we have a veritable “tragedy of the commons” with regards to incentivizing positive cyber-security behavior (more on that in Chapter 3). But it is hard to overlook the significance of the ever-present human factor in all of this. How people design technology, empower technology to change over time, and interact with both design processes and resultant technologies all matter a great deal. The implication of this is quite simple. Cyber-security is inherently about the interaction of human systems with important technological ones. More than just being the practice of protecting information systems, “cyber-security”—i.e. security that is of a cyber nature—describes the security of socio-technical dynamics related to the impact of the information revolution on pre-existing mechanisms of human interaction the world over.

The sections that follow attempt to lay out the fundamentals of security and insecurity in the digital age in a format familiar to most students of international politics. The sections below treat different elements of the cyber insecurity puzzle—information security challenges, technology design and usage issues, and infrastructure setup—as different levels of analysis. Much as is the case with other realms of study in political science, dissecting the digital world in such a way is intended to allow students to better deliberate on the value of different factors for explaining insecurity. All cyber-security issues with political, economic, social, or strategic dimensions are defined by the interaction of security dynamics at different levels. Information security problems have driven political conversation about civil rights’ protections. Political happenstance has, consistently in recent history, led to faulty assumptions about the motivation behind cyber attacks. The sections below take steps to outline different areas of concern and the logic of insecurity at different levels so that students might be better prepared to think adaptively about the substance of cyber-security issues in the chapters to come.

The technological foundations of cyber insecurity

The first step to understanding the insecurities of a world wired by information technologies is to understand how the networked world works. Though not everything networked is a part of the Internet, the history and nature of the Internet is nevertheless the only logical starting point for any effort to outline the broad shape of the digital world. From there, it is possible to springboard, first, to questions about the nature and extent of cyberspace and from there, second, to more fundamental principles of information security and technology design that impact upon the full gamut of cyber-security and conflict issues.

Networking the world: how the Internet works

The history of what is now called the **Internet** is about half a century old and centers, as has been the case with many breakthrough innovations over the past few hundred years, on a government-funded research and development organization. In this case, the setting is the network of laboratories at government facilities and universities across the United States linked to the programs of the Advanced Research

Projects Agency (ARPA, now called DARPA after the word “Defense” was added at a later date).² Chapter 4 describes in greater detail the backdrop of computerization that drove stakeholders within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) community to invest in the networkization of increasingly sophisticated computer systems. In short, however, the motivation for funding what would essentially become a new kind of information technology emerged almost entirely from the transatlantic scientific community.

Specifically, researchers at laboratories funded by the DoD were regularly faced with the need to send sizable amounts of information to their sister labs and to fellow government collaborators.³ Likewise, the advent of early “supercomputers,” which were situated at only a few labs around the country, meant that researchers were vying for both physical and remote access to new processing capabilities for a variety of purposes. Whereas telephone, snail mail, and fax were obvious existing mechanisms via which information could be sent and telephone connections could support some remote usage of computing power, the fact of the matter was that using these methods of communication represented a serious inefficiency. If computers being developed and used in these labs could speak directly with one another, wouldn’t life for these programs be both simpler and cheaper? Likewise, if methods for linking computer systems could be developed and implemented, wouldn’t the perpetual concern about vulnerable control systems held by the military consistently through the 1950s and 1960s disappear?⁴

The answer in both instances is, of course, yes. The development challenge was that existing methods of linking labs to ensure data connection between computers was a reasonably expensive proposition. The reason for this was twofold. First, much as was the case with telephone connections, the labs and their computers would—as technological practices at the time dictated—have to be physically connected with one another. Thus, there was a clear infrastructural cost to hooking up numerous facilities and personnel across government. Second, there was a serious risk of failure from an information communications perspective insofar as data would be sent from one computer—essentially functioning like a computer switchboard—to another and another down the line of physical connection until it reached the intended recipient machine. This was **circuit-switching**, where the “switching” part of the whole thing referred to central elements of the setup that manually adjusted connections to allow for new interconnections between endpoints. This was the basic technological principle behind the telephone and telegraph networks. But the issue with this approach was that computer failures—or the inability of a recipient program to read the data and resend it due, for instance, to a glitch—would lead to a break in the circuit. Information would not (or not entirely) make it through.

The solution lay in a shift to a new technological approach to sharing information between endpoints.⁵ Called **packet-switching**, this approach—which was not originally developed in the United States—would allow information to be broken up into constituent parts and sent through a network of redundant inter-computer linkages to an intended endpoint. Much like transporter systems in *Star Trek*, the point was that information would be broken down to an appropriately small level and then reassembled in the right way at the final destination. The transmission of these packets of data worked via the logic of multiple failsafe routes to the final source. By networking computers together—and then by connecting networks of computers with other

networks of computers—data packets could simply try every possible inter-machine connection node in order to continue down the pathway to an intended destination. If an issue arose with one machine failing to accept the transmission of a data packet, it would be sent via the next fastest route and then joined with other packets to be reassembled into meaningful information at the end of the line.⁶

With what would become the Internet, information transmission can be best thought of by envisioning a tree of networks—a hierarchical series of interconnected networks of computers that constitute the digital world. In reality, this is arguably—indeed, depending on how one thinks about the ability to access, not at all—synonymous with “cyberspace” as a whole, but we’ll get to that shortly. Information transmission across networks and between networks of networks is enabled through a series of **protocols**, which are specifically delineated sets of rules about how and when information should be transmitted between computer systems. For the purposes of a discussion on the history of the Internet, there are two specific protocols worth mentioning.

The first of these is the set of protocols—incorporated in the design of all networked information systems—that allows information to be passed between networks regardless of differences in underlying technological design. The most important concept here is the **handshake protocol**, which was suggested and designed by Vint Cerf and Robert Khan in the 1970s.⁷ The idea held by these gentlemen was simple—machines connected to others should be programmed to use a standard set of rules for contact so that there is no need for requiring the *physical* compatibility of underlying technology. The idea was that, if one wanted to ensure greater utility and higher adoption potential for Internet technologies, there needed to be some way to compensate for the inevitable reality that computers built by different companies in different countries across different generations over time would not share most physical design characteristics. This led initially to what is generically called a three-way handshake protocol, wherein machines were directed to request the right to send information to another, would receive acknowledgement of authorization to do so, and would then acknowledge that acknowledgment before attempting to send over data. Included in the protocol was specific information about what kind of data packets were preferred by the receiving machine and how best to accommodate the recipient’s access to the nascent Internet.

Less generically, information is transferred from computer to computer across networks via reference to a **protocol stack** that moves information from applications on a device, packages it, addresses it, and transforms it into electronic signals to be sent across the Internet.⁸ Specifically, the two most critical elements of this stack, developed to accommodate the function of the growing Internet, are so often described in the same breath that they bear mention together. The **Transport Control Protocol** and the **Internet Protocol** (together referred to as TCP/IP) constitute the rules of how computers would break apart different kinds of data coming from one computer and then transmit that data across networks to intended recipients. On the one hand, TCP essentially determines how data will enter and leave a computer. To match various pieces of software that use different kinds of incoming network information to support user functions, TCP directs data through different **ports**. Data constituting email messages might leave and be accepted through one port, while streaming music or video or website data might enter through others. The IP then enables the direction of such diverse data between linked networks (more on this later).

A second protocol worthy of specific mention is called the **HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP)**. HTTP addresses the human element in information transmission between networked machines and between networks of network machines insofar as it allows for the identification of formatted “documents” online. These documents (i.e. websites) can, thanks to HTTP, be recognized as discrete formatted resources able to be displayed in a standard format.⁹ Moreover, HTTP allows for such documents to be imbued and enriched with applications to enhance user experience, from “hyperlinks” that allow users to jump quickly between webpages to more complex tools (e.g. widgets) hosted on websites.

Knowledge of what these protocols do in broad terms should offer an idea of how computers ultimately interact with each other across the digital world. But it doesn’t yet tell us how the Internet works; mapping the Internet requires understanding how information makes it from your computer connected to Network A to another computer on Network Z. To understand how this happens requires greater focus on the IP as a mechanism employed in order to ensure effective movement of information across the digital world.

The IP works in direct reference to the **Domain Name System (DNS)**. In essence, the DNS is the address book of the Internet.¹⁰ If we think again of the Internet as a family tree of sorts, with different kinds of networks linked to other networks via physical linkages and protocol-enabled agreements on acceptable forms of communications, the DNS is the function that acknowledges the specific identification information of each layer of the Internet and translates it into something usable for humans. In other words, as the IP assigns a number to different networks and specific computers (i.e. your personal computer will have an IP address), outgoing connections will inevitably target a specific external numeric location when requesting information. The DNS is a registry of locations—specifically a registry of IP locations tied to web addresses (from high-level ones ending in .com, .uk, .edu, and so on to lower level ones like .ac.uk or .co.ch)—that your computer queries when it is trying to find out where to send information.

Box 2.1 Layers of the Internet

In all of this, it’s worth teasing out that there are different layers of the Internet. What most people think of as the Internet is in actual fact something called the **surface web**. This part of the Internet is based on reasonable knowledge of the content of web “documents” (i.e. websites) and on an ability to access them without precondition. Search engines map the Internet through the use of, among other things, web crawlers—sophisticated code devices that follow the pathways of the Internet from one webpage to the next, cataloguing the contents of the sites they find and following embedded links yet further out into the networked world. The result is, in essence, what most would think of as the Internet.

But not all sites are able to be catalogued in such a way. The common example is that of the paywall. Paywalls are access prevention mechanisms that allow a site to deny access to anybody without, say, pre-existing login credentials or the ability to purchase such credentials. An example would be the *Wall Street Journal*. Access to *WSJ* is restricted beyond the main webpage to those who have not purchased a subscription pass to read online content. Since web crawlers

are not naturally possessed of such credentials (though they may be enabled by inter-organization arrangements), they do not, in reality, scour all available content in what we might call “the networked world.” Thus, there exists a part of the Internet beyond the surface web where it is not possible to access content via conventional search engine means. This is called the **Deep Web** and is, in reality, far larger than the surface web.

And content exists in the networked world beyond even what is not indexed by the world’s extant web crawling services. Some content exists on overlay networks that send information along the same physical connections that the Internet is premised on, but have unique criteria for access. Specifically, overlay networks usually require specific credentials *and* the use of specialized software to access information. These kinds of networks (**darknets**) are often referred to as the **Dark Web** (though that is a misnomer because these networks are not connected to one another). Entry to these parts of the cyber world requires the use of both keys—pre-obtained credentials—and specific software to enter. Mapping the fullest extent of this bit of the digital world is tricky, if not impossible, because the primary function of enabling software (such as **The Onion Router** (TOR)) is to mask the IP address of web users.

The result is a *hierarchical* network of networks wherein your packets of information (let’s assume you’re sending an email) keep going upwards until they find the address of the person you are trying to send a message to. The functionality of the Internet essentially rests with a series of **root servers** that regulate the registration of high-level domains and redirection of information to those domains. Traffic is routed at the highest level through such servers to a massive series of **autonomous systems** (AS). Taken together, all ASs constitute what is called the **Internet backbone**—the entirety of the physical infrastructure of the Internet, including fiber optic cables, telephone networks, satellites, and more. This backbone infrastructure is owned and operated by **Internet Service Providers** (ISP). Sometimes your information will leave an AS and be routed through higher-level **servers** to other locations; where your machine is attempting to communicate with a local partner—say, where you are sending an email to someone located within the network of the ISP you are currently using—this may not happen.

This description of how the Internet works should result in a few realizations. Three are particularly noteworthy. First, much of what we tend to think of as a new domain is actually privately owned. ISPs own (or rent from other owners) the infrastructure of the Internet, and even the highest-level DNS functions are operated privately (though with many redundancies and failsafe features in operation at this time). This point is worth bearing in mind in later chapters when we discuss the shape of cyber policy in the United States and the relationship between the government and actors in private industry.

Second, this should give readers an idea of exactly “where” the Internet is. Of course, the Internet is in the tubes and airwaves connecting various pieces of the world via network connectivity. But in reality, the Internet is more significantly concentrated at important points where connectivity between the layers of the thing is most critical—at the level of functional control of different autonomous systems and at the root servers.¹¹

When it comes to thinking about the function of the Internet in the context of potential conflict between powerful countries in later chapters, it's worth bearing in mind the fact that the massive amount of redundancy vested in such a decentralized system for transmitted information around the world *does not* mean that there are no points of unique vulnerability. While the Internet would not be destroyed by a strike on critical high-level infrastructure, such as the submarine cables that carry much Internet traffic across oceans, it is certainly possible that much service could be disrupted and that some parts of the Internet could be cut off from others.

Third, and related to the first two points, it is perhaps most important to realize that the Internet is not an inherently secure system. It was not set up and augmented at various developmental inflection points with security management in mind. Rather, it was developed with greater efficiency in communications between networked computer systems in mind. Though security considerations were brought up even during the initial development of ARPANET, most famously by Willis Ware and his colleagues, they were ultimately sidelined by the argument that it was more important to get the technology right before saddling it with regulatory requirements.¹² Due to the rapid adoption of the technology across entire industries in the West in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, this *ex post facto* correction was not feasible.

As a result, the existence of a global network that undergirds global commerce and society is based on rather a lot of trust. And the history of the Internet is replete with instances of actors violating that trust—a trust which generally takes the form of ISPs not making false representations with regards to information pathways—and causing a great many headaches for users. This is a significant point, particularly given that the Internet will not look the same forever. Indeed, by the 2030s, it is entirely feasible to think that many of the high-level functions of the Internet will have migrated to other parts of the globe. At present, the Internet has 13 root servers, a number maintained largely because of the efficiencies to be had in squaring the requirements of the IP standards—currently IPv4, which dictates a particular length of address for **client** computers (i.e. the lowest-level computers employed to use the web, such as personal computers)—with standards on the most efficient size of data packets. Most of these are in North America, with a few being in Northern Europe.¹³ However, under IPv4 the world is running out of IP addresses. Thus, the world is transitioning to IPv6. This is a complex process and adoption of the more lengthy address format is going to take time. However, it changes the calculation regarding packet composition such that more high-level DNS servers could make sense out into the future. By the 2040s, much web traffic could run through emergent leaders in digital industry—Israel, China, Russia, Germany, or Brazil. Given this, the issue of trust as the basis of Internet functionality becomes increasingly more problematic. Can an expanded set of countries be trusted to maintain the shape and functions of what we've come to know as the digital world?

Box 2.2 Is the Internet American?

The Internet is largely owned and operated by private enterprise, both in the United States and around the world. But does any one country have more control over or access to the logical functions of the Internet than others? Put another way, is there such a thing as a “national-level” Internet (i.e. an Israeli Internet, a U.S. Internet, a Russian Internet, etc.)?

There are two ways to think about this—in the context of (1) the physical infrastructure and informational content of the Internet, and (2) the logical functionality of the Internet. In terms of the physical setup of the Internet, the modern Internet is underwritten by a broad system of submarine cables connecting the world. Though the Internet was birthed in the United States, these cables and the on-land network infrastructure that they plug into are reasonably even distributed around the world, with substantial development in the twenty-first century focused on South American (particularly Brazilian) connections, South and East Asian connections, and Middle Eastern/Indian Sub-Continent connections. From this point of view, it would be unreasonable to say that the Internet is intrinsically “American” beyond the historical context of its genesis. Likewise, it would be reasonably accurate to say that there are such things as “national Internets.” After all, the most common locations for exchange points—i.e. for those nodes where data traffic is transferred from one autonomous system to the next—are on national borders. Thus, in the event of a conflict, it is possible to target by either physical or cyber attack the Internet of a specific country (or regional sub-unit, like a province or in some cases a municipality), and, in the event of political interference with the Internet, the scenario of a **Balkanized Internet** divided along national lines is not fantastical.¹⁴

In terms of the information environment enabled by this underlying Internet infrastructure, it is also somewhat reasonable to assume that much information is stored along national lines. Websites run by German citizens are more likely than not hosted physically inside Germany somewhere. The wrinkle here is that major consumer and enterprise services for storing content and deploying applications online have increasingly moved to **the cloud**. The cloud is quite simply a configuration of information services that allows businesses to offer immense resources and storage to customers without the need for significant local infrastructure. In other words, **cloud service providers** (CSP) use the web to provide customers with access to processing power, data storage, and development environments remotely. Instead of having to buy servers and the like to set up a business, entrepreneurs can simply pay a CSP for access to pre-existing resources that are accessible online.¹⁵ Resultantly, the trick here is that consumer content is often not stored close to the consumer—oftentimes not even in the same country. Massive server farms operated by multinational corporations in cold climates (to save on cooling costs) constitute an incredibly large portion of the information layer of cyberspace, all of which adds an additional dimension to the question of “national” information ecosystems.

Whereas it might be reasonable to argue that there exist national Internets based on how Internet infrastructure is internationally distributed, the same cannot be said when one considers the logical functionality of the Internet. Data traffic flows upwards as people send messages and otherwise transmit information around the world. Specifically, data flows upwards towards root servers that are able to route packets between high-level domains. Here, the reality of U.S. first-movership in Internet affairs is that most root servers are physically located within the United States and, to a lesser extent, Northern Europe. Thus, while the physical infrastructure of traffic exchange is well distributed around the world, most Internet traffic inevitably flows through the United States.

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From this point of view, one might reasonably argue that the Internet is American. Though the Internet is not federally owned, the United States has an unusual degree of privileged access to Internet communications, something that has been the source of unique security developments (discussed in later chapters) over the past few decades.

Naturally, this is not the entire picture when it comes to understanding insecurity in the world in the digital age.¹⁶ Hopefully, this lends some insight as to why the governance of cyber spaces (a topic more fully covered in later chapters) is so fraught in international affairs and where the main perspectives on that governance lie—from the **multilateralism** of states that favor state control of the web to the **multi-stakeholderism** of those that want to include civil society. But there are few answers for security issues at this level. Starting again and building a new Internet from the ground up, one with better attention paid to security management, is quite arguably a non-starter. From the basic details discussed earlier, this might not seem to be the case. But, again, perhaps the best way to think about this is in terms of the levels of analysis. With the history and brief detail of the development of the Internet offered earlier, we have shown what amounts to a topographical view of the digital world from on high. If one were asked to describe the international system, one might start by talking about the existing borders of the world and how people—and money and militaries and information—move across them. That is essentially what we’ve done here. We have described the borders and the transmission functions of the digital world. But we have not yet fundamentally described where many enduring vulnerabilities come from, particularly not in a way that allows us to move on to topics more specifically associated with the study of cyber conflict—the shape of cyber attacks, the actions of defenders, and the prospects for conflict mitigation. To do that, it is necessary to think of yet more fundamental issues bound up in the design and development of information technologies.

The security of information and information systems

If the core function of new information technologies is to enable more efficient communication, then the first challenge in designing such systems is in how to customize information transmission mechanisms to ensure security. In other words, designing information technologies requires building ways for people to send information to whomever they want without publicly broadcasting that information and while preventing malicious third parties from intercepting what is being communicated. This is an age-old problem and is not unique to the digital age. How does one make sure that only those you intend to read your messages can actually read them? How do we prevent public transmission of information that is intended to be private?¹⁷

This is an issue of information security. Functionally, this is a question of **cryptograpy**. Broadly, cyber-security (in the innumerable ways that it manifests) is problematic and worrisome on two fronts. First and foremost, information technologies undergird an increasingly complex global system of interactions within and across traditional national borders. ICTs are the wiring of critical societal functions, and attacks on

that wiring can naturally lead to deleterious outcomes, from the trivial (i.e. stealing small amounts of money) to the extreme (i.e. subverting an element of a country's command-control infrastructure for nuclear weapons contingencies). Second, it is never going to be perfectly possible to design ICTs wherein the core function of systems can be assured. That function has to do with access to information. When different parts of the global information infrastructure talk to one another, they have to make sure that only those with authorization to see different information or use different features are able to do so. All security issues within the networked world, thus, can be boiled down to the issue dual of *authentication and authorization*. In essence, is someone who they say they are, and do they have the right to access what they're trying to access? These issues manifest at two levels—the mathematical and the functional (i.e. how we implement information security when designing technology).

This subsection deals with the former; the next deals with the latter, computer and network security. Chapter 4 then further discusses the historical context of information security challenges for states in greater depth and provides a framework via which it is possible to trace the development of computerized and networkized information systems for national security purposes over the course of the past century.

Traditionally, the general shape of the authentication problem with the digital world has been illustrated in game theories and mathematical proofs. One common game, for instance, involves a scenario wherein several generals and their armies have laid siege to a city.¹⁸ They cannot take the city except with the aid of the other two generals. In order to coordinate their attack effectively, they must send couriers to each other to relay relevant orders. However, they do not know if one or more counterparts are actually traitors. If one is, then the communication might be misleading. How can they ensure that their peers are telling the truth? How, in essence, can the generals ensure that their system is relatively **fault tolerant**—i.e. able to withstand the possible betrayal of incoming information and be best positioned to determine false intention? Here, there are two basic concerns. How can the privacy of information be ensured, and how can the receivers of information ensure that said information has not been altered?

Though such concerns are not unique to the digital age, they apply in a fundamental sense. In designing information systems, we must attempt to ensure a degree of fault tolerance. Mostly, we want to authenticate usage by authorized users in as secure a manner as possible. But how is this done? Broadly speaking, the basic idea is that we figure out how to scramble the contents of our information transmissions in such a way that only our affiliates and our intended recipients know how to unscramble them. If Jimmy wants to talk to Betsy without others knowing the content of their messages, they need only design a secret code that transforms the original message into gibberish and then—through application of the same code known to the recipient—translates that gibberish back into meaningful text. In this scenario, Jimmy and Betsy use an algorithm they have previously agreed upon to translate messages—called the **plaintext**—into gibberish—called the **ciphertext**—that only they can resolve.

The problem with this is twofold. First of all, the algorithm used to translate plaintext into ciphertext and back again must be robust. Human beings have a great many reasons to want to break the encryption of others' communications and are, eventually, quite clever. Even the most robust algorithms for encrypting information are usually mathematically imperfect. The reality is that a sufficiently powerful computer or the efforts of a human analyst in dissecting a given encryption approach might spell

doom for a particular given method of secure communications. Second, symmetrical encryption is problematic because it does not provide for a way to eject untrusted individuals from the pre-existing secure communications agreement. If Jimmy and Betsy decide they don't like Willie, then there is no realistic way of ejecting him from the system without entirely changing the system. Therefore, given the usual challenges of human relationships, symmetrical encryption approaches to securing information will enduringly fall apart as time goes by.

So, how might we design fault tolerant systems that ensure the transmission of information securely over time? The answer to this question can be found in answering the question outlined earlier of the generals trying to coordinate an attack. How might we answer the question: how can you be sure that a courier has not been intercepted or that a counterpart general is not a traitor? The answer to doing so does not rest with information protocols. Even if generals that receive messages from their peers request further instructions or commit to action based on a contingent event, the level of trust cannot exist such that a successful attack would be mounted. But what if the courier involved was a lifelong friend or family member? What if the courier spoke a secret codeword known only to a select few? Or what if the courier spoke at the same time as a corroborating message—perhaps a specially colored smoke—was sent from their general's camp as corroborating evidence? In short, the answer to a range of information security issues lies in the appropriate use of *both* public and private knowledge when designing effective information systems.

The simplest form of this solution to the basic issue of common knowledge of algorithms is called **symmetric encryption**. With symmetric encryption, all users of a system hold a **key** that allows them unique access to information sent from a specified other party. Much like how lots of people have the same design of lock on their front doors, or many banks utilize the same vault lock systems, algorithms are designed well and used for everyone (using a given service or system). However, a personalizable key is necessary to open messages that are sent to you from another person. In essence, you and another person have agreed upon a key that both can use to solve the algorithm for only your communications. The key will be different for your communication with others. This is one of the most common ways of encrypting information found in the world today. However, again, there are distinct problems. For one, the number of keys a single individual must hold—particularly if that individual is running a large company, for instance—can be immense. And though symmetric encryption allows one to exclude individuals from communications that have left an organization or are thought to be traitors (or what have you), their keys need to be destroyed at that point. If keys are willfully discarded and discovered by others, the whole encryption scheme falls apart.

But there must be further steps that, mathematically speaking, we might take to ensure information security, right? Of course! In general the rule of thumb on information security is that defenders and security designers have a massive advantage over potential malicious attackers in that they can mathematically stack the deck—from a probabilistic point of view—against someone being able to fool defenders or crack encryption in a reasonable amount of time. This is done by yet further employing private knowledge to act as a force multiplier to ensure that authentication is almost always possible and that privacy of information is ensured. Cryptographic solutions to information security challenges constitute a broad set of approaches to sharing information that involve different authentication mechanisms and one-way mathematical

functions—calculations that are easy to make one way, such as the multiplication of prime numbers, but not the other, such as the division of the result to equal the initial set—wherein detailed knowledge of the sender of information is required in order to authenticate incoming information.

These solutions take several different forms that can generally be thought of, again, as focused on authenticating access to information systems by authorized personnel and ensuring the actual privacy of information. In other words, some solutions just assure readers that the message they're reading is the exact same one sent to them from the known sender (i.e. not intercepted and altered). Others ensure the privacy of the content of data packets themselves.

One simple method of authenticating the contents of incoming information packets is for recipients to study a **message authentication code**. The notion behind these is simple. A mathematical function is used with the shared private key by individuals in the know, which produces a distinct code. When the message is received, the recipient simply uses his or her own version of the same key to compute the code and compare it with the incoming one to see if they match. If they do, the message has not been tampered with. This is a simple method of authenticating information, as intercepting parties should be unable to alter *both* a message and its code accurately without access to the secret key. **Hash functions** do a similar thing. A one-way mathematical formula is employed that produces a short, unique code in place of a much longer one. The formula cannot be reversed (i.e. the hash value of a couple dozen digits cannot be worked backwards into the original information) and is complex enough that the chances of two large pieces of data producing the same hash are zero, probabilistically speaking. Hash functions are massively useful, as they provide simple ways for users to translate information into verifiable (and short!) code pieces that would require the initial data to replicate. Interception is functionally improbable in the most extreme sense.

The general notion behind hash functions—i.e. that we can use mathematical functions that are easy to compute one way but really (really, really, really!) difficult to reverse—also serves to solve the problems with symmetric encryption outlined earlier. Using such functions, we have developed **asymmetric encryption** procedures. In essence, users still use common algorithms to protect their data but split the job of the key into two keys. Using these one-way mathematical functions, they create one key for encrypting messages and another for decrypting them. They publish the encryption message for the entire world to see, thus ensuring that anybody can send them encrypted information (a useful thing in a world beyond the imprecise scenario wherein only intra-organization encryption is desired). But only the recipient can unlock messages and, of course, there is no dissemination of the private key (i.e. no potential breaches from unscrupulous partners, etc.). This kind of encryption is also often called **public key encryption** and is remarkable similar in format to **digital signature encryption**. Whereas asymmetric functions used to ensure data privacy focus on exclusive access to private keys that can decrypt data, digital signature schemes only seek to ensure that authentication is possible. They are not about ensuring the actual privacy of information sent between parties. Thus, these schemes switch the role of the public and private keys. Information senders can encrypt messages using their private keys and provide a public key to everybody that can decrypt them. Information decryption is easy, but only the sender could possibly have encrypted the message to begin with (as only they have the private key and, thus, the ability to “sign” the message).

Finally and most simply, but perhaps most notably, one solution to information security issues is just to use incredibly long digit requirements when requiring different encryption standards. If passwords are extremely long, they are exponentially harder to crack with **brute force attacks** (i.e. computer-based attacks where an attacker simply tries every possible combination of letters and numbers until they get it right) than are short ones. Mathematically, this actually breaks down to an advantage for defenders based on extremely simple actions. Just one additional letter in a passcode (a key) multiplies the difficulties involved for attackers trying to guess the right one and force entry (aka the breaking of encryption). And this advantage in incremental steps with cryptography for defenders is actually suggestive of a broader dynamic reality in that the various techniques and approaches outlined in this section are rarely employed in a vacuum. Rather, designers of systems most often employ different protocols wherein users must employ different techniques in steps in order to authenticate, prove their authorization, and interact with information. This multi-technique protocol approach to information security stacks the deck against would-be attackers in powerful ways.

But if the deck can be stacked against attackers, why is information security such a pressing concern? Why do attackers still attack? In short, a big part of the answer is the same as it is at other levels of analysis—that the users and designers of information systems are human. In just 70 years, humans have become very capable of designing advanced computer systems (or computers that can help design newer computers). Moore's Law states that processing power potential will enduringly double roughly every 18 months.¹⁹ At that rate, computers will exist in some years time to whom today's basic key length protections will present a limited challenge. Whereas today it might take a computer thousands of years to brute force attack a robust 1,024-bit key, in 20 years it may only take a few days or hours. And particularly with quantum computing power in sight as a real possibility, prior encryption procedures may largely go by the wayside and have to be rethought given unprecedented access to processing power. In short, cryptography is about making information attacks probabilistically unfeasible. Out into the future, this means constant vigilance and new development as computers will inevitably manage to catch up to today's standards and make attacks far more feasible.

Beyond processing power considerations, information security is so pressing a concern because of the element of human usage of information systems. This manifests in two ways. First, in building protocols, we often resort to using less complex authentication and authorization schemes than we should in order to provide for a degree of practicality. Some of what has been described here constitutes processes that take some time—real-time minutes or hours. In applying these practices to the design of systems used by banks or militaries, designers must consider operational imperatives. Real-time delays might blunt the function of organizations or put what is considered to be an unreasonable demand on operators. Thus, a compromise will be instituted that makes things slightly less secure (but still pretty darn secure!) in exchange for enhanced time management abilities.

Second, it should be reasonably obvious to anybody reading this chapter that the topic of keys and algorithms can proxy for (and, indeed, is primarily intended to proxy for) the more specific topic of computer passwords and security systems. We discuss the latter—computer and network security systems—further later in this chapter. In thinking about keys as passwords, however, it has likely occurred to you (the reader) that key security is a major challenge. The most common passwords in the

world today remain “p@ssword,” “12345,” “guest,” and so on. Even with genuinely robust passwords, we as users are encouraged to use information in the construction of passcodes that will help us remember our credentials. Among even the best thought out passwords then, there is a pattern of human input that can be taken advantage of by attackers. Some kinds of brute force attacks, for instance, employ a hierarchical list of likely words based on a study of how people tend to construct passcodes. Others employ web resources to try to learn about potential victims and then use personalized information to break encryption more quickly. And personal information in the content of messages can allow attackers to circumvent encryption procedures as well. The famous case of the codebreakers at Bletchley Park deployed to crack Germany’s Enigma encryption scheme during World War II is a case in point on how a combination of minor design flaws and deft intelligence work can lead to defunct information security practice.²⁰

Implementing It All (or “The Security of Networked Computers”)

Though information security challenges are partially about prospective future computational capabilities, the primary problems we face stem from issues with implementation. Designing information systems of various kinds that are truly secure is a serious challenge. Partially, this is because of the ways in which humans use information systems. But there are other problems that should be addressed too.

This section addresses these “computer” security issues. The word computer is entered in quotation marks because the security of information systems from an implementation and design perspective does not fully pivot on the study of individual computers. Rather, the “computer” challenges that we care about exist and must be discussed in a layered fashion. There is the security of individual computers used by multiple individuals with different degrees of authorization. There is the security of computers vis-à-vis authenticating any of those users’ access credentials. There is the security of computers connected to network connections. And there is the security of networks themselves. There are distinct design issues that computer engineers and scientists have to grapple with at each layer. Here, we face similar issues as we do with cryptography insofar as the human element is often to blame for the general vulnerability of information systems. But with computer security, the technological solutions to information security issues themselves present as less probabilistically powerful than do the mathematical solutions to basic cryptographic problems. Computer security is fundamentally a function of man-made systems attempting to solve organizational problems. Thus, there are almost infinitely more avenues for malicious actors to forge paths.

But what is actually involved in computer security? In essence, computer security is about the implementation of information technology in such a way as to ensure three things—the **integrity** of information, the **confidentiality** of information, and the **availability** of information. Collectively, these three requirements are known as the **CIA Triad** and are the fundamental elements of **information assurance**, the practice of assessing and managing risks related to the threat of information attack.²¹ In reality, there are two other requirements that are less generally considered to be main pillars of information security in this vein—the **non-repudiation** and the **authenticity** of information.

Maintaining the integrity of information is a reasonably simple notion—it means that actions must be taken to ensure that unauthorized users do not alter information

stored in computer systems or transmitted between systems. Hand-in-hand with this, the information assurance requirement of confidentiality simply means that steps must be taken to ensure information privacy. That is, those without authorization must not be allowed access to information, period. This is actually simpler than integrity, as the point here is simply about access and not focused on alteration of information. Maintaining availability of information systems, the third leg of the information assurance triad, is where computer security turns to more purely functional considerations. Maintaining availability simply means that information systems need to continue to function as intended by designers and operators, regardless of malicious efforts to compromise information security. Finally, the two lesser-known requirements of information assurance are related to the ability of users to know that information is accurate *when it is being sent from one party to another*. Authenticity differs very subtly from integrity insofar as information should be able to be verified as sent by the specified recipient. Integrity, by contrast, is simply about keeping information—which is often stored and used but not sent—unaltered (at least by those without authorization). Non-repudiation is more broadly about standards for ensuring that authenticity can be universally acknowledged. In short, non-repudiation is the ability to validate the authenticity of communications between two users (or systems) in a public setting.

Box 2.3 Information assurance as a metaphor

In international and national security studies, thinking about systems—from political systems to conflict environments—as kinds of information systems isn't such a bad idea. The functionality of much of what is involved in the national security enterprise can be best understood by looking at the mechanisms of information transmission, information privacy, and the mitigation of uncertainty related to information inherent in a given system.

A good example is that of political systems, particularly democratic systems of governance and public participation. As we discuss in later chapters, the digital age has augured in new means and modes by which states are attempting to interfere with foreign political systems for strategic gain. Between at least 2013 and 2018, the Russian Federation was widely accused of using cyber means to enable broad-scoped subversive espionage campaigns against Western political systems in Europe and North America. The most prominent of these, interference in the U.S. presidential election campaign season in 2015–2016, included a broad range of cyber attacks alongside manipulation of new digital content systems (i.e. social media platforms and other online content distribution systems). Putting aside the objectives and effects of such a campaign (which are discussed in later sections), it is easy to see the intended effects of Russian efforts if we use information assurance as a metaphor for how the system—in this case, democratic systems of discourse and politics—work.

Simply put, we might analogize democracies as functioning through the existence of different mechanisms that modulate how information is treated when it is in the public domain (i.e. when facts are being reported, debated, and discussed among the public). Experts, legislators, free news media organizations,

and more all engage with information and present it to civil society in such a way that relatively prudent public policy decisions might emerge in voting and in representative governance. *Modern cyber-enabled interference campaigns aim to degrade the ability of those mechanisms to work properly so that democratic processes become less effective.*

What's the value of the information assurance metaphor here? Easy! By manipulating the content of the information environment by producing fake news and by maligning entrenched political interests via questionable sources, foreign influence campaigns aim to degrade faith in the **integrity** of available information by violating the **confidentiality** of private information and making **non-repudiation** extremely difficult. The goal, in short, is the manifestation of what is called **Byzantine faults** in the system. This term emerges from the problem of the generals (typically portrayed as the **Byzantine Generals' Problem**) trying to communicate with one another that appears throughout this chapter. Given that the generals don't know who might be a traitor, their system isn't just flawed—there is clear potential for faults to exist without their knowledge. With influence operations against democratic systems, this is the primary goal.

These aspects of security manifest across design and implementation considerations over every element of the apparatus of computer security, from the internal programming design of personal and specialized computers through the functionality of networks. In reality, each element of the information assurance triad (and the two additional elements) can be boiled down to access control or “how our technology can be set up to allow for different customizable types of access regulation.” At the level of the personal computer, the primary concern is in regulating access to information and the ability to alter information across different people using a computer. This was a major problem until the early 2000s when personal computers became so ubiquitous that expectations regarding usership of computers changed (i.e. it became far less common for multiple users to share a computer). Before that time, security models—of which the **Bell LaPadula model** is perhaps the most broadly known—were developed wherein integrity and confidentiality were maintained largely via a process of status-to-classification comparison. In other words, the level of permission that a user had (e.g. “Confidential” or “Top Secret” clearance) was compared to the classification of a document or process to determine whether or not that person could undertake a particular action *as different from another user*.

That said, these concerns have re-manifested in the decentralization of computer functions across network systems such that multiple users now commonly access parts of the same computer(s). The main challenge with internal computer security from a software design perspective is in keeping the core security programming of a computer simple. With operating systems, the **kernel** is the main section of hardware, firmware, and software that is both trusted and considered to be vital to system function. The challenge for computer engineers is in preventing the kernel from becoming too expansive, as only by keeping the kernel tight can the possibility for manipulation of user access privileges be realized.

Then, there is the problem of authenticating user efforts to access individual computers (or distributed computers). This is different from essential computer security issues because there doesn't exist an assumption that at least some degree of authentic access is allowed to users. Rather, the concern is that malicious actors might try to access a computer without the proper authorization to do so. Naturally, the main question here is: how might we ensure that access allowed is access authorized ahead of time? The answer lies with information security and the key that authorized users are given. In other words, it lies with passwords or equivalent entry credentials. As described earlier, the challenge with designing systems to be secure at this level is simply one of determining how to prompt the construction of better keys. Most systems require users to adhere to certain rules when doing so, such as having a certain number of characters or a certain diversity of characters (i.e. at least two numbers and a non-alphanumeric symbol). Many more additionally take security steps to prevent unauthorized access, such as locking down after a certain number of unsuccessful attempts. And yet other systems employ passcodes that are of a different nature than simple alphanumeric sequences. Biometric systems—wherein a person's fingerprint or retinal information, for instance, are the passwords—are increasingly common in mobile computing product development and in private industry. The problem with all of these, of course, is that they rely on human input and are relatively simple to fool for the dedicated attacker.

Moving beyond the internal function and design of computer systems, we quickly run into issues of computer security in the digital age. Issues of access control on specific computers have been grappled with for more than half a century. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, however, designers and engineers increasingly had to adapt security procedures to deal with the threat of network-based attacks. Specifically, they had to adapt their work to deal with the threat of malicious software, or **malware**, which was designed and prepackaged to disrupt the normal function of computer systems.

Understanding malware is relatively simple insofar as we might think about malware as several categories of techniques developed to subvert access controls and violate the requirements of information assurance in several ways. Broadly, malware includes **viruses**, **worms**, **Trojan horses**, and a host of other related code applications for achieving malicious effects that are less easy to categorize. Of these, worms are perhaps the simplest to understand. Though they can be designed to employ sophisticated break-in techniques, worms are essentially pieces of code that first break into a computer and then use any available connections to try to spread to other computers. If successful, the worm clones itself and is replicated across a network of computers, disrupting functioning. By contrast with worms, which do not necessarily hide their actions, viruses are pieces of malicious code that co-opt whatever system they enter and attempt to spread their influence to achieve a pre-set outcome. Viruses can work in a number of different ways but typically either target specific programs or subvert systems via direct interaction with a computer's underlying programming language. Trojan horses are pieces of software that are either designed to be or are introduced as a malicious element of otherwise seemingly benign computer programming. As was true with their namesake, Trojans are highly seditious and virulent tools for stealthily entering a system and subverting access controls to enable malicious actions.

Box 2.4 Viruses, worms, Trojan horses. . . what do they do really?

Though the technical design of given malware instances can be highly complex, it is relatively easy to understand the function and general workings of malicious programs designed to achieve harmful effects in computer systems. Functionally, we might think of malware as being employable for two purposes. Some malware is designed with delivery in mind and some is focused on achieving a malicious effect. In any malware attack, some malicious code is wrapped up in a delivery mechanism of some kind. The “wrapper” is designed to elude security measures in networked computers so that the **payload** can be delivered.

It is reasonably commonplace to label all malware as computer viruses. In reality, viruses are malware which, much like their biological equivalents, spread from computer to computer in reference to some condition. Where a biological virus might spread between people off the back of poor hygiene practices or through accidental exposure to the bodily fluids of an infected person, computer viruses spread off the back of users’ actions (such as the sending of an email). What a virus does is not determined by its ability to infect different computers, but rather by what the payload it is carrying is designed to do. Indeed, viruses are such a ubiquitous threat to computer users and network operators because they are merely the courier for a potential universe of malicious code.

Worms and Trojan horses are, similarly, mechanisms for delivery malware with a more specific purpose. Worms are a subset of viruses that are often held apart because they do not require human action to spread. Worms are more virulent and purposeful (but also often more detectable) than viruses because they are capable of self-propagation. Trojan horses, by contrast, are simply pieces of delivery software aimed at entering computers not through subterfuge, but by misdirection. Much in the way the original Trojan Horse enabled Greek soldiers to enter Troy via trickery, Trojan horse programs are designed so as to convince victims that they are legitimate. Then, after a user downloads the seemingly legitimate program, the payload is released.

Generally, computer viruses employed by a dedicated attacker are difficult to combat. Viruses are designed to mimic the biological process of adaptation and mutation over time. Specifically, computer viruses are designed to **self-modify** in order to fool anti-virus software, which most often works by simply scanning files for evidence of known malware signatures. In the simplest sense, viruses are able to rewrite themselves by simply jumbling and reordering the subroutines that constitute the code determining their movement. More pressingly, more complicated instances are able to employ cryptographic techniques in order to evade detection. Encrypting the **payload** malware hidden within the virus delivery mechanism is a common counter to anti-virus defenses that involves the program transforming the payload code into ciphertext to be decrypted just prior to delivery. The trick here is that the *decryption module* must inevitably remain outside the encrypted section of the software. Anti-virus programs look

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for such tools, though sophisticated viruses contain **polymorphic** capabilities that allow them to rewrite the code of the decryption module for each new computer. In rarer instance (particularly rare because this swells the size of the file in question), viruses are sometimes given **metamorphic** capabilities that allow the program to entirely rewrite itself with each new computer. The result is a program that achieves the same effect over time but never contains the exact same code sequences.

And finally, information assurance issues exist in questions of network security. Network security is different from computer security insofar as this is the first place where our discussion of digital security intersects with the earlier discussion of the shape of the Internet. Here, security concerns are largely about the security of packets of data that enter a given network. Ensuring the integrity of those packets is critical for the task of ensuring that no malicious behavior takes place within a network. And the threats of packets are significant. Common attacker stratagems include the use of **packet sniffers** to read the content of packets being sent to a given network (so as to extract password information or modify contents to redirect traffic to a malicious web address, an action called **IP spoofing**).

At the same time, network security involves maintaining the functionality of the network itself, often in the face of persistent opposition. **Denial of service** attacks are commonly employed to disrupt the function of networks and, thus, the operations of computers within those networks. Denial of service attacks take a range of formats but, in essence, the point is to take up so much bandwidth that a network server is unable to continue legitimate operations. One common type of such attacks (called a **SYN flood**) takes advantage of the handshake protocol described earlier in this chapter to do this. A handshake is extended and the network server puts aside a small amount of runtime (memory) in order to handle the new incoming request. But the victim's acknowledgement is never acknowledged. After enough of these requests, the victim runs low on memory and has to stop legitimate operations to handle what has become a massive and seemingly unending volume of incoming traffic.

Distributed denial of service attacks do pretty much the same thing, though the method of disrupting legitimate network operations is incoming traffic from a large host of malicious computers. These computers are often themselves compromised by malicious actors (often without the knowledge of the user) and directed against a specific network target. Those compromised computers are called **zombie computers**.

Network security is a tricky beast. Defensive technological principles emphasize two sets of activities: manning the perimeter and monitoring traffic within networks to try and spot odd activities. The next few chapters deal with computer network exploitation/attack (CNE/CNA) and defense (CND) in more detail. But it's important to note here that network security is as inherently challenging as are other elements of computer security and for similar reasons. The networked world is complex, and there exist a plethora of connections in computer-based human activities that constantly offer avenues for the violation of information assurance principles—for information theft, modification, and more. In truth, computer defense and network

defense are not doomed tasks, of course; the defender has a broad range of tools available to them that makes the job of potential hackers extremely difficult. Again, these are discussed over the next few chapters. But where the mathematical realities of information security favor the defender in a probabilistic sense, the realities of computer security (broadly writ) are a more balanced affair. Technology design is simply not refined to such a degree that malicious action is either unthinkable or unfeasible.

What's vulnerable in the information age?

So what is actually vulnerable in the information age? The previous sections of this chapter have highlighted a number of different issues with the construction and function of the digital world. Most of these can be boiled down to the human factor. More specifically, most of these can be boiled down to two human-derived facts. First, humans create and implement information technologies. As such, there are inherent insecurities in the imperfect designs we promote. Refinement occurs but is often outpaced by innovative advancement in the construction of better technology. Thus, at the same time, humans are providing both the flaws in information systems and, despite positive developments in achieved in parallel, the mechanisms for taking advantage of them. Second, humans have to use information technologies. As creatures of pattern and habit, we favor interactions with technology that balance convenience with security. Thus, we inevitably use bad passwords and systematically endorse the use of methods that fall short of ideal security efficiency.

This said, it is not accurate enough to blame all that is vulnerable about the digital world on humans. Rather, as a number of scholars have in their treatments of cyber-security issues, it would be more accurate to split the digital world up into layers.²² Specifically, discussion of cyber-security as it intersects with traditional topics of international security—from interstate conflict and the function of military-intelligence apparatuses to the use of ICT by non-state actors—is arguably best served by generalizing on the content outlined so far in this chapter and identifying the broad contours of the cyber threat ecosystem.

Scholars and practitioners operating at the intersection of cyber-security issues and national security processes tend to break up cyberspace into four layers. They do so with an eye to describing the distinct threat modalities faced by actors from the full range of foreign threats. The first of these is the **physical layer** of the networked world. The physical layer is constituted of the real-kinetic components of the Internet and other network infrastructure. More specifically, this layer is constituted of fiber optic cables, microwave receivers, physical computers (i.e. personal computers, servers, etc.), and other kinds of connecting wiring. Of particular significance in this layer are the submarine cables that crisscross the world's oceans and carry data packets from one side of the globe to the other with almost no delay. These cables are particularly important considerations for national security planners because destruction of a relatively small number could significantly hamper Internet functionality (and, thus, the functionality of economic sectors). Submarine cables could be mined or attacked by naval vessels in the event of war. Perhaps more worryingly, these cables are vulnerable at their "landing zones" where they come on shore. Many such points of transition between sea and land are insecure and, though meaningful disruption would require large-scale attacks on numerous landing points, would make easy targets for a dedicated non-state attacker.

The second layer of cyberspace is the **logical layer**. The logical layer is constituted of those systems and procedures that dictate how packets are sent from one part of the networked world to others. As outlined earlier, this principally includes the Domain Name System and various protocols that are critical to expected functionality of the web for everyday citizens of planet Earth. However, the logical layer also includes tools used—both legitimately and illicitly—by denizens of the digital world to access networks in a specialized fashion. Browsers like The Onion Router (TOR) that are designed to allow access to secure sites and to anonymous web traffic to a degree are used by people the world over to securely (and, admittedly, often criminally) interact with others. TOR is actually the result of DoD funding,²³ but other similar tools are the work of non-state actors and private companies around the world. Dynaweb is an example of one such non-government-developed product that constitutes an important part of the logical layer for dissident non-state actors around the world.²⁴ Developed by exiled members of Falun Gong, an outlawed spiritual exercise group in China, Dynaweb allows individuals in repressive digital environments to circumvent state controls and access the global Internet more freely than would otherwise be the case. Both TOR and Dynaweb are tools that enable certain kinds of specialized socio-political activities and, as such, stand as strong examples of vulnerable elements of the logical layer of cyberspace.

The **information layer** of cyberspace constitutes the actual content of the digital world, from the languages underwriting systems' designs to the text, imagery, and multimedia content of different databases. We might break this layer down further into two sub-layers of the networked world—the *syntactic layer* and the *semantic layer*. The syntactic layer is constituted of the informational design components of information systems and, as such, might also be said to contain elements of the logical layer. The semantic layer, in contrast, is entirely constituted of the above said content that computers are built to accommodate and make secure. This description of the information layer is brief, largely because of the attention paid to security implementation earlier and because of the attention given to the topic of computer network attack and defense in chapters to come.

The final layer of cyberspace is the **user layer**. Naturally, this layer is not technologically constituted. But if cyber-security is the security of socio-technical systems emerging from or affected by the information revolution, then any map of cyberspace must necessarily include the primary category of socio-political inputs to the other layers. That category is defined by human approaches to using computer systems. Much of what security researchers and practitioners are concerned about at this layer falls under the moniker of **cyber hygiene**, or those actions taken by individual users to maintain a healthy position with regards to computer usage (i.e. to maintain effective security habits). From the perspective of the attacker, the most viable approach to intrusion is most often through the user layer. **Social engineering** occurs when attackers attempt to trick users into surrendering credentials (i.e. passwords and usernames, etc.) or valuable information that might make the job of forced entry into digital systems easier (for instance, information commonly incorporated into passwords such as birthday information, the name of a pet, family names, or a home address). Social engineering can occur in a range of formats, but by far the most common techniques include **phishing**, **spearphishing**, and **waterholing**. Phishing involves the large-scale distribution of false messages in an effort to have victims follow a link to a malicious website (or to download a piece of malware). After a link is clicked, users invariably

are asked to offer personal information or are unwittingly made to authorize access privileges for some downloaded malware. Spearphishing differs from phishing only insofar as messages are more intensively customized and sent to a few targets (as opposed to a massive number). Waterholing, by contrast, flips the phishing scenario by placing malware or tricks for naive users on commonly frequented websites. In doing so, attackers are “staking out the watering hole” in the same way that predators might do in the wild.

Box 2.5 What is cyberspace?

Given what we know about the design and function of the networked world, what exactly is cyberspace? To some degree, this is an unfair question. There is no consensus position on what cyberspace actually is, nor any agreed-upon standard of judgment for settling any debate on the subject. Some regard cyberspace as a technical system of interconnected computers; others think about the thing metaphorically as a medium in which human interactions occur in non-physical ways.

The first question on the nature of cyberspace that many ask is quite simple: “Is cyberspace the same thing as the Internet?” Here, there *is* some consensus that the Internet *cannot* be synonymous with cyberspace for a couple of reasons.

The Internet is constituted of the physical and logical layers of cyberspace. In essence, the Internet is a transit system for digital communications that has a clear underlying infrastructure and, in the logical elements that enable information transmission, a well-defined functional design. But does the Internet include the information and user layers of cyberspace? Though it is harder to tease apart from the vision of the Internet that most people hold in their minds, the information layer is not specifically linked to the function of the networked world. Prior to the ARPANET, information was stored in computers around the world in much the same way that it is today—it just wasn’t accessible for anyone without physical access to a given computer. Indeed, it was the digitization of information and of control systems in computers that prompted many to support the development of network features within the DoD community. So while the information layer is intrinsically linked to the Internet, it preceded and clearly exists separately from it. The same might be said of the user layer. Again, it is hard to tease apart the people that use the Internet, given that the Internet is designed to accommodate broad-scoped human interactions. But users are not, in their utilization of networked computer systems, a critical element of how the Internet functions. Thus, the user layer of cyberspace is not intrinsically a part of the Internet.

So what is cyberspace? It is worth thinking about this in terms of how national defense establishments have conceptualized the thing. In the United States, specifically, the DoD has regularly described cyberspace as the **fifth domain of warfare**. This means that, alongside land, sea, air, and space, the U.S. service branches consider cyberspace a unique domain in which security operations can occur.

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From this point of view, cyberspace clearly includes more than just what functionally constitutes the Internet. After all, the target of offensive cyber attacks is often information stored on servers, internal computer processes that control an industrial system, or the ability of malicious hackers to act online. While cyber attacks do principally involve manipulation of the logical design of information and network systems, the scope of security operations inevitably includes things not defined by how networks work (i.e. computer-stored information and the ability of users to engage others online). Thus, while it is certainly possible to debate where cyberspace ends and other domains start, it is obviously the case that cyberspace is bounded most specifically by the way in which networked ICT cedes humans the ability to engage one another in a manner categorically divorced from how humans interact in other domains. It is defined by human usage of networked computer systems and so includes the infrastructure of the Internet, the underlying design characteristics of information systems, information contained within those systems, and human agency reflected in those systems.

Of interest, the DoD, which envisions cyberspace as being constituted of layers in this fashion, does not specify the user layer in its definition of the domain. Nevertheless, any survey of the basic principles of information and computer security—like the brief sections presented in this chapter—demonstrates clearly that the human factor is the most significant determinant of variable risks and of threat profiles in the cyber world. Humans not only have to design and implement information security requirements; we are also the primary users and manipulators of the information systems constructed in the world to date.

Beyond design: network externalities as an underlying source of insecurity

This chapter has placed significant emphasis on the role that humans play in being responsible for enduring insecurities in the design of computer systems and the function of the networked world. An important theme in chapters to come, however, is that human agency in the design and use of information technologies extends beyond static instances. That is to say that humans do not simply design individual systems and use them in a vacuum. In reality, it is the context of human development and deployment of new information technologies that arguably has the most to say about the nature of enduring vulnerabilities in digital affairs.

Much of what we are saying in previewing this theme has to do with network externalities. An externality is simply a consequence or a side effect of the activities of human inventions, social and cultural practices, and institutions. With cyberspace, the context of the Internet's development and subsequent global adoption matters a great deal. For reasons discussed in Chapter 4, much of the early development of computers and the subsequent employment of cyber instruments for national security purposes was concentrated within the U.S. and UK intelligence communities. As Chapters 3 and 10 both discuss in part, the rise of industries based on the Internet

in the e-commerce/dotcom boom era prevented the widespread adoption of robust security management practices and, to this day, incentivize mediocrity in solutions to broad-scoped cyber-security problems.

From bytes to fights

The next chapters in this book deal with topics in computer network attack and defense in greater detail, before moving on to deal with substantive issues of theory, policy, and the empirics of cyber topics in international affairs. In particular, chapters to come pay particular attention to the notion of the **advanced persistent threat** (APT). APTs are often construed as particularly virulent pieces of malware or specific country threat groups (i.e. foreign intelligence agencies or military units), but the label really just signifies sophistication in design of malicious actions taken in cyberspace. Specifically, an APT is an attempt by a dedicated attacker to breach information systems beyond what we might think of as normal hacking activities. APTs are worthy of note as a final point here because it should be noted that many threats manifest across every layer of cyberspace. Indeed, the layers of cyberspace outlined earlier are cognitive aids and are not truly separate. Insofar as the construction of computer systems automatically involves the simultaneous development of informational, logical, and user-focused platforms, truly sophisticated cyber attacks will threaten each layer in service of a particular objective. Thus, the next chapters, in focusing on specific offensive and defensive topics in cyber-security, look at the flip side of the information security coin and assess the socio-technical shape of security threats rather than (as has been the case here) the technological basis of insecurity. From there, this volume aims to introduce a broad range of topics related to cyber conflict between countries, the use of ICT by non-state actors, the history of national cyber-security experiences around the world, and the shape of governance of the digital domain at the highest level.

Notes

- 1 For perhaps the best use of this metaphor to describe critical infrastructure, see Hunker, Jeffrey. "Policy Challenges in Building Dependability in Global Infrastructures." *Computers & Security*, Vol. 21, No. 8 (2002), 705–711.
- 2 See Leiner, Barry M., Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts, and Stephen Wolff. "A Brief History of the Internet." *ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review*, Vol. 39, No. 5 (2009), 22–31; and Leiner, Barry M., Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Lawrence G. Roberts, and Stephen S. Wolff. "The Past and Future History of the Internet." *Communications of the ACM*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (1997), 102–108.
- 3 Salus, Peter H., and G. Vinton. *Casting the Net: From ARPANET to Internet and Beyond*. . . Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc., 1995.
- 4 Though it is generally held to be apocryphal that military concerns about computers as targets that were uniquely vulnerable within the nuclear deterrence complex led to the funding of ARPANET, it is certainly the case that a number of military reports through the 1950s and 1960s consistently cautioned against overreliance on static, centralized computer control systems to regulate key military functions.
- 5 Perhaps described best, initially, in Cerf, Vinton, and Robert Kahn. "A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication." *IEEE Transactions on Communications*, Vol. 22, No. 5 (1974), 637–648.

- 6 Also see early descriptions in Cerf, Vinton, and Bernard Aboba. "How the Internet Came to Be." *The On-line User's Encyclopedia: Bulletin Boards and Beyond*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley (1993); and Cerf, Vinton G., and Edward Cain. "The DoD Internet Architecture Model." *Computer Networks* (1976), Vol. 7, No. 5 (1983), 307–318.
- 7 Cerf and Kahn. "A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication." 1974.
- 8 Braden, Robert, Ted Faber, and Mark Handley. "From Protocol Stack to Protocol Heap: Role-Based Architecture." *ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2003), 17–22.
- 9 Berners-Lee, Tim, Roy Fielding, and Henrik Frystyk. *Hypertext Transfer Protocol—HTTP/1.0*. No. RFC 1945. 1996.
- 10 See Mockapetris, Paul, and Kevin J. Dunlap. "Development of the Domain Name System." Vol. 18, No. 4. ACM, 1988.
- 11 For one of the best narrative descriptions of the "terrain" of the Internet, see Blum, Andrew. *Tubes: A Journey to the Center of the Internet*. New York: Ecco, 2012.
- 12 For perhaps the best historical narrative treatment of the development of the Internet and its lack of security features, see Kaplan, Fred. *Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016. Also see Ware, Willis H. "Security and Privacy in Computer Systems." In *Proceedings of the April 18–20, 1967, Spring Joint Computer Conference*, pp. 279–282. ACM, 1967.
- 13 See Mockapetris and Dunlap. "Development of the Domain Name System." 1988.
- 14 See Hill, Jonah Force. "A Balkanized Internet? The Uncertain Future of Global Internet Standards." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* (2012), 49–58; and Healey, Jason. "The Five Futures of Cyber Conflict and Cooperation." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* (2011), 110–117.
- 15 For more on cloud computing, see Armbrust, Michael, Armando Fox, Rean Griffith et al. "A View of Cloud Computing." *Communications of the ACM*, Vol. 53, No. 4 (2010), 50–58; Mell, Peter, and Tim Grance. "The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing." (2011); and Armbrust, Michael, Armando Fox, Rean Griffith et al. "Above the Clouds: A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing." Vol. 4. Technical Report UCB/EECS-2009–28, EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley, 2009.
- 16 Though we discuss the subject in some detail in later chapters, for more on Internet governance see Mueller, Milton L. *Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010; DeNardis, Laura. *The Global War for Internet Governance*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014; and Kahler, Miles, ed. *Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015.
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- 18 Lamport, Leslie, Robert Shostak, and Marshall Pease. "The Byzantine Generals Problem." *ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1982), 382–401.
- 19 Schaller, Robert R. "Moore's Law: Past, Present and Future." *IEEE Spectrum*, Vol. 34, No. 6 (1997), 52–59.
- 20 This is a primary point of discussion in Chapter 4.
- 21 See Perrin, Chad. "The CIA Triad." www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/the-cia-triad/488 (2008).
- 22 A tact taken variously in, *inter alia*, Choucri, Nazli, and David D. Clark. "Integrating Cyberspace and International Relations: The Co-Evolution Dilemma." (2012); Clark, David. "Characterizing Cyberspace: Past, Present and Future." *MIT CSAIL, Version 1* (2010): 2016–2028; and Russell, Alison Lawlor. "Strategic Anti-Access/Area Denial in Cyberspace." In *Cyber Conflict: Architectures in Cyberspace (CyCon)*, 2015 7th International Conference. IEEE, 2015, 153–168.
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3 Cyberspace and international relations

Cyberspace is a fact of daily life in the twenty-first century. It is the unusual political episode or diplomatic incident that occurs without feeling the modifying influence of the digital world. Cyberspace affects the real-kinetic dynamics of everyday global society at almost every level—virtual networks aid in the spread of information about a particular issue, while different computer systems serve as a direct path between the functions of different national or subnational institutions—and, in doing so, has a very real impact on policy, politics, and security.

It seems reasonable to say that cyberspace is the most significant emergent issue for the **international relations** (IR) field in the new century. This is largely because new information and communications technologies (ICTs) broadly and *systematically* affect the contours of human interactions and institutions. If cyber-security is the security of socio-technical systems pertaining to the information technology revolution and ICTs have had an impact on almost every function of human societies, then cyber issues are roughly synonymous with the full gamut of topics in IR.

More specifically put, the digitization of global infrastructure has changed the ways in which information is accessed, controlled, and transmitted across every type of interaction—economic, social, and security. Traditional political phenomena are increasingly influenced or changed entirely by the nature of cyberspace’s “special” characteristics. Inter-state security calculations, for instance, must cope with distinct asymmetries of capability and knowledge in a world where networked computer systems underwrite most societal functions and where attribution is difficult. Moreover, the rise of digital technologies has laterally produced changes in the content of international society. Large populations of global constituents systematically access and utilize new means of communicating with each other. And information, due to the rise of social media and related platforms, is presented across borders in meaningful (and potentially vulnerable!) new ways. These dynamics, and the institutions that are emerging from different national and international efforts to adapt, constitute new challenges of empirical understanding for scholars and students of both IR and public policy.

In this chapter, we consider the importance of cyberspace and cyber-security for the IR field. In particular, we attempt to place the rise of cyberspace in an appropriate context as a systematic development that continues to impact upon the dynamics of world politics in a myriad of ways. First, we describe the historical circumstances surrounding the rise of cyberspace and the current state of cyber affairs. Then, we ask why cyberspace matters for international security and IR theory. What are current debates? And what challenges—both empirically and epistemologically—do scholars

face with future efforts to describe the cyber-infused world? We then conclude by describing IR's main paradigms and discussing their applicability to today's digitally augmented world.

The rise of a global cyber ecosystem

Advances in ICTs have defined major shifts in sociopolitical and economic affairs in the modern international system for centuries. From the telegraph to space technologies, new ICTs have consistently been the cause of changes in the setup of economic and political systems that ultimately impact upon the power of states, the shape of industries, and more. Digital technologies are no different. Indeed, the rise of cyberspace arguably constitutes the most significant set of changes to the contours of IR and the core function of global processes ever. The digitization of infrastructure has, since the late 1980s, involved complete transformations in the way individuals interact with society writ large, in the way that society itself cultivates and treats major issues, and in the way that institutions and authorities comport themselves on issues of diplomacy, business, and security.

This section describes the history and trajectories of advances in information technologies and the rise of cyberspace. It then describes the shape of the system—an international system with cyber characteristics—that we see today, including the institutional and technical architecture of computer networks and the political capital behind it.

The rise of cyberspace in world politics: history and circumstances

How have information technologies come to impact the processes of world politics in fundamental ways? What has been the trajectory of cyber developments and how have political entities—from governments to social institutions and international organizations—considered them over time? The phrasing of these questions is somewhat misleading. Pundits, analysts, and scholars alike tend to think of the “cyber phenomenon” as a cohesive set of developments that have gradually become a major set of issues for global society, when in reality there is significant disconnect between IR's focus on “cyber” and the broad-scoped impacts of information technologies on the contours of world politics.

The Internet—and, as a result, cyberspace—has been around since the 1960s.¹ As the last chapter describes, the first networked computer systems emerged in the 1960s and 1970s from the research and innovation of a series of U.S. government programs, notably the predecessor of the modern Internet—called **ARPANET**—designed by the U.S. **Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)** in the late 1960s. The development of the ARPANET has its roots in several spheres of national security, notably the postwar expansion of the UK and U.S. intelligence communities and the subsequent computerization of key defense establishment functions through the 1950s and 1960s. These are described in greater detail in Chapter 4.

Despite the fact that the Internet and its direct predecessors have been around since the 1960s, it would be entirely unreasonable to assume that cyberspace has had a concentrated and regular impact on all aspects of world politics over that period of time. In reality, it would be far more accurate to say that different theaters of international affairs have experienced distinct and relatively unique periods in

which information technologies have both changed the fundamental functionality of a given set of processes and prompted a range of geopolitical responses. Three sets of such developments—and the sociopolitical events that accompanied them—bear particular mention.

In the realm of national and international security, the story of information technology adoption and integration has, broadly speaking, been one of punctuated political equilibrium. For intelligence agencies, militaries, and other cogs in the traditional apparatuses of state security, ICT adoption through the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s generally took place in much the same fashion as it might have for private industry. New technology was adopted as it became cost efficient or particularly effective. Except for where institutional tribalism stymied progress, better security mechanisms were constructed and implemented as threats—technological and sociopolitical—became apparent.

Despite this general condition, however, the modern apparatuses of state cybersecurity functions have tended to emerge from the unique ways in which different countries have been forced to deal with incipient cyber challenges. In summarizing the history of such institution-building in the United States, Healey (2013) points out that the national experience with cyberspace as a national security concern has largely been shaped by “realization episodes,” in which government at the highest level has been forced to address cyber-security as a result of a specific threat. This kind of reactionary pivot to cyber policy inevitably disrupts the organic adaptation of elements of national security apparatuses to new challenges and opportunities, and forces the formation of unique policy regimes and perspectives. Chapters 4 and 10 both expand upon this in their description of different national experiences with computers and new network technologies.

By contrast with the tumultuous history of orientation towards cyberspace in the national security setting, the story of information technology adoption in global economic terms has been relatively smooth. Quite apart from the reactionary fits and starts that have characterized the emergence of focus on cyber in other areas, the integration of ICT to economic ventures of all stripes has occurred regularly and in a more deterministic fashion than has been the case with national security institutions since the 1980s. Internet-based services and technologies have revolutionized not only technical aspects of global society—such as the tools of information access and transfer available to consumers the world across—but have also made for remarkable economic transformations at the national and regional levels.

Network technologies have enabled countries like India, China, Brazil, and many others to expand massive industrial sectors in support of information externalities—i.e. to e-commercialize broad sectors of national industry in order to meet rising consumer demand for Internet-based products and services. Likewise, network-based information technologies have lowered the barriers to development and welfare for countries and individuals around the world, as education, medical services, and more have increasingly cultivated viable online characteristics. Today, policy that addresses cyberspace in terms of the massive economic impact that information technologies have had on global society includes focus on necessary adaptations to international law and interstate treaties, the distribution of economic assets in line with technological advances, and the evolution of issues related to ICT’s impact on the world economy, including immigration.

And beyond the realms of national security and global economics, we might broadly consider the shape of information technology adoption in terms of global

society itself. Global economics and international security dynamics are highly relevant elements of any conversation about the shape of global society, of course. But there *have* been unique events and distinct effects on the social and cultural dynamics of world politics beyond those that emerge from economics and information security.

The development of the Internet has essentially transformed global social processes at two distinct points. First, the emergence of a public facing set of information access and dissemination tools in the 1990s revolutionized not only industrial or government functions but also the dynamics of distinct social phenomena. As one prominent literature in political science points out, Internet technologies in the 1990s and 2000s became “liberation” tools for social movements of all stripes around the world. Protest, revolution, and citizen advocacy have taken on new forms in the digital age by enhancing the ability of civil society to coordinate and visibly apply political pressure. Information technologies have also affected the way that information is presented and social processes—including political participation—take place in response. The Internet age has seen the intensification of media effects on populations, such that the specific contours of media information reporting and “spin” have a direct impact, in various ways, on the preferences and behaviors of citizenry.

On top of this, second, the recent emergence and proliferation of social media platforms around the world has continued to transform social processes in meaningful ways. Social and political communities are increasingly taking on virtual characteristics. This is significant for two reasons. First, virtual society is dramatically different from pre-digital society in a number of respects, including that there is greater mobility of social interests, fewer barriers to information sensationalism, and a more diverse range of sources for sociopolitical learning. Second, not all social development in the Internet age has happened uniformly. The experience of virtualization of society differs greatly across countries, with unique local conditions—including government regulation, prevailing social conditions, and enduring political dynamics—setting the scene for social adaptation to life in the digital era.

“Cyber” means different things across vastly different aspects of world politics. Information technologies have had unique effects on different political, economic, social, and security processes in the global system such that understanding policy and issues related to “cyber” anything means comprehension of a tangled web of disparate but interlocking topics. This reality is no less the case for security researchers just because security at some level is the focus of our interests. As parts of this chapter and much of the content of later chapters show, understanding the contours of strategic calculations in digital affairs or the dynamics of international cooperation on cyber-security involves knowledge of how information technologies tie together issues related to—among other things—international law, human and civil liberties, military effectiveness, and parochial politics.

The political architecture of cyberspace

Though discussed elsewhere in this book (partially in Chapter 2 and more fully in Chapter 10), the question of who runs the digital world is particularly relevant to any consideration of cyber-security as world politics. In particular, understanding who runs the digital world is important for trying to understand what rules of the road—informal or formal—exist with regards to the regulation and governance of cyberspace, as well as what rules might exist in the future. Where does the political

capital lie across cyber issues, and how does this setup relate to the organizational and strategic dynamics of world politics more broadly?

In truth, the management of cyberspace relies on a great number of institutions. Some of these institutions have been established specifically to govern aspects of the digital world, while others are either old or new parts of the regulatory apparatuses of different authorities in world politics—state and local governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.² Though the latter category of institutions tend to have purview beyond just matters of cyberspace governance—i.e. they are concerned with the digital aspects of issues that go beyond cyberspace, such as human rights, civil liberties, human security, social activism, and so on—all of these weigh in on some subset of the same group of cyber management issues, including the development and management of infrastructure, the function of computer systems, and the services linked to cyberspace.

As suggested in the last chapter, governance of the Internet largely has to do with the regulation and coordination of the logical elements of the innumerable network components that make up the global Internet apparatus. The key difference between network ICT and previous telecommunications technologies (like the telephone or telegraph) lies in how information is transmitted between end nodes. With older technologies, information was sent through a set circuit (i.e. one device location was physically connected to another for the purpose of exchanging information). With digital technologies, information is sent in packets across a network of nodes. Data packets contain pieces of information and address headers that contain information about the intended recipient of communications. The path of packets across the Internet is determined sequentially by different computers that receive data packets, read the address headers and then forward information down what is understood to be the most efficient route. As such, determination of responsibilities for registration of different network addresses and standards for best practices (for development of new technologies, etc.) is the main function of most Internet governance entities.

At present, governance of cyberspace and the functions related to it in the international system take the form of what is called a **multi-stakeholder model**. This model is described further later, but essentially describes a reality in which various actors, *not just states*, have a say or role in how the domain is governed. This setup, to which there is some opposition—and which, again, will be described further later—has emerged from the circumstances of cyberspace's early development in the United States. In essence, the U.S. government's early institution of a private nongovernmental entity—called the **Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers** (ICANN)—to regulate the Internet's Domain Name System (DNS) set the stage for massive private actor authority over the core functions of public-facing computer networks. Alongside a variety of affiliated organizations, the ICANN—which was “internationalized” in 2016 to allow for more representation of interests by foreign states and interested organizations—remains today as the main functional agent for network maintenance and regulation in world politics.

More broadly, a range of different entities and interested parties are driving the global agenda on the governance of cyberspace. Foremost among these are the actions of non-profit organizations that adjudicate and advise on standards for network technology implementation and adaptation. The **Internet Engineering Task Force** (IETF) has self-awarded purview (by consensus among the world's engineers and scientists) over the function of protocols for network technologies. The IETF, in essence, takes

upon itself to request feedback from relevant parties around the world and then works to adapt existing standards to keep up with advancing technical realities. By contrast with the IETF's focus on developing awareness of different issues through consensus and community operations, the **Internet Society** (ISOC) actually oversees technical standards in a more direct way. In particular, the **Internet Engineering Steering Group** (IESG) offers direct oversight capacity for developers globally, while the **Internet Architecture Board** (IAB) oversees the operations of the IESG itself. These sub-units of ISOC together constitute the primary means of coordinating standards and practice on non-crisis development issues for the international community.

Second among governance efforts is that of the United Nations. Though the global agenda on cyberspace has been taken up by a diverse host of interested parties since the late 1990s, the UN has, in recent years, encouraged a series of initiatives under the auspices of its different agencies aimed at streamlining coordination on and progress regarding rules of the road for cyberspace regulation and policy. The World Trade Organization has, in particular, been at the forefront of advocacy for better adoption of favorable region-specific practices under international law. The UN is also behind the **World Summit on the Information Society** (WSIS), which is constituted of a series of meetings and documents on the subject of global development and information technologies. The main idea behind WSIS is that ICTs are responsible for increasing information content accessibility around the world and that sustainable economic development across a number of sectors benefits from stability and favorable regulation of cyberspace. WSIS is notable in that it has called for and received non-binding agreement from many countries for agreement on unfettered global access for all on projects related to education, e-governance, social services, and research. Thus, though responsibility for cyber governance and for coordination on regulatory issues in all veins continues to rest on the diffuse motivations of a host of actors in world politics, the UN has emerged as perhaps the most important cog in international efforts to meaningfully move towards a progressive regime for information technology management.

By comparison with more general efforts to achieve meaningful progress on streamlining the processes of global governance of cyberspace, attempts to obtain international coordination on security issues reflect an interesting dichotomy of interests in which there are at least somewhat effective mechanisms in place to monitor non-state cyber instabilities and very few formal pillars on coordination on the subject of interstate cyber-security. With regards to the former, it is clear that there is significant international agreement on the responsibilities of governments to protect their citizenry from the negative externalities associated with increased societal exposure to network technologies, namely crime, political extremism, and terrorism online. To be fair, the landscape of mechanisms put in place across countries in this regard is a *mélange* of uncoordinated institutions that function much as police organizations in different countries might—by coordinating inefficiently but as needed about different incipient threats. Nevertheless, there is some degree of central planning in international security efforts to mitigate the effects of cyber crime and non-state militancy. A number of countries maintain a **Computer Emergency Response Team** (CERT) (there are more than 200), which takes on the threefold task of coordinating responses to cyber emergencies, promoting better general cyber-security, and building for more robust service options within a given jurisdiction. CERTs are additionally able to coordinate internationally through the CERT Coordination Center and, though

national experiences differ in the approach adopted, tend towards the mission of building better relationships with the private sector for the purposes of information sharing. In this way, CERTs have emerged as a standard component part of procedures across countries for coping with particularly egregious situations of criminal or extremist disruption and intrusion. Moreover, CERTs are increasingly proving their value as a relatively impartial interlocutor between private industry and governments.

By contrast with efforts to coordinate on issues related to crime and low-level disruption from non-state sources, there are thus far only limited formal features of the coordinative landscape for interstate security cooperation. Though cooperation and recognition of norms of behavior through codification of appropriate rules of the road for cyber-security are desirable in the future, the reality is that major powers in world politics have barely moved beyond formal assurances regarding interference online. China and Russia have signed a pact stating that they will not interfere with each other in cyberspace, and the United States has obtained a similar assurance from Beijing that national processes will not be targeted online. However, there are few formal aspects to such agreements at present, with most bilateral interactions between states on cyber issues taking the form of memoranda of understanding. Though we cover international norms and law on cyberspace in a later chapter, it is clear that there still exists uncertainty for states in linking emerging norms and viable formal practices for interaction on a number of fronts. Specifically, there are a range of issues bound up in constructing acceptable treaty structures for future cyber international relations, and the domain's special characteristics—particularly the attribution problem—only exacerbate state concerns about the ability to validate, verify, and enforce binding cyber agreements.

In the next section, we describe how scholars and analysts have been theoretically and descriptively studying cyberspace across a range of issues. In particular, we discuss the current state of IR scholarship on the cyber phenomena and engage with the problem of streamlining conceptual approaches for producing better knowledge on the contours of world politics in the digital age.

Why cyberspace matters for IR theory

IR theory is the examination of world politics and society wherein researchers apply different frameworks to try to explain patterns of human behavior across individuals, organizations, countries, and supranational entities (like the UN or the European Union). The IR field can be roughly divided according to a number of theoretical debates about how the world works. Some scholars, for instance, hold that the world can best be explained via an understanding of how humans assign meaning to different objects and arrive at unique identities. Others, by contrast, broadly argue that relationships in international affairs entirely emerge from and are shaped by specific disparities in power between human institutions. Yet other debates pivot on disagreement over the role of economics, types of government, features of different national societies, and the constitution of norms. Regardless of the flavor, however, the bottom line is that IR theories allow us to describe different logics of outcome for world affairs depending on what forces we find most relevant and impactful.

Major advances in information technologies and the rise of cyberspace are of special interest for scholars in the IR field largely because of how systematically their effects can be felt in world politics. Almost all societal functions are connected

digitally. Information is available for access or transmission instantaneously and in a far less secure fashion than might have been the case in eras past. Moreover, changes to the function of international society and what might be called the mechanical substrate of the global system are reflected in actor behavior and organization. We exist at a time, thanks to the rise of digital technologies, in which myriad different actors possess preference sets molded by the dynamics of the new interconnected world and in which political organization has been forced to take new forms to cope with the challenges of that world. These developments have significant implications for scholars of world politics and, as is the primary focus of this book, analysts of national and international security.

By far the most cited and studied set of developments in the IR field emerge from what might be called the digitization of global infrastructure, or the process by which most societal functions—from various aspects of the global economy to military systems and tools of local governance—have, since the 1980s, gone digital. This process is the reason most commonly listed by scholars of cyberpolitics and security as to why IR should pay attention to cyber developments.³ The digitization of infrastructure has exposed global society to new opportunities and vulnerabilities, and has significant implications for the calculations of political actors of every kind.

For scholars of international security, in particular, the digitization of international society portends new threats and vulnerabilities on a number of levels. Information and the systems that run our society (particularly the more “important” parts, such as military or government systems) are at risk of infiltration, exfiltration, and broad-scope disruption in an unprecedented fashion. Sensitive information is at risk of digital theft not only for private citizens and industry but also for the intelligence community and the developers of military hardware.⁴ And specific military and vital national systems, such as air defense platforms or nuclear reactor computer networks, might be vulnerable to disruption and exploitation by any number of aggressors. In addition, the costs of entry for actors seeking to threaten state security, whether one is talking about other states or non-state actors like terrorists or “patriot hackers,” are exceedingly low.⁵ The know-how and hardware needed to execute reasonably sophisticated cyber attacks aimed at intrusion and disruption are, in most instances, well within the means of a dedicated individual or small group. Thus, with cyber, the balance of capabilities is—perhaps for the first time in history—uniquely and systematically stacked against the state.⁶

Of course, cyberspace matters for security and other scholars in IR not just because of the systematic way in which it links different societal functions and produces new types of interactions. Rather, it also matters because of the great number of special characteristics that must be considered when controlling for the impact of information technologies. Not only are the costs of entry low for actors of all stripes, but actions undertaken in cyberspace benefit from a diminished threat profile. The “attribution problem,” which describes the difficulty faced by the victims of cyber crime and aggression in identifying the real-world source of cyber intrusions, forces decision-making and strategic planning to take place in a range of new ways.⁷ Deception has become a major guiding component of both defensive and offensive strategies, at least for state actors, and authorities face new challenges stemming from attribution difficulties. Moreover, the nature of cyber “weapons” as benefiting from secrecy in development and execution introduces a range of new strategic calculations to be considered by policymakers and officials. Unless defenders use deception to

effectively derail attacks, cyberspace presents as an offense dominant domain where the incentive for competitors is to hit first and commit early to parallel actions.⁸ This dynamic is further compounded by the relative difficulties involved in determining the effects of cyber actions against foreign computer systems.⁹

Cyberspace also matters for IR scholars and for IR theory more broadly because of the secondary effects of the digitization of societal functions.¹⁰ In particular, the massive global adoption and integration of information technologies has had major impacts on both the behavior of different actors—from individuals to states and international organizations—and the way they self-organize. Information technologies, in introducing new modes of information access and control, have significantly affected the preference sets of actors concerned with a diverse range of economic, social, and political issues. As one set of literature points out, problem solving and decision making in the digital age often occur in a “networkized” fashion,¹¹ with individuals and the institutions they build reacting to challenges by offering solutions with distinct network characteristics. Social mobilization, for instance, is approached in a much broader and more complex fashion than it might have been in eras past, and security challenges are problematized as crosscutting issues affecting the entire portfolio of actor interests.

Box 3.1 Skeptics and revolutionaries: debating the impact of cyberspace on international security

The existing literature on cyberspace and international security principally focuses on a debate about the importance of cyber developments for stakeholders in international affairs. Specifically, the debate revolves around the significance of information technology development for state efforts to govern and secure national security imperatives. Broadly speaking, there is a disagreement between scholars on the extent to which cyberspace portends complex and challenging obstacles to security and stability for actors of all stripes in the international system. One side of the debate holds that information technologies are the next revolution in military affairs (i.e. they are forcing military planners and practitioners to fundamentally rethink their approach to security issues) and that the massive transformation of societal functions at nearly every level to a digital format augurs widespread vulnerabilities for actors of all stripes.¹² These vulnerabilities are particularly diverse and numerous for advanced states, where ICT integration occurs and guides industrial function on a much larger scale than it might elsewhere in the world.¹³ The suggested global dynamic for such scholars is one of mismatched capacity—smaller states and non-state actors hold disproportionate powers of intrusion and disruption against a diminished great power’s ability to regulate effectively.¹⁴

The other side of the debate on the significance of cyberspace for international security, however, eschews this read of emerging global dynamics and argues that much analysis of threats from online oversimplifies matters.¹⁵ In particular, aggression online never takes a violent form, and there are a great number of considerations to take into account when analyzing state-level vulnerabilities.¹⁶ Incentives for would-be attackers and exploiters of all forms are

limited by the realities of strategic circumstances, regardless of the bounds of technical possibility, thus producing a global landscape possessed of new technological dynamics but fundamentally unchanged basic dynamics.¹⁷

This stark division among scholars of cyberspace and IR appears in the range of debates that have, in recent years, attempted to explain the realities of politics and state-level security in the digital age. In particular, advocates of both perspectives dominate discussion over (1) how important cyber-security should be in national security policymaking and rhetoric, and (2) what effect cyberspace has on patterns of conflict and interaction in the international system. On the former discussion, a range of prominent officials and scholars has consistently argued that cyber-security has quickly emerged as the most serious challenge for modern society. From Leon Panetta's claim of a possible "cyber Pearl Harbor" to the arguments made by Tom Donilon and others that the core functions of society—particularly critical infrastructure and intellectual property—are prone to disruption at any time, the public sphere in the West is awash with the belief that cyberspace is a revolutionary development that has altered the conduct of national security in its entirety. By contrast, a small but growing number of scholars argue that the nature of cyberspace itself is used to overblow assessments of threats to national security. If cyberspace is a crosscutting domain that augments actors' abilities and introduces new vulnerabilities to society at every level, then it is analytically disingenuous to lump all security issues under a cyber moniker. Rather, research and policymaking must attempt to parse out the implications of information technology adoption over existing, traditional issue areas. In so doing, it is argued, we might see that cyberspace's destabilizing effects are highly contextual and that, in many instances, new inter-connectedness just means new dimensions to old problems, such as terrorism, interstate competition, and global economics.

With regards to the effect of cyberspace on patterns of conflict and interaction in the international system, it is important to understand how scholars have differently used phrases like "cyber warfare," "cyberwar," and "cyber conflict."¹⁸ Scholars have used *cyber warfare* consistently as a catchall term to describe the use of network technologies during conflict. In referencing cyber warfare, one might as easily be talking about cyber aspects of traditional conflict scenarios—such as war between great powers or a military intervention—or intentional low-level disruption caused by either state or non-state belligerents outside an official state of war. **Cyberwar**, by contrast, has been used not only by scholars¹⁹ but also by policymakers, pundits, and private sector spokesmen to describe a condition of interstate conflict that might take place *only* (or at least primarily) online, while **cyber conflict** has most often been used to describe any conflictual interactions via cyberspace that *don't* meet the threshold of interstate warfare (formal or otherwise).

The question of likelihood of cyberwar itself has largely been the content of the debate between the cyber skeptic and cyber revolutionary camps. Rid's seminal article—and the book that followed²⁰—points out that nothing of conflictual cyber interactions is violent and that the vast majority of incidents involve espionage, sabotage, vandalism, or other defacements. And while sabotage might

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be used on a massive scale—many of the more alarming lines of rhetoric in punditry and analysis consistently bring up the question of critical infrastructure security, for instance—any advantages brought to a foreign state aggressor would be temporary. Thus, cyberwar is a fiction outside the scope of traditional conflict scenarios that include kinetic campaign aspects.

However, in introducing this point about the myth of cyberwar, the works of Rid, Gartzke, and others in this vein have consistently demonstrated that the same cannot be said at all of cyber conflict. Indeed, it is the crux of the counter-cyberwar argument that cyber conflict happens consistently in the international system in *low-intensity* terms—meaning espionage, vandalism by non-state proxies, and more. Given this, what might be said of the effect of cyber conflict on state behavior in international relations? Do low-level provocations by one state tend to produce aggressive foreign policy responses by others? And how do the special characteristics of cyberspace—including attribution problems and the difficulty in determining what the “use of force” might look like online—play into this?

These questions lie at the heart of ongoing study into conflict in the fifth domain and form in part the basis of later chapters’ discussion of cyber conflict across numerous settings in world affairs.

Information technologies have also spurred new institutional development in world politics. Two dimensions of these developments highlight the need for more study of advances in ICT development by IR scholars. First, global ICT adoption has and is continuing to produce institutions concerned with the governance, regulation, and contestation of cyberspace. These include international organizations concerned with legal and normative aspects of cyber regulation, as well as national and local institutions concerned with the reconciliation of meaningful cyber-security practices and the welfare of different communities.²¹ Second, information technologies, in changing dynamics of interaction and information usage in the world writ large, have introduced the need for existing institutions at every level of society to adapt rules and operating procedures to the contours of the digital age. Doing so might entail the introduction of new processes, the reinterpretation of existing doctrines, or the layering of reimagined approaches on top of existing procedures. These developments, occurring as they are systematically within global society, portend major changes in the directionality and the outcomes of political behavior in international affairs and present compelling explanatory challenges to the IR field.

Realism, liberalism, constructivism: IR’s paradigms and cyber conflict

Just how useful is IR theory when it comes to explaining patterns of and potential for cyber conflict? Off the bat, it seems reasonable to think that IR theories are going to be of great help in unpacking the impacts of the information revolution on world politics. Since the 1970s, IR theory—whether paradigmatic theory that attempts to explain entire modes of human interaction, or what some have called “mid-level”

(aimed more specifically at explaining unique political phenomena)²²—has developed conceptual approaches and borrowed from other social science fields such that students of international affairs can draw on a range of perspectives to explain the world around them. It seems intuitive that IR theories will be adapted, in time, to provide explanations of the contours of the digital world.²³

At present, however, it would be disingenuous to suggest that political scientists are possessed of macro theories that link new cyber developments to the fundamental behaviors of states, institutions, or individuals. *Broadly, we argue that IR theory, in the broadest sense, is ill-suited to describing digital politics but that core concepts across the IR field are of immense utility in problematizing new dynamics of human interaction in the information age.*

In reality, existing IR theories and approaches to different conceptual problematics suffer with cyber from a problem of imprecision on two fronts. First, recent theoretical and analytical work on cyber-security and digital politics has suffered from the imprecise and sometimes clumsy application of concepts and principles previously used to describe things such as strategies for nuclear conflict. Terms like “offense dominance,” “deterrence,” and even “power” have been used to describe the manner in which cyberspace’s unique characteristics constitute a set of strategic dynamics for both state and non-state actors.

Offense dominance, for instance (and which we return to in later chapters), describes a situation in which strategic logic favors the first use of a particular weapon type due to losses in effectiveness at a later stage of conflict.²⁴ The basic logic of offense dominance in cyberspace, an assumption found in numerous scholarly and pseudo-academic texts stretching back to the 1990s, references the logic of zero day exploits in explaining why the incentive will always be to strike first.²⁵ If a vulnerability is patchable and a capability able to be mitigated with even a small amount of advanced information, then full effectiveness of a cyber arsenal can only be realized in conflict under conditions in which an actor is the first mover. The problem with this use of an offense- vs. defense-dominance framework for understanding strategic calculations online, of course, is that the unique characteristics of cyberspace also influence actors’ behavior in other ways. Cyber “weapons” are often ineffective, a fact that is difficult to determine for both attacker and defender. Cyber tools often also accomplish things other than their intended purpose, making it difficult for a defender to interpret situations. And deception also awards a number of abilities to defenders to reroute or otherwise mitigate incoming threats, a fact, again, which might be difficult to fully comprehend for would-be attackers. Knowing these things, the strategic calculation for attackers becomes significantly more complex than the simplistic and dichotomous offense/defense dominance label might suggest.²⁶ Overreliance by scholars and strategists on such imprecise terminology thus carries with it significant risks for misinterpretation and premature prescriptions, and the field is only recently beginning to address the need for greater nuance in conceptual treatments of cyberspace.

Second, the IR field has so far struggled with describing both the broad-scoped impact of the information revolution on international affairs and the effect thereof on the various aspects of state behavior in theoretical terms. One need go no farther than the field’s main paradigmatic perspectives on world politics to see how mainstream IR theories both provide useful lenses for viewing cyber developments and yet fall short when it comes to applying their broad assumptions to the description of human interactions online. The many forms of realism, liberalism, and constructivism—IR’s

three main theories—hold insights useful for scholars interested in cyberspace, as do other theoretical perspectives, but also largely fail to function in their entirety when faced with issues of cyber interaction in international affairs. The task presently before political scientists thus lies in parsing relevant conceptual foundations apart from scholarly bluster such that our theories accurately describe developments in world politics in the digital age.

Realism

Realism is fundamentally about power. In reality, there are several realist theories that each rely on different justifications and formalizations of a relative cohesive set of assumptions about how the world works. Realism has its roots in the *realpolitik* thinking that dominated the class of statesmen, military thinkers, and scholars focused on imperialist politics through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. Realism was formalized in the writings of men like E.H. Carr and Hans Morganthau, as well as in the geopolitically focused work of George Kennan, Herman Kahn, and others. **Classical realism**, as the first set of articulations of the theory is referred to, essentially holds that IR is an inherently tense business because humans are naturally flawed creatures. Specifically, humans always tend towards the search for greater power, the result of which is that peace only ever results from balanced power relationships that can effectively deter the conflictual excesses of any one actor.

By contrast, **neorealism**, which attempts to justify the assumptions of realist thinkers via better grounding in logic and empirical observation of the nature of relationships between countries, essentially holds that the state is a unitary actor that exists in an anarchic global system.²⁷ Since anarchy is the underlying condition of IR, state behavior inevitably rests on the assumption that strategy must be self-help—i.e. since there is no enforcing authority above states, state actions must necessarily be focused on securing the conditions for survival and welfare.²⁸ This condition is made worse by the fact of the problem of other minds, essentially the surety in life and in world affairs that it is impossible to truly know the intent of peer competitors.

Box 3.2 How relevant is realism in a world of powerful non-state actors?

A particular challenge for anyone interested in adapting the tenets and assumptions of realist theories to explaining conflict dynamics in the information age is in explaining the role and significance of non-state actors. As Chapter 9 describes in greater detail, the cyber conflict ecosystem is in many ways better defined by those non-state actors that operate therein than by states that employ cyber tools for conflictual purposes. This is largely because, in addition to the immense crowd of terrorist organizations, criminal syndicates, social movements, and hacker irritators that have moved their operations to the web, most state-related acts of cyber contention are executed under the cover of deniability. In other words, when states hack, the direct culprit is often non-state

hackers under the hidden employ of the state or state agencies that actively hide their identity. In cyber conflict, because full attribution of digital actions to those politically responsible is inherently difficult, it is both common and relatively simple to bypass the direct consequences of aggression found in other domains.

For realism, this is particularly problematic not because such a dynamic excludes the utility of core concepts linked with the school of thought but because it throws a wrench in the works of the predictive elements of the thing. Later chapters break down different parts of realist dogma as they relate to conflict in the fifth domain, including *anarchy*, the **security dilemma**, the **offense-defense balance**, **coercion** and the nature of *power*. These concepts bear significant deconstruction and debate for various reasons. Neorealism is defined as a paradigm, however, not just by those conceptual elements but by the implications thereof for state behavior. The two main variants of neorealism both hold that anarchy and the problem of other minds drive states towards self-help behaviors. While this is relatively uncontroversial, they also note that states respond to perceived threats via balancing actions. While a neorealist might argue that cyber attacks regularly fail to elicit balancing actions in interstate relations because they don't often hit the threshold of threat credibility, there are no provisions in the theory to explain broad-scoped commitment on the part of many states to tactics that emphasize reliance on non-state proxies and don't directly affect the military power of competitors. Realism, in other words, does not present as a compelling framework by which we might explain the choices of states and non-state actors to engage in cyber conflict.

When it comes to cyberspace, realism's main problem lies in the common critique that its structural (and most popular) variants are overly parsimonious. With cyber, as with all things, this means that states are likely to adopt policies and take actions to enhance capacity and strategically mitigate threats.²⁹ The problem of being overly simplistic is perhaps more obvious with cyberspace than it is with any other empirical phenomenon. Certainly, realism holds important insights for understanding how states might think about the digital component of national security, but a focus on unitary state processes and systemic mechanisms as primarily responsible for compelling state action simply doesn't gel with the reality of cyber interactions. Given that cyberwar is unlikely³⁰ and low-intensity cyber conflict is the norm of digital interactions in the contemporary international system³¹—points we return to in later chapters—the relationship between realism's primary explanatory assumptions and the incentive to engage in cyber conflict is not clear. Moreover, as later chapters discuss, it seems to be the case that particular cyber aggressions emerge from the unique interests of institutions within state security communities and that cyber conflict is often linked to the existence of a range of parochial, political circumstances. In short, with neorealism, the focus on unitary state agency seems to suggest few real methods for accounting for variation in behavioral outcomes with regards to cyber, even if (as we discuss in-depth in later chapters) many core realist concepts have utility for our study of cyber conflict.

Liberalism

Of the three main schools of thought in IR, **liberalism** in its various modern formats might be of most use to the research program on cyberspace and international security. Two iterations bear particular mention. First, the variant of liberalism presented by Andrew Moravscik and extended by others fits most closely with the evidence regarding patterns of interaction and effect in cyber international affairs.³² Liberals explicitly reject the idea that everything pivots on power politics and promote the notion that international cooperation can emerge as a self-interested output of institutional politics, often aided by international institutions and the development of positive norms of behavior. Though theoretically undeveloped as yet, initial evidence we have that states are relatively restrained when it comes to responding to major cyber speaks to the tenets of modern liberalism in that state behavior might be expected to emerge from configurations of political capacity and interests at both the domestic and interstate levels. The abilities and inclinations of private actors matter a great deal when it comes to determining propensity for conflictual interstate relations,³³ when it comes to norm development in international relationships, and when it comes to predicting deviations from established patterns of interaction.

Seeing international affairs in a cyber-augmented world as being constituted of private actors—states and otherwise—trying to maximize bounded self-interest makes a great deal of sense, as one of the main theses of the literature on cyber-security in world politics holds that information technologies have fundamentally altered the abilities of actors at every level of global society to achieve informational outcomes disproportionate to their kinetic abilities.

Box 3.3 Why no international cooperation? Attribution as the ultimate spoiler

Proponents of liberalism within the IR field advocate that stakeholders in world affairs tend towards cooperation over time. There are a broad range of reasons offered for this, from the formation of shared cultural ties that often come with (additionally restraining) trade relationships to the logical need to mitigate the otherwise harmful excesses of life in an anarchical world. Given that at this juncture there are remarkably few constraining arrangements in existence that serve to restrain the conflictual tendencies of cyber actors, we might reasonably ask liberals to explain themselves.

A number of concepts and arguments strongly linked with liberalism are relevant here. Liberals regularly argue that international organizations serve a series of purposes in helping to develop global compacts on trade, finance, social issues, and the prevention of war. International organizations help build common cultures of understanding about what is and is not permissible in IR. Moreover, they incentivize cooperation among states that otherwise would have to compete on a playing field that is often uneven. They also offer enforcement mechanisms for those actors that break the rules and, as Chapter 11 discusses, help sustain positive norms of behavior.

When it comes to international conflict, the most relevant element of international law is quite arguably **the law of armed conflict (LOAC, also often called the law of war)**. Simply, the LOAC is constituted of all parts of international public law that deal with conflict. Major elements include the provisions of the Geneva and Hague Conventions and those articulations of just right to wage war included in the United Nations charter (which dictates when member states can engage in conflict and when the international community should intervene to prevent uninhibited warfare). In most cases, these formalizations of mutual understanding about how war should be conducted link with various **just war theory** traditions.

The direct application of the LOAC to the fifth domain is not a simple proposition. There is significant debate, for instance, about how to protect targets traditionally held as off-limits during wartime, such as hospitals or schools, in a cyber conflict. Given that the Internet enables a broad range of medical services beyond those simply contained in hospital facilities, simply labeling certain IP addresses with a special “do not attack” label will not protect all national or organizational medical functions. Likewise, it is unclear as to the degree to which the LOAC should protect hackers that are caught by states and held as responsible for major disruptive attacks. Some national actors use proxy actors extensively in cyber campaigns to ensure deniability. These non-state agents are not terrorists that have disavowed a recognizable political entity, but they are likely to be specifically disavowed by a state sponsor interested in maintaining its own neutrality. So, are they combatants to be protected by international law (as a soldier hacking as part of a national cyber military service would be) or not?

Another useful concept for thinking about cooperation and the Internet from the liberal perspective is that of the **tragedy of the commons**. The tragedy of the commons emerges in situations where there is some resource that is available to everybody but controlled by nobody, such as public lakes where you might want to go fishing or public land where you might graze cattle. The tragedy itself is that individuals are incentivized to take all of the resource they can because it is free to them (i.e. to let their cattle graze as much as possible on public land), despite the fact that this kind of self-interested action will reduce the usability of the resource for everybody over time (i.e. there will be less grass for others’ cows to graze on).

Is there a tragedy of the Internet commons? After all, the Internet is a resource that is not **rivalrous** (meaning that my consumption of Internet bandwidth doesn’t prevent others from getting online) and is only minimally **excludible** (meaning that its possible to prevent someone from using it). In terms of international cooperation, it simply isn’t possible—short of a major disruptive attack, as will be discussed in later chapters—to prevent other countries from using cyberspace. From the perspective of the individual, it is possible that a gatekeeper—an ISP or an authoritarian government, for instance—could prevent you from getting online. But in general, Internet usage is so common now in world affairs that the thing is only minimally excludible.

That the Internet is a **common pool resource** in this way is not inherently problematic for attempts to have countries cooperate on cyber conflict issues.

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After all, numerous treaties have existed over the centuries governing what countries can and cannot do militarily in space, on the high seas, etc. All states have interests in mitigating threats of misuse of public goods that could hamper trade or encourage criminal enterprise. Moreover, it is often quite possible to coerce or shame states into good behavior. On the one hand, it is possible to call out a country for abuse of the commons. On the other, abuse of the commons is most often met by a balancing action, such as a Russian militarization of spacecraft in response to U.S. efforts to station ICBMs in orbit.

Herein lies the difference between the Internet and other public goods that have been successfully regulated by international agreement. Much as is the problem with applying international law to cyberspace, challenges of attribution prevent the development of effective verification capabilities. Simply put, it is not always—or even often—possible to satisfactorily identify when a state is using the Internet inappropriately. Moreover, the Internet seems more truly non-rivalrous than other domains of warfighting like space of the oceans in that one country's ability to act offensively online does not naturally limit or balance the ability of others to do so. The result is a digital age tragedy of the commons wherein international cooperation is difficult because there are strong incentives to abuse the resources juxtaposed against no incentives (i.e. no social or political costs) to stop.

Second, the neo-institutional or neoliberal perspective on world politics bears mention as a potentially useful framework for understanding how international cooperation might emerge on cyber-security and other digital issues.³⁴ Though grounded in the behavioralist language of structural realism, neoliberalism historically has no quarrel with the idea that states are not the only important actors in international relations. Moreover, the neoliberal approach emphasizes the manner in which iterative relationships can compel complex learning and the formation of unique configurations of either cooperative or conflictual interactions. Taken with the more traditional take on liberalism updated by Moravcsik and others, neoliberal approaches appear to gel well with research to date on the empirics of the cyber phenomenon in world politics. Institutional learning and strategies matter, as do parochial political dynamics. If anything, the challenge for constructing liberal theories of cyberpolitics moving forward will be in the details. In particular, liberal theories often make claims about the directionality of political relationships (the hierarchy of local, national, and state interests, for instance) that present as clumsy in the digital age. A substate actor's political capacity in using cyber tools need not be employed via the prism of state configurations in the digital age, a fact that opens up new possibilities for cause and effect beyond the pale of interstate politicking.

Constructivism

Finally, as the research program on cyberspace and international security continues to develop, it seems likely that researchers will increasingly turn to **constructivism** to flesh out and explain patterns of interaction and political behavior in world politics in the digital age. Constructivism, broadly writ, holds that the environment in which

political action takes place is social and that the social setting of interactions can essentially *provide* states and other actors with their core preferences.³⁵ This differs dramatically from the perspectives of realism and structural liberalism, where core conceptual assumptions about the sources of state power are based on the condition of anarchy in the international system. For constructivists, “anarchy is what states make of it,” meaning that social conditions in world politics compel actors to construct different perspectives on the anarchic condition of the system.³⁶

Box 3.4 Ideas, the Internet, and insecurity

The global proliferation of Internet technologies has naturally aided a worldwide transformation of the processes of information diffusion and identity creation. Specifically, the information revolution has led to the development of unique new tools for information dissemination and to the construction of novel information environments wherein humans now access, consume, and have framed content in ways not seen before.

Constructivist modes of thinking about world affairs are quite arguably the most relevant for anybody interested in understanding the *new* sources of contention and conflict in the digital age. This is quite simply because so much new contestation is bound up in these broad-scoped changes to the global information environment. From the Arab Spring to the Umbrella movement protests in Hong Kong in 2014, information technologies have been important enablers of social conflict and have defined the course and perception of activist campaigns around the world. Likewise, the rise of the Internet has prompted significant international focus on issues of infrastructural policy in ways that would have seemed ridiculous in eras past, simply because of the way that ICTs have rewired most core functions of global society. Net neutrality, for instance, is a hotly debated issue primarily because making sure network operators aren’t allowed to treat different kinds of data based on their economic self-interest is an obvious guarantor of ideational freedom in democratic societies. And much of what is increasingly being thought of as part of the toolkit of cyber contention in the form of information warfare conducted by subversive state agents is, as later chapters discuss, only logically significant when one considers the security and political stability of IR from an ideational perspective.

There’s a problem of imprecision with constructivism that is, in many ways, no different from the broader critique of the school of thought. Simply put, constructivism—the idea that “ideas matter”—fails to provide agent-centric mechanisms for explaining and predicting patterns in international affairs. Nevertheless, constructivism provides some interesting insights and has likely applications for theoretical treatments of cyberspace in world politics in the future. The school lends itself to understanding how institutions and states learn from the conditions of their interactions. In particular, a constructivist perspective—which emphasizes the role that constraining norms play in changing state behaviors over time—lends itself to future studies of international cooperation on cyber issues.

Box 3.5 Future shock (or “from speed comes vulnerability”)

As Chapters 4 and onwards repeatedly note, any discussion of cyber conflict and the information age is invariably an old discussion. Just because the most recent information revolution has arguably been the most dynamic and unprecedented in human history, does not mean that there have not been other information revolutions or that other new information technologies have not fundamentally changed the way the world works. Famously referenced with some regularity by political scientists, the Gutenberg printing press is an example of a revolutionary ICT that, among other things, helped expand literacy in Europe, standardized conceptions of time and language, and generally fed the rise of the nationalistic state in Europe. The development of papyrus paper and simple written shorthand in Egypt spurred the rise of the first major bureaucratic empires. And so on.

Humankind, in short, has regularly experienced the tumult and catalyzing force of information revolutions. Inasmuch as we often associate these revolutions with great progress on a civilizational scale though, it is worth noting that truly revolutionary ICTs have often been key drivers of great catastrophe and conflict in human history. As a series of thinkers, notably a scholar called Paul Virilio, point out, new information technologies dramatically speed up the functions and interactions inherent in human society. And yet, we humans don't really speed up to match, at least in terms of how we fundamentally operate. The result is quite often a mismatch between techno-political societal progress and the development of the human condition. With great speed comes significant disruption to traditional identities and relationships, as well as a diminished understanding about the way the world around us works. The shadow of the future, as some scholars might put it, grows shorter because technological progress reflected in societal advancements injects uncertainty into the human experience. At these times, constructivists—or post-structuralists, post-materialists, etc.—suggest that we are significantly more prone to “future shock” where an inability to reconcile prevailing conditions with uncertainty about the future produces vulnerability to conflict.

In addition, constructivist theories are perhaps the only set of perspectives that might accommodate psychological evidence put forward on the impact of cyberspace on the preferences of individuals and institutions in the digital age (i.e. on how people think and behave differently as a result of changes in the global information environment). Much recent work has pointed to the way in which the information revolution has caused a sea change in the way that global constituents—from individual citizens to state organizations—undertake problem solving and strategic planning. Today, it is increasingly the case that these tasks take place in a “networkized” fashion, with actors formulating responses to sociopolitical events in unprecedented ways. Constructivism, alone among the three main schools of thought in IR, provides interesting insight as to how such developments might affect world politics.

The future of IR theory in the digital age

What is the future of the research program on cyberspace, international security, and politics in the IR field? How might IR theory be effectively brought to bear on issues of information technology and national security? And how can scholars incorporate the broad-scoped implications of the information revolution into core driving assumptions about the nature of political realism and social context in world politics research?

The challenge for researchers going forward is relatively simple, if not easy to tackle. Scholarship must abandon constraining assumptions drawn from past applications of theory to substantive problems while adapting and applying what is good about the field's extant theories. In many ways, the field has already begun to do this in moving directionally away from grand treatments of cyberspace and studying the dynamics of specific issues under the broad cyber umbrella—espionage, subversion, crime, and more. It is imperative that this trend continues for two reasons. First, these are issues that are often dramatically understudied in the literature on IR and comparative politics, usually because data is hard to come by. By broadening the scope of study of cyber phenomenon to these areas, scholars are both advancing the general state of knowledge in those areas where it is most underdeveloped—including on topics like intelligence gathering, government-industry relations, and espionage—and providing new insights into what many have now conceded to be the most common and relevant issues for the research program on international cyber-security.

Second, it is unlikely that IR theories will quickly be adapted to effectively function as claims about the ontology of world politics in the digital age without new research into non-traditional subject matter. As indicated earlier, the reason for this is simply that grand theory must increasingly describe broad-scoped patterns of interaction and agent behavior in world politics via reference to non-traditional political dynamics. The rise of cyberspace has had, perhaps more than any past set of technological developments, distinct impacts on the contours of human interactions in the international system. The information revolution has fundamentally altered the structures of global infrastructure across most societal functions and independently influences preference formation for most global constituents. Increasingly, explanatory power with regards to the specific dynamics of cyber affairs lies at levels not previously considered to be as important to mainstream IR scholars, or at least to structural theorists. Thus, adapting theory effectively now demands greater substantive intercourse with such topics and, in turn, greater use of lessons learned to adapt the concepts of IR's grand theories to better fit the digital world.

As a final note, perhaps no element of the social science effort on cyber-security topics demonstrates the tension described earlier between competing perspectives on the reality of world politics as does the epistemological challenge bound up in collecting data on digital dynamics. IR scholarship faces a distinct challenge insofar as comprehensively linking cyber actions to social and political intent is extremely difficult. Data collection on cyber conflict episodes, Internet usage, and more must necessarily focus on one of two types of units of analysis—digital units (such as packet traffic) or sociopolitical units (such as terrorist groups, nation states, or individual hackers). The task thereafter is linking digital actions to the real world. Because of the unique nature of the digital domain, wherein attribution of digital actions is difficult and many types of actions are easy to obscure, this is almost intractably problematic

for social science researchers. Given that this is the case, how can we know what we know when we perform research? Though some research programs—such as those that consider the second-level effects of cyber conflict—are not necessarily burdened by this methodological reality, it nevertheless stands as a clear impediment to effective adjudication on theoretical issues considered significant by IR scholars. If scholars cannot effectively address such a seeming inability to “look directly at” what they think they are looking at in their research ventures, then the IR field will inevitably fall short of providing perspective backed up by robust evidence.

Where to next?

Cyberspace and information technologies affect global society at virtually every level. From the infrastructure of security, economic and sociopolitical functions to the ways in which global constituents consume information and approach problems, the maturation and continued evolution of the cyber phenomena has significant implications for the dynamics of world politics.

There are a great number of important issues to be considered in the nascent cyber-politics field. What might future international cooperation on conflict avoidance online look like? How will the international community deal with cyber extremism? How do human and civil rights tie into processes of human interaction and information availability in the digital age? At stake in studying these issues and in answering critical questions about what might determine variation in outcomes along different lines, is a better understanding of the phenomenon itself. Better knowledge produces better real-world outcomes in policy and in norms of coordination.

At present, the state of scholarship on cyberspace and IR is relatively immature. This is not to say, of course, that there is not important and significantly insightful work already published on the cyber phenomenon and its impacts on international affairs. But scholars have only in recent years moved to an analytic footing that emphasizes the interdependent complexity of issues that link across traditional categories in an unprecedented fashion. And overreliance on imprecise or underdeveloped theoretical constructs continues to impede progress on research related to cyberspace.

Moving forward, scholars and analysts will need to continue to recognize that a great number of sociopolitical factors impact upon the already unique situations that different actors—from states to international organizations and domestic political groups—find themselves in in the digital age. In order to apply IR theories successfully as claims about the ontology of IR in a cyber infused world, there is a great deal of work needed on fleshing out those non-traditional areas of focus in the field that are most impacted by digital developments. The rest of this book is designed so as to give students of world politics interested in cyber conflict a foundation from which such work might emerge.

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- 30 Rid, *Cyber War Will . . .* (2012).
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4 Exploitation

From signals intelligence to cyber warriors

In the chapters to come, we unpack a host of topics related to modern-day manifestations of cyber conflict. However, it would be inexcusable to start our foray into warfare in the fifth domain without first contextualizing the rise of cyberspace since the 1960s. To do this, we actually need to go back almost a full century to describe the manner in which intelligence-focused developments fueled, at first gradually and then rapidly, the construction of new technologies that are today at the heart of our topic. Today, conversation about cyber conflict often pivots on issues of military strategy. While this is a worthwhile perspective on what the phenomenon has become, the reality is that computers and network systems have been built and used at the cutting edge primarily by intelligence communities. First, these technologies were the tools for spying, instruments for breaking codes and analyzing vast amounts of information. Then, these technologies became the targets and victims of espionage, as intelligence organizations realized that secrets stored in machines could be stolen as easily (if via a somewhat different method than was traditional) as if they were stored on paper in a filing cabinet. And finally, use of these technologies has become the means of spying itself, a set of exploitative methods where machine interactions are the entire basis of stealing information, deceiving adversaries, and understanding enemies. In short, though the focus of our book must inevitably turn to questions of computer network attack (CNA) and disruption beyond intelligence matters, the roots of such a focus are unquestionably the substance of espionage—of computer network exploitation (CNE). This chapter briefly offers a history of these issues and developments.

The unbreakable marriage of computers and espionage

The starting point of any attempt to understand the origins of cyber conflict lies in understanding computers. This might seem an obvious thing to say, but here we would note that use of the term “computer” to refer to a mechanical, electronic device of some kind is something that has only come about since the 1960s. Traditionally, computers were simply people that computed. Anybody whose job involved the analysis and computation of patterns in information might have, at one point in time, been generically referred to as a “computer.” Traditionally, computational vocations came in two main flavors. First, “computers” might have included anybody who used mathematics and other relevant acquired knowledge to deconstruct and assess patterns in coded information, such as the scrambled communications of state enemies. Second, we might have labeled someone a “computer” if they were involved

in the complex analysis of information via some dumb process. To understand this statement, it is necessary to know something of the conceptual design of modern computers. In turn, we first require some historical context reaching back to the years following World War I.

As any student of IR will tell you, the story of great power politics from Westphalia (and backwards) through the present day is the story of strategic gambit and maneuver wherein actions are informed by both geostrategic circumstances and parochial national interests. Intelligence organizations have classically and enduringly been a critical element of state security apparatuses whose job it is to inform national leaders on the condition and intentions of foreign foes (and allies!). Intelligence, essentially information collected, processed, and analyzed so that some kind of inference about world affairs is possible, comes in a number of flavors. **Human intelligence** (HUMINT) is information gathered directly from human sources, often via the actions of special operatives and informant networks. **Imagery intelligence** (IMINT) is derived from representations of objects reproduced electronically or via other optical means, such as visual photography, radar, or infrared sensors, lasers, or electro-optics. **Measurement and signature intelligence** (MASINT) is derived from scientific and technical information that is used to characterize specific targets of national interest. MASINT encompasses a broad set of disciplines, including those that fall under the nuclear, seismic, chemical, and materials sciences. **Open source intelligence** (OSINT) emerges from publicly available information, such as that found in newspaper reporting or social media postings. And **geospatial intelligence** (GEOINT) involves the collection and study of imagery and mapping data produced through an integration of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information (i.e. data that comes from satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, etc.).

Our story begins with the systematization—meaning the development of institutions given a relatively unbounded mission of collecting all relevant signals information for national security purposes—of the last category of intelligence (**signals intelligence** (SIGINT)) in the years during and following World War I.¹ The Great War, as it was referred to following the cessation of hostilities, occurred several decades following what we might think of as the last great information revolution. Across the world, Europe's colonial empires and independent countries alike had come to rely on the telegraph and the telephone for the transmission of information critical to international commerce, government, war, and social processes. At the outset of the war, the British Empire in particular held sway over much of the physical infrastructure of global telegraphy in the form of close patronage relationships with the British firms that directly managed the thing.² This made signals intelligence, which is simply the interceptions of signals passing between people (via machines, inscription, etc.) for the purposes of extracting strategically useful information, a more promising prospect than it had been at any point in history up until then. Shortly after the war began, Britain instituted a censorship regime wherein individuals placed at key telegraph exchange points around the world (given the title of “censor”) would review massive volumes of information and weed out relevant data that could be processed further by British intelligence.³ Britain would even quickly move to try and force the Central Powers to communicate entirely via British-overseen infrastructure. They did so at the beginning of the war by cutting German telegraph cables laid under the English Channel. The British effort was only somewhat successful on this front, largely due to the fact that radio technology rapidly came of age during the war, but the seeds of

what would become signals intelligence—and, much later, cyber exploitation—were laid in such broad-scoped efforts to mine the world’s communications systems for useful data.

Britain’s efforts during the Great War were not unique in their shape, though they did perhaps stand apart in scope. During the war years, both Allied and Central Powers spent large sums of money developing systems that would effectively secure communications for military and high-level political purposes. Each major power involved in the war leveraged access to intellectuals and defense establishments that had, in the pre-war years, made rapid advances in the mathematics field specifically related to cryptography. The result, quite simply, was that many of the Great Powers’ ciphers were broken by the mid-point of the war.⁴

Following the war, as Europe rapidly rebuilt and the United States receded from the world, there was a veritable renaissance of intellectual and industrial enterprise on a number of fronts. That this happened is not necessarily a great surprise, given the incredible number of military and intelligence personnel that reentered civilian life at universities and in business having been exposed to both other great minds and practical challenges that required solving. Part of this renaissance of sorts was, particularly in Western and Central Europe, a surging interest in cryptography—in the theory and practice of sending (and intercepting) secret messages. The result of this interest was a series of rapid advances in the development of more secure ciphers, many of which were technologically enabled. One such advance, for instance, was the development of the **one-time pad**, a programmable disc of sorts that could be used to encrypt information to be sent to a recipient elsewhere in the world.⁵ The device, which shared its encryption cipher with a partner pad, was unique and immensely useful for two related reasons. First, the jumbling of letters that occurred each time a message was sent would be truly random. Pads were built two at a time and physically distributed to those who wanted to communicate in secret. Each pair of pads would have a different, randomly decided key. Second, no code would ever be reused. The pads were truly “one time use,” designed to be discarded after use and never reused. There was no mathematical chance that a key would ever be reproduced at a later stage because of the immense number of possible key combinations that the manufacturers had to choose from. Thus, there would be no pattern or logical system that could be targeted by foreign spy organizations to “break the code.”

Enter Enigma

A problem with some advances, like the one-time pad, was that they were innovative but fundamentally inefficient in their design. With the pads, as is generally the challenge with most private key encryption schemes, the problem was that the paired pad needed to be physically distributed to those in need of the ability to communicate. Key distribution on a scale required for securing military communications during wartime, quite simply, was out of the question. After all, the distribution of thousands of keys is certainly possible. The billions of paired pads needed to support tens of thousands of daily communications from hundreds of military units deployed over expansive theaters of war did not seem so.

For Germany, whose military leaders were shocked to learn in the 1920s and early 1930s that their ciphers had been so thoroughly deconstructed by the Allies during the World War I, a solution to the pressing challenge of communications’ security

came in the form of a now-famous series of machines called **Enigma**.⁶ Developed by a German engineer called Arthur Scherbius in the late 1910s and updated considerably over the next two decades, Enigma was an electro-mechanical device that promised unheard of encryption power. Interestingly, the German military was reluctant to purchase the device for a long time, as it was incredibly expensive to produce when first introduced. The inflection point was the discovery of the extent to which German communications had been previously tapped. One source of this information, ironically, was a book published by future Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the 1930s.⁷ Another source, one which would worry many other countries besides Germany (notably Japan) in the years before World War II, was a book called *The American Black Chamber*.⁸ The book was published by a disgruntled former government employee called Herbert Yardley and detailed much about the inner workings of U.S. efforts to systematically dismantle foreign encryption schemes.

Enigma—as well as the efforts of Polish,⁹ French, and British analysts¹⁰ through the 1940s to break it—stands (alongside a device called the Tunny) as one of the most significant drivers of processes that would lead to the computer revolution at the mid-point of the twentieth century. Enigma was a remarkable device. Prior to the German military's purchase and deployment of its own Enigma machine variants in the 1930s and 1940s, the device was largely targeted for sale to banks and other financial institutions that were uniquely interested in making sure that their transmissions were secure from prying eyes. The upside of this commercial genesis of the Enigma in the inter-war European experience was that the head of British intelligence's codebreaking section was able to simply walk into a company office in Germany just prior to the start of World War II and purchase one of the Enigma devices.¹¹ Unfortunately, unlike the one-time pads where the device itself constituted the key needed to decrypt enemy signals, possession of the machine relayed no more advantage to the Allies than perfect knowledge of how seemingly improbably the task before them—of breaking the Enigma code—was.

The Enigma device works on a simple mechanical concept, namely that someone can type in a message and immediately have it scrambled. The internal wiring of the device is triggered when somebody types a letter into a keyboard sitting atop the device casing. From any distance, Enigma looks remarkably like a typewriter given its standard keyboard and boxy design. However, the device does not print text on a page, but rather scrambles the words input into the thing as they are entered. When a key is typed, it creates an electrical circuit wherein the input signal—a letter—is switched over and over again before outputting a final alternate letter. For example, if “B” is typed and “F” were to be the output, the user would type in “B” and “F” would appear in the form of a bulb that would light up atop the machine, then to be recorded for message transmission via radio, telegraph, etc.

The reason that possession of the Enigma machine would not itself give someone the ability to read all Enigma-encoded messages lies in the fact that the inside of the device is configurable. Specifically, the input letter would be switched in reference to a series of moving internal rotors. These circular parts would each switch the input letter for a new one as part of the electrical circuit being produced; indeed, they would do so twice, as the circuit looped back through the rotors after an initial pass because of the use of a reflector that bounced the current back towards the light panel (i.e. the bulbs that would light up to show the user what letter their input letter had been switched for). For each letter typed into the machine, the rotors would move forward

one position. Thus, no letter would be switched for the same alternative letter twice in a row unless the result came about through pure luck.

This was the immense power of Enigma. The fact that the internal rotors required configuration meant that the device itself merely functioned as a sort of padlock for scrambling messages. In order to unlock the message (i.e. the decrypt the ciphertext),¹² you didn't just need the lock. You needed the "key," which in this case was knowledge of the starting positions of the rotors inside the machine itself. Without that information, messages typed into a recipient's own Enigma machine would remain scrambled. The German military added a plugboard to its own initial versions of the machine, which allowed for the additional switching of letters inside the device based on the toggling of a pair of switches. Later versions added additional rotors and more complicated plugboards. The idea with each addition, of course, was that each new element multiplied the challenge of breaking the code exponentially. And Enigma was logistically secured from compromise via robust operational planning on the part of the German military, with instructions on rotor settings distributed on dissolvable paper and changed daily so that even capture of a "key" would not compromise operational security for more than a few hours. Some German operators even began their radio transmissions by sending seemingly random numbers in the clear to their counterparts. The idea was that the counterpart operators would turn their rotors that random number of times before commencing Enigma transmission. This meant not only that the onus was on the enemy (i.e. the Allies) to have guessed the daily set of starting positions but also that they would necessarily have to intercept all radio transmissions over and above.

Enigma was a seemingly insurmountable problem for Allied intelligence in the late 1930s and into the early 1940s. The standard configuration of the device used by the German navy—the "Naval Enigma"—was set up in such a way that any brute force attack on the code (i.e. an effort to break the cipher by simply guessing all possible combinations of machine settings) had a chance of success of about 1 in 159 million million. Some variations on the device worsened those odds to 1 in billions of billions.¹³ Quite simply, it would take thousands of "computers" thousands of years to break even one day's worth of coded signals unless they were improbably lucky. Obviously, some answer other than a large-scale human effort to guess the right "key" each day was required.

We go through the details of Enigma's inner workings to reinforce the significance of the relationship between information security and what would ultimately become the technological foundations of modern network-based computer systems. At the same time, it is necessary to know some detail of the challenge facing the British intelligence community in 1940, prior to the United States' entrance to World War II and when the threat of invasion seemed imminent on an almost daily basis. It was in that environment that the now-famous members of the British intelligence establishment, notably men like Alan Turing, Bill Tutte, and Tommy Flowers, who were gathered to Bletchley Park in England in the late 1930s to serve Her Majesty's government in codebreaking endeavors, devised techniques for cracking mechanically enabled cryptographic innovations like the Enigma machine.¹⁴

The simple answer to Enigma was that "computing"—as an analytic activity—needed to evolve beyond human capabilities in much the same way that cryptography had been enhanced via technological augmentation. Specifically, a machine had to be constructed to allow for greater ease of brute force attacking the Enigma encryption.

That machine was called a “**bomba**” and, of particular interest, it was not actually developed initially either during the Second World War II or at Bletchley Park. Rather, the first bomb (or “bomba”) was developed by Polish codebreakers in 1937 working to break an initial employment of Enigma during the Spanish Civil War.¹⁵ They shared their accomplishments with their French and British counterparts shortly thereafter, and their work became the basis of more sophisticated bombs (so called probably because of the constant ticking noise they made as they worked) at both Bletchley Park and Arlington Hall (the U.S. cryptanalytic center set up in the 1940s). The bomb’s design was quite simple. It was a recreation of the inner workings of the Enigma machine designed to crank through possible combinations at incredible pace, only stopping its incessant clicking when it landed on the right “key.”

But even the development of bombs by British intelligence was not in itself enough to break Enigma. The volume of possible keys was still too great to work through in a single day before the German code changed. Those at Bletchley Park needed some way of limiting the number of possible combinations in a given day. The answer to the whole thing came down, as it often does, to the human factor. Researchers realized that two features of human efforts to create secure communications with Enigma actually allowed for the elimination of millions of possible settings combinations from the get-go. One of these features was design-based; the other was in the Germans’ actual usage of the machine.

The first flaw that gave researchers an advantage stemmed from the specific nature of the marriage of mathematics and technology inherent in the machine’s construction. The inner workings of Enigma did what all good encryption algorithms do as they are set to work to jumble information in a fashion both reversible and difficult to reverse—it simulated complexity so as to drastically lower the odds of brute force discovery while systematically allowing for key-based decryption. However, the specific design of Enigma meant that any letter entered could never be transformed into itself, an outcome that should obviously be mathematically possible given the process of randomly swapping one letter of the alphabet for another.

The second flaw, one familiar to most computer users today, stemmed from the fact that the use of Enigma by German operators invariably took on some amount of the personality of the operator themselves. In truth, the fact of Enigma was that even with knowledge about the limitations of the machine factored into the design of the attempt to brute force break the Enigma’s code, one still needed to know something of what was already inside a message in order to decode the entire thing. Today, an attempt to guess somebody’s password is dramatically more likely to succeed if some personal information is known about the target—their birthday, pet’s name, mother’s maiden name, and so on. If some detail of how a user persistently interacts with an information system (e.g. sets passwords) can be uncovered, then that leads to a systematic vulnerability across everything that user touches. If that detail manifests at the level of an organization—say, because a company issues default usernames like “admin” or “firstname_lastname@company.com” to its employees, some of whom will be too lazy to change their settings—then that organization is systematically at risk. In the case of Enigma, this last scenario manifested in the regular usage of certain terms in German communiques, from regular weather reports where Bletchley staff could confidently assert that formulaic words (i.e. “Begin weather report: . . .”) would appear to the standard “Heil Hitler” end-of-message sign-off.

Box 4.1 Systematic vulnerability and backdoors from Enigma to Huawei

Later in the book, we evoke in greater detail a story about how the first offensive action undertaken by the British Empire in World War I was actually about information and communications security. Very shortly after the official declaration of war, a British ship dredged up German telegraph cables off the northern coast of the European continent and cut them. The effect was a massive advantage for Great Britain in terms of infrastructural control of global communications. British operators were able to more effectively plan the intercept of German and Austro-Hungarian communications. This allowed British forces to more effectively counter Central Power moves, though largely outside of Europe proper, and to thwart secret plans to import resources in circumvention of the Allied embargo.

The case of Enigma is similar to the case of British attacks on German telegraph systems in that the whole thing revolves around exploiting a systematic vulnerability. Because of specific flaws in the way the device was designed and used, the Allies gained a systematic ability to compromise a foreign military system. And indeed, following the war, Allied governments made sure that Enigma machines found their way into the hands of dictators around the world, particularly in Africa. Given that Ultra and the breaking of Enigma were kept secret for more than 30 years, this spread of the machines essentially constituted a backdoor into foreign communications that the U.S. and British governments exploited to great gain.

Today, we have enduring concerns about the design and origins of technology that ultimately underwrites global communications and the various societal functions based on the function of global information infrastructure. Perhaps the best example of national security concerns about backdoors manifesting in policy is the enduring resistance in the United States to allowing the import of technology produced by Huawei, the largest Chinese manufacturer of network infrastructure. In short, the enduring concern is that something in Huawei's design might give the Chinese government a functional weapon against global Internet infrastructure in the event of future conflict. Great Britain, though it has allowed Huawei imports in recent years and has come to an arrangement with Huawei based entirely on this concern. In order to allay fears that there is something in the source code of Huawei devices, which now make up about a third of the world's physical routing infrastructure, the company has set up a secure Ministry of Defence room where British technicians can observe and dissect the source code. Nevertheless, concerns remain that the rise of non-Western technology behemoths—as well as the submission of Western firms to foreign oversight practices that might compromise design knowledge in exchange for market access—pose an immense security threat.

Taken together, British cryptanalysts were regularly able to eliminate enormous quantities of possible rotor settings for the machine. Then, bombs were able to calculate the proper key in a matter of hours each day by cranking through combinations

faster than even an army of human “computers” ever could. Enigma’s breaking, which by some estimates led to the early cessation of hostilities by as much as two years, thus involved the ushering in of a new kind of intelligence where the tools of the game were machine-based, not human. It was the start of a new era of signals intelligence. And yet, the bombs and the work on Enigma would not be the direct progenitor of the digital machines that came after the war. That honor fell to a device developed later in the war to address an even more daunting encryption challenge than Enigma.

The Tunny and the Colossus

Before World War II, the renaissance of mathematics and mechanical advancement referenced earlier not only saw the production of cryptanalytic innovations that would be applied in aid of the allied war effort but also the first real steps towards the digital age. Though it should be noted that a number of scientists in the West, in Central Europe, and in Russia notably worked on similar projects in the interwar years, credit is often and rightfully given to Alan Turing as the father of modern computers (not to mention artificial intelligence). This is largely because of his being the first to conceptualize the modern computer’s design.

Turing published a now-famous paper in 1936 called *On Computable Numbers*.¹⁶ It is quite dense. Even given this, however, it is surprisingly readable for non-specialists in those sections where the author deigns to momentarily put aside mathematical formula to describe his premise. The paper is about human intelligence and the notion that machines might be made to simulate such intelligence. Up until this point in history, humanity had made a vast number of machines built to accomplish narrow goals with some efficiency. Circuit switches for telephones, for instance, efficiently and dumbly enabled the rapid connecting of phone calls from their first widespread usage in the early twentieth century. The problem with such narrowly focused machines, of course, was that they could not be redeployed to be useful for other tasks. A human “computer” was enduringly more useful than a machine simply because the human brain is intelligent and intelligence is defined, to some greater or lesser degree, by an ability to apply skills to diverse problems.

Turing’s paper asks whether or not it was possible to design a machine that mimicked this flexibility in humans, an adaptability that he saw as roughly synonymous with intelligent behavior.¹⁷ He designed a machine in his paper. This machine would work on a fairly simple set of principles. The main principle that is critical to understanding how it worked is the deconstructability of information to dichotomous decisions. That is, every decision, no matter how complex or nuanced, can be reduced to a series of yes-or-no calculations. Turing drew, quite accurately it has turned out, his notion of human intelligence emerging from complex combinations of simple calculations from his studies of microbiology. In principle, his notion here reflects the function of neural networks (i.e. the “thinking” substrate of the human brain) in that they are basically complex sets of nodes that receive information, interpret, and then send on a new piece of information based on some set of rules. The cumulative result is human consciousness. Turing was not entirely novel in suggesting this as the basis for simulating intelligence beyond the human brain; after all, “computers” of the repetitive action kind (e.g. the armies of censors that would scan letters during World War I who decided to pass or flag one by responding to simple rules) had been doing this for years. But Turing was the first to acknowledge

how, with existing technologies, a machine might be made that entirely automated the process.¹⁸

Turing's machine, which existed for him only in his mind and on paper, was set up to receive information via two sets of paper tapes. Tapes with a single piece of data would be fed into the machine slide-by-slide for analysis. These tapes contained the information that was the focus of the machine's work. The other set of paper tapes would include the instructions from which the machine would take a simple action. The whole thing worked by a simple "if this, then that" logic wherein outputs from the machine depended entirely on the thing's "state of mind" (meaning the disposition of the machine, determined by the instructions, to make dichotomous decisions in a single way). Turing had described, in other words, not just the first programmable computer system but the first *reprogrammable* computer system with general application. The task before the machine did not matter so much as the possible programming permutations that the thing's design allowed for. The implications were immense, not least for signals' intelligence.

Towards the mid-point of the war, following the breaking of the Enigma code by cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park, new and puzzling communications were intercepted by British intelligence. They were not encrypted by Enigma and proved an immediate, unbreakable challenge for Allied intelligence. The messages were encrypted by something called a Tunny device, the use of which was reserved for the communications of German high command.¹⁹ The Tunny device was significantly more advanced than the Enigma and far more ergonomic. Typing in a message did not result in light bulbs blinking with letter outputs. Rather, the messages typed in would be encrypted and sent directly from inside the machine along wires to the destination. The Tunny worked by translating input letters into bits of information (i.e. into binary representations) that would then be scrambled via the use of 12 rotating wheels that added additional letters to the message. All the recipient would have to do would be to add the same coded letters to the received ciphertext to reveal the plaintext within. The encryption value of the Tunny was, if it is possible to believe, astronomically higher than the ubiquitous Enigma, with estimates ranging from the device being between one million and ten million times harder to break.²⁰

The key to breaking Tunny was not some prediction of regular usage patterns or a design flaw of the machine as it was with Enigma. For one thing, the usage patterns of the German high command were much more careful and the relatively limited usage of the devices prevented usage predictions based on regimented daily provision of keys in the same fashion. For another, the Allies had no Tunny machines. Rather, the answer to Tunny came from a series of Bletchley researchers—Tiltman, Tutte, and Newman, initially—who realized that there might be mathematical ways to reveal the correct key that did not require possession of one of the machines. Tutte, in particular, realized that incorrect keys would mark an incoherent distribution of outputs when run against encrypted messages but that correct keys would produce clustered distributions (what is called a statistical bulge). Mathematically, if it could be possible to set up a process in which hundreds of millions of calculations could be performed very rapidly, it would be possible to find indicators of the right keys.

A machine like the one Turing described in 1936, which had never before been built or seriously designed with real-world technological limitations in mind, was the obvious answer, and a man called Tommy Flowers stepped up to the plate with a design in mind. He and a team of 50 others used telephone circuits to construct a

fast-“thinking” device that could be programmed via use of a light plate to make simple decisions about whether or not input data conformed to a specific condition. If the statistical bulge existed, the machine’s work was done. If not, it kept going.

The machine was called Colossus and was the first legitimately digital “computer” ever built. Colossus went to work barely months after Flowers and his team began construction of the device to great success. Moreover, Colossus was adapted a number of times to tackle similar kinds of challenges. It was the generally focused, programmable machine that Alan Turing had envisioned in 1936 and allowed the Allies even greater advantages in the closing days of the war. While breaking the Enigma helped the Allies save countless lives and maneuver with greater strategic effect in the latter years of the war, the breaking of the Tunny machines allowed for information deceptions of the most sophisticated kind. The example most often cited relates to the D-Day landings in 1944, when Tunny intercepts were used to verify that information transmitted to German high command by double agents about fake Allied landing targets had been believed. It was largely confirmation of this fact via Tunny communiqués that persuaded General Eisenhower to launch the invasion when he did.²¹ As significant as such wartime advantages were, however, it was Colossus’s demonstration of general-purpose computing at work that did most to shape the coming computer revolution.

Cold War computing and the move from narrow to general

The cooperation of the intelligence communities of the UK and the United States both during and immediately following World War II drove and shaped the computer revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, a period when major commercial manufacturers made incredible advances in electronic computer technologies.²² Even before the war began, a tenuous trust was established that blossomed thereafter into an unprecedented relationship between two foreign powers that had, 100 years earlier, still regularly risked at least low-level warfare. The initial deal between the intelligence branches of both countries was fairly simple. The United States would take the lead against Japanese cryptographic and other espionage efforts with Britain in support; the flip was true for Britain against Germany. An early trade of information—details on Japan’s Purple cipher against data on how researchers at Bletchley Park had cracked the Naval Enigma—cemented the relationship.

Following the war, both countries began to wind down their intelligence networks while at the same time grabbing all of the German equipment and personnel they could. And yet, it would only be a few short weeks and months before the governments of both countries decided that the future would be a broad-scoped expansion of signals intelligence work, rather than a recession of wartime efforts. The General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was set up jointly as a successor to Bletchley Park. The new focus was the Soviet Union, a foe that the British were vastly more used to facing off against than their American cousins. Thus, in the early few years of what would become the Cold War, the UK roared ahead and took some amount of precedence in the relationship.²³

That position of preeminence would not last long. Britain’s historical experience with combating Russia aside, U.S. security services excelled in playing catchup. More importantly, U.S. technological efforts would soon surpass those of Great Britain, though largely as a result of industrial strength. Companies in the UK would quickly move to help GCHQ develop newer and better versions of the Colossus-style general

purpose electronic computer. By the time the last Colossus machines were decommissioned in 1959, several dozen more powerful successors were in operation.²⁴ In part, these computers were built to combat new and novel Soviet cryptographic techniques. One major focus of their work was Project Venona, an effort to exploit a flaw in the way the Soviets had produced a series of one-time pads—in essence, they had accidentally created about 35,000 duplicate pads—that left them vulnerable to decryption.²⁵ The work was slow and did not provide real-time intelligence, but with the help of new general purpose computers GCHQ and the new **National Security Agency** (NSA) were able to uncover significant information on traitors within Western security services.

Where the UK lost out was in the industrial might of U.S. companies, several of which were given exclusive contracts to aid the NSA in the construction of new high-tech computer systems. Whereas the UK required strict adherence to secrecy laws from a limited set of contracting companies that begin to build machines under government supervision, the United States surreptitiously shopped around with the result that innovation in computer systems was nested in private enterprise. This meant, on top of the greater moneys thrown their way by U.S. intelligence organizations, more rapid updates and user-friendly designs than UK companies were incentivized to build. The result was that, several years into the Cold War, the computer centers at both the NSA and GCHQ were filled almost entirely with IBM machines. U.S. primacy in the intelligence relationship was thus established not so much by ingenuity or adaptation to the substantive realities of Cold War espionage, but rather by the greater resources and dynamism of U.S. industry.

Enter the Internet

The upshot of such a dynamic in the early years of the Cold War, as Chapter 2 discusses briefly, was a proliferation of computer systems across *both* private industry in the West and most elements of state national security apparatuses. Entire commercial sectors grew up around the use of increasingly sophisticated computers, and the non-intelligence sections of both U.S. and allied defense establishments adopted computers in their Cold War efforts to deter Soviet aggression.

In some ways, the story of how the Internet came into being is almost a side story to the broader narrative about how the intelligence world shaped the conditions that would lead to the appearance of what we are now calling cyber conflict in the international arena. What's almost as important as the technical details of what projects were funded and new methods of information transmission developed is the shift around the midpoint of the 1960s in the role of computer systems in national security. Whereas before computers were used as tools of spycraft, now they were both used as tools of statecraft (more broadly defined than spycraft) and had become targets of the same.

Chapter 2 describes the nature of the technological development that manifested as the ARPANET in the late 1960s.²⁶ The ARPANET was the product of U.S. research funding of ideas that had been percolating in scientific communiqués in the transatlantic scientific community since at least 1962, when a scholar at MIT called J. Licklider hypothesized a “Galactic Network” concept.²⁷ In the simplest sense, the main motivation behind the development of packet-switching technologies and the design of an open architecture networking environment was the desire to more effectively share resources. On such a network, communications could be made simpler and more

accessible to the average user. The result of the ARPANET's development—and its various expansion stages that ultimately opened the nascent network to more and more institutions in academia and industry—was, eventually, the modern Internet.

Important in all of this, the example of the ARPANET as a novel and innovative method for improving efficiency in the use of computers by large organizations—or, in ARPANET's case, connected universities and laboratories spread across the United States—was not lost on the U.S. military and intelligence communities. Defense interest in the greater efficiencies involved in networked computer operations led to great private sector investment in the relevant technologies and helped fuel the expansion of Internet infrastructure through the 1970s and 1980s. Interestingly, however, interest in the Internet would be more pronounced outside of the NSA. As a result, the trajectory of Western national security establishments towards the practice of cyber warfare would not be particularly smooth, but rather defined by the pathologies of the intelligence community.

Stunted development, crypto protection, and delayed realization

The lack of interest in the Internet among those at the NSA and at GCHQ is relatively easy to understand. In the world of spycraft, computers were used to store and analyze incoming information. Communication of that information was itself a closely guarded enterprise, and the Internet was nowhere near developed enough that Western intelligence forces would be incentivized to seriously adapt their cryptographic skills to web-based forms of signaling.²⁸ The upshot was that, while militaries and research departments were investing immense resources in efficiency-improving projects based on this new network platform, the spooks at Fort Meade were generally ignoring the whole thing.

Box 4.2 Crypto as weapons of war: should security software be exported?

From the 1970s through at least the late 1980s, the U.S. and Western European defense communities were engaged in what many have called the “crypto wars.” Far from being a conflict—cold or otherwise—against foreign actors, this period was actually characterized by growing hostility between the scientific and intelligence communities in the West around the subject of secret communications. As we describe later, the simple shape of the conflict was disagreement over the right of the government to have a monopoly on encryption and a rapidly developing set of academic approaches to securing information transmission in increasingly sophisticated ways.

Two academic researchers in particular took up the mantle of questioning what they saw as the “Big Brother” practices of the NSA in monopolizing information security. They would, though they eventually came to an understanding with the government in the interests of a shared feeling of patriotic obligations, be instrumental in the development of public key (asymmetric) encryption techniques. This has, in the intervening years, led to a revolution in the way that the public is now able to enjoy the benefits of cryptography in everyday applications.

For the government, the development of public key encryption techniques (described in Chapter 2) is reflective of a broader set of enduring concerns about the nature of information technologies (particularly cryptographic ones). Given that asymmetric encryption empowers individuals and makes the task of breaking encryption far more difficult (when implemented effectively, of course), the task of law enforcement and intelligence agencies has been made harder. And yet, law on the books in most Western countries permits the government certain abilities to ensure that interception of communications is possible for national security and law enforcement purposes. Should this not extend to asymmetric encryption systems? In other words, should governments be able to mandate backdoors be built into applications that employ a public key security system? Or does the public have the right to security for its information beyond government authority?

Beyond the traditional tension between national security oversight authority and public concerns over information privacy, governments must also consider the value of security software and techniques to foreign competitors' military and intelligence services. In the mid-twentieth century, cryptographic techniques were regularly considered to be instruments of national security and so the export of new knowledge in the space was illegal. From the 1970s onwards, this position waned with the explosion of academic and commercial interest in cryptography beyond the intelligence sphere. And yet, governments are still regularly concerned about the proliferation of information security know-how around the world and the security implications of such spread. The NSA maintains informal advisory processes for coordinating the publication (or non-publication) of new techniques with academic sources where national security implications are pronounced.

More significantly, there are a series of import-export control agreements that consider certain information security applications and techniques to be instruments of conflict. In particular, the **Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies** is a multilateral arms control treaty between 42 countries that has increasingly seen the addition of software to the lists of prohibited trade items. Originally focused on traditional weapons or war and unique products like chemicals, the Arrangement has been updated in recent years to include software that encompasses intrusion command-and-control features and zero day exploits. Though the logic behind such a move is simple insofar as the signatories seek to limit the spread of potent techniques for malicious behavior, the wording of the ban on these items is broad enough that it seems to ban products that legitimately incorporate such features. These include penetration testing products made by cyber-security companies and intrusion software that doesn't provide execution features.

In short, both the domestic and international cases of government oversight of information security technologies serve to illustrate an enduring tension between national security imperatives and the desires—economic, social, and political—of non-government sectors of global society. Should governments treat these technologies as weapons or instruments of war (or crime) and act to restrain them appropriately? We'll assume the answer here is yes. But to what degree should governments be able to affect oversight?

Of more concern to spies at the NSA and at GCHQ in the 1970s was the gradual loss of control being experienced over the tools of signals intelligence.²⁹ In addition to computers proliferating throughout U.S. and UK industry, the mathematical art of cryptanalysis was gradually becoming a topic of great focus among non-government researchers. Specifically, academics in California and in the Northeast were beginning to publish new and innovative work on how to secure information. Whereas in the past such researchers would often be visited by the NSA with an offer of consultancy and a non-disclosure agreement to sign, many younger mathematicians believed that the public had the right to greater information security in an age of rapid computerization. Moreover, many researchers objected to what they saw as the NSA's attempt to securitize a public good at the expense of civil liberties.³⁰ A series of "wars" thus broke out between the signals intelligence wing of the U.S. Department of Defense and a broadening community of researchers focused on "democratizing crypto" through the 1970s and into the 1980s.³¹ Though a compromise system of sorts—wherein academics could enter into dialogue with the NSA to ensure patriotic adherence to common sense national security arguments with actual censorship—was eventually put in place, these spats largely came to define the NSA's approach to the technologies of the information age until something changed in the mid-1980s.

Maturation and exploitation in the age of cyber conflict

In the 1980s, the United States faced its first true crises of a cyber nature. These are described in much greater detail in the later chapter cataloging notable episodes in the history of cyber conflict. Briefly, however, a series of events convinced the NSA and its counterparts in allied countries to finally give the Internet its due as a revolutionary development in the ongoing information revolution.

Among those episodes, like the Cuckoo's Egg and the Morris Worm, a common feature was the use of the Internet to launch intrusive computer network attacks (CNA) for the purpose of stealing information. With the end of the Cold War, this method of approach—which had been on the minds of SIGINT operators for two decades already—was regularly and officially recognized by several directors of the NSA as a further evolution of the computerization of the intelligence business that was started at Bletchley Park some 50 years prior. Computers had become tools and then targets of espionage. Now, computers were themselves the means of spying on one's enemies, and the Internet was the medium in which spy operators would lurk. As a result, signals intelligence work that centered on networked computer systems—which would, of course, be an increasingly large section of the SIGINT portfolio of both the NSA and GCHQ—became less about the use of computers to allow for exploitation (based on information that one decoded) of enemies in the real world. Rather, use of computers *was* the exploitation that was the ultimate end goal of signals intelligence. The NSA thus evolved rapidly following the end of the Cold War from an organization largely focused on informing others within the U.S. defense community to a frontline operator directly engaging with the United States' enemies.

Structurally, this meant the rapid retooling of the NSA's operational divisions. "Group A"—i.e. those parts of the NSA focused on the Soviet Union—diminished in stature and resources while other divisions, notably the Information Assurance Directorate, rose to prominence given their traditional role in developing technological and mathematical solutions to SIGINT challenges.³² There was, of course,

entrenched opposition from those who objected to a reimagining of the NSA towards digital age operations. But such opposition gave way to the experiences of the NSA in supporting national security missions on a number of fronts. Significantly, NSA operators aided U.S. military efforts during the First Gulf War by conducting what was then often referred to as counter-command/control operations to disrupt Iraqi communications. There, the NSA was authorized to engage in operations designed to compromise computer systems and networks to aid national security objectives in line with the SIGINT mission. They were authorized, in other words, to engage in computer network exploitation.

Box 4.3 Going for the “whole haystack”

Following the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, the U.S. government underwent a major retooling of elements of the homeland and national security establishment. One major development was the installation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) between the President and the heads of individual intelligence agencies. The idea was to coordinate the transmission of intelligence from the community to the rest of government more effectively than had previously been the case and to allow for a voice that could effectively lobby the executive branch.

The second DNI, Mike McConnell, is well known for (among other things) supporting the upscaling of the NSA’s mission to capture and interpret signals for intelligence purposes. Early in his tenure, an aid presented him with a map of the world overlaid with Internet traffic volume lines. Naturally, as Chapter 2 notes, most global traffic transited through the United States (because of the unique manner in which packet routing occurs through hierarchical servers). The national security implications of this were immense. To read what a terrorist in Yemen was saying via email to an associate in Afghanistan, one did not even need to leave the United States. Rather, the information would come to the United States on its way to Afghanistan. Thus, so long as the NSA could figure out how to capture relevant data, signals intelligence work was poised to benefit immensely from an artifact of the Internet’s technological development.

There were a number of implications of such a move. In fact, McConnell’s notion matched the ideas held by many in the intelligence community from at least the late 1980s onwards. Those voices, future head of the NSA Keith Alexander among them, had envisioned a sophisticated analytic apparatus in which massive amounts of data were sifted and dissected to provide the agency with unparalleled predictive capacity. The challenge in setting up such a thing would be twofold. First, the NSA would require said massive amounts of data. And since it would be impossible to collect Internet communications after the fact, the implication of a future need to find terroristic needles in a haystack was that the NSA needed to first possess “the whole haystack.” In other words, the NSA needed to collect and store all Internet data prior to actually acting on an analytic need. This was accomplished in two ways. First, the NSA worked with Internet backbone operators to collect data “upstream,” meaning that traffic

(continued)

(continued)

was captured as it transited routing nodes in the United States. Second, the NSA was able to retrieve data directly from major technology firms like Apple and Google who were compelled by the Protect America Act (PAA) and a revised Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act (FISA) to aid the defense community.

But the data challenge implied another, one that the PAA, the Patriot Act and revised FISA were designed to address. The NSA has no purview to spy on those living within the United States or on U.S. citizens more broadly writ without a warrant. The challenge would be in separating the data of those people from foreign traffic such that the NSA could fulfill its SIGINT mission legally. The answer was a reconceptualization of the rules around SIGINT on two main fronts. First, the NSA would not be considered to be collecting Americans' information by capturing the "whole haystack" of information. Rather, this would simply be data put into storage. "Collection" would only occur if and when the NSA took that data "off the shelf" in order to perform analysis, something that would still require a warrant if Americans' information was involved. Second, the revised legal maneuvers made by the Bush administration in the 2000s removed legacy language that impractically required validation that information to be collected was definitively from persons located outside of the United States.

The line between exploitation and attack is a fine one and one that we take up in chapters to come. Next, we discuss the shape of **offensive cyber operations** (OCO). However, it is worth here noting that the line between exploitation and defense has been legally massaged over the past 20 years to allow intelligence organizations in the West to attack foreign network systems for informational gain. Specifically, in 1997, the NSA was permitted to engage in such operations broadly writ as part of a redesignation of what kinds of actions fell under the legal requirements of Title 50 of the U.S. Code (which outlines intelligence restrictions and responsibilities). For the purposes of our discussions of cyber conflict in this book, the line between exploitation and attack is meaningful only insofar as the term "cyber conflict" has increasingly been applied to an immensely broad series of conflict phenomena that have benefited from the possibilities of computer network operations. The reality, as we note consistently from now on, is that there exist few technical distinctions in the execution of operations variably labeled CNE or CNA. Rather the differences exist in the intentions of those who hack for intrusive or disruptive purposes and the kinds of effects they are able to cause. We discuss this more in detail across the next several chapters.

Towards cyber warfighting

Since the late 1980s, the Pandora's box of cyber conflict possibilities has consistently been opened wider and wider. As we describe later, events in the 1990s brought about broad-scoped national fears of "netwar" and "cyber terrorism" that persist in public discourse to this day.³³ Since at least the mid-1990s, much of that concern has been about the security of critical infrastructure that is computerized, network-enabled, and operated not by the government but by private owners. And most recently, Western

nations are concerned about new avenues for the conduct of information warfare in the form of propaganda and political manipulation enabled by cyber attack.

In many ways, a surprisingly small cross-section of major cyber conflict topics fall under the umbrella of what we might think of as the traditional SIGINT domain. Certainly, the NSA has come under fire—much as it did in the 1970s—for apparent heavy-handedness related to the massive collection of Internet signals from within the United States since the mid-2000s. Those programs rest on a twofold logic; first, that the logical nature of the Internet as pushing most global packet traffic through U.S. servers allows for collection of foreign signals from within the country and, second, that future investigations to find needles in the haystack (i.e. terrorists, foreign agents, etc.) clearly require that the NSA collect “the whole haystack” by constantly recording what happens online. Likewise, the NSA and the broader defense community have faced several major threats in the form of cyber-enabled economic espionage, such as Titan Rain, which we describe in later chapters.

But it’s important to note here that even traditional intelligence functions, because of the way that the information revolution has run its course, are about more than just spying. After all, today’s Internet-oriented SIGINT is not simply about the computerized analysis or storage of data; it is about the use of computers and networks to attack opponents’ information infrastructure as a prerequisite to conducting core intelligence tasks. Cyber exploitation *is* cyber attack, and Western espionage communities have at every turn been both the pivot upon which critical design decisions were made and the force that has shaped many of the operational realities we face today in problematizing cyber conflict as a broad-scoped, dynamic phenomenon.

Notes

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5 Attack

From exploitation to offensive cyber operations

In this chapter, we shift gears from the historical introduction of Chapter 4 and provide a descriptive introduction to offensive cyber operations (OCOs). OCOs are comprised of computer network attack (CNA) and computer network exploitation (CNE). OCOs vary in breadth and scale and are part of the overall “offense-persistent strategic environment” of cyberspace.¹ An offense-persistent environment is one in which there is a constant and continual range of OCOs and anything beyond defense in the moment is difficult. The Trump administration’s 2017 *National Security Strategy* highlights this environment when it says:

Cyberspace offers state and non-state actors the ability to wage campaigns against American political, economic, and security interests without ever physically crossing our borders. Cyberattacks offer adversaries low cost and deniable opportunities to seriously damage or disrupt critical infrastructure, cripple American businesses, weaken our Federal networks, and attack the tools and devices that Americans use every day to communicate and conduct business.

United States Cyber Command’s 2018 “command vision,” entitled “Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority,” seeks to help the United States address OCOs and “achieve and maintain superiority in cyberspace.” Here, we describe the broad context of OCOs in order to help understand how and in what ways the United States and other actors are engaging in conflict online. First, we provide an introduction to the concept and to different types of OCO. Then, we discuss the argument that OCOs constitute a revolution in military affairs and overview the special characteristics associated with cyber weapons. We conclude with a review of some notable examples of OCO, which are expanded on in Chapter 6’s brief history of several major cyber conflict episodes.

OCOs and the digital domain today

As earlier chapters indicate, the digital domain has been conceptualized and defined in numerous ways and has only recently emerged as a strategic security concern. In the United States, the domain was originally defined by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in 2000 as the “notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over computer networks.”² This computer-centric definition was significantly modified in 2006 when the U.S. Air Force constituted a broader

definition that was subsequently adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late 2006 and ultimately codified for all of DoD.³ The new military definition of cyberspace—which applies to the military and non-military sectors—is as:

[a] global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processes and controllers.⁴

This definition encompasses the **Internet**, the **World Wide Web**, smartphones, computer servers, iPads, and other common elements of our digital lives. The U.S. government's 2003 *National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace* went even further and highlighted the virtually all-encompassing list of societal sectors that are particularly reliant on cyberspace. The document broadly discusses the agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemicals and hazardous materials, and postal/shipping sectors.⁵ Given the breadth of functions of daily life reflected in this list, cyberspace is unmistakably central to the U.S. and global economy. Further, the United States is utterly dependent on cyberspace with over 239 million regular Internet users (a 77.3% penetration rate).⁶ Cyberspace is also a key supporting element of U.S. military power. The DoD relies heavily on information technology networks for Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and the planning and execution of day-to-day military operations. This reliance on cyberspace, while particularly relevant for the United States, also applies to the rest of the international community. As the Obama administration's *International Strategy for Cyberspace* points out:

[t]he last two decades have seen the swift and unprecedented growth of the Internet as a social medium; the growing reliance of societies on networked information systems to control critical infrastructures and communications systems essential to modern life; and increasing evidence that governments are seeking to exercise traditional national power through cyberspace.⁷

The ITU, the UN agency for information and communication technologies, reported that over one-third of the world's seven billion people were online at the end of 2011, a 17% increase since 2006.⁸ That figure has only gone upwards in the intervening years. Multilateral security organizations such as NATO are still grappling with how to approach cyber threats and develop consensus on regulative norms and approaches for collective defense.⁹ Further, the cyber domain is largely owned and controlled by private industry and, thus, many actions in cyberspace require a public-private partnership.¹⁰ This raises a host of ethical and legal questions associated with conducting warfare through a domain largely privately owned and controlled. For example, what are the responsibilities of ISPs to detect, report, and block malicious traffic intended to harm their host nations? This legal question and many others arising from this rather unique aspect of the domain have yet to be resolved.

While it can be challenging to reach agreement on what constitutes cyberspace as a domain, hostile action in cyberspace is even more difficult to define—yet it is even

more pivotal to understand the dynamics of cyber warfare. OCOs are the employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace and cyber warfare and generally understood to be CNE and CNA-style attacks. As the previous chapter alludes to, CNE and CNA often go hand-in-hand as CNE is conducted to collect information and conduct pre-attack reconnaissance prior to a CNA. In a very real sense, using unauthorized cyber access to steal information allows the option to destroy information and progress into a cyber attack. Tom Gjelten described this phenomenon when he said that:

[t]he difference between cyber crime, cyber-espionage and cyber war is a couple of keystrokes. The same technique that gets you in to steal money, patented blue-print information, or chemical formulas is the same technique that a nation-state would use to get in and destroy things.¹¹

Box 5.1 Cyberspace as the fifth domain. . . too actuarial?

It is worth, at this early stage, noting that the U.S.-centric view of cyberspace as a domain in which human interaction—such as warfighting—can occur is challenged by many as being so actuarial as to preclude certain notions of what cyber conflict actually ends up being. In short, Western defense communities tend to think of cyberspace as a domain much like land, sea, space, and air. It has a certain terrain and a unique mode of interaction, much as exists in the other domains. The strong implication is that we can problematize conflict in the cyber domain in much the same way that we do the others by understanding the characteristics of the landscape and tools involved.

The issue with such a view, though it remains popular and has clear appeal in thinking about conflict online, is that it encourages categorization of cyber techniques for engagement in line with the dynamics of the domain itself. Cyber actions might be analyzed as meaning or accomplishing particular things and not others simply because much theory about how actors fight online emerges from an understanding of *only* domain-specific characteristics. For instance, if there is an inability to differentiate between intrusion for aggressive purposes or for reconnaissance purposes, then we might be inclined to think that limited cyber attacks are more indicative of the latter than the former. And yet, such attacks may be designed to enable conflict in other domains, such as a kinetic attack or a HUMINT-style intelligence operation.

This might seem like a minor point and, indeed, we do not argue that the notion of cyberspace as a unique domain of warfighting is unhelpful. But it is certainly the case that non-Western countries have conceptualized Internet-based technologies and their effects on global conflict without resorting to the sort of domain-specific conceptualizations that parallel the organization of Western defense establishments so neatly. The Chinese, for instance (and as we discuss later on), conceptualize information age conflict as occurring more broadly in the context of an “informationization” trend in global society akin to industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century. Others have envisioned the phenomena not as an entirely new feature of human interaction, but rather

as a sort of new source of background pollution that adds complexity to international conflict and contention. Ultimately, of course, the question is one of the utility of different frameworks for thinking about cyber conflict. The “fifth domain” mindset is useful and certainly the prevailing framework present in Western cyber conflict discourse. But it is easy to see how such an approach to conceptualizing cyberspace could be limited. Indeed, as we discuss at length in later chapters, Western defense communities have regularly undergone “realization” episodes wherein previously under-problematized cyber threats have manifested and forced planners to consider a broader scope to cyber issues than they had in the past.

As a result, many today refer to cyber espionage as “cyber warfare” or “cyber attacks” when in actuality no damage (other than secondary damage caused by the relative advantage the stolen information provides) occurs. Security scholar John Arquilla has pointed this out by highlighting the fact that international law defines an attack as “violence against the adversary” and that such a term does not necessarily apply to all cyber operations (namely, here, to CNE-style operations).¹² A good example of this blurred line between CNE and CNA would be the 2014 cyber attack that occurred during the political crisis in Ukraine involving a weapon known as “Snake” (or Ouroboros). Snake is of suspected Russian origin, but positive attribution has not been achieved.¹³ It is a CNE, possibly CNA, tool kit that in 2010 began infecting Ukrainian computer systems.¹⁴ Since 2010, researchers have identified 56 incidents of Snake, 32 of which were found in Ukraine, and believe it was used not only for CNE but also to conduct highly sophisticated CNA-style attacks.¹⁵

This imprecise lexicon when it comes to the term “cyber warfare” and “cyber attacker” complicates the environment in which perspectives on cyber warfare emerge and in which cyber conflict is itself conducted. Moreover, Security and Defence Agenda, in collaboration with computer security company McAfee, published a report in February 2012, which identified the lack of agreement over key terms such as cyber war and cyber attack as a major impediment to norms and regulating cyber conflict.¹⁶

Offensive cyber operations as a revolution in military affairs

It is commonly thought that cyber warfare and OCOs represent a major revolution in military affairs, a technological shift so dramatic that the character of conflict and the paradigms of strategic thought that govern how militaries prepare for (and engage in) war are fundamentally transformed. Some have gone so far as to predict that it will “soon be revealed to be the biggest revolution in warfare, more than gunpowder and the utilization of air power in the last century.”¹⁷ Further, in all likelihood, the threat of emerging-technology cyber weapons will only increase. CSIS has identified more than 30 countries that are taking steps to incorporate cyber warfare capabilities into their military planning and organizations,¹⁸ and Adam Liff has argued that the use of cyber warfare as a “brute force” weapon is likely to increase in frequency.¹⁹ Adversaries such as China have increasingly focused on developing “informationized” warfighting strategies (discussed in Chapter 10) that are heavily reliant on computers and information systems and focus on attacking such systems possessed

by their adversaries.²⁰ Increased international interest in cyber warfare is also based on the recognition that information networks in cyberspace are becoming operational centers of gravity in armed conflict.²¹ This was reflected in DoD's 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (as it was in previous reviews), which said:

[t]he United States has come to depend on cyberspace to communicate in new ways, to make and store wealth, to deliver essential services, and to perform national security functions. The importance of cyberspace to the American way of life—and to the Nation's security—makes cyberspace an attractive target for those seeking to challenge our security and economic order. Cyberspace will continue to feature increasing opportunities but also constant conflict and competition—with vulnerabilities continually being created with changes in hardware, software, network configurations, and patterns of human use.²²

Cyber warfare plays a role at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war: from impacting engagement systems at the tactical level, to the adversary's ability to mass and synchronize forces at the operational level, to the ability of senior leadership to maintain clear situational awareness of the national security environment at the strategic level.²³ Additionally, many of IR's most well-known perspectives, such as Michael Horowitz's theory on the diffusion of new military capabilities (Adoption Capacity Theory), indicate that cyber weapons are likely to spread quickly. Adoption Capacity Theory, for instance, argues that the diffusion of military innovations depends on two intervening variables: the financial intensity involved in adopting the capability and the internal organizational capacity to accommodate any necessary changes in recruiting, training, or operations to adopt the capability.²⁴ The low financial and organizational barriers to developing cyber warfare capabilities indicate that the adoption of OCOs will likely be widespread.

The special characteristics of cyber “weapons”

Cyber warfare involves many special characteristics that often do not apply to other forms of conflict, especially conventional military conflict. These include the challenges of actor attribution, multi-use nature of the associated technologies, target and weapon unpredictability, potential for major collateral damage or unintended consequences due to cyberspace's “borderless” domain, questionable deterrence value, the use of covert programs for development, attractiveness to weaker powers and non-state actors as an asymmetric weapon, and the use as a force multiplier for conventional military operations.²⁵

Challenge of attribution. The first major characteristic of most cyber “weapons”—this term is extremely common in scholarship and practitioner work on cyber-security, but we place it in quotation marks because of the broadly acknowledged dispute over how accurate it is to call code a weapon—is the challenge of attribution following their use. This is a result of the tremendous difficulty in conclusively determining the origin, identity, and intent of an actor/attacker operating in this domain if the actor wishes to remain anonymous, and defenders generally lack the tools needed to reliably trace an attack back to the actual attacker. Thomas Rid argues that all cyber attacks to date have been examples of a sophisticated form of sabotage, espionage, or subversion and are reliant on this attribution difficulty.²⁶ Cyberspace is truly

global, and nearly all action passes through networks and ISPs in multiple countries. Additionally, the hardware used to conduct cyber warfare can be owned by innocent noncombatants, illicitly harnessed for malicious use through the use of computer viruses (as was the case in the Estonian and Georgian attacks, to be examined later in this chapter). Some computer experts estimate that between 10–25% of computers connected to the Internet (approximately 100–150 million devices) are compromised and used illicitly as part of various networks of compromised computers—known as “botnets”—utilized to conduct attacks.²⁷

The use of these types of proxies provides plausible deniability to state sponsored activity. The Conficker worm, first detected in November 2008, is another example of the challenge of attribution in cyberspace. It is suspected that it is of Ukrainian origin, largely because it did not target Ukrainian IP addresses or computers using Ukrainian-configured keyboards; however, a savvy adversary could have deliberately programmed it that way as part of a deception strategy.²⁸ Another attack, this one on DoD computer systems and known as “Solar Sunrise,” was initially traced back to Israel and the United Arab Emirates. U.S. officials suspected that the attack was orchestrated by operatives in Iraq. However, later investigations determined it was conducted by two teenagers in California.²⁹ Yet another cyber attack, known as “Night Dragon,” targeted five multinational oil companies and stole gigabytes of highly sensitive commercial information regarding Western energy development activities. Investigators traced the attack to IP addresses in China, confirmed that the tools used in the attack were largely of Chinese origin, and that the attacks were conducted between nine-to-five Beijing time (indicating the likelihood that government or government-affiliated personnel conducted the attack). However, in spite of this significant evidence indicating Chinese involvement, probably even official Chinese government involvement, it was not possible to conclusively attribute the attack and Chinese officials claimed innocence.³⁰ These attribution challenges make it very difficult to conclusively link hostile action in cyberspace to a particular individual, organization, or nation state. This reality makes cyber warfare particularly appealing for an adversary seeking to achieve certain effects anonymously or at least with reasonable deniability.

Offense as emerging from defensive considerations. Something to consider about OCOs up front is that not all offensive action taken in cyberspace is designed to be aggressive or even about espionage. Rather, states and non-state actors often hack in order to better their defensive situation. In general, we think of cyber defense as being constituted of both computer network defense (CND) *and* proactive measures taken to scope out the nature of threats on the horizon. CND is a relatively simple set of operational activities to understand. In short, CND typically involves passive defensive measures designed to help secure the perimeter of an organization and that organization’s information systems. Actors might seek to improve cyber hygiene among employees (i.e. by training the workforce in better data protection practices and enforcing better standards for password usage). Likewise, they might employ firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and anti-virus software in their systems. **Firewalls** are programs that sit on information exchange points (i.e. a router) and either allow or prohibit Internet traffic from entering a network based on a set of rules (e.g. does this packet of information come from an IP address in a blacklisted country?). IDS programs are similar but look at traffic internal to a network as opposed to just at the exchange point. IDS applications, though the line between these and

firewalls has blurred a great deal in recent years as applications have become more sophisticated, look for anomalous behavior and report findings to a network administrator. Anti-virus software does something similar, either comparing the content of data packets to a database of known malicious signatures or (in the more sophisticated instances) looking for code that could be linked to malware.

By contrast, any actor concerned with cyber-security has significant incentives to take *active defense* measures. The logic here is pretty similar. If you are trying to defend a vault in a building containing valuable commodities (gold, diamonds, bearer bonds, etc.), you are not only going to invest in security guards, ID systems, bullet-proof glass, and so on. You are going to hire individuals to actively investigate who might want to steal your goods and who might be capable of doing so. This lets you better prepare your perimeter defenses. In some instances, this might let you disrupt the preparation of someone you find that is interested in attacking you or at least signal to them that you're onto them, thus hopefully changing their operational calculus.

The logic is identical with cyber operations. More often than not, a good defense means a good offense. Reconnaissance of those threat actors you suspect of future transgressions is useful for your own defensive preparations. Moreover, doing something like “burning a vulnerability” (i.e. drawing attention to your own ability to intrude on an enemy's systems) can signal your awareness of the situation to an opponent and hopefully deter their future attack. This dynamic with offensive cyber operations is particularly significant for our later discussions of the strategic dynamic that exists between states in cyberspace. In short, if you are unable to tell the difference between what is an attack, an intrusion that is a prelude to an attack, and a mere reconnaissance exercise, how can you plan for different conflict eventualities?

Box 5.2 “Hack-back”

An additional element to the discussion of CNA as multi-purposed in these sections is the practice of “hack-back.” Hack-back is quite simply the practice of victimized actors—often via some specialized service provider hired to help mitigate the costs of an attack—undertaking their own offensive cyber operations designed to find and delete stolen information, monitor an attacker after the fact, and potentially minimize the chance of a future assault. In practice, hack-back often occurs in several stages, which are illustrated in Figure 5.1.

The first stage of a hack-back operation is to track the culprit and assess their approach to your systems. This stage is risky, largely because tracking a culprit often means entering innocent third-party systems that were compromised for purposes of supporting the initial attack. We return to this point later. Second, the victim gains access to the hacker's system, often the command and control (C2) server used to launch the attack and which now (ideally) is the location upon which stolen data resides. At this juncture, the idea is not to be seen to be counterattacking, and so efforts are taken to hide the presence of the victim in the attacker's system. Once able to do so, the victim can then affect a means of control over the system and monitor attacker actions. Then, when ready, the victim attacks with the goals of mitigating the costs of the original assault and disabling the attacker's ability to further antagonize.




Figure 5.1 Operational stages of “hack-back”

Hack-back is not, at the point of writing this, legal in the United States without a special court warrant. Such a warrant has rarely been issued. Without such authorization, hack-back attacks violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. In Europe, it violates the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention. In particular, hack-back clearly contains risks to innocents that have been compromised and manipulated in the initial attack. Nevertheless, a niche industry exists around the practice that makes use of proxy servers in foreign countries and personnel based overseas to bypass legal restrictions on the practice. More significantly, a bill is at the time of writing this book in Congress that aims to legalize certain forms of hack-back.

Multi-use nature of Internet technologies. Another characteristic of cyber weapons is that their underlying technologies are multi-use. This means that cyber IT systems can have defensive and civilian applications and purposes in addition to any offensive cyber warfare application. In fact, many IT and hardware and software components usable for cyber warfare are ubiquitous, commercial, off-the-shelf technologies with many peaceful applications. According to the NRC, advances in IT are driven primarily by commercial needs and are widely available across the globe to nearly all groups and individuals.³¹ Additionally, Forrester Research projected that the number of computers worldwide—and therefore the number of individuals with access to these tools—would grow from one billion in 2008 to probably two billion by 2015, although this would be difficult to quantify accurately.³² The military and intelligence community IT required to conduct cyber warfare is drawn from these globally

distributed and commercially developed resources. In some cyber operations, such as those utilizing distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks, private and commercial computers themselves may deliberately and surreptitiously be utilized as part of the attack. A DDOS attack uses multiple compromised systems (collectively known as botnets), usually infected with a Trojan virus that can be developed by simple criminals or state actors, to target a single system. Victims of a DDOS attack consist of both the end-targeted system and all systems maliciously used and controlled by the attacker (also known as a “botherder” or “botmaster”) in the distributed attack. The most common form of DDOS attack is simply to send more traffic to a network address than it is equipped to handle. This multi-use nature of cyber warfare technology has obvious implications for the ability to address cyber threats by restricting access to the hardware or software involved—namely that doing so would likely not be particularly effective or practical.

Unpredictability and potential for collateral damage. Another characteristic of cyber weapons is the unpredictability and potential for collateral damage associated with their use. Due to the ever-changing innovations in enterprise architecture and network operations, as well as any IT interdependencies, predicting the precise effects of an attack are very difficult. As in other warfighting domains, an actor may have conducted intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations and mapped out vulnerabilities in an adversary’s cyber network as would be done to plan for a conventional ground attack with tanks and troops. However, unlike in the conventional realm, the targeted actor is capable of flipping a switch and instantly changing the network (i.e. the target set) or even unplugging it altogether. This factor is a destabilizing force as it rewards immediate hostile action to prevent network modification if cyber ISR intrusions are later detected. It is in effect the opposite of deterrence, incentivizing early offensive strike when an advantage is present. Defenders may also have unknown automated countermeasures that negate the desired effects of cyber attacks (such as instantaneous network reconfiguration or firewalls). For example, the Stuxnet attack is probably no longer able to continue to attack Iranian nuclear facilities as the zero-day exploits it utilized have been plugged by Iranian officials. In addition to network/target evolution, cyber weapons themselves can also be unpredictable since many can evolve. A cyber weapon can adapt—as has been seen with the Conficker virus. Conficker includes a mechanism that utilizes a randomizing function to generate a new list of 250 domain names (used as command and control rendezvous points) on a daily basis—remaining adaptable and staying one step ahead of those seeking to shut down or hijack the illicit Conficker-enabled network.³³

Network interdependencies also contribute to the potential for collateral damage that is characteristic of cyber weapons. The Internet is made up of hundreds of millions of computers connected through an elaborate and organic interwoven network and, as previously discussed, it is the backbone of much of the global economy; any major attack could pose significant unintended and collateral impacts if it spurred a ripple effect through the network. For example, if an attack on a particular Internet node resulted in the blackout of an entire regional ISP, not only would the intended target be affected but also all other users of the ISP and other individuals who relied on the services of those users directly impacted. The second and third degree impacts of some forms of cyber warfare are nearly impossible to predict. These effects are not limited to the theoretical: cyber attacks have already led to real-world collateral damage. Israel’s suspected cyber attack on Syrian air defense radars in advance of their

2007 attack on a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction may have also inadvertently caused damage to Israel's own cyber networks.³⁴

Questionable deterrent value. Another characteristic of many cyber weapons is their questionable value in achieving deterrent effects. Deterrence theory and OCOs are discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters, but its relevance as a characteristic of cyber weapons is briefly discussed here. The uncertain effects of cyber weapons coupled with the availability of defenses and the need for secrecy and surprise reduce their ability to serve as a strategic deterrent. Available defenses and the potential for network evolution to mitigate the effects of an attack given early warning requires cyber attackers to rely on surprise for much of their effectiveness. To achieve surprise, secrecy is required, reducing the ability of a state to make credible threats without compromising their cyber warfare capabilities. Credible threats regarding specific means of attack or targets invite the threatened state to take protective actions which could blunt the deterrent value of a threat. Although cyber weapons have the potential to inflict unacceptable damage against an adversary, they are probably unable to offer states an "assured" capability for doing so. This deficiency significantly undermines their suitability as a deterrent tool and instead they are more likely to be used preemptively or as force multipliers. Additionally, because of the attribution challenge discussed previously, there is often limited public discussion regarding cyber warfare capabilities and intent.

Importance of secrecy and surprise. A feature of cyber conflict discussed more fully in later chapters, another important characteristic of cyber weapons is the frequent use of covert programs to develop them and the related prospect for unexpected technological breakthroughs of tremendous significance. Due to the sensitivities of cyber weapons and the uncertain international response, their development is rarely publicly acknowledged or demonstrated. Further, because of the multi-use nature of IT, the development of offensive cyber capabilities is similar in many ways to the development of defensive capabilities or even civilian and commercial activities. Thus, it can be very difficult to gauge the intentions of the adversary based solely on their public indicators. Cyber warfare does not require large facilities with distinctive signatures and easily detected emissions as would a nuclear weapons program. This makes national technical means such as intelligence collection satellites fairly ineffective for understanding adversary cyber activities. Intelligence on foreign capabilities and intentions in both areas is likely to be poor barring well-placed human sources who pose challenges of their own.³⁵ Further, the utility of cyber CNE-type espionage activity incentivizes keeping secret efforts to develop such cyber tools and counter-measures against them.

Another distinct aspect to the importance of secrecy and surprise in cyberspace is the potential emergence of revolutionary technology such as a quantum computer, which would render all forms of encryption obsolete. Any category of weapon is always subject to an advance in technology that gives someone an edge, but with cyber the risk of a breakout is much more pronounced. A quantum computer would utilize the principles of quantum mechanical phenomena to process data at spectacular speeds. The first nation to develop and field a full-blown quantum computer could be able to utterly dominate cyberspace for a period of time. Looking beyond the acute example of quantum computing, smaller technological advances could also have a dramatic effect on the balance of power in cyberspace. The life-cycle of advanced computer technology is much more accelerated than other weapon systems.

Moore's Law, developed by Intel co-founder Gordon Moore in the 1960s, rather accurately predicted that computer technology would advance dramatically. He predicted that "the number of transistors which can be manufactured on a single die will double every 18 months."³⁶ Moore's Law arguably continues to apply today. If a nation fails to keep up with these advances, their ability to defend against or wage cyber warfare will be dramatically reduced.

Asymmetric warfare. Another distinguishing aspect to cyber weapons, which is fully the focus of Chapters 8 and 9, is their attractiveness to weaker powers and non-state actors as asymmetric weapons. This attractiveness is based on the potential for anonymity and associated plausible deniability, as discussed previously, as well as the relatively low cost of developing cyber weapons and the global power projection they can provide. Cyber weapons are attractive to relatively weaker actors (state and non-state) due to their low cost compared to other weapons. The most successful known cyber weapon—Stuxnet—likely cost in the low double-digit millions of dollars to produce.³⁷ Alternative weapons for achieving similar effects against the Iranian nuclear program—Stuxnet's target—would have necessitated weapons costing billions of dollars (for example, producing a single B2 bomber costs over \$2 billion).³⁸ Cyber expert Adam Liff has contested the financial ease of acquiring potent cyber weapons and argued that obtaining advanced cyber weapons such as Stuxnet would in most cases exceed the reach of weaker states.³⁹ However, Liff's argument does not take into account the ease with which computer code, once developed, can be replicated and modified. Anti-virus software company founder Eugene Kaspersky has said that given Stuxnet's code is now publicly available, it would be "quite easy to disassemble the code to discover how it works, to extract the components and to redesign the same idea in a different way."⁴⁰ As a result, the cost of cyber weapons will likely decrease as they (and their associated code) proliferate and are increasingly deployed. Dorothy Denning further described this appeal to weaker actors when she highlighted that the cost of launching cyber warfare operations could be "negligible" while the cost to the attack victims could be "immeasurable."⁴¹

In addition to relative low cost, cyber weapons also provide global power projection capability to almost any adversary due to the global nature of cyberspace. This characteristic is particularly appealing to states with very limited expeditionary capabilities but with global aspirations, such as China. "Thanks to computers," one Chinese strategist writes, "long-distance surveillance and accurate, powerful and long-distance attacks are now available to our military."⁴² Operations in cyberspace, unlike those in other domains (with the possible exception of space), immediately give a state global power projection capability. The National Research Council (NRC) has highlighted this prospect of "remote-access" attacks where computers are attacked through the Internet or connection nodes present in wireless networks or dial-up modems.⁴³ By tapping into global ISPs and other IT-based networks, attackers are able to effectively conduct expeditionary warfare in an area distant from their own territory. Prior to the advent of cyber warfare, very few nations had the resources to develop the sizable and robust military assets required to overcome global logistical challenges and project power far outside of their neighborhood. Through pre-existing global computer networks, a cyber attack with global reach can be conducted as rapidly as electrons can traverse the electro-magnetic spectrum. While IT networks and advanced technologies have enhanced the command and control required for traditional power projection, cyber attacks can now be conducted from completely within

cyberspace itself. This effectively removes the high entry costs required in conventional warfare to develop aircraft carrier battle groups, strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and so forth, associated with power projection. Denning describes this characteristic, stating cyber warfare operations:

[c]an take place in an instant and come from anywhere in the world. They can be orchestrated and conducted from the comfort of a home or office, without the risks of spies and undercover operations, physical break-ins, and the handling of explosives. The number of targets that potentially could be reaching is staggering.⁴⁴

Cyber warfare has clear limitations as compared to traditional expeditionary capabilities, but it is understandably attractive to less-developed or advanced states, such as rising peer competitors to the United States—such as China—who are seeking to exert global influence. The 2007 DDOS attacks against Estonia, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, provide a good example of this power projection capability. During a two-week period attackers were able to successfully disrupt the Estonian government, media outlets, banking, ISPs, and telecommunications websites by launching attacks from approximately 100 million computers distributed to more than 50 nations.⁴⁵ Due to the asymmetric nature of cyber warfare, it is likely to be a favored form of warfare by adversaries unwilling to directly challenge conventional military capabilities with similar conventional capabilities (particularly China, which as discussed, has demonstrated a heightened interest in cyber warfare).⁴⁶

Force multiplier. The ability to use cyber weapons as a force multiplier for conventional military operations is another significant characteristic of cyber warfare. Cyber weapons are well suited for attacks on logistical networks, reinforcements, and command and control facilities in order to “induce operational paralysis, which reduces the enemy’s ability to move and coordinate forces in the theater.”⁴⁷ While cyber weapons may not have a direct kinetic effect on an adversary’s tanks and aircraft, it is still possible for cyber attacks to render these weapons useless. Additionally, because cyber weapons can achieve such effects without kinetic destruction, they can be employed in ways similar to those intended for the infamous neutron bomb (which killed troops with a blast of lethal neutron radiation but did not cause physical damage) by degrading or destroying enemy military capabilities while preserving transportation infrastructure, etc. Thus, cyber weapons can provide an attacker with the capability of seizing valuable natural resources or industrial facilities without risking their destruction.

Similarly, cyber weapons, particularly those allegedly being developed by China to exploit the U.S. military’s logistics IT network, would complement conventional military operations. A 2007 RAND Corporation report on Chinese anti-access strategies explained that Chinese military strategists believe cyber attacks are likely to be effective in disrupting U.S. military operations because military IT systems are connected to commercial networks. The report indicated that one Chinese official said that in the United States, “95 percent of military networks pass through civilian lines and that 150,000 military computers pass through normal computer networks. This characteristic of computer networks makes it easy to conduct a virus attack.”⁴⁸ Despite their general lack of transparency on defense issues, Chinese strategists have had a handful of open discussions about how they would exploit this weakness as a

force multiplier for a conventional conflict. A Chinese report in 2000 said that the goal of Chinese cyber warfare was to “cut off the enemy’s ability to obtain, control, and use information, to influence, reduce, and even destroy the enemy’s capabilities of observing, decision-making, and commanding and controlling troops, while we maintain our own ability to command and control.”⁴⁹

What do offensive cyber operations actually look like?

Though Chapter 2 does strive to provide a technical foundation upon which students using this book can expand their understanding of what dynamics cyber conflict emerges from, it is not an in-depth forensics accounting of how cyber attacks take place. Likewise, the earlier sections in this chapter are written so as to offer a strategic perspective on what offensive cyber operations look like. Simply put, it is not the purpose of this book to offer a set of operational training resources for those interested in OCOs. Rather, we aim to offer context and content for those interested in understanding the theoretical, doctrinal, and policy implications of cyber conflict, all of which we turn to over the next few chapters.

That said, it is worth briefly describing the series of actions typically involved in cyber attacks. One way to do this is via something called the **Kill Chain** (or “Cyber Kill Chain”). In essence, the Kill Chain is a model for deconstructing cyber operations via an understanding of the operational phases involved for the attacker. The assumption with a Kill Chain is that some attacker is going to achieve some objective and that they’ll need to go through various operational steps to get there. Given that, we can start to make assumptions about what an attacker might need to be successful, how they’ll have to plan their attack, what resources they’ll need, and so on. In doing so, it is possible to construct a pretty good generic outline of what attackers are likely to do in detail at different stages of planning and execution. Thus, the Kill Chain is immensely useful for those interested in forensically breaking apart cyber incidents to understand the relevance and significance of different particular actions taken by aggressors online.

It is important to note here that there are a number of other models similar in function to the Kill Chain but different in the details. Most, however, deal with similar kinds of assumptions. There is an argument out there among experts that the Kill Chain is outdated, but a common position is that it has immense analytic value.

Figure 5.2 visually outlines the Kill Chain. The Kill Chain envisions cyber attacks as occurring in four stages, one of which is actually constituted of another four sub-stages. First, malicious cyber actors will take initial action to preliminarily compromise a target. In all of this, it’s important to remember what we read and talked about in Chapter 2 regarding access control. Simply put, all cyber insecurities—insofar as they emerge from the *design* of information systems—have to do with loss of access control (i.e. with the loss of the ability to prevent an unauthorized access of information or data controls). The implication of this is that attackers will rarely be able to directly attack—i.e. attempt to gain access to—their primary target. They’ll need to figure out a way in towards their objective. This involves reconnaissance and the preparation of resources geared towards compromising some part of a target system. This is the phase where traditional intelligence resources are often employed for the purpose of, say, subverting employees of a target organization, stealing credentials, or inserting malware. The initial compromise then allows basic




Figure 5.2 The cyber Kill Chain

access to a system wherein an attacker eventually aims to move around and find the right target.

The second stage of the Kill Chain is the establishment of a beachhead or a foothold. Once the initial compromise has been made, an attacker will act to ensure their continued initial access to a system. This means that an attacker might do something like change logs (records) to make their use of stolen credentials look innocuous or create themselves additional low-level access credentials.

After this, the Kill Chain describes cyber attacks as going into a multi-phase stage wherein the attacker attempts to move towards their ultimate target. This entails four different activities. The fourth activity is that, now inside, the attacker will look for new opportunities to escalate their privileges. This means exploring the environment they have access to and looking for ways to affect new compromises that will let them into other areas of a network or computer system that they currently can't access.

Three activities aid this effort to upgrade access privileges. First, an attacker will undertake reconnaissance of their new environment. Second, they will move laterally within the system in order to achieve the right conditions for further compromise. And third, they will continue to take actions to maintain their presence, including masking their actions and providing for future abilities to re-compromise the system. The final part of the Kill Chain is then simple. At some point, the attacker will complete their mission, having escalated their access to such a point that they are able to achieve the disruption they intend or are able to steal information etc.

An important point to be made here is that not all cyber operations mirror the linear attack profile outlined by the Kill Chain model all the way to a clear end point. Indeed, there is a robust criticism of the Kill Chain as more being useful for conceptualizing the task involved in planning and executing computer network attacks than for actually mapping out specific operations. For one thing, the Kill Chain is particularly useful for describing efforts to insert malware and then use infected systems to affect greater control of a target's platform. By contrast, extremely sophisticated intelligence and warfare operations, which are largely the focus of this book, might involve an immense volume of intrusions, malware employments, and non-cyber actions as a

necessary means of attacking highly secure or complex systems. Often, understanding how an APT was planned and executed precludes use of something like the Kill Chain, simply because it oversimplifies the attack pathway taken by an attacker. In reality, perhaps the best way to think about cyber campaigns is quite simply to think of multiple Kill Chains arrayed alongside one another to represent multiple vectors of attack, both cyber and conventional. Taken together, these different intrusive and manipulative actions constitute a campaign that provides appropriate access control exploitation potential and allows for the execution of a mission/the delivery of a payload. Nevertheless, as we mentioned earlier, it is a useful model with which to conceptualize and from which to infer about OCOs in general.

Understanding cyber warfare

In this chapter, we have discussed offensive cyber operations from a strategic perspective. The next section of the book extends what we've started here in outlining major cyber conflict episodes and engaging with questions of *why* and *how* states go about making the decision to use cyberspace for aggression, espionage, and subversion.

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6 A brief history of major cyber conflict episodes

Though the link between information technologies, cyberspace, and national security seems to be timelessly cited as something governments are *increasingly* worried about, the fact is that the history of interactions between states online in international affairs is already decades old. Broadly speaking, cyber conflict has been a hallmark of IR—particularly between advanced industrial countries—for many years. States regularly intrude upon the digital systems of their peer competitors in attempts to disrupt, to steal information, and to contest the digital control of different national functions. Perhaps the first known incident of state-sponsored hacking of U.S. government systems—involving the infiltration of U.S. computer systems by an East German free-lance agent connected to Soviet intelligence forces—happened in the late 1980s; today, states are faced with the challenge of detecting, deterring, redirecting, and defending against many thousands of cyber attacks on critical state functions on a daily basis. Moreover, national militaries have increasingly adopted doctrine and assets designed to incorporate digital operations into campaign deployments.

That said, it would be disingenuous to suggest that cyber-security has changed the entire calculus of national security and of strategizing on future conflict for states. Certainly, governments face new challenges and opportunities in the digital age. However, it is as yet unclear as to the degree to which cyber interactions have actually affected state foreign policymaking beyond the confines of specific episodes. Indeed, initial evidence on the matter suggests that cyber conflict and non-digital responses to thousands of cyber “interactions” since the late 1990s have been remarkably restrained. Cyber assaults can provide unique gains for an aggressor. However, cyber attacks rarely lead to negative foreign policy responses, with barely a few notable exceptions. Cyber conflict, it appears, tends to meaningfully manifest as the result of relatively nuanced strategic realities, like the existence of an established regional rivalry or government investment in parallel strategic initiatives.

This chapter deals with the history of interstate cyber conflict. Conflict is defined as no more or less than the incidence of conflictual interactions between state entities, such as militaries, intelligence agencies, or other governmental organizations. Such interactions lie on a spectrum of severity from unauthorized access to certain computer systems all the way to actions designed to cause major digital or physical disruption, and include acts of espionage, sabotage, and, in some quite rare cases, physical violence. In this chapter, we cover briefly major events in the history of cyber conflict to date with a particular focus on those incidents involving the United States, China, Russia, and Israel. We specifically describe the nature of state challenges extending from and vulnerabilities to different forms of cyber conflict before

outlining the empirical contours of cyber interactions over the past few decades and the apparent normative realities thereof. This tees us up for the discussions included in Chapters 7 and 8, where we debate the utility of cyber methods for state security strategies and consider the applicability of traditional IR concepts to international security in the information age.

Formative episodes in the history of interstate cyber conflict

States have hacked one another countless times and for a broad range of reasons over the past several decades. And yet, interstate warfare conducted via cyberspace—meaning the universe of identifiable episodes of large-scale cyber attacks directed by one country against another—has been a relatively limited set of affairs, at least insofar as individual incidents have erupted into what we might categorize as “warfare.” Though students of international security might be forgiven for assuming that low costs of entry and attribution provide incentives for states to liberally engage in belligerent behavior online, only a handful of episodes constitute the noteworthy topography of the timeline of what we might think of as *massive* digital interstate conflict—meaning sophisticated, targeted assaults and not simply low-level nuisance operations—since the late 1980s.

Box 6.1 Cyber conflict terminology: a recap

Before discussing conflict in the information age from the perspective of scholars who have systematically analyzed the contours thereof, it is first worthwhile to briefly revisit issues of terminology with regards to two terms—“cyberwar” and “cyber conflict.” Though these phrases have variously been used interchangeably in this book so far—and will be used as synonyms in a great range of literature on the subject of cyber-security alongside related terms (cyber warfare, cyber battle, cyber incursion, etc.)—there is a discrete variation in meaning in the way that academics particularly use them to describe different interstate interactions.

First, it is important to revisit what *cyberspace* actually is. One might be forgiven (because they would be partially correct!) for describing cyberspace as the set of network technologies that undergird the Internet and similar networks that do not actually link directly to the searchable Internet (like the Deep Web or darknet overlay networks). The problem with this, as some point out, is that this definition precludes two important considerations. First, this definition technically eschews capture of network systems that don’t relate to the Internet in any way. The design of malware employed during Buckshot Yankee and Olympic Games demonstrates that a lack of connection to the Internet—in those cases due to the “air gap” defense procedures in place—is simply an architectural feature of cyberspace in particular areas to be overcome. Second, this definition ignores the possibility that future network technologies radically different in design from current Internet-connecting platforms could be considered component parts of cyberspace. The Internet of Things, where network devices governing all manner of biological and physical infrastructure are linked, is a

commonly cited example of what is meant here in that a more diverse landscape of network systems utilized for specialized functions of industry and government out into the future is a more likely topological description of cyberspace than is the current cohesiveness of the Internet.

Valeriano and Maness's description of cyberspace as being "all computer, network, digital, cellular, fiber, and space-based forms of communications, interactions, and interconnections" seems appropriately broad.¹ To be fair, this imagining of cyberspace complicates (accurately so, admittedly) the landscape of what must be considered to effectively address multifaceted questions of cyber conflict. Such a definition naturally implies that cyberspace is far more than a technological domain. Indeed, much variation in the constituent parts of cyberspace—including information stored in servers dispersed around the world, members of far-flung social media networks, etc.—is defined legally, politically, socially, economically, and geographically, and *not* technologically.

Scholars studying cyber conflict further assign different meanings when using the phrases "cyberwar" and "cyber conflict." The latter phrase is often used to describe most conflictual actions that take place between actors—both state and non-state—in world politics. This includes one-off cyber attacks, any directed employment of malware, the use of computer exploitation techniques to gather intelligence through unauthorized systems access, and more. Cyberwar, by contrast, is used to describe a discrete episode in which two politically recognizable entities are engaged in hostile activities against one another entirely via cyberspace. Politically recognizable entities do not have to be states, but naturally often are. Moonlight Maze (discussed later) is often held up as an example of what is often meant by cyberwar, wherein a state actor engages in a broad-scoped campaign of exploitation and intrusion designed to radically alter strategic dynamics between the countries involved.

Naturally, "cyberwar" is not as monolithic in form as is something like nuclear war. Though one might imagine nuclear exchanges as being limited or total in terms of the destruction wrought, the results are massive destruction. That is not necessarily the case with the employment of cyber weaponry. Moonlight Maze was broad-scoped but not overly disruptive. The intent was to exfiltrate information, not to engage in anything that might be construed as aggression under traditional norms of armed conflict between states. Nevertheless, massive disruption and even physical damage is possible under some potential cyberwar scenarios. Attacks against national energy grids and utilities alongside blockade activities targeting a country's ISP complex could produce inadvertent deaths and would undoubtedly produce billions of dollars of damage to infrastructure, even if much of it were to be non-physical. This and other cyberwar scenarios are further discussed in the rest of this chapter.

Naturally, any summary of the history of interstate cyber conflict episodes will focus on the actions of great powers—those countries with immense capacity for conflictual operations and the geopolitical motivation to undertake them—and this section is no exception. There are two reasons for this. The first is that advanced nations were the first to commit major resources to the development of cyber warfighting abilities.

Likewise, advanced industrial states are among the most technically vulnerable in that information technologies wire societal functions together at almost every level more completely and more extensively than might be the case for smaller, less developed states. It is important to note, of course, that being more technically vulnerable to broad-scope intrusion does not itself mean that small states are less susceptible to disruption from targeted cyber attacks. Indeed, there are many advantages to the fact that great powers constitute dense, complex networks of information systems connected to societal functions. Some of these will be discussed later in the chapter. Nevertheless, any student of strategic studies in the digital age must recognize that the level of integration of ICT in advanced industrial states does at the very least provide would-be belligerents with a more robust set of options for attack.

The second reason that summaries of the history of cyber conflict between states focus on the great powers is pedagogical and, in many ways, more significant than the point about complexity. Simply put, interstate cyber conflict that can be identified and verified has been relatively rare in modern international affairs, and only a handful of interactions exist as examples of the several main archetypes of attack commonly discussed by scholars and analysts of the topic. Indeed, though the description of specific episodes that follows is arrayed chronologically, it is important to note that cyber conflict between states has essentially been conducted in four principal ways, each of which is characterized by a unique set of attacker objectives.

First among these is (1) **information exfiltration**. These attack episodes are often the longest, with coordinated cyber attacks spanning timeframes from a few minutes to multiple years. The purpose of these operations is to steal significant information from or monitor activity within government, military, or related industry systems, such as defense contractors or security firms working for a particular government agency. Such information is then repurposed to some goal by a foreign entity, such as the acceleration of technology development or the execution of diplomacy from an improved informational position.

Second, cyber attacks have been employed for the (2) *direct disruption, degradation or destruction* of core foreign security assets.² Stuxnet, which will be discussed further later, is perhaps the most prominently cited example of this type of conflict episode wherein a state employed digital-only means to disrupt the physical operation of an important facility (in that case, the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz in Iran). Two things characterize this type of cyber conflict episode. First, such operations employ only malicious code to achieve an identifiable disruptive outcome (i.e. they do not rely on secondary support from traditional military assets to be effective). Second, they aim to disrupt the function of a particular security entity. This can be achieved through a number of methods, including simply deleting information through physically damaging infrastructure. Kinetic results—i.e. when a system is physically harmed by a cyber attack—are rare. Nevertheless, such outcomes are possible.

It is critical at this stage to draw a definitional line around a particular manifestation of such attacks. Though most conflict episodes in this vein have involved targeting of specific facilities or, when multiple systems are targeted, particular organizations or security entities, it is possible that an entire country can be the target of this kind of disruptive conflict action. Such an operation is called a **cyber blockade**.³ The term describes a particular instance in which an entire national system is, in practice, disconnected from the Internet. This is done through massive denial attacks directed against a country's set of ISPs in combination with a series of complementary

attacks on critical regulatory and information infrastructure targets. There are few instances of this type of attack episode taking place and blockades are usually very short-lived. The resources involved in successfully carrying out such an attack are enormous, and limited recovery by the foreign state is likely within a matter of hours. Nevertheless, such strategic employment of disruptive cyber attacks differs so drastically in its potential for political messaging or large-scale warfighting scenarios to be worthy of particular note.

Likewise, it is possible—and even desirable for researchers—to think about disruption as a desired outcome. In doing so, we must recognize that not all cyber attacks aimed at technical disruption are motivated by a desire to simply wholesale deny an opponent the ability to function. Many cyber attacks are designed to limit the function of opponent's capabilities and prevent efficient employment of assets, security, or otherwise. In this way, we might think about sabotage operations as differently being either about *disruption* (i.e. where the aim is broadly to disrupt core target functions) or *degradation* (i.e. where attacks are tailored to reduce the efficiency of an opponent's processes). By contrast with broadly disruptive operations, degradation attacks are the preference of attackers with sophisticated political or economic designs.

Related to such targeted disruptive cyber efforts, the third principal way that cyber conflict is conducted is in the form of *enabling attacks*, where some disruptive action is taken as an aid to more conventional forms of military operation.⁴ The common example cited both in scholarship and in forecasting efforts to problematize the role of cyber capabilities in warfighting scenarios is that of a cyber attack against localized military defense systems, such as a radar station, a missile emplacement, or a military checkpoint. Disruption of a small section of specific national security systems opens up new space for traditional military assets to achieve a primary objective, such as a kinetic airstrike against foreign targets or the exfiltration of intelligence assets.

Finally, cyber attacks can directly aid efforts to *manipulate the information environment* within which politics, policy debates, and policy construction occurs. Here, cyber attacks are construed broadly as operations composed of dozens of actions designed to obtain, redirect, and modify information in tandem with more traditionally contentious actions to provoke a particular political response. Particularly in democratic states where there are clear and direct linkages between public conversations and national deliberations on different policy approaches to a range of issues, the global adoption and integration of information technologies has altered the dynamics of information transmission and dissemination such that there exist new angles for foreign manipulation. Russia's 2016 efforts to manipulate public-facing political conversations in the United States, which at the time of writing this book are still being investigated in full, stand as a good example of how foreign powers might increasingly engage in cyber conflict designed to achieve favorable ideational outcomes.

We cover information warfare in greater detail in Chapter 8. However, for purposes of clarity, it is worth noting here that new abilities for states to engage in information warfare aimed at subverting the internal politics of peer competitors cover more than simply another mode of cyber conflict interaction. Much of what is bound up in this form of contention has to do with the way in which cyber actions increase the effectiveness of non-cyber instruments, such as the employment of traditional propaganda tools or direct human intelligence efforts. Among other things, information exfiltration attacks might be used to more effectively equip domestic subversive elements that

irritate status quo forces in adversaries' political systems or to produce international efforts aimed at shaming the same. Likewise, cyber vandalism and information modification—i.e. attacks that change the content of websites or data repositories—are useful techniques for causing confusion and altering the shape of popular discourse, while the release of private information and even the mere appearance of systems being compromised by a foreign entity can be of service to any attempt to cast doubt on the integrity of domestic political procedures.

The section that follows outlines significant interstate cyber conflict episodes chronologically. After that, the chapter turns to specific questions regarding the dynamics of interstate cyber conflict. First, the chapter delineates national security processes as uniquely diffuse in the digital age. Here, we discuss the technical vulnerabilities and organizational challenges involved in safeguarding and building cyber-security capabilities across four main sectors of national security apparatuses—(1) critical infrastructure, (2) military systems, (3) innovation and research (i.e. intellectual property), and (4) the national information environment. The chapter then shifts gear and moves beyond history both to conceptually consider unique digital threats to interstate relations and match such conjecture to empirical evidence on the nature of cyber conflict. This effort informs the discussion outlined in the final sections of this chapter on the applicability of traditional strategic concepts—such as power, coercion, and deterrence—to the cyber domain.

A brief chronology of important interstate cyber conflict events

Trans-Siberia pipeline attack. While cyberspace as we know it today has at most existed for only a few decades and most sophisticated cyber attacks have occurred only since the late 1990s, the first purported CNA-style cyber operation dates back to 1982. This attack is largely still shrouded in uncertainty and it is possible that the attack did not actually take place, as there is a single source for the episode.⁵ In 1982 a portion of the Trans-Siberia pipeline exploded within the Soviet Union, allegedly as a result of computer malware implanted in the pirated Canadian software by the CIA which caused the SCADA system that ran the pipeline to malfunction.⁶ The main source of information on this cyber attack is the Farewell Dossier.⁷ Among other things, the document points out that “contrived computer chips [would make] their way into Soviet military equipment, flawed turbines were installed on a gas pipeline, and defective plans disrupted the output of chemical plants and a tractor factory.”⁸ While the accuracy of this attack is disputed to this day, it allegedly resulted in the “most monumental nonnuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space” and the embarrassed Soviets never accused the United States of the attack.⁹ For the purposes of understanding emerging norms, this attack is significant because it involved an attack on critical infrastructure that was not explicitly military in nature. The Trans-Siberian pipeline was responsible for transporting natural gas to western Ukraine and ultimately to the broader energy market in order to generate revenue of about \$8 billion a year.¹⁰

The Cuckoo's Egg. Though the incident did not directly involve one state employing malicious code against another per se, the earliest cyber conflict incident worthy of note that involved state actors in some way (that we verifiably know of) is what has now come to be called the Cuckoo's Egg.¹¹ This name was taken from a book written about the incident by Clifford Stoll, the researcher-administrator at Lawrence

Berkeley National Laboratory who in 1986 led a somewhat impromptu investigation into the targeted infiltration of the organization's computer network. In the Cuckoo's Egg case, suspicion that malicious hackers were attempting to gain access to lab computers was aroused, as is often the case in the realm of information security, when a logistical discrepancy was presented to administrators that seemed out of place even beyond the usual profile of such things. In this case, Stoll was asked to account for a billing discrepancy of only 75¢ for computer usage (at the time, lab computer usage was billed and monitored much as an electronic payphone might be). Though this seemed to be a minor discrepancy—the billing anomaly translated to only 9 seconds of computer usage—Stoll managed to ascertain that it was linked to an unauthorized entry into lab systems. Indeed, more than simply a compromise of a lab user's account, Stoll says that an intruder had managed to obtain administrators' privileges by exploiting the movemail function written into the GNU Emacs used in the lab. In a matter of days, Stoll's examination of the intruder's actions led him to escalate his initial assumption that the lab was dealing with an amateur prankster of some kind. Clearly, though nothing was initially known about intentions, the intruder was patient and knowledgeable.

Despite reticence on the part of authorities to get involved early on (as will be discussed further in the next chapter), Stoll's subsequent investigation was path-breaking in that he developed for the first time a range of forensic and counter-intrusion techniques that would become mainstays of digital investigation. After identifying the port of entry for the attacker, Stoll was able to monitor the hacker's activity and make inferences about the belligerent's interests and identity. The attacker was active at particular points in the day, which suggested a European work schedule. Moreover, they were clearly interested in files related to the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") and other critical military topics. This nugget of information allowed Stoll to employ a honeypot—a technique wherein a target of value, which in the case of Cuckoo's Egg was a seemingly important "SDInet" account, is placed so as to attract the attention of the hacker—and invite the intruder to reveal himself. Markus Hess, who had for some years been selling hacked secrets to the KGB, was arrested soon thereafter in West Germany.¹²

Moonlight Maze. Cuckoo's Egg was a relatively limited case of intrusion. A decade later, the United States would stumble upon evidence of another spy campaign that made Hess's activities look inconsequential.¹³ The episode began in late 1996 when the U.S. Navy assessed a digital break-in had occurred in the computer network of the Colorado School of Mines in Golden, Colorado.¹⁴ The immediate purpose of the attack was relatively clear. Hackers had compromised the network and hacked a specific machine for the purpose of setting up a proxy base. From this temporary access point, the hackers spent many hours exploring and examining machines belonging to the Navy, the Air Force, **National Aeronautics and Space Administration** (NASA), and to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Some weeks later, the hackers struck again, breaking into NAVSEA Indian Head (a Navy system commands facility) in Maryland. Here, they exploited a known vulnerability, seemingly from a computer based at the University of Toronto. This time, however, investigation revealed that the original location of the intruders was a machine in Moscow. This pattern would repeat itself throughout the next year across hundreds of intrusions and attempted intrusions aimed at elements of the government's organizational infrastructure, including the Navy's Naval Research Laboratory and the Department of Energy.

Much as was the case with Cuckoo's Egg, it was unclear if this set of incidents originated from a foreign state entity or from **black hat hackers** operating either independently or as a proxy. It was also unclear if there was some sort of connection between the various attempted and actual intrusions. Was this the work of some broad-scoped operation targeting the U.S. government or was this the advent of a new normal of systems' vulnerability? Clearly there was some link between some hacks, as evidenced by source information extracted during the investigation, but the total shape of the threat remained complex and irregular in the eyes of the examiners. Indeed, despite some commonalities in the way that intrusions were executed, there was no evidence that could concretely tie one or a handful of concentrated efforts with the increasing number of intrusions across government, military, and contractor entities.

This changed finally in the middle of 1998, when the Wright Patterson Air Force base was the target of a number of attempted intrusions. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), an agency tasked with providing combat and logistical support of various kinds at the Pentagon, investigated and found that a machine in Cincinnati at the university was the initial point of contact in the chain. Much as occurred at the Colorado School of Mines, University of Toronto, and elsewhere, the machine had been compromised for the purposes of using that computer as a beach-head from which to launch attacks and confuse investigators. Further investigation, however, found that this compromised machine was itself subverted from another compromised computer in the UK. Over the weeks that followed, federal authorities working with Scotland Yard re-enacted Stoll's earlier efforts to isolate and monitor the activity of the known point of entry. The results were astonishing. The UK terminal was linked directly to Moscow and had been used not only to launch the intrusions at Wright Patterson but also across a massive number of government systems in the United States. Some of these were known intrusions; some were not. Regardless, the incident could now be bound as a large-scale foreign-based attack on various parts of the U.S. government. The FBI investigation, arguably now dealing with a substantially more worrying set of challenges, suddenly became the first national law enforcement and counterintelligence effort to problematize and neutralize an interstate cyber threat. Agents dubbed the ongoing episodes "Moonlight Maze," taking the investigation code name that referenced both the stunning complexity of the networked attacks and the midnight hours in which most intrusions were attempted.

The scope of the information theft enabled by Moonlight Maze was stunning. Russian-based hackers were stealing unbelievable numbers of sensitive files from across government agencies, linked research labs, universities, and military units. The classified Congressional report stated that all the files stolen would be taller than the Washington Monument if stacked one on top of the other. And the patterns of intrusion were unusually hard to predict, up to a point. Intruders would steal information selectively, systems access would be brief, and the hackers would get away with sensitive material in a matter of minutes. This, naturally, enhanced the nature of investigative challenges facing the FBI and the intelligence community. Ultimately, of course, examiners managed to explain such behavior. In yet another parallel with Stoll's early incident investigation, the content of files themselves dictated the intrusion patterns of the Moscow-based hackers. One extensive strategic planning document in particular was eventually found to be the roadmap for Russian efforts to steal information. Investigators used this information to set up a honeypot—a corrupted PDF file that would prompt the intruders to re-download a version of Adobe

Acrobat from a government mirror that would send IP address information back to the United States. The operation worked and, though there remained uncertainty about the usability of the information, it gave the Feds a location in Moscow.

We spend some additional time on the details of Moonlight Maze because, almost two decades on, the size of the operation undertaken by one state against another in this specific case has arguably not been surpassed. Moonlight Maze was unprecedented in its complexity. In many ways, it constituted a cyberwar. Eventually, information about the episode came out in public and prompted a range of government responses aimed at improving national capacity to deal with such threats. These are discussed further in the next chapter.

There was no clear end date for the Moonlight Maze spy campaign. Indeed, Russian efforts became even more persistent and sophisticated over time. Though the concentrated intrusions of 1998 and 1999 constitute the bulk of hacks that can be specifically tied to that operation, the U.S. government would receive precious little respite in the first years of the new century. In many ways, the complete retooling of strategic planning processes after 9/11, as well as rapidly changing procedures for effective cyber-security across agencies, helped the U.S. government mitigate the effects of Moonlight Maze insofar as procurement and development priorities were reformulated across many features of military planning in their entirety. But conflictual interstate interactions via cyberspace entered a new era after Moonlight Maze, with a range of attacks characterizing the security experiences of the United States and other countries.

Solar Sunrise. Three such episodes, spanning a decade from the late 1990s until 2008, bear particular mention. In 1998, at roughly the same time as the early phase of the Moonlight Maze investigation was underway, the Department of Defense and other government agencies were the target of a series of attacks now known as Solar Sunrise.¹⁵ These attacks were sophisticated in their simplicity, mostly targeting unclassified information and systems across the U.S. government. Specifically, Air Force, Navy, the Knesset (in Israel), and various university systems were compromised in what was called, at the time, the “most organized and systematic attack to date” on the United States via cyberspace. Though the culprits of such attacks were ultimately demonstrated to be an Israeli hacker and two teenagers in California basing some of their intrusions from compromised machines in the Middle East, the prevailing thought in the initial stages was that Solar Sunrise was being prosecuted by Iraqi infowarriors in rapid retaliation against ongoing anti-Hussein regime airstrikes being undertaken by the United States. Solar Sunrise was both an organizational wake-up call (discussed in the next chapter) and a strategic revelation insofar as planners increasingly saw the value for foreign states in low-intensity cyber conflict responses to real foreign policy clashes.

Chinese espionage. Yet another massive set of attacks ostensibly perpetrated by state actors against the United States took place starting in 2003 and arguably have yet to abate. Originally labeled “Titan Rain” by the federal government (this code-name was changed to “Byzantine Hades” after the original name leaked, and then again to an as-yet-unspecified moniker), this cyber attack campaign constituted an Advanced Persistent Threat wherein hackers based in China were able to steal a large amount of unclassified information from several computers.¹⁶ Several possibilities exist for the identity and motivation of the hackers involved, including direct involvement of the Chinese government, low-level elements of the People’s Liberation Army,

and independent hackers based in China. The attacks did target sensitive systems belonging to the FBI and NASA. Although they did not achieve significant success over the initial period, they have been emulated in a range of major attacks over the subsequent decade (the bulk of which have been dubbed “Shady Rat” to delineate a specific set of China-based espionage cyber operations). These include in one major incident in 2007 wherein (according to the Snowden leaks) more than 50 TB of information, containing blueprint information for the F-35 fifth generation fighter aircraft and other sensitive data, was stolen.¹⁷

Buckshot Yankee. Though the scope of the infiltrations bound up in the Moonlight Maze, Titan Rain/Shady Rat, and Solar Sunrise incidents is impressive, it is commonly argued that the most significant interstate cyber-security incident to date was Buckshot Yankee.¹⁸ In 2008, Department of Defense and State systems were infected by a malware application dubbed “Agent.btz.” This incident, purportedly the work of Russian security services, was unique in that it bypassed the “air gap” defenses (meaning that there is no direct connection to the Internet via which hackers might gain entrance) of these secure systems. The scenario for the incident that enabled Buckshot Yankee is commonly described as one of human error—a USB drive was purchased from a local marketplace known to be frequented by U.S. service personnel and targeted for product infiltration by Russian security services. The unwitting carrier of the malware payload then plugged it into an otherwise secure computer onbase. Agent.btz would then infect computers until it communicated with a master system, at which point it could receive targeting instructions and begin the exfiltration of sensitive data. The threat was neutralized relatively quickly. Nevertheless, Buckshot Yankee was yet another demonstration of the relative vulnerability of states to subversion and infiltration at the behest of foreign powers. Specifically, Buckshot Yankee was significant because it was the first breach of classified, protected systems by a foreign power. The incident demonstrated the various difficulties involved in protecting information from a sufficiently sophisticated effort to infiltrate systems beyond the efforts of individual hackers or teams of hackers. With appropriate design and implementation resources, the vectors for possible assault by a foreign state multiply. Buckshot Yankee, the effective response to which was almost entirely put forth by NSA personnel, also demonstrated the relative inability of military institutions to adapt to such a threat. Institutional inability to act itself, the roots of which are discussed further in the next chapter, very almost prolonged broad government exposure to malicious action.

Olympic Games. Ironically, of course, the lessons of attacks against the United States have clearly translated into new abilities on the home front. From the First Gulf War to NATO operations in Kosovo, U.S. infowarriors have utilized ICT in conflict at the cutting edge of technological possibilities. And no history of cyber conflict, however brief, would be complete without particular mention of Operation Olympic Games, a covert series of operations perpetuated by the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations as an attempt to disrupt the functionality of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. To be clear, the program and operations have yet to be acknowledged in public. Nevertheless, there is anecdotal and minor direct evidence that U.S. agents (with possible Israeli involvement) sought to both specifically disrupt Iranian nuclear operations via cyber means and more generally steal information about the function of various Middle East governmental and military organizations on an ongoing basis.

The former effort was typified in the deployment of Stuxnet.¹⁹ An alleged joint operation of U.S. and Israeli government authorities,²⁰ Stuxnet was first discovered

when an Iranian customer complaining of trouble with his Windows computer contacted an obscure anti-virus firm in Belarus. Close inspection, first by the firm in question and later by malware experts, revealed that the affected device suffered from a complex and malicious piece of software. Indeed, the program, dubbed “Stuxnet,” was one of the most sophisticated ever revealed and was targeted, according to various expert investigations, at the facilities of Iran’s fledgling nuclear complex. Stuxnet reportedly went on to damage 10–20% of the centrifuges in place in Iran’s Natanz facility, an act that undoubtedly set any weapons’ development program back some time.²¹ The expert community has regularly agreed that Stuxnet’s sophisticated design and deployment suggests governmental involvement,²² and a consensus has commonly emerged that the development strongly implies U.S. agency.²³

The latter effort, focused on a broader range of disruption and monitoring efforts, is the supposed function of Flame. Flame is malware that was discovered in 2012 that both has similarities with Stuxnet (which was derived from the much larger Flame) and presents as vastly more sophisticated than the worm that damaged Iran’s centrifuges and temporarily hindered operations at Natanz. Flame is unusually large but also uncommonly smart in its ability to evade detection. It is highly complex and is designed to record all manner of input to computer systems, including data stored, audio, and video. Leaked documents from the NSA and a range of computer forensics efforts point to the development and deployment of Flame by the NSA in collaboration with the British intelligence establishment. The purpose, it seems, is broad-scoped interstate collection of private information from foreign sources and, through that process, the interdiction of foreign state-based and related threats.

Saudi Aramco. In part as a cyber response to the damage wrought by Stuxnet, Iran is suspected to have invested heavily in offensive cyber warfare capabilities. On August 15, 2012, these investments seem to have borne fruit in an attack involving the “Shamoon” virus that was launched against the state-owned oil company Saudi Aramco (the most valuable company in the world).²⁴ The attack prompted U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta to describe Shamoon as a “very sophisticated” piece of malware generating “tremendous concern.”²⁵ Over 30,000 computers were infected and in many cases data on servers as well as hard drives on individual computers were destroyed.²⁶ The goal of the attack was purportedly to disrupt the flow of Saudi oil by damaging SCADA control systems, but it did not succeed in achieving that effect.²⁷ An Iranian-linked group called “Cutting Sword of Justice” ultimately took credit for the attack, which also affected the Qatari company RasGas as well as other oil companies.²⁸ Ultimately the attack affected the business processes of Saudi Aramco, and it is likely that some important drilling and production data were lost.²⁹ This attack again showed a dangerous trend of unconstrained attacks against non-military targets and was interpreted by Richard Clarke—cyber warfare expert and former senior official at the U.S. National Security Council—as a signal that this kind of retaliation and escalation was just the beginning.³⁰

Operation Ababil. In September 2012, not long after the Saudi Aramco attacks, further retaliation and escalation stemming from the Stuxnet attack on Iran occurred when the Iranian-affiliated hacker group Izz ad-Din al-Qassam launched “Operation Ababil” targeting the websites of financial institutions for major DDOS attacks. These institutions included the Bank of America, the New York Stock Exchange, Chase Bank, Capital One, SunTrust, and Regions Bank.³¹ In January 2013 Izz ad-Din al-Qassam again claimed responsibility for another series of DDOS attacks, again predominantly

U.S. financial institutions, as part of “Operation Ababil,” phase two. A third phase of DDOS attacks began in March 2013.³² U.S. officials believe that Izz ad-Din al-Qassam is a front organization for an Iranian state-sponsored effort.³³ U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman went so far as to state on C-SPAN that he thinks “this was done by Iran and the Quds Force, which has its own developing cyberattack capability.”³⁴

To this point, all interstate cyber conflict incidents discussed (bar the last two discussed as responses to Stuxnet) have involved the United States. Naturally, not all significant episodes do—at least from the perspective of analysis and theorization on the nature of cyber conflict. Before discussing two more recent incidents that once again center on the experiences of the United States or her close allies—those of the 2016 Russian attacks on civil society actors and industry in the West, as well as the slightly earlier set of incidents surrounding the release of Sony’s film, *The Interview*—three episodes bear particular mention.

The attack on Estonia. To backtrack chronologically very slightly, the first of these episodes is the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia, perpetuated by unspecified elements of the Russian government in the midst of a tense disagreement between the two countries about the relocation of a Soviet-era grave marker statue, the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn.³⁵ This incident is worth some additional detail as it is regularly held up as the first major example of both outright cyberwar (in the disruptive rather than the infiltrative sense) and an effective cyber blockade. The first phase of the cyber conflict between Russia and Estonia in 2007 took the form of widespread DDOS attacks that denied service to a range of government and related organizations and prevented the public sector from conducting essential operations. The context and cause of such an attack was the anniversary of the conclusion of World War II and the recent decision by the Estonian government to move a statue—the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn—over the objections of local officials ostensibly in order to minimize tensions between ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians in the long term.³⁶

After two nights of violent clashes and riots in Tallinn, the first cyber attacks began. Based from Russia, hackers vandalized numerous websites and set about disrupting network usage on a national scale. DDOS attacks and *ping flood scripts* were employed to flood systems with access requests and deny both government and private corporate entities the ability to access their systems. Targets were quickly expanded to include political party websites, daily newspapers, and critical service providers, including banks. These attacks were amateurish but highly effective. Estonia’s response, in partnership with a range of international ISPs, was only partly effective. On May 9, a second wave of cyber attacks was unleashed against Estonia. This wave was more sophisticated. Over a million zombie computers around the world—machines that were compromised and directed to take part in denial of service attacks—were used to throw more than 1,000 times the normal operating volume of data at Estonian servers. This continued in third and fourth waves for several days. The effect was impressive. Estonia became largely cut off from the outside world. In addition to the other social and economic effects of the crisis, the Estonian government, Estonian industry, and Estonian citizens could not access most network services to communicate beyond national borders. Quite naturally, Russia was blamed and a range of evidence points to Russian government involvement, not least because the most effective defensive effort during the first day of attacks included the blocking of Web addresses ending in the Russian “.ru” identifier. Nevertheless, much as has also been the case with cyber attacks launched against Georgia and Ukraine in subsequent crises, the centralization

of control of Russian cyber conflict efforts is unclear. With Estonia, many outlets claim that botnets were provided to a range of Russian-based hackers who assaulted their smaller next-door neighbor for purposes of national pride. In Estonia and Ukraine both, other sources suggest that botnets were released by organized criminal elements in Russia, perhaps at the behest of elements of Russian government officials.

Following the attack, NATO, of which Estonia is a member, established the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) on May 14, 2008.³⁷ This center, located in Tallinn, Estonia, seeks to enhance NATO's ability to respond to cyber attacks and as of late has been acting as an organizational platform for norm entrepreneurs, as will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. The Estonia cyber attacks were aimed directly at disrupting and degrading civilian services and thus demonstrated the lack of a constraining cyber norm for non-combatant immunity or discrimination. However, the attack did not result in permanent damage and did not destroy any critical infrastructure—although this was likely due to the limits of the DDOS mechanism available and not to any normative constraint.

Georgia attack. Compared to Estonia, the Russian attack on Georgia in July 2008 presented a slightly more recent example of cyber warfare conducted against a former Soviet state in order to achieve tangible disruption and effects beyond CNE-style espionage. This attack began on July 20, 2008, prior to the military invasion of Georgia by Russian forces, with a large scale DDOS attack shutting down Georgian servers. It is the best example to date of cyber weapons being used as a force multiplier for conventional military operations. As the invasion began, the attacks increased and spread to other targets.³⁸ This ultimately forced the Georgian government to move critical communication services to commercial U.S. sites as their own services were shut down.³⁹ The attack was likely organized by the Russian government to support its broader political and military objectives in the crisis, but was executed by loosely affiliated “independent” hackers that strengthened the government's plausible deniability.⁴⁰ Like the Estonian attacks, this attack demonstrated no normative constraint prohibiting targeting civilian resources. However, also like the attacks on Estonia, critical infrastructure was not attacked and permanent damage did not occur. Both of these attacks on former Soviet states—likely originating from the same source—show that the only constraint on the attacks is not a norm, rather it is the limits of what is technologically possible and effective.

Operation Orchard. Another incident not involving the United States, also in 2007, that bears unique mention is surprisingly limited in scope given the nature of interstate conflict interactions outlined so far. Operation Orchard was an Israeli military mission in which F-15 and F-16 aircraft assaulted a suspected nuclear reactor in Syria. This incident is of particular note in the history of interstate cyber conflicts as it is perhaps the best example of the use of network intrusion for the purposes of aiding a kinetic military action.⁴¹ In short, Israel employed a computer program often likened to Boeing's Suter program, which is designed to attack computer networks and alter the data being provided by a sensor system to either human or linked machine observers. In this instance, Israel disrupted Syrian air defense systems and fed them false radar and other sensor information to mask the transit of Air Force jets into Syria. Alternatively, some reports hold that Israeli cyberwarriors were able to attack the computer networks controlling Syrian air defense systems and use a built-in kill switch, a piece of code incorporated during the production phase and designed to allow unauthorized control—usually highly specific—of a system.

Black Energy. The third major cyber conflict incident not involving the United States occurred much more recently, in late 2015. The incident, broadly known by the name that was given to the threat group responsible by global cyber-security firms (“Black Energy”), was a sophisticated attempt to interfere with the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that controlled electrical grid functions in Ukraine. Ukraine has a long set of experiences in dealing with Russia-based digital attacks against critical infrastructure and civil society (indeed, the Black Energy threat profile has been active since 2007). In December 2015, however, these efforts culminated in a successful disruption of the functions of electricity distribution companies across the country, most notable Prykarpattya Oblenergo.⁴² The result was that about 1.4 million people were left without power for a few hours. While this may not seem particularly significant, the incident was the first time that a foreign actor had successfully achieved a real-kinetic effect in a cyber-only attack on critical infrastructure. Black Energy thus highlights the increasing relevance of infrastructure vulnerabilities to national security considerations.

Russian APTs. Finally, two more recent interstate cyber conflict episodes are worthy of note, specifically because of their sociopolitical characteristics. The first episode is actually several incidents linked to Russian-sponsored campaigns to interfere with the internal politics of countries across the Western world. Broadly put, this macro case involves several APTs (labeled “Cozy Bear,” “Fancy Bear,” and more by the diverse cyber threat assessment community in the West) that utilized spearphishing and sophisticated infiltration malware to attempt the theft of politically useful information from entities in the United States, Denmark, Norway, France, and the UK. Arguably most significantly, the actions of these Russian-based threat actors (potentially the same actor) have been linked with efforts to manipulate political discourse during the 2016 U.S. election cycle.⁴³ It should be noted that, at the time of writing this book, investigations into the full extent of foreign cyber attacks related to the election campaigns are ongoing. Nevertheless, the broader episode is worthy of note as one of the few cyber conflict instances where the purpose of attacks was ostensibly to undergird an information warfare effort to influence the information environment of foreign politics. While much of what concerns national security administrators in the United States includes traditional propaganda efforts to influence foreign political processes, it has been clear since early 2016 that Russian efforts to hack into entities such as the Pentagon and the Democratic National Committee provided a range of actors with private information that, when released, appeared to influence the trajectory of popular discourse during the U.S. election season. It is not yet known at the time of writing this book whether or not there was some profound effect on the function of U.S. democracy. Nevertheless, it is obviously of concern that cyber attacks so enhance the ability of foreign actors to interfere in the internal political machinations of other countries. Moreover, it highlights an important lesson about aggression and conflictual interactions in the digital age, which will be discussed in more depth later, that the horizon of utility of states employing cyber techniques is measured at least partially by sociopolitical context, not simply by technical possibility.

North Korea and Sony. The notion that sociopolitical context determines the utility of particular cyber capabilities is equally apparent in what might defensibly be called the biggest incident involving the interaction of the United States with North Korea in cyberspace (though it is worthwhile noting that North Korea has itself

attempted to disrupt national services in South Korea in much the same way that Russia did in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine in the 2000s). This episode involved an obscure hacking organization and Sony Pictures Entertainment.⁴⁴ In essence, the episode was an attempt at coercion to prevent the release of a comedy embarrassing the Dear Leader of North Korea. In late November, Sony executives received an anonymous note demanding money in exchange for a commitment not to engage in cyber attacks. Several days later, cyber attacks wiped information from data storage units and infected some computers with a simple onscreen message from the group, who were called the “Guardians of Peace.”

What followed was a series of events intended to gradually build pressure on Sony and coerce behavioral changes. Proprietary Sony data was leaked to various online sites, and file-sharing sites were updated with company information, such as the emails of Sony officials, strategic planning documents, etc. This release lasted several weeks and resulted in some success for the attackers—Sony Pictures Entertainment said little and was forced to delay releases in order to combat the threat. The “Guardians of Peace,” however, were not content to wait. Company employees received anonymous notes threatening harm if they didn’t denounce Sony, and threats were made regarding the movie *The Interview*. The demand was that Sony should not release the film to theaters, otherwise theaters showing it would themselves be subject to attack. Eventually, with apparently little choice, Sony announced that it would hold its release of the film and continue its own investigations.

In the weeks that followed this announcement, Sony’s decision would be the basis of a broad-scoped discussion about the interaction of cyber-security, terrorism, and terrorist threats to civil society, and a variety of civil liberties’ issues. Eventually, citing evidence from both Sony and FBI investigators,⁴⁵ President Obama confirmed that the attempt to censor the movie through coercive means was a North Korean one. Though some experts and analysts suggested at the time that North Korea lacked the necessary infrastructure and technical expertise to carry out such sophisticated attacks, the government line and the consensus of many private industry commentators has been that Pyongyang was the perpetrator of the attempt to compel Sony to alter its behavior. The retaliatory result was unique in Western involvement in cyber conflict episodes. For a period of ten hours, North Korean access to the Internet was entirely shut off. While the relatively primitive nature of the country’s network setup makes this somewhat less impressive of an accomplishment for the presumed attacker—the U.S. government—than was the blockade of Estonia by Russia, the significance remains in that Washington clearly considers such an action to be feasibly and defensibly part of the toolkit of conflict instruments in the digital age.

Next steps

This introduction to major episodes of interstate cyber conflict was designed to be brief and is naturally incomplete. Nevertheless, these events demonstrate the scale and enormity of the threat faced by states in cyber interactions with competitors. As mentioned above, the next chapters now move to discuss the technical vulnerabilities and organizational challenges involved in safeguarding and building cyber-security capabilities before shifting gear to consider empirical trends in cyber conflict—and the generalizations we might make from such data—and concepts useful for strategic analysis of conflict prosecuted in the digital domain and in the information age.

Notes

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- 4 We discuss this format of attack later in describing Operation Orchard, a kinetic assault on Syrian nuclear infrastructure enabled principally via a cyber action. More broadly, however, this categorization of cyber actions fits broadly with Gartzke's now well-known refrain that cyber conflict actions are best thought of as adjunct modifiers of traditional warfare. See Gartzke, Erik. "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back down to Earth." *International Security*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2013), 41–73.
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7 States at cyberwar

The dynamics of interstate cyber interactions

In this chapter, we discuss the actual conduct of cyber warfare as it pertains to state security interests. Specifically, we undertake to describe the various elements of the twenty-first-century national security apparatus that are vulnerable to different forms of cyber-enabled warfare, before addressing core questions about how useful cyber conflict is to state actors.

What is vulnerable in the age of cyber conflict?

If there is one thing that the brief history of interstate cyber conflict outlined in the past chapter indicates, it is that the apparatus of national security is multi-faceted in the digital age, far more so than has been true—regardless of whether you delineate an era in terms of wars fought, organizational changes achieved, or technological advances made—of eras past. Simple put, national security in the digital age revolves around more than just military capabilities. To some degree, of course, this has always been the case. A state's power is typified by its warfighting capabilities, its institutional pull, and its ability to affect norms of behavior in international affairs. National security planners must consider the protection of those processes that undergird all of the above. These include (1) actual security and military procedures, (2) those systems that govern national economic and social function (i.e. the various realms of critical infrastructure), (3) the political-institutional and real informational foundation of the innovation economy, (4) the regulations of coordination between government and private industry, and (5) the ability of the domestic political process to function according to design and prevailing expectations. This final one is more pressing for democratic nations, of course, than it is for semi-democratic or authoritarian ones. Of these different imperatives, the nature and function of a nation's regulatory environment—both in how it operates in the domestic and international arenas—is unpacked in greater detail in other chapters. The remaining four are discussed in some detail now.

Military systems

In many ways, military systems constitute the simplest element of the national security apparatus insofar as actual cyber-security procedures include the employment of computer network attack, exploitation, and defense techniques to safeguard critical platforms/information and augment traditional military capacity. A range of operations are possible for military forces, including the use of attack techniques to disrupt enemy systems, the use thereof to enhance the function of kinetic forces, or the use of exploitation techniques to pave the way for greater effectiveness in future operations.

In reality, it is arguably most accurate to say new challenges in the digital age for military forces are not necessarily bound up in new technical possibilities for attack and defense—except possibly to admit that military forces are, quite obviously, vulnerable to cyber disruption—so much as they are about the organization of military assets and procedures such that multi-faceted service branches are able to consistently take advantage of new methods for defense and offensive operational success. Military cyber conflict considerations are inevitably not only about defending from foreign cyber attacks. Neither are they entirely concerned with how best to incorporate new disruptive techniques into military procedures. Considerations also include using digital techniques for reconnaissance purposes, coordinating with non-military agencies that aid national security operations (including the intelligence community, the technology industry, defense contractors, and ISPs) and ensuring that continued technological innovation is both possible and free of malicious meddling from foreign actors. And on top of this, of course, military forces have had to adapt to the special characteristics of conflict in the digital age by developing new rules of engagement.

At this point in time, the norm for development of centralized authority on network warfare as a coordination structure for military forces across countries appears to be the incorporation of a specific joint forces structure that has jurisdiction over the cyber domain. In the United States, this was the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare, which is now largely extant in the form of U.S. Cyber Command. In this, the United States—and this format is mirrored across a range of partner nations in Europe, East Asia, and Latin America—has essentially identified **cyberspace** as a domain that is unique and discrete from other traditional operating domains (air, land, space, and sea). Such joint force structures are given broad purview and control of coordinating procedures for any functions of military forces that include network warfare. For the United States, this means that Cyber Command broadly has responsibility for supporting and undergirding the network functions of other Combatant Commands in operations.

Military forces around the world face a unique set of issues when it comes to developing appropriate rules of engagement for interactions with the security elements of other states. In particular, military organizations must contend with the issue of aligning the dynamics of conflictual interactions in the cyber domain with pre-existing norms and rules of engagement outlined in adherence to the various laws of armed conflict. Cyber attack is not inherently violent, but it is aggressive and can disrupt the lawful operation of foreign governments, industry, and society. Military forces must determine (1) the conditions under which the undertaking of cyber attacks is permissible, (2) the specific profile of targets that can be attacked, (3) the duration of an assault, (4) necessary communications surrounding an attack, and (5) lines of communication within the government necessary to authorize different forms of action.

In reality, this final challenge of lawfare is particularly worrisome for analysts considering the prospect of cyber conflict thresholds—i.e. the barriers that may or may not exist to prevent the outbreak of digital or digitally augmented conflict. Authorization for cyber attacks may not necessarily come from the executive level. Indeed, in many cases there is simply no link between high-level officials and those personnel responsible for authorizing either initial or reactive attacks. In a situation where a system has been compromised, for example, the responsibility for retaliating in order to delete stolen information may in some instances fall to the officer on duty or his direct commander. Thus, the threshold for military-to-military or military-to-nonstate actor interactions in cyberspace is normally variable based on the condition

of military procedures in place across countries. Understanding decision making as emerging more from this set of dynamics than from centralized strategic planning, democratic debate, or some other catalyzing process is called the **cybernetic model** of decision making by scholars of strategic studies, wherein the clash of procedures principally determines the shape of conflict incidents.¹

For the U.S. military, such procedures—in the context of defensive operations—are called **response actions** (RAs).² RAs set specific guidelines about what kind or intensity of attack warrants a response. Likewise, it outlines what legitimate targets look like, such as an originating machine for an attack but not a “zombie” computer that likely does not belong to the attacker. RAs are perhaps fuzziest with regards to the geography thresholds that typically bear on decisions to respond to an attack. In conventional military operations, kinetic assets are often limited in their ability to retaliate over large distances. More importantly, doing so may compromise broader strategic security conditions, and so response procedures set strict limits on response boundaries. No such considerations exist with cyberspace, at least in terms of purely geographic considerations. Instead, RAs must be based on a shifting understanding of the nature of foreign threats as they relate to international and national laws, the jurisdiction of foreign governments, and the jurisdiction of other agencies at the national level, such as the **Federal Bureau of Investigation**.³ The purpose in structuring guidelines in this way is twofold. First, such procedures prevent the employment of military assets in such a way that there would be broader, unintended ramifications to diplomatic relations between states. Second, military forces are able to rely on other assets before committing to reactionary defensive operations that may be wasteful, may be deemed heavy-handed, or may reveal counter-force abilities prematurely.⁴

Two further digital age challenges for military establishments bear mention—that of talent acquisition and that of weapons development. In both cases, a unique condition of conflict in the information age acts as the factor driving a need for adaption. That condition has to do with the source of the technological innovation that defines and continually transforms the characteristics of the cyber domain in which militaries must operate. Simply put, much of the inherent ability of a state’s military to remain on the cutting edge of electronic and information warfare extends from the health of the innovation. Unlike with other military assets, such as fighter jets or submarines, innovation relevant to the armed forces is not—indeed, *cannot* be—isolated in a neat complex of defense contractors. A nation’s broader technology industry and the development of global technology infrastructure matter and must be factored into planning processes.

One challenge particular to military forces is that of relevant talent in an establishment’s labor forces.⁵ Personnel with unique abilities to aid in systems administration, asset development, and more must be retained over long periods of time. To do this, the armed forces must compete with the trappings of a burgeoning global marketplace for such specialized talent. In other words, militaries have to entice employees that might otherwise go into the private sector.⁶ This invariably means not only improving economic incentives for would-be government workers but also liberalizing cultures within the armed forces and civilian government ranks. A related challenge is the acquisition of actual systems useful for defense, detection, and offense in the cyber domain. In many ways, of course, effective realization of such a development program extends organically from solving labor force issues and from effective coordination with the private sector (to be discussed further in the next few chapters). But militaries do face training and planning issues in a macro sense that are additionally worthy of

note here. Such issues are no more complicated than the fact that large numbers of service personnel must constantly be trained to incorporate new requirements and new abilities of operation into planning processes. At the highest levels, where relatively higher numbers of older personnel are concentrated, this means the effective reimagining of ongoing education initiatives and necessary emphasis on effective articulation of new operation imperatives to civilian government.⁷ Otherwise, militaries can face additional issues of asset acquisition that emerge from an ineffectual articulation of development priorities in the statements of military and civilian leaders, government budgets, and executive-level strategies.

Critical infrastructure

When it comes to national security and cyber issues, it is difficult to avoid the topic of critical infrastructure. “Critical infrastructure” is a term of art—first promulgated in a series of commission reports on infrastructural vulnerabilities in the United States following the Oklahoma City bombings in 1995—that describes different sectors of national systems so important that the destruction or debilitation of one would have a major impact on national security and welfare.⁸ Critical infrastructure in the United States specifically describes the 16 infrastructural sectors that, for lack of a better phrase, allow the country to run. These sectors are diverse and include a range of societal disparate functions, from water systems and agriculture to transportation, dams, and nuclear energy.

The notion that critical infrastructure might qualify as a component part of a conceptually broadened national security apparatus is relatively uncontroversial. Indeed, public infrastructure has been targeted and protected by states in wartime and peace for thousands of years. The health of a nation’s roads, railroads, energy infrastructure, and productive abilities are, much as is discussed below when we turn to the issue of intellectual property, clearly correlated with national capacity to act in the national interest. With regards to the information revolution, however, the threat to critical infrastructure has become significantly more pronounced in any imagining of conflict with aggressive foreign actors.

Cyberspace and information technologies are crosscutting. Every sector of critical infrastructure relies on information systems to function effectively. Some, of course, rely on ICTs far more than others. Jeffrey Hunker describes this variation in terms of a concept from the engineering field—tightly or loosely coupled.⁹ Tightly coupled systems are those where change or disruption in one sector means a direct and rapid effect elsewhere. Loosely coupled systems describe a slower moving set of effects. With regards to critical infrastructure, we might consider sectors like agriculture to be loosely coupled. Disruption has a clear effect, but it is not necessarily drastic or immediate, particularly if rapid reversal is possible. Banking, energy infrastructure, and transportation, by contrast, are tightly coupled. Naturally, attacks against tightly coupled critical infrastructure are considered to be more significant in the context of national security processes than might be intrusions targeting loosely coupled sectors.¹⁰

Though cyber technologies are crosscutting, there are effective hubs of national abilities to ensure digital functionality for the country writ large. Specifically, the telecommunications sector of critical infrastructure governs the ability of other sectors to function in full. Therefore, telecommunications infrastructure is a particularly serious consideration for states when preparing for a range of cyber conflict scenarios.

Relationships with critical infrastructure sectors will be discussed further in the chapters focusing on national experiences, including with public-private dialogues across countries.¹¹

For now, though, it is perhaps worthwhile to note that one of the major issues that states face with regards to infrastructure protection comes from the fact that governments need to adapt policy to suit massive sections of national economies. For non-authoritarian states, this is not easy. Different economic sectors have remarkably different and remarkably entrenched perspectives on information technology issues. Not only that, but effective state command of the national security apparatus inevitably means the ability to affect control of different processes in crisis scenarios. This will be discussed further in the next chapters, but in short there is a clear issue in terms of the abilities that governments want with regards to infrastructural function. Perhaps the simplest example is that of the kill switch option. A kill switch would be a mechanism of governance set up to allow a state executive (or perhaps a small legislatively delegated body) to effectively shut down the national Internet through control of ISPs. Naturally, this option is unacceptable to a range of national industrial and infrastructural parties, regardless of their commitment to national security integrity, because it directly clashes with a range of competing behavioral motivations, most notably the need to function as private businesses and responsibilities to the public. In the context of national and international security imperatives, governments must develop policy that brings as much capacity for effective control as possible within reach while still responsibly meeting the demands of society and industry. This imperative is further exacerbated by nuanced formats of relationships between government and industrial sectors, wherein some particularly tightly coupled ones—like the banking sector—make natural partners for government that do not act impartially in national-level conversations regarding appropriate buy-in to cyber-security initiatives.

Intellectual property

As mentioned in the previous section, the nature of the innovation economy directly determines the operational capacity of major elements of a state's national security infrastructure, including the functionality of militaries in warfighting. Though this is perhaps more true within the context of cyber conflict than it is in the aggregate, the idea that economic and innovative potential links to national power is not new. To the contrary, scholars of IR of all stripes have regularly argued that the dynamic operation of the innovation economy is part of the basis of long-term power potential.¹² This is not the entire picture, of course, but it is certainly the case that industrial efficiency is linked to economic growth and development. Digital intrusion on a massive scale to steal data from governments and private companies, whether coordinated or not, portends a significant redistribution of innovative processes that might feasibly lead to unwanted imbalances of power. Even though there are challenges in absorbing massive amounts of stolen information, the theft and reapplication of intellectual property is one commonly discussed way that countries can change the dynamic of their own industrial potential in the short term. Thus, much as the British and French Empires concentrated considerable effort on the task of trade and economic administration, states in the digital age focus attention on the issue of low-level incursions with the aim of minimizing future security costs.

Naturally, the exact costs of such redistribution are difficult to pinpoint. In the aggregate, reporting has held that costs to global industry from the theft of intellectual property are annually perhaps as low as \$2 billion and as high as \$400 billion. Given that global GDP exceeds \$70 trillion as of 2014, these figures do not necessarily suggest major disruption. But it is worth considering the long-term challenges to national security from the direct and indirect effects of such information theft, both criminal and political.

Perhaps the most commonly cited deleterious outcome of intellectual property theft is the direct transfer of sensitive technological or intelligence secrets from the infiltration of government, intelligence community, or defense contractor systems. In 2015, a series of leaked reports claimed that Chinese authorities had stolen more than 50 TB of information from the U.S. government that included blueprint information for weapons platforms like the F-35 Lightning II fighter craft.¹³ Certainly, cyber attacks undertaken during Moonlight Maze, Titan Rain/Byzantine Hades, Shady Rat, and other episodes gathered large amounts of both unclassified and classified information useful to foreign governments.¹⁴ Naturally, such one-way exchanges of information risk the national security of the victim state by enhancing foreign potential to compromise the victim's capabilities.

With regards to the innovation economy itself, broad-scoped problems of intellectual property loss can cause massive problems with investor confidence on a number of fronts. Start-up businesses, which are the heart of many technology-focused sectors that ultimately undergird large-scale industrial programs that support government security establishments, can experience shrinkage as the costs of initial investment—or even just perceptions of costs involved—rise directly as a result of information redistribution. Likewise, national industry can suffer the loss of first-mover advantage after the costs of research, development, and operation are weighed against the costs of foreign companies that benefit from illicit information transfer. Moreover, such intrusions can *discourage* strong industry-government cooperation on meaningful cyber-security practices in that companies may feel unwilling to share information about incidents that would result in lost consumer and shareholder confidence.

The information environment and democratic integrity

We cannot characterize security issues in the wake of the information revolution as entirely relating to the digitization of infrastructure. Much as Gutenberg's printing press, the telegraph, and the television did in eras past, information technologies have had gargantuan effects on the information environment in which global politics takes place.¹⁵ Individuals, institutions, and countries access and create information in new and unique ways. New paradigms of access to information about the world around us have had apparently lasting psychological effects regarding the way that we, as humans, problem solve (i.e. we more naturally consider network-shaped solutions to complex issues and perceive issues of global and national security in different ways than we have in the past). Likewise, information itself is more open to manipulation and multi-faceted framing by a range of actors.

Why discuss such extended changes to the environment of international politics here? The fact of the matter is that, much in the same that economic considerations like the innovation economy link directly to national potential to act in security affairs, the marketplace in which ideational contestation and debate occurs can be

highly impactful when it comes to state approaches to foreign policymaking. This is, of course, particularly true of democratic countries where governments are designed so that political processes interact with social discourse in as healthy a fashion as possible to then direct national trajectory.

In democracies, the legitimacy of governments extends from popular mandate. This does not only mean that a government elected through a robust and free set of elections has the ability and responsibility to act on behalf of the people. It also means that governments must—broadly speaking, regardless of whether officials are perceived as pure representatives or delegates—respond to national discourse on particular policy issues and perspectives. In political theory, a range of theories speak to the manner in which popular discourse coalesces to become policy positions that are then either accommodated or responded to by the state. Marketplace of Ideas theory, for instance, is a set of arguments going back to John Stuart Mill that says democracies tend towards centrist, prudent policy positions as a result of the ideational tendencies of the marketplace.¹⁶ Much as happens in economic markets, extreme positions are countered by less extreme ones as individuals seek new information and change preferences to find a position that seems most beneficial. This does not necessarily mean that democratic bodies always adopt “true” or “right” policy stances, but they do tend to be reasonably prudent. The success of this marketplace depends on the power of countervailing institutions of democracy. When an actor like the U.S. President—who has an unusual advantage in speaking about security issues because of his direct control of intelligence resources—states a position on a subject, democratic process tends to see his rhetoric countered by the information-seeking behaviors of a free media and the self-serving rhetoric of other elected officials who are interested in being seen to represent constituent interests.

Regardless of whether or not one buys this particular imagining of democratic process (other scholars, for instance, have variously argued that people seek value resonance or are risk-averse when it comes to specific costs to be incurred in conflict), there is a reasonable consensus that the dynamics of interaction between different elements of democratic societies drives foreign policy and defines policy trajectories in unique ways. Naturally, then, the integrity of this process is a critical part of any state’s security apparatus, and a healthy domestic marketplace of ideational discourse is an asset to be protected. We return to this point in detail in Chapter 8 in discussing cyber-enabled forms of unconventional warfare.

Cyberwar: how likely is it to take place?

How likely is “cyberwar” between two countries? In other words, how likely is it that a major interstate conflict might occur entirely in the digital domain? From the perspective of military strategists and security scholars, the truth of the matter is that cyber conflict operations do little in isolation to improve national warfighting capabilities. This is not the same as saying that cyber weaponry adds little to the warfighting toolkit of states. In reality, there are a great many things that Internet technologies and the computer systems they connect do to add to the security portfolio of states; they augment military potential, they offer opportunities for interfering in foreign countries’ internal affairs, and they offer new ways by which a government might favorably affect the global information environment. And yet claims about the possibility of “victory” in cyberwar or other low-level cyber conflicts imprecisely describe the benefits to be had from the construction and employment of a cyber arsenal.¹⁷

Box 7.1 Cyberwar scenarios

Across the scholarly and practitioner literature on cyber conflict, three distinct scenarios have variously been linked with the notion of “cyberwar,” a conflict of exceptional proportions fought between states entirely—or almost entirely—via digital means.

The first among these is the least disruptive to states, as it focuses on military systems alone. Simply put, scholars have occasionally envisioned cyberwar as a large-scale debilitating attack on complex military systems. The only extant example of such an attack taking place, many note, is the Stuxnet attack on the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran in 2010. There, as is described in the previous set of sections, a worm of remarkable sophistication was employed to sabotage the legitimate functions of the Natanz facility, namely of the centrifuges used to produce enriched isotopes of weapons-grade uranium. In other scenarios, scholars have envisioned a broad set of cyber attacks aimed at multiple military bases and at the nuclear command/control infrastructure of the United States. Though (as this section argues) these acts would make little strategic sense if employed without other force additionally being brought to bear, such complex disruption of military functions would undoubtedly—if only achieved via cyber means without subsequent action in other domains—constitute a cyberwar.

The second and third cyberwar scenarios constitute the more realistic set of possibilities, at least according to a wide range of security practitioners. On the one hand, cyberwar may take the form of effective **cyber blockade**. The blockade, which is discussed elsewhere in this book, takes the form of a massive denial of service attack against the Internet infrastructure of an entire country. Russian-based hackers achieved such an effect in Estonia in 2007 and, partially, in Georgia in 2008. U.S. hackers blockaded North Korea in 2014 in response to the attacks and threat of further attacks leveled against Sony Pictures, Inc. During a blockade, Internet access from within the target country is ideally entirely cut off. At the very least, a partial blockade would allow a country to hamper commerce, key government functions, and the full range of societal activities.

Finally, cyberwar may take the form of broad-scoped attacks against national critical infrastructure (CI). This scenario, popularized in movies like *Die Hard 4*, is the one typically held up as most concerning by cyber-security practitioners. A successful disruption of one or several CI sectors could cause immense damage to the national economy, and the testimony of various stakeholders since 2001 suggests that a variety of foreign irritants, from al Qaeda to the Russian Federation, have taken active steps to map U.S. CI vulnerabilities. It is important to note that this scenario is highly variable and *does* include a cyber blockade of Internet infrastructure. After all, as later chapters describe, Internet and telecommunications critical infrastructure act as a plane upon which all other CI sectors function. If those networks are systematically compromised, then other CI sectors, from financial services to transportation, will feel the immediate effects.

Here, we might consider what traditional theories of warfighting say about the translation of political interests to favorable outcomes through aggression and violence. In short, such theories argue that aggression and violence can be useful to states for two reasons. First, states can use the threat of violence, implicit or otherwise, to achieve security goals.¹⁸ This is the domain of coercion, wherein states can either compel or deter action by opponents. Compellence describes successful attempts to force a foreign power to change their behavior and take an action via threat of force that they would not have otherwise taken. Deterrence, by contrast, describes successful attempts to force such an adversary to avoid taking action that they would otherwise take. Second, states can employ capabilities for violence to directly take control of an opponent's territory and political systems. Here, military and other forces of a state are employed to physically occupy enemy positions and force—through conquest—changes in foreign behavior.

Cyber compellence and deterrence are complex subjects which are covered in more depth in the next two subsections. Nevertheless, there is an overall principle of cyber conflict that is relevant when we consider the simplest scenario in which a state threatens cyber attacks in an attempt to change the behavior of a foreign actor—cyber incursions are, with few exceptions, aggressive but *not violent*.¹⁹ Physical damage from cyber attack is rare and requires a confluence of circumstances, such as those specific to the case of Stuxnet, that is uncommon in world affairs. Thus, in the bulk of cases, disruption and damage brought about by a cyber offensive will be temporary. Computer systems can be repaired and secured, in some cases in minutes. Disruption to sensor systems or even critical infrastructure systems can be modified to compensate and to close known vulnerabilities in short order. On top of this, much of the value of cyber weapons is in the relative secrecy of their development. Cyber exploitations are often “one shot,” meaning that the use of a particular technique often notifies the victim of the mode of assault and provides a basis for better defense in the future.

The upshot of this dynamic is quite simple. Without the use of additional tools of statecraft and violence, cyber capabilities do not promise to states the ability to achieve lasting victories, to occupy territory, or to force changes in an opponent's behavior. In this way, we might think of state cyber conflict capabilities as an adjunct modifier of conflict that relies on other elements of a state's security infrastructure—such as traditional military forces, intelligence assets, or diplomatic channels—to achieve meaningful foreign policy outcomes.²⁰ Of course, this argument only applies to state adversaries acting within the confines of commonly held assumptions about the balance of power in international affairs. As the next two chapters note, state actors sponsoring conflict below the threshold of war and terroristic non-state actors may have significant incentive to engage in cyberwar insofar as widespread disruption might aid constitutive objectives.

Does cyberspace make states more likely to attack one another?

Does the existence of a new domain of possible human interactions in cyberspace mean that states are more likely to attack one another than in eras past (i.e. than in eras before the Internet existed)? In this section, we consider this question in two ways. First, given the opportunities for mayhem and given the special characteristics

of human operation online, is there unprecedented motivation for states to attack one another *entirely through digital means*? Second, does the existence of cyberspace and of extensive cyber arsenals employed by state security services mean that there is a new risk involved in states who face off in the real world? In other words, does cyberspace introduce new risk to conventional interstate security relationships?

Through cyber alone: how inclined are states to employ cyber weapons?

In the literature on IR and strategic studies, the Security Dilemma (SD) is a commonly cited concept that describes how two actors—usually countries—can move towards the brink of conflict entirely without the intention of doing so.²¹ Also called the “spiral model” or the Thucydides Trap, the SD essentially describes a situation in which efforts to enhance the ability of one state lead one or more foreign states to attempt to mobilize their own security forces in response. For instance, if State A decides that it must develop and produce new advanced tanks to replace obsolete models, State B might interpret this as being a direct threat to national security. Even if there is no knowledge of duplicity or ill-intent, the fact that (1) there is no way to actually gauge foreign intentions and (2) no global police force to call on if you are attacked without warning, forces State B to take actions to compensate (for instance, with the production of its own new tanks or the mobilization of border fortifications). This balancing effort, mirrored in turn by the first mover who undertakes the same calculated assessment of State B’s mobilization, leads to a spiral of hostilities in which rising tensions emerge from no original intention for conflict.

Box 7.2 The attribution problem revisited

Perhaps the simplest unique characteristic of interactions in the cyber domain, the attribution problem, is the core focus of much literature on conflict in the digital age. Simply put, it is difficult for defenders to identify attackers during cyber incidents.²² This is true on several fronts.

First, not all cyber attacks are detectable. Effective cyber warfare certainly includes a set of actions wherein the attacker is able to elude the detection apparatus of the defender entirely. Likewise, disruption is often an effect to be avoided in cyber conflict, particularly where the goal is information monitoring or exfiltration. It is also worth noting in this vein that some cyber attacks do not achieve the intended result. Where knowledge of the victim’s systems is imperfect or the design of cyber weapons is shoddy, there is great possibility for modes of intrusion that sidestep the original objective and are potentially more difficult to detect, because detection procedures are designed around catching specific types of intrusions.

Second, even where attacks are detected, there is a long and often complex pathway towards full attribution (i.e. a set of technical information that allows a defender full information on the nature of the attack and the exact actions, down to location, of the attacker). Well-targeted intrusions can occur rapidly. As happened variously during Moonlight Maze, well-executed attacks that occurred over the course of mere minutes limited the opportunities available to investigators to

observe attack behavior and draw inferences. It should be noted that attribution is not impossible at all in the cyber domain. Quite the reverse. Most incidents leave telltale markers of one kind or another. However, unraveling the full story of the details of a particular attack requires specialized equipment and human resources, as well as—often—the cooperation of a number of entities indirectly involved in a given episode (including ISPs, other government agencies, private companies, foreign organizations, etc.). Attribution investigations are sometimes hampered further by the need to obtain information that exists in formats protected by law as private, such as personal computers.

Finally, even where technical attribution is possible, there is a distinct difference between identifying the origin point/details of an attack and being able to effectively assess responsibility. Intent and direction are political phenomena, and it is inappropriate—though certainly indicative—to argue that basic descriptive information proxies for an understanding of responsibility. During Moonlight Maze, for instance, the successful entrapment of the intruder through the download of an altered Adobe Acrobat software package did not provide investigators with strong enough evidence to move forward with diplomatic efforts to end the conflict episode. The identification of an IP address in Moscow may have been yet another “zombie” computer being used as a beachhead or could have been the home computer of a non-state hacker without links to the Russian government.

Naturally, attribution uncertainties prompt all manner of challenge for state security actors, from technical analysts through military managers to the policy practitioners and diplomats that must act on threat intelligence in times of crisis. Where the stakes might be relatively high in potentially accusing a foreign power of aggression, what level of certitude enables practitioners to be comfortable pointing the finger. Typically, attribution is broken down into three categories based on the robustness of the case that evidence can make—essentially being able to prove “who dunnit” (1) to oneself, (2) to the attacker, and (3) to the broader global community. Being able to attribute cyber sophisticated attacks directly to foreign state actors in the eyes of the global community is difficult, not least because the connection between government actions and the actions of hacking units is often nigh impossible to demonstrate. Being able to demonstrate knowledge of an attack to one’s attacker may be of some use behind closed doors as a threat or a bargaining tool, as arguably was the case with Moonlight Maze. But insufficient evidence to move the conversation into the public sphere makes such attribution cheap—attackers are not motivated to stop or admit responsibility because the victim has no power (other than counterattack) to produce punitive consequences.

The existence of an SD between states is particularly sensitive to two factors—(1) the nature of military technology as offense or defense dominant and (2) *perceptions* held by either party about the utility of that same technology. In other words, whether or not a country possesses technology that is most useful in a first strike scenario (versus a defensive one) and whether or not other countries can tell the difference determines whether or not the SD is acute or muted (i.e. whether the risk of conflict is high or low).

So is there unprecedented motivation for states to attack one another *entirely through digital means* alone? Is the security dilemma acute online? The question with cyber is threefold. First, is cyberspace offense dominant or not? Second, can we tell the difference between offensive and defensive abilities given the constant development of systems and techniques? And, third, is it possible for us to quantify foreign perceptions of cyber conflict dynamics? In other words, is it possible to tell what other countries think about cyber conflict and adapt our doctrine accordingly?

Offense/defense differentiation is hard. Because of the attribution problem, we might consider strategic calculations on the part of intruders to be low-risk, high-gain at all times. In reality, of course, this is variably dependent on the abilities of the defender. It is a common meme in the literature on cyber-security that the domain is “offense dominant,” meaning that the current state of technology produces a singular value in attacking. Would-be intruders have all of the cards and there are few risks involved in engaging in aggressive activities for a range of purposes.

Specifically, cyberspace is an offense dominant domain because of several specific reasons, so the argument goes. First, the effectiveness of different techniques or combinations thereof in intruder approaches almost always relies on secrecy prior to the attack. Success is, therefore, a function of *not* communicating with a defender in any way (either directly or through probing attacks) prior to an assault. Cyber “weapons” also have volatile half-lives in that their effectiveness might be lost entirely as a result of, for instance, a basic systems update or patch on the part of the defender. Moreover, cyber weapons, as will be discussed later, are not best suited for coercion where there is a need to send messages of intent and threat to a defender. The result of all this is that cyber “weaponry” is use-or-lose in that its primary characteristic is effectiveness from obscurity. This incentivizes first strike doctrine, which is reified in the lack of executive control often found with such operations. In short, authorization to hack rarely comes from the top and often emerges from mid-level managerial entities (or individuals) in charge of incident planning and response. Again, defenders and attackers both know this, which encourages the mutual development of first strike practices.

As anyone taking a second glance at the issue might conclude, this reading of the situation *somewhat* misstates the issue.²³ The attribution problem also provides a range of unique abilities to defenders in the cyber domain. In particular, the ability to *deceive* attackers and to encourage unique behaviors that compromise the ability of intruders either to effectively achieve objectives or remain hidden is a powerful one. One need only look at early cyber conflict incidents wherein a honeypot was employed to entrap intruders—Cuckoo’s Egg and Moonlight Maze, in particular—to see the tools available to defenders trying to even the score and examine assault conditions. This is not to say that defense is easy. But there are inherent advantages held by the defender, including the ability to set up traps based on expected intruder behaviors that nullify expected gains and the fact that defense analysis is not a digital set of processes.

Two other points in this vein bear mention. First, it is quite arguable that attackers have significant incentive to restrain their aggressive actions.²⁴ In fact, the more likely an attacker is to undertake a major assault, the less likely that same attacker should be to engage in regular, broad-scoped disruptive activity. The logic here is that, while probing attacks and reconnaissance might be necessary to design and implement a major attack, regular intrusion is likely to give defenders significant warning and

opportunities to disrupt the exact actions necessary to achieve more sophisticated intrusions. Second, and relatedly, it should be noted that cyber attack is a forced interaction.²⁵ With planning, intrusion can be desirable from the perspective of the defender, as it gifts new knowledge about network vulnerabilities and offers avenues for hack-back in which defenders can infect or disrupt specific would-be attackers.

There is certainly a good argument that the domain is offense dominant. However, additional thought suggests that it might perhaps be more accurate to say that cyberspace is an *offense enabling* domain. The technology *does* allow attackers unique abilities such that tactical calculations take on a low-risk, high-gain flavor. Moreover, these calculations are not affected across the board by the actions of defenders, particularly because of the high costs involved in constructing effective cyber defense and forensics capabilities. Fluctuations in decision making on the part of attackers are entirely dependent on case-by-case circumstances. At the same time, however, defenders are not *defenseless*. Given the right infusion of capital and appropriate design, systems can be made secure such that intruders are effectively deterred from attack. For one, militaries and intelligence units regularly and necessarily engage foreign foes non-combatively to signal ability. Such intrusions cannot be differentiated from pre-strike reconnaissance, leaving defenders with an unfortunately broad scope of possibilities to consider in their analysis. Moreover, good cyber defense is not just perimeter defense, but rather includes active measures that—though a standard definition of “active defense” continues to elude practitioners and industry alike—necessarily include preemptive intrusion to gauge adversary intentions. The result of this is, quite simply, that differentiating between incoming attack and standard defensive operations is extremely difficult in practice.

Given all of this, can we tell the difference between offensive and defensive abilities given the constant development of systems and techniques? And is it possible for us to quantify foreign perceptions of cyber conflict dynamics? The answer to these questions is simpler, though not particularly mollifying. As discussed previously in several places, differentiating between exploitative intrusions, aggressive attacks, and cyber actions designed to actively aid defensive efforts is immensely difficult. Likewise, a quantification of how others think about cyber conflict is prone to imprecision because of the degree to which there is likely going to be variation at the level of different operational units. Among other ways, quantifying assessments are done through in-depth studies of foreign doctrinal developments, Professional Military Education programs, and joint exercise experiences undertaken by members of the international community. However, as is enduringly true of intelligence analysis and military assessments of human factors in conflict, assessing perception and intention is always difficult due to the task of having to predict psychological factors. This, again, is even harder with cyber-security, as decision making rarely occurs at only the executive level and as operational behaviors are likely to vary across units of the security services.

The suggestion that emerges from such a read of the dynamics of cyber conflict is that, regardless of the technical realities of cyber capabilities, the SD is acute in interstate relations . . . at least insofar as cyber operations alone are concerned. Perception is uniquely difficult to quantify, and the nexus of actions required to maintain effective defensive procedures and to gather information relevant to national security policy planning means that government security establishments are likely to face the challenge of intention analysis linked to different kinds of cyber intrusions in perpetuity.

Do cyber weapons affect the likelihood of conventional warfare?

Beyond cyberspace, a core concern among strategic planners and scholars of IR is that cyber warfare lends itself organically to greater instability between states interacting in the real world, particularly in crisis situations. Crisis stability refers to the potential for sudden conflict during a particularly heated standoff between two states over a specific issue. Examples of a crisis might historically include the assassination crisis that sparked World War I, the Sudetenland crisis that led to the appeasement of (rather than conflict with) Nazi Germany at Munich, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, wherein the United States launched a naval blockade of Cuba to prevent further construction of nuclear missile facilities there by Soviet forces intent on responding to the United States' previous placement of missiles in Turkey. In contemporary security discourse, the most commonly cited potential crises that would involve great powers include a Sino-American standoff over the issue of Taiwan's independence, a re-launched conflict on the Korean Peninsula, an escalating conflict between China and Japan over maritime territories in the East China Sea, and a range of scenarios involving Israel and belligerent neighboring states.²⁶

It should be noted up front that cyber warfare *cannot* cause crisis instability, where two states find themselves on the brink of direct military engagement, by itself. The reason for this is simply that cyber weapons do not contain a unique feature of other weapons that might be employed in crisis scenarios—they are not “use it or lose it.” Some crisis situations are defined by the relative military weakness of one side to the other due to the situational deployment of a particular military force or the geographic conditions of the standoff. In such situations, the value of the military asset that portends this first mover advantage is greatly increased in the present because future action might allow an enemy to engage on more even terms. Therefore, the advantaged side is incentivized to strike first. Cyber weapons simply do not function this way. Though additional time *does* often allow a defender more opportunity to potentially mitigate the effects of an intrusion, the fact is that cyber weapons are not inherently able in most situations to degrade the kinetic ability of enemy militaries to strike back.

Nevertheless, cyber weapons as an additional feature of *existing* crisis scenarios do potentially make for greater instability. The first major reason as to why this may be the case is the same reason that cyber weapons cannot themselves be the cause of a crisis.²⁷ Because a cyber attack invariably awards defenders the ability to analyze an intrusion and adapt defenses in a short period of time, employment of a cyber weapon incentivizes quick decisions to act in other ways while there is an advantage—perceived or actual—from the initial effects.

Such a set of incentives is bolstered further by the fact that specific cyber techniques are difficult to duplicate in terms of their intended effect. There are two main reasons for this. First, defenders are able to more effectively shore up vulnerabilities once an initial attack vector and target have been identified.²⁸ Second, intrusions in interstate conflict situations often rely on complex vulnerabilities in sophisticated systems.²⁹ Finding more than one vulnerability that allows for the achievement of a similar effect is no easy task. Thus, early use and early commitment to other actions to escalate a crisis based on an initial attack make significant sense.

Another reason why cyber warfare is potentially dangerous in crisis situations has to do with intention and strategic assumptions made about the other side. Cyber

weapons do not always produce clear or easily verifiable results.³⁰ Attackers know what was meant to happen but don't necessarily have a good line on where the effect was achieved. Likewise, defenders are able to see what happened in general, but have no understanding of the parameters of the operation as set by the intruder. Particularly where some attacks will have unintended or secondary consequences—such as a situation in which information theft efforts unexpectedly deny network access briefly to a military unit in the field—opponents will have to make assumptions about the intentions of the other side. Given the tension likely to characterize a crisis scenario, it seems logical that intentions will be considered as belligerent by default. Moreover, such uncertainty simultaneously acts to incentivize cyber probing of an opponent, as knowledge that many attacks will go unnoticed in some way reinforce the low-risk, high-gain conditional reality faced by belligerents.

Finally, there is the possibility for increased crisis instability from employment of cyber weapons inherent in the organizational setup of military network warfare procedures.³¹ Where information warfare operations are broad in both scope and severity, authorization for a range of actions lies not at the level of national executives or even with high-level military commanders. In many situations, this spells out a troubling situation in which unit commanders must respond to a particular intrusion effort or must coordinate with intelligence operations across institutional lines to achieve surveillance and reconnaissance mission objectives. And, of course, this decentralization of authority, which exists even in situations where national network warfare operations run through a specific command entity, also worsens the calculation made to assess foreign intent in that it invokes a traditional psychological challenge of interstate relations—decision making is not centralized; however, one side simultaneously (1) expects that the other knows this and (2) still tends to think of an opponent as a monolithic, centrally controlled enemy organization.

Can states use cyber weapons for coercion?

In general, cyber capabilities offer little opportunity for either state or non-state actors to coerce foreign governments. In particular, the knowledge that any “victory” of disruption will be temporary nullifies much of the potency of any threat made with coercion in mind. Of course, it is possible that the threat of a broad-scoped cyber intrusion might convince some actors to change their behavior. As is covered in this section, however, even in such instances it is clear that the possibility of disruption from the employment of digital weapons alone does not dictate the potential for success in coercion.

First, it is important to consider the dynamics of coercive efforts targeted at the state in international affairs. At the most basic level, an actor's ability to coerce might stem from the application or threat of physical violence, diplomatic pressure, or the use of indirect mechanisms to apply economic or social pressure. Often, though a state is the recipient of coercive pressure, coercive actions target individuals or organizations associated with or operating under the jurisdiction of a particular regime. Coercion most commonly takes the form of strategic attempts to either deny or punish a competitor. Strategies of denial essentially promise to significantly deny access to a market, a piece of territory, an allied partner and their forces, or another such geopolitical resource. By contrast, strategies of punishment threaten direct repercussions

for the competitor if behavior is not altered. Such strategies can usually be broken up further into policies that threaten the punishment of military or related governmental assets (including strategic territorial possessions) and policies that threaten retaliation against the civilian population or civilian infrastructure. In all cases, coercion is more based on an appraisal of the *power* an actor has to hurt,³² rather than the application of force itself; coercion is achieved through only the threat or *limited* application of military or other forces.³³ After all, the point is that the target has a choice available to them—stay the course or, if the conditions are compelling, change course.³⁴

Failure of coercion occurs in one of several ways. First, failure occurs when the coercive policy fails to produce any change in the behavior of the targeted actor.³⁵ This failure mode is somewhat hard to observe, as time is a significant variable. Coercion might yet occur if the applied forces remain viable and the external situation has not changed the range of choices available to the target.³⁶ Nevertheless, long-term non-effect is a sure sign of the failure of coercion. Second, failure occurs when the “sender” of the coercive signal abandons that policy without any perceptible result.³⁷ This occurs before any deadlines that have been set in the conveyance of the coercive signal. By contrast, and finally, failure can occur following the period of time signaled to the target in which change was meant to take place.³⁸ In this situation, failure occurs because the signaler shrinks away or finds itself unable to carry through on the threatened action. Regardless of whether this stems from political unwillingness or technical capacity, the result is the same. It is important to note that failure to coerce is not synonymous with the necessity of the use of force.³⁹

For coercion to succeed, it is useful to think of coercive signals as requiring three basic components. First, as Rich summarizes,⁴⁰ any attempt at coercion demands clarity in the expected result.⁴¹ Desired changes in the behavior of the targeted competitor must be clearly interpretable in the manner in which the coercive action is made. Vagueness undermines the attempt being made and is itself a common cause of the failure to coerce. As one might expect, this required component presents varying degrees of challenge to states that favor the use of one type of coercive instrument—sanctions or diplomatic statements, for example—over another, like the mobilization of military units in a particular area.

Second, any demands made of a target must be accompanied by some signal of urgency that hints at swift repercussions in the absence of imminent changes in behavior.⁴² Without such a signal, coercive demands—even implicit or veiled ones—might lack the necessary time-based component that allows the “sender” to approximate a schedule for its next move.⁴³ Moreover, the target might ignore general threats as not credible.⁴⁴ After all, the power of a particular signal lies principally with its credibility. While this depends to some degree on the capabilities of the signaling actor, coercive power most critically depends on the ability of that actor to make short-term intentions clear.⁴⁵

Finally, the targeted actor must believe itself in real danger of repercussions given inaction.⁴⁶ In particular, the target must be made to believe that it will be worse off if the threat of action is implemented than if it turns away from the current course. Here, it is easy to think that the most potent relevant element is the capabilities of the signaling actor.⁴⁷ However, it is important to consider the geopolitical context within which coercion is undertaken. The position of the signaler in the international system plays a significant role in determining the potency of a threat and the degree to which the target considers itself in danger.⁴⁸ Is the signaler socially bound by the

expectations of either order or partnerships to reaffirm a particular precedent? Are there constraining domestic variables at work or has the signaler historically followed through with threats? And are there secondary circumstances to consider in international affairs—such as a related conflict—that might place constraints on future interactions?⁴⁹

The bottom line is that success in coercive efforts depends on the ability of that competitor to process information and to understand the intended consequences of the promised course of action. As may be clear by now, this is problematic when it comes to the employment of cyber arsenals—that is, without the parallel use of some other tool of statecraft—to such an intended end.

With regards to the question of coercive strategies, particularly strategies of denial and punishment, cyber attack strategies come in a series of flavors. Though the prospective scope of resources required in such an undertaking is enormous, a cyber blockade is the tactic that proxies as perhaps the most direct corollary to more conventional tools used in strategic efforts to punish. Cyber blockades describe a large-scale set of efforts made to essentially cut off a country's access to the Internet, whether for minutes, days, or longer, with far-reaching effects not only for industry, government, and citizenry but also for foreign social and economic target dependents.⁵⁰ When attempted in a limited fashion, such blockade-style tactics present in the form of directed attacks that might seek to either take control of a central system—such as government servers or a critical infrastructure control system—or disrupt information processes in an ultimately harmful way.

Beyond direct damage that might be made to digital systems, prosecutors of a cyber attack that aims to coerce might also focus on the content of information and the socioeconomic or political value it holds. More in line with the mafia-flavored metaphors that strategists often use to describe basic compelling concepts, computer network infiltration techniques allow for access to private, propriety information that is often valuable *only* due to its protected nature. Control of such information or the ability to damage it provides cyber coercers with the means to manipulate a target on the level of socioeconomic operation—i.e. to bribe a target actor.

It is important to note that the range of threats possible through digital means is in constant flux. Though the strategic parameters of computer network assault are unlikely to change in the abstract sense, it is undoubtedly the case that constant evolutions—and even revolutions—across various aspects of the incredibly varied cyber ecosystem in the world mean additional vulnerabilities for states over time.

So how viable is coercion enabled by cyber attack? One consideration is that the high degree of innovative ICT evolution present in industrial sectors in developed economies plays an important role in determining the efficacy of attempts to coerce online. A high rate of adaptability on the part of prospective targets variably affects the strategic parameters of any possible or threatened assault. How can an attacker be sure that a victim is incapable of quickly adapting to effectively defend against disruption? Here, of course, we also have to consider the fact that any intrusion is likely to produce temporary gains for an attacker. Again, unless the purpose of the assault is to enable a non-digital form of disruption such as the release of sensitive data, cyber attack promises only short-term problems for a victim. Likewise, the threat of attack itself potentially diminishes an actor's ability to make demands. After all, past the initial stages it is increasingly likely that a system flaw exploited in an attack will be unusable or of significantly reduced value in the future. In short, effectiveness in cyber

assaults clearly relies heavily on secrecy and a lack of technical foreknowledge. Loss of this advantage affects the ability of a coercer to credibly communicate intentions and to convince the target that danger is both real and hard to defend against.

Of course, no discussion of the use of cyber weapons for compellent means would be complete without recognition of the attribution problems that naturally accompany digital, as opposed to more conventional, forms of attack.⁵¹ Due to the nature of computer systems as effectively detached from physical actor identifiers, attribution of a particular attack is difficult. More specifically, attributing agency to a particular state or major actor is often difficult in a geopolitical sense. On the one hand, it is not easy to trace an attack or, if an attack is traced, to link it to a particular actor with only geographic IP address information to go on. On the other, even if the target produces a comprehensive portfolio of evidence that includes geographic information and correlated likelihoods of agency based on prior observation of exploitative activities by a specific actor, it is remarkably difficult to know whether the actions of an individual or small organization is representative of a broader policy. Indeed, public discussion thereof is often deemed harmful for a series of political and economic reasons.⁵² While this might sound favorable for an attacker, however, the coercer necessarily requires a degree of communication and understanding as part of the compellence process. Thus, coercers face the unenviable task of attempting to either create conditions under which attribution is not problematic or to produce a strategy that retains non-attribution benefits *and* effectively communicates both demands and intentions.

Finally, there inevitably exists the possibility that cyber coercion—even that which aims to use obtained information in efforts to change an opponent’s behavior—will suffer because it is difficult to bound the intended audience when making threats. The 2014 hack and threatened disruption of Sony, Inc. systems by North Korean hackers in response to the release of *The Interview* provides a good example of how imprecise and shoddy threat behavior can backfire on a would-be coercer. Here, the perpetrators of the coercion campaign chose the substantive target of their operation poorly. While Sony may have fit the requirements for an appropriate target organization, the “Guardians of Peace” placed too much focus on a single piece of content—the movie, *The Interview*. Doing so moved the scope of the compellent effort beyond Sony, though not in the details, and expanded the parameters of the operation to societal circumstance not flexibly changeable with the tools that were being brought to bear. When the specific reference to the film was made, the campaign’s perpetrators essentially changed how Sony’s inevitable non-release would be cast—from an issue of organizational decision making to one of free speech and civil liberties.

The “Guardians of Peace” incident also invited the jurisdictional interests of law enforcement agencies by expanding the scope of their own efforts to include threats of personal injury, both on specific persons and on theater-going citizens. Such a move further pushed the parameters of what is realistic for such an effort and weakened the operation on a number of fronts. First, threatening a broader range of actions, particularly ones that are generally open-ended on a national scale, reduces the threat credibility of the compellent effort enormously. Second, such threats muddy the time-frame as seen by the target and the calculations the target might make. Additional threats imply that the coercer is desperate to affect change in the near term, but also that alternative outcomes might suffice. In this situation, the target may be increasingly unsure as to whether its own actions will suffice, or whether the broader mechanisms invoked when the coercer issued new threats might either save it the cost

of altering course or cushion the costs of standing firm. Finally, and perhaps most importantly in the long run, widening the scope of the operation invites the application of security measures beyond those originally under consideration. This can, and did in the case of North Korea's campaign, have the effect of making attribution significantly more likely, both in technical and social terms. Social and political context clearly matters a great deal when it comes to cyber-security issues. The case of North Korea and Sony, in particular, highlights the way in which social capital and democratic norms can interact with what might otherwise have been a case of simple actor-target criminal coercion.

A final observation about coercion by cyber means seems prudent. Simply put, the coercion described earlier is a form of complex political maneuvering. In spite of the fact that coercion via cyber means appears to be of minimal use for state actors writ large, it would likely be disingenuous to say that cyber tools are not useful for the simple act of signaling opponents. A common tactic employed by intelligence units is that of "burning a vulnerability" wherein a cyber intrusion is affected—often where the technique is likely to be of limited use for much longer—to generally demonstrate the ability to do so. In short, cyber techniques can be used to send simple messages, from communicating the broad extent of an actor's capabilities to demonstrating knowledge of an ongoing hack to an opponent. In this way, at the operational level, cyber weaponry can be remarkably useful as coercive tools.

Can states deter cyber aggression?

Though these discussions of coercion and SD address the idea that states will be more or less motivated to launch cyber attacks, we do not directly engage with the notion that states might be able to actively deter their adversaries from cyber action. We do so here with a discussion of deterrence theory as it pertains to cyberspace.

Deterrence theory is nothing new but deterring offensive cyber operations is. The challenges to applying deterrence theory to cyber warfare relate to marked uncertainty with respect to, first, awareness and attribution of an attack, and, second, the uncertain effects of any attack (as depicted in Figure 7.1).

The difficulties surrounding attribution and control of its effects make deterrence of offensive cyber operations (OCO) uniquely difficult. In some cases, lack of control makes the application of the weapon both enticing for the attacker but also risky due to blowback onto his or her own interests, society, and economy, and those of his or her allies, and the risk of escalation by the defender, if, indeed, he or she is able to determine the attacker. Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution and others have identified this lack of attribution as the key factor that prohibits the direct and immediate application of deterrence theory to the cyber realm.⁵³ If an attack is attributable, then



Figure 7.1 Challenges in applying deterrence theory to cyber warfare

traditional deterrence applies, including the possibility of a kinetic response. If an attack is not attributable, or the attacker believes it will be falsely attributed, it may be so enticing a weapon as to be irresistible.

This is an old problem—if you could do something bad and get away with it, would you? This issue has been considered in various guises by philosophers and political leaders throughout history. In *Republic*, Plato provides the example of *Gyges' Ring*, which made its wearer invisible.⁵⁴ Would a man wearing *Gyges' Ring* be righteous; alas, no, he concluded. The temptation of being able to get away with something malicious without attribution would be too great, and even a moral man would be corrupted by such power. Cyber weapons give a nation state a *Gyges' Ring*, and, increasingly, we witness the consequences. The implications of this uncertainty illustrate the need to develop an approach to improve the ability to apply deterrence to cyber conflict.

Overview of deterrence theory. Modern deterrence theory is largely associated with nuclear policy. During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union adopted a survivable nuclear force to present a 'credible' deterrent that maintained the 'uncertainty' inherent in a strategic balance as understood through the accepted theories of major theorists like Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, and Thomas Schelling.⁵⁵ Theories of deterrence were largely developed early in the Cold War by academics coming to grips with the intellectual conundrum and novelty of the political and military impact of nuclear weapons, and arguably prevented a world war by allowing policymakers to understand how nuclear weapons affected traditional tools of statecraft—deterrence and coercion—and the risks associated with nuclear war.

Ultimately, deterrence is the manipulation of the cost/benefit calculation an adversary undertakes related to a given action. A nation can convince its adversary to avoid taking a specific action by reducing the prospective benefits and/or increasing the prospective costs. Cyber deterrence is therefore simply the manipulation of an adversary's cost/benefit analysis of a given cyber activity.⁵⁶ Keeping someone from doing something you do not want him or her to do may be brought about by threatening unacceptable punishment if the action is taken. This is called deterrence by punishment or reprisal (the power to hurt). Convincing the opponent that his or her objective will be denied to him or her if he or she attacks, is known as deterrence by denial (the power to deny military victory).⁵⁷ In the nuclear context, complete defense was impossible so deterrence by punishment was the primary approach.^{58,59} Further, nuclear deterrence sought to deter any nuclear attack (along with other major aggressive behaviors, such as a Soviet invasion of Western Europe with conventional forces), but in the context of cyber, a threshold or subset of cyber activity is the target of deterrence, such as OCO against critical infrastructure or economic targets. Both deterrence by denial or deterrence by punishment may apply in the case of a cyber attack; however, two major problems exist.

Awareness of cyber attack and attribution. The first major problem posed by most cyber weapons is the challenge of becoming aware of the attack and properly attributing the attack once it has occurred. These problems are extremely difficult to resolve as a result of the tremendous difficulty in conclusively determining the origin, identity, and intent of an actor/attacker operating in this domain, compounded by the fact that defenders generally lack the tools needed to reliably trace an attack back to the actual attacker. As Rid argues, all cyber attacks to date have been examples of sophisticated forms of sabotage, espionage, and subversion and are reliant on this

attribution difficulty.⁶⁰ Cyberspace is truly global, and nearly all action passes through networks and ISPs in multiple countries. Additionally, the hardware used to conduct cyber warfare can be owned by innocent noncombatants, illicitly harnessed for malicious use through the use of computer viruses. The 2007 Estonian, 2008 Georgian, and 2013 Ukrainian experiences highlight the challenges associated with uncertainty and attribution in cyberspace. For all three of these attacks, while the role of Moscow was suspected, evidence of direct involvement was lacking and therefore plausible deniability was possible.⁶¹ Millions of devices continue to be compromised and used illicitly as part of various networks—‘botnets’—utilized to conduct cyber-attacks.⁶² This also provides plausible deniability to state-sponsored activity.⁶³

Finally, if quality evidence tracing an attack back to its origin is obtained, it still may not lead to attribution of the attack. Knowing the originating IP address of an attack vector will not necessarily indicate who the attacker was or if they were acting with state support or direction. Sometimes an analysis of the malware itself can provide clues, but these could just as easily be deliberate decoys intended to lead investigators astray and are unlikely to result in firm attribution of a cyber attack. The challenges of attribution in cyberspace make it very difficult (although not impossible) to attribute hostile action in cyberspace to a particular individual, organization, or state and so make cyber warfare particularly appealing for an adversary that wants to execute an attack anonymously or at least with reasonable deniability. This poses significant challenges for achieving offensive deterrence against cyber attack, as an adversary can have some reasonable expectation that it may be impossible to fully attribute the attack and impose reliable costs for the action.

Uncertainty regarding cyber weapon effects. The second major characteristic of cyber weapons that significantly impacts the logic of deterrence is the uncertainty regarding their effects. Due to the potential for IT network evolution as well as IT interdependencies, it is difficult to predict the precise effects of an attack. In cyberspace, the targeted actor is capable of literally flipping a switch and instantly changing the network, or even unplugging it altogether. This factor is a destabilizing force as it rewards immediate hostile action to prevent network modification if cyber reconnaissance-targeting intrusions are later detected. In essence, it is the opposite of stable deterrence and akin to nuclear crisis instability where nuclear deterrence may fail because it incentivizes a first strike. Defenders may also have unknown automated countermeasures that negate the desired effects of cyber attacks, such as instantaneous network reconfiguration or firewalls. For example, the Stuxnet attack is likely no longer able to continue to attack Iranian nuclear facilities as the zero-day exploits it utilized have been plugged by Iranian officials. In addition to network/target evolution, cyber weapons themselves can also be unpredictable and can evolve. A cyber weapon can adapt—as was seen with the Conficker virus. Conficker included a mechanism that employed a randomizing function to generate a new list of 250 domain names, which were used as command and control rendezvous points, on a daily basis. Thus the virus remained adaptable and stayed ahead of those seeking to shut down or hijack the illicit Conficker-enabled network.⁶⁴

Network interdependencies are another dynamic contributing to the potential for collateral damage that is characteristic of cyber weapons. Because the Internet is made up of hundreds of millions of computers connected through an elaborate and organic interwoven network, and it is the backbone of much of the global economy, there is the potential for significant unintended and collateral impacts from cyber action.

This interconnected nature of IT systems has led to real-world collateral damage. For example, the 2007 Israeli cyber attack on Syrian air defense systems as part of Operation Orchard, was believed to have also damaged domestic Israeli cyber networks.⁶⁵ Fear of this kind of cyber collateral damage has had a profound effect on military planning. As another example, in 2003, the United States was planning a massive cyber attack on Iraq in advance of any physical invasion—freezing bank accounts and crippling government systems. Despite possessing the ability to carry out such attacks, the Bush administration canceled the plan out of a concern that the effects would not be contained to Iraq but instead would also have a negative effect on the networks of friends and allies across the region and in Europe.⁶⁶ The adverse consequences of such unintended results were powerful deterrents for the United States. Of course, this is not to say that other states would be similarly deterred from such actions, especially states that do not have the alliance obligations and responsibilities of the United States.

The uncertain effects cyber weapons coupled with the availability of defenses and the need for secrecy and surprise, reduce their ability to serve as a strategic deterrent in their own right. Available defenses and the potential for network evolution to mitigate the effects of an attack given early warning requires cyber attackers to rely on surprise for much of their effectiveness. To achieve surprise, secrecy is required, reducing the ability of a state to make credible threats without compromising their cyber warfare capabilities. Credible threats regarding specific means of attack or targets invite the threatened state to take protective actions which could blunt the deterrent value of a threat. Essentially, although cyber weapons have the potential to inflict unacceptable damage against an adversary, they are likely unable to offer states a credible, consistent, and ‘assured’ capability for doing so. This deficiency significantly undermines their suitability as a deterrent tool, and instead they are more likely to support an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission, or to be used as a first strike weapon, preemptively, or as force multipliers.

Beyond the two key challenges identified, other factors complicate the deterrence of OCO. For example, these include the blurred spectrum and confusion over key concepts such as Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), Computer Network Attack (CNA), Information Operations (IO), and other concepts, “inherent instability” associated with the perception of offensive dominance in cyber conflict due to “Zero Day” exploits, the relative perishability and fragility of cyber weapons, and uncertainty over the relative balance of power. Cyber scholars have long focused on these challenges of applying deterrence theory to cyber conflict.⁶⁷ Few scholars have focused on the tactical and operational issues associated with applying deterrence theory in practice—namely the nuclear war planning experience—to the cyber problem set. The exception is Austin Long’s article titled “A Cyber SIOP? Operational Considerations for Strategic Offensive Cyber Planning.”⁶⁸ Long’s article highlights the value of moving beyond solely theoretical analysis to focus on operational issues, such as planning, targeting, and command and control. Thus even if a theoretical construct for cyber deterrence does not yet fully exist, there may be additional lessons at the operational and tactical level from nuclear deterrence. Finally, the most recent Commander’s Vision for U.S. Cyber Command (2018) indicates that the United States may be moving beyond the attempt to deter cyber attacks and instead focus on continual engagement and efforts to actively thwart and defend in cyberspace.

Cyber power and power in the digital age

What makes a state “cyber powerful”? What makes a state powerful in the digital age? Are these two things different from one another? When it comes to cyberspace, much talk of power revolves around the ability of actors to use new digital tools to change opponents’ behavior. Many works that have forwarded working definitions of cyber power commonly focus on “hard” abilities—i.e. the technical capabilities (or *means*) of both state and non-state actors in international affairs. Spade, for instance, simply describes cyber power as “the employment of computer network attack and computer network exploitation,” before going on to argue that the term means advantage or influence gained through the use of their abilities.⁶⁹ Betz and Stevens likewise, though they define power as depending on social and political conditions external to cyberspace, argue that cyberpower is a manifestation of power in cyberspace itself. They tie their cyberpower framework to capacity in cyberspace in saying that “any actor with access to cyberspace and the requisite skills and knowledge can, hypothetically, enact compulsory cyber-power against another.”⁷⁰ Betz, in particular, likens cyber power to airpower insofar as the potential for single powerful strikes is common, but strategic power to employ cyber resources in-depth demands infrastructure at the level of the state (implying, of course, that rich states will inevitably be more powerful).⁷¹ And Pope, in his brief discussion of the meaning of cyber power, falls back on the notion of coercive capacity and the idea that the ability to coerce largely constitutes actor power.⁷² Thus, cyber power itself is, according to many, constituted by the means—i.e. the technical capacity—to coerce and ultimately change the behavior of one’s opponents over time.

Box 7.3 Where does state power come from?

In a seminal work on the nature of power in IR, Barnett and Duval forward a definition of power as being “the production, in and through social relations, of effects on actors that shape their capacity to control their [circumstances and] fate.” In phrasing a broad definition of power in this way, the authors attempt to make clear that we are dealing with a hierarchical logic of being. Power is not merely the capacity to affect favorable outcomes. Rather it is those things involved in producing that capacity and is centrally defined by the nature of those social relationships that characterize the international system.

Barnett and Duvall argue⁷³ that power is constituted across four different categories (Table 7.1). These categories are determined by variation across two analytic dimensions. The first of these dimensions imagines that power emerges from different features of the international system. Power can work in the context of active relationships between agents and objects, such as the interaction of states in bargaining, diplomacy, and conflict or the interaction of countries in the context of international institutions (formal or otherwise). At the same time, however, power emerges from the consequences of sociopolitical dynamics that precede active relationships between actors in world affairs, what the authors

(continued)

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refer to as the “constitution” of relationships. In other words, the context of an actor’s geography, sociocultural positioning, and more affect the circumstances under which states will more directly engage others. Though such a differentiation might be understood as social constructivist in nature, the reality is that this basic supposition is broadly accepted in IR literature in the distinction between extant and latent sources of power. Geographic location, access to natural and human resources, and more define the nature of “social” relations—meaning simply the substantive shape of actors’ positioning relative to one another—and affect the degree to which states understand one another as more or less powerful. Understanding this dimension of power is perhaps of most relevance in this article’s attempt to flesh out conceptual understanding of cyber power because most preceding efforts to define or engage with cyber power as a distinct concept fall squarely under the heading of “power emerging from active relationships.”

The other dimension of power is concerned with the directness of the relational link between actors (and their interests) and their peers. Power can work through clear connections between states and objects (such as international institutions or specific conflicts). In this vein, power is defined by actors’ positioning in the context of an active relationship. On the other hand, power can work through indirect conditions that define the relationship of one actor to both other actors and objects. In layman’s terms, there exists a power relationship between, say, the United States and Burkino Faso *even where and when there exists no active relationship*. Here, power is defined by those factors that constitute the networks in which states are embedded. Again, though there is clear suggestion of social constructivism in this assertion, this notion is nevertheless broadly accepted and employed in IR theories beyond that perspective, including tangentially in the cyber conflict field in Nazli Choucri’s employment of lateral pressure theory to the development of cyberspace.

Table 7.1 Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power

		<i>Relational specificity</i>	
		<i>Direct</i>	<i>Indirect (or diffuse)</i>
<i>Power emerges from</i>	<i>Specific interactions of actors</i> <i>Constitutive relationships between actors</i>	Compulsory Structural	Institutional Productive

Taken together, Barnett and Duvall argue that these analytic dimensions of power suggest a fourfold taxonomy of power that is far more inclusive than the threefold levels of analysis understanding of power often employed among security scholars (i.e. power via force, over rules, and over preferences). **Compulsory power** describes the ability of agents to achieve direct control over one another via a range of mechanisms. **Institutional power** describes the ability of actors

to control distant peers via manipulation of or control over rules of the game. **Structural power** describes direct constitutive control over others, such as Actor A's ability to determine Actor B's power through the medium of economic dependence on Actor A. And **productive power** describes indirect constitutive control over others in the context and construction of those broader socio-technical relationships within which all states are embedded.

Most scholars agree that this focus on technical capability does make some sense if the question is about power that emerges from cyber capabilities—i.e. about being “cyber powerful”. But any conversation about the nature of power in world politics must recognize a basic argument made by political scientists—that power has much to do with the institutional and normative context within which actions are taken. Joseph Nye's early effort to describe the nature of cyber power points out the flaw in presuming that the basis of power in any category is the technical capability of the instrument(s) involved.⁷⁴ Much as might be considered the case with, for example, nuclear weapons, power from possession of such weapons derives not only from the ability to use or threaten use. Possession, which with nuclear weapons is a relatively clear-cut status beyond a certain point, can be framed and maneuvered so as to manipulate the preferences of domestic and foreign audiences, can be used as a buy-in chip to position in different formal and informal rule-making positions, and more.⁷⁵ In this way, power is conceptualized not only as a capacity to force behavioral changes but also as an ability both to influence the “rules of the game”—thus tacitly constraining others—and to alter preferences.⁷⁶ Capabilities-focused definitions thus fail to account for a great deal of variation in outcomes emerging from the nexus of abilities surrounding a particular set of instruments. This is particularly the case with cyberspace, where possession and the potential for use of a diverse range of abilities is relatively difficult to assess and characterize in the aggregate.

In many ways, it is useful to think of power in the context of how the information revolution has systematically changed the dynamics of human interaction in world affairs. In general, we might think of three principal types of changes that have occurred as a result of the global integration of information technologies across all levels of societal functioning. These are described below. Taken together, these different kinds of changes effectively describe the changing context within which state behavior emerges, not only in terms of the digitization of global infrastructure but also in terms of the institutional and social trajectory of international order. In short, the information revolution of the past several decades has done more than just advance technical frontiers; it has fundamentally transformed communications infrastructure, how people (and states) communicate, and how ideas spread.

How global infrastructure functions. Perhaps more obviously than other changes, the ubiquity and sophistication of information technologies has augured profound changes to the infrastructure of the everyday functioning of global system processes. These changes to how industries, governments, and militaries function is the focus of much scholarship on cyberspace and IR.

For international security studies, in particular, the digitization of global infrastructure challenges both state security as well as a wider range of normative, legal, and economic interests. The strategic rationale behind the design and deployment

of advanced “cyber weapons,” for instance, can broadly be found in the twofold digitization of information and control dynamics around the world—that is, the digitization of security systems and the digital inter-connection of previously discrete functions. Stuxnet, for example, was designed to circumnavigate “air-gap” defenses that would otherwise have rendered attempts at network intrusion impotent.⁷⁷ Likewise, Stuxnet—alongside other programs like Flame and, responsively, efforts such as Byzantine Foothold—was designed to take advantage of the widespread inter-connectedness of computer systems in recent years, transmitting component parts of itself via otherwise innocuous network or media transfers over time.⁷⁸ As some work has argued, the massive integration of ICTs across societal and industrial sectors also constructs unprecedented security obstacles for national security in economic⁷⁹ and legal⁸⁰ terms, with broad-scoped inter-connection of systems allowing for varying degrees of access and control of information.⁸¹

Beyond the traditional purview of the security studies field, the digitization of global infrastructure has had a more direct impact on the shape of the global economy and on processes of global governance. Across industry, government, and public organizations at almost every level, means of financial transaction, recordkeeping, and utilities procurement look markedly different than they might have in the 1980s, even if the specific aims and parameters of a given set of processes remain the same.⁸²

How people (and societies) interact with each other. By contrast, the change to the global system more focused on by the more loosely defined body of work on cyberspace and political organization has less to do with technical conditions than it does to do with agent behavior. Related to the broad digitization of global infrastructure, recent decades have seen unprecedented changes in the ways that global constituents (individuals, communities, organizations, etc.) communicate and consume information.⁸³ This certainly might be thought of as a consequence of global infrastructure digitization. However, changes to the nature of inter-constituent communication are both unique and fundamentally related to the dynamics of the global system in which specific actors are embedded. In short, new communication and information consumption modalities affect preference sets in a very basic manner.⁸⁴ Individual and organizational approaches to problem solving, self-representation, and other fundamental political activities continue to adapt to match the network realities of an increasingly transnationally oriented—rather than nationally oriented—international system. This is a natural outgrowth of the proliferation of information linkages across most societal functions.

How people (and societies) see each other. Finally, the global adoption and integration of ICTs across the full range of societal functions has augured significant changes in the way that ideas are communicated, disseminated, and presented. These changes are not limited to inter-personal communications.⁸⁵ Just as fundamental changes in the nature of communications’ possibilities for people and institutions around the world have affected how preferences are constructed, dynamics of ICT utilization and development across both public and private sectors have had a unique impact on patterns of ideational inter-connections across numerous types of boundaries in the digital age.⁸⁶ Though drastically understudied in comparison as a type of systematic change fueled by global ICT integration, a diverse body of scholarly work in the social sciences has for some years consistently demonstrated that the market-specific nature of ICT development has had noticeable effects on patterns of political organization and expression in world affairs. In one vein, for instance, patterns of public

opinion and information consumption on different topics has been linked to the specific dynamics of Twitter usage.⁸⁷ The rise of virtual, polycentric communities centered around the use of specific social media platforms and activated by community attention to a topic—rather than more traditional governmental or old media focus on an issue—has, at least to some degree, altered the dynamics of gatekeeping and agenda setting in IR. One immediate effect of this fundamental change to the global system is that political actions in the information age reach, affect, and interest a much broader subset of global constituents than they may have in decades past, while the dynamics of specific areas of state interest—such as aspects of national security—have expanded to interact with societal functions at many levels.

These revolutions in the topology of infrastructure, information, and preferences in the global system affect the dynamics of international interactions and human organization in a number of meaningful ways. Specifically, these changes to the global system have been and increasingly are the cause of new types of relationships and institutions in international affairs, including increasingly complex links across borders that do not rely on state accommodation. Shifts in national security, economic security, and civil liberties' preferences are increasingly forcing existing institutions to strike new institutional equilibriums, to interpret old rules in new ways, and to reinterpret patterns of interaction. Moreover, new institutions are needed for a host of issues related to ICT-derived preference sets, and both new and existing institutions are having to adapt to the conduct of IR constituted of new forms of social organization, including virtual communities and new global media patterns. In other words, the trajectory of global ICT adoption and development has affected distinct and meaningful changes to not only the technical context of international affairs but also to the social and institutional networks in which human interaction occurs.

The meaning of global changes for cyber power. So, given these changes to the international environment in which states operate, what does power in the digital age—a state's true "cyber power"—look like? Among scholars, there are two emerging points of view. The first argument is essentially that cyber power is multi-faceted and highly variable. It manifests in an actor's abilities to control the continued development of technical, regulatory, and normative conditions surrounding ICT usage in favorable ways. Cyber power and cyber power strategies are not just about the use or threat of use of cyber weapons.⁸⁸ Cyber power certainly might be constituted of different abilities to intrude, disrupt, exploit, and safeguard information systems attached to a range of societal functions. But it can equally derive from an ability to influence formal and informal rules regarding cyberspace or the capacity to induce changes—whether through soft or hard power means—in the preferences of peer constituents in the global system. While cyber power strategies might include the development of disruptive capacity across a range of information systems, it might also include actions concerned with, for instance, the condition of norms of network usage or case-specific efforts to influence foreign political conditions to catalyze favorable policy outcomes (i.e. states might undertake to promote "Internet access as a human right" organizations because the action is normatively beneficial).

The second argument is essentially that cyber power will enduringly be tricky to pin down for those interested in understanding some kind of balance of global cyber power. This perspective is not necessarily mutually exclusive from the argument that cyber power is simply constituted of an incredibly diverse set of determining factors. For many, being cyber "powerful" is about broadening the spectrum of possible

ICT-aided actions that can meaningfully secure national interests through (1) the development of technical capacity and infrastructural redundancy, (2) the construction of rules of the road favorable to an actor's portfolio of capabilities, and (3) the development of norms of behavior to underwrite the strategic perspective of the actor involved. But viewing power in the digital age as relating to strategic goals achieved in the context of how ICT have changed the international system also moves the focus from inherent state attributes to the shifting context of that continuing transformation. State cyber power would essentially be contingent on the context of an actor's strategic interests and the nature of broad systemic developments—such as the expansion of Internet infrastructure or linguistic shifts in the content of the web—that favor that actor. Given that assessments of power will then radically vary depending on an understanding of diverse factors, and that divergent perceptions of the abilities of others will invariably make for diverse assessments of just how “cyber powerful” others are, how useful a concept is “cyber power” really? To understand the abilities of states and potential for conflict, it is often better simply to focus on the derivative elements of power—i.e. on how cyber capabilities might be used at any given time to win wars or to coerce or deter others.

Implications for policy and statecraft

There are clear implications of what has been outlined in this chapter for policy and statecraft. Some of this is covered in other chapters. It is worth mentioning here, however, that foremost among these is a great need for national-level dialogue about the scope of what constitutes cyber conflict and the degree to which the Internet has altered the character of warfare. The need for such conversations—which will emerge naturally over a span of many years as governments and their populations are exposed with ever-increasing frequency to the externalities, if not the direct effects, of cyber conflict—is multi-form. In particular, where popular responsiveness will dictate the extent of a state's reaction to cyber conflict (i.e. in democratic societies), greater information and knowledge will help produce prudent policy outcomes. Specifically, greater conversations about cyber-security issues will also act as a stabilizing agent for certain elements of the interstate cyber conflict set of calculations. Clear delineation of and dialogue on the subject of what constitutes critical assets and red lines for cyber aggression can help clarify the parameters of deterrent strategies and discourage foreign entities in efforts to coerce.

At the same time, it seems only logical that states should publicize how they plan cyber conflict issues and specific crisis situations, at least when it comes to major disruption scenarios. Such a move would help mitigate fears from escalating from the various uncertainties involved in cyber conflict and would blunt the effectiveness of cyber conflict oddities of operations, including regarding the independence of different network warfare arms of the government and lines of authorization during conflict. Such an effort would also help with definitional issues that emerge in translating operational principles to either the public dialogue or foreign analytic setting.

Policymakers would likewise do well to recognize that there are great efficiencies in cyber-security policy endorsed by the broadest number of actors possible in a given country. Naturally, this gets into the territory of public-private dialogues and the relationship between government branches. In part, this is the topic of Chapter 10 on national experiences with cyber-security governance. Nevertheless, it is worth further

noting that public conversation to produce more effective and representative policy positions should produce egalitarian ends.

Finally, states should apply appropriate lessons learned and processes utilized in other arenas of international security affairs but should be careful to avoid applying existing procedures where utilization might produce inefficiencies. Specifically, states would naturally do well to encourage national conversations in the context of the existing consensus that is the law of armed conflicts. For Western countries in particular, aligning national conversations with the ethical and moral imperatives of prevailing international legal conditions is critical if the trappings of cyber conflict governance are to organically fit with the contours of the present liberal international community. Likewise, states should recognize that existing mechanisms for the normalization of the outputs of such conversations could be effective when it comes to cyber-security. Wargames and joint professional military (and civilian) training, in particular, can be effective for standardizing operational expectations among state security organizations. Of course, there is a challenge involved in setting up effective collaborations in this manner, as security actors may be incentivized to hide capabilities. Nevertheless, such mechanics of normalization of interstate affairs have significant value when it comes to building engagement and process expectations between those communities that will inevitably clash in the future in cyber conflict episodes.

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8 Cyber conflict as “not war”

In 2012, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta drew the attention of the world—or, at least, of Western defense communities—when he claimed in a speech that the one of the biggest threats faced by the United States was that of a “cyber Pearl Harbor.”¹ In saying this, he implied that a catastrophic and unpredicted cyber assault on the country could dramatically harm national function, potentially as part of a broader set of conflict actions taken by a foreign adversary. According to his speech, designed to highlight shortcomings in Western approaches to cyber-security at the national level, there is significant potential that a cyberwar scenario will play out in the real world in the foreseeable future.

As we discussed in Chapter 7, there is broad consensus among both scholars of international affairs and cyber-security practitioners that such cyberwar scenarios are likely to remain the stuff of special circumstances in world politics. Where powerful states desire to interfere in the affairs of small ones or aim to punish political intransigence for coercive purposes, the implementation of a cyber blockade or of broad-scoped attacks against critical infrastructure seems possible. But where states of comparable strength and competing interests find themselves squared off, waging cyberwar makes little sense. Unless accompanied by broader aggression in other domains, cyber victories are simply too fleeting to be worth it.² Moreover, cyber attacks might worsen relations between states such that conflict in other domains is forced. Except for where broader conventional war is the intention, disruptive cyber campaigns might thus be disastrous.

Despite the clear logic of this position, the reality is that cyber conflict is a widespread and rising phenomenon in world affairs. As we discuss in this chapter, it is necessary for students of IR that we move the conversation on how cyber conflict manifests from the traditional framing of warfare between states as a dichotomous affair—i.e. states are either at war or they are not—to notions of contention increasingly common in IR’s strategic and military studies subfields. Specifically, cyber-security students would do well to think of information security as enabling forms of conflict that exist between war and peace.³ Such “not war” forms of contention are not new at this point in human history; they are millennia old and involve the application of both limited force and non-violent actions to alter the political and security landscape of world affairs. That said, conflict outside of warfare—what many are calling “grey zone” conflict,⁴ a phrase we unpack in detail later—is an increasingly common feature of IR in the twenty-first century. Moreover, conflict of this kind increasingly contains digital elements.

This chapter describes conflict that takes place between states beneath the threshold of conventional warfare and considers reasons as to why increased incidence of such contention might stem from the effects of the information revolution. Then, we discuss the specific rise in incidence of “grey zone” conflict as relatively unique to the twenty-first century and consider a series of arguments as to why states that otherwise would be able to effectively fight one another might increasingly opt for sub-optimal conflict strategies—including cyber conflict and cyber-enabled information warfare—as a matter of course.

Between war and peace

Conflict between states, or between states and significant, recognizable non-state entities, occurs outside the bounds of declared warfare more often than it does within.⁵ In other words, though interstate warfighting is a relatively common feature of the landscape of international affairs, conflict that occurs between war and peace nevertheless presents as a sort of constant background noise of world politics. For many countries, deaths—both military and civilian—stemming from foreign aggression are not the result of formal military actions most years. State-sponsored militant groups might kill a handful of civilians by firing improvised rockets across a border, while state-linked terrorists might target a military checkpoint with home-made explosives, all without such actions escalating to the outbreak of conventional interstate warfighting.

Asymmetric warfare, in particular, is an age-old feature of conflict in IR.⁶ Asymmetric warfare quite simply describes conflict that involves actors of disproportionate military capability (i.e. strong actors versus weak actors). The term might be applied to characterize a broad range of conflict scenarios, from state military efforts against terrorist or insurgent forces to the clash of state proxies (i.e. non-state arms of state security forces). Such conflicts tend not to look much like traditional military conflicts in tactical or strategic terms. Given the relative indifference in levels of power and ability involved, combat often entails limited engagements chosen by the weaker force to maximize either military or terroristic effects (e.g. bombing a truckload of soldiers rather than engage them with comparable forces).

Asymmetric warfare—and conflict between states more broadly that, regardless of the relative strength of those involved, occurs below the threshold of warfighting—often takes non-violent forms where the point is to achieve favorable changes to political and security circumstances via manipulative and coercive means. In part, such contention takes the form of what is called **political warfare**.⁷ Political warfare regularly occurs where asymmetric warfighting dynamics exist, but it is often prosecuted in situations beyond violent clashes between mismatched combatants. Political warfare is a form of coercion that doesn’t rely on the use of force or threat of force so much as it seeks to compel changes in behavior by making conditions hostile for the target. Naturally, this *does* sometimes include low-level violence conducted by state security actors or, more often, state proxies against sub-state organizations. But as often it includes the manipulation of public opinion, the suppression of pro-target voices in society, the spread of propaganda, bribery, and more, all to create an environment that is hostile to the interests of a given target.

Box 8.1 How else should we think of cyber threats?

Given the idea that cyber conflict does not necessarily constitute warfighting in some meaningful way, but rather a set of enabling dynamics and techniques that permit new forms of contention outside the scope of traditional warfare, it is worth considering the form that cyber threats to national security take beyond individual incidents. In short, if we drop the U.S. Department of Defense’s assumption that cyberspace is best thought of as a domain of warfighting and instead assume that cyber conflict simply emerges from a broad-scoped “informationization” of global society, what kind of problem is the cyber phenomenon?

Traditionally, of course, public policy practitioners have thought about cyber threats to homeland and national security in terms of the technological and political sources of insecurity involved. Many think of cyber-security as inherently technical and would likely argue that security threats to society as a whole are premised on technological challenges. As a result, solving technical problems should take precedence over other forms of problem solving, and the most critical actors in the construction of better national cyber “health” are technologists, researchers, and developers. By contrast, others (many of those cited in the writing of this book on cyber conflict) are of the mind that cyber-security is best understood in thinking about the threat actors that threaten society in this domain—i.e. criminals, foreign states, intelligence organizations, and proxies of all of these. Combating cyber threats, if you think this way, inevitably means combating those specific threat actors and empowering the processes of national security that are tasked with doing so.

But is cyber-security more than just a technical or political issue? Given the way we’ve talked about the information revolution in this book as having systematically rewired the world system and as evolving from complex societal processes, would it be better to think about cyber threats as environmental phenomena rather than man-made issues?

Two ideas in this vein are worth mentioning. One is quite simply the increasingly popular notion that cyber threats to global society present as pollution—a sort of ever-present force that occurs in the everyday operation of the international system. Thinking this way, cyber threats might be best thought of as emerging from the negative externalities of human social, economic, and political systems. For instance, rapid growth of new information services motivates reduced focus on security practices so as to ensure efficiency and productivity. Therefore, the public policy challenge is less meaningfully about addressing specific cyber criminal or security threats—perhaps except for the major ones that loom on the horizon—and more about incentivizing good behavior and best practices across all societal sectors. The implication, of course, would subsequently be that the most important actors for achieving a broad-scoped condition of national cyber-security for any country would be economic and social stakeholders in a position of influence over usage of network technologies.

Similarly, another idea about the nature of cyber threats is that they are best thought of as a public health issue. This idea makes some considerable

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sense if one thinks about the broad landscape of cyber-security threats as emerging in pandemic-style patterns. Particularly where we’re talking about major data breaches or global ransomware attacks, cyber challenges emerge patterned in a similar fashion to pandemic disease outbreaks. Cyber threats are hard to predict, can spread unpredictably, and affect a diverse cross-section of societal sectors. Therefore, the public policy challenge is about making sure facilitators—i.e. stakeholders that can coordinate across sectors of society for rapid crisis response—are enabled to act in the public interest in the most effective manner possible.

More than just political warfare or asymmetric warfare involving relatively autonomous proxies of foreign competitors, however, much interstate contention between war and peace takes the form of what many have increasingly called **hybrid warfare**, where political warfare techniques are blended with limited applications of more traditional security techniques in order to more effectively compel a target in some way.⁸ Though the definitional line between these terms is reasonably blurred, the difference between hybrid warfare and some combination of asymmetric and political conflict is the implication that hybrid warfighting is a highly directed effort. Wherein political disinformation and propaganda efforts might aim to reduce the resolve of foreign populations to stand up to aggression, limited kinetic security actions—such as the deployment of un-uniformed soldiers to contested territory, as happened in Crimea in 2014—can be planned to coincide with such effects and maximize gains for an attacker without actually risking outright war.

Information warfare

In thinking about and analyzing conflict between war and peace, much focus is often placed on manifestations of **information warfare**.⁹ This is a term whose meaning has morphed over time to imply more or less specific elements of information security that manifest in conflict processes. Unfortunately, the term remains under-defined. There are no real consensus positions on what is meant by information warfare beyond those that attribute most warfighting actions to be, in some sense, intrinsically about information dynamics. Warfare is an inherently human affair, and what is human is inevitably about how humans communicate, organize, institutionalize, and behave in a social sense. It is, in essence, inevitably about information—the informational content of human societies, the *meaning* of such content, and the strategic value of all of the above.

What constitutes the toolkit of information warfare depends on the era and the circumstances we are interested in analyzing. Information warfare has enduringly been said to include **propaganda** efforts, which involves the circulation of biased or misleading material to politicize a particular topic; **psychological operations**, which involve the manipulation of information specifically to affect the reasoning capacity of a target (such as a foreign state’s military leadership); **military deception**, which is efforts that aim to mislead competitors about the extent of a state’s military preparedness;

and **internal security measures**, by which governments enact protocols designed to shield security functions from interference. Naturally, affecting the information environment in which politics, commerce, and national security functions take place might also involve physical destruction and, at least from the midpoint of the twentieth century onwards, **electronic warfare** aimed at disrupting the infrastructure of military, government, and societal communications.

But, particularly given the degree to which discussions of information warfare have come back into vogue in the digital age, it seems wise to introduce the topic in terms of outcomes rather than specific modes of conflict interactions. Regardless of the tools being used to achieve informational outcomes for political and security purposes, certain modes of interactions persistently characterize information warfare campaigns. Specifically, five modes of interaction and activity cover the gamut of tools and targets typically involved in such campaigns, regardless of era.

Much of what is involved with information warfare efforts is not actually what one might be tempted to label an attack. Rather, sophisticated and effective information warfare campaigns often involved significant efforts aimed at ensuring appropriate infrastructural conditions for success. **Information transportation** is the broad term used to describe any effort to construct such conditions. Information transport efforts might include any attempt to shape how adversaries transmit information, as well as defensive attempts to ensure redundancy in communications infrastructure. Significantly, information transport efforts often entail actions that ensure one of two things: first, that only certain kinds of information are being communicated or accessed by a target and, second, that information is as susceptible to interception and manipulation as possible. U.S. bombings of Saddam Hussein’s fiber optic cable tranche stations during the First Gulf War, which forced Iraqi forces to use legacy radio systems (which were easily tapped by U.S. intelligence) to communicate, is a good example of an operation that aimed to affect how information was transported.¹⁰

Similarly, information warfare efforts aimed at constructing appropriate infrastructural conditions for operation usually contain basic **information collection** activities. The idea here, quite simply, is to achieve enhanced situational awareness such that disruptive conflict actions can be better planned and put into effect. Again, it is worth mentioning here that what constitutes “information warfare” might be almost anything, as “information collection” essentially describes the function of state intelligence services.

Information protection involves the use of any technique that minimizes the information collection activities of one’s adversaries. If effective information collection is desirable because heightened situational awareness lends itself to better planning, then information protection is desirable simply because reducing an adversary’s awareness diminishes the opportunities they’ll have to gain by engaging in information warfare. This is a two-way street in that information protection activities can be both offensive and defensive. Defensively, information protection is constituted of security measures taken to blunt the effect of foreign interference. Offensively, information protection is any action that degrades the view of one’s opponent.

Information disinformation and **information manipulation** involve altering the content of an information environment in an effort to shape how adversaries—governments, specific institutions, or a broader population—view the world around them. With information manipulation, the goal is often twofold. First, disinformation is designed to inject false narrative and facts either into sociopolitical discourse or

into the decision-making processes of specific institutions. The purpose of doing so is to muddy the water and prevent the effect function of systems that might otherwise result in prudent debate and analysis of unbiased information. Second, information tampering—particularly where information is altered but not entirely falsified—is often used to inject uncertainty about the credibility of information resources. Even where a target population reaches a consensus position about major issues or facts, the knowledge that information being received in news media coverage or in non-news reporting might have been manipulated often causes doubt over the reliability of traditional pillars of political and institutional information security.

Finally, **information disruption** refers to efforts that aim to prevent adversaries from receiving the full picture by directly attacking information and information systems. In reality, information disruption—as it pertains to information warfare—includes several different techniques, including *information denial*, *information degradation* and *information disturbance*. The point in each case is that an information warfare attacker reduces the ability of an enemy to receive or rely on information by directly tampering with the way in which information is made available thereto. Information denial simply entails the deletion of information, often strategically so as to ensure a skewed view of incoming information on the part of the target. Information disturbance more specifically aims at reducing the reliability of incoming information, often by introducing additional information to confuse the target. Such additional noise makes it hard to parse out relevant detail and meaning from incoming information. By contrast, information degradation involves those techniques that take aim not at the nature of incoming information or its reliability, but rather at the ability of a target to receive or analyze it. Degradation attacks might, for instance, include denial of service attacks that prevent the use of a given network connection or even the physical bombing of, say, a receiver station for radio transmissions.

The utility of cyber conflict for “not war”

Many scholars and security practitioners place “cyber warfare” as a new part of the toolkit of information and political warfare.¹¹ Yet others describe cyber conflict as a mode of contention and disruption that is adjacent to and overlaps with, but is distinct from, political-security activities like intelligence gathering, counterintelligence efforts, terrorist campaigning, and military operations. Regardless of the specific approach one takes to categorizing cyber conflict as a subset or corollary to traditional forms of political contention, it is clear that Internet technologies have had a profound impact on the conduct of warfighting. Moreover, there has been an explosion in the number of conflicts in the space between war and peace since the late 1990s, many of which prominently feature Internet technologies in enabling or disruptive roles. This section outlines several reasons as to why the Internet—or, more accurately, cyberspace—presents as an attractive new domain of operation and set of tools for those interested in engaging in contestation short of war.

The Internet as a global control system

In 1914, a few hours before the outbreak of World War I in Europe, the first offensive action of the British Empire was ordered and preparations were made.¹² Quite apart from being an attack against the military forces of the Central Powers, the purview of

the orders given was the communications capabilities of the German Empire. Setting sail on a ship called the *Alert*, British agents traveled a handful of miles into the English Channel and—not long after the official declaration of hostilities—dredged up and severed a series of telegraph cables. Though wartime development of better radio systems and construction of new telegraph infrastructure would not allow the Allies an enduring upper hand in the communications war, the effect of the *Alert*’s action was rapid and remarkable. Great Britain was able to force significant delays in communication between different elements of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies over the opening months of the war. More importantly, Britain’s broad-scoped control of global telegraph infrastructure—or, at least, access to British-operated infrastructure—would allow for the development of an unprecedented communications interception regime wherein agents of the Empire (called “censors”) would sift global information transmissions at critical junctures to obtain valuable intelligence and to engage in information warfare.¹³

The British Empire’s control of global communications infrastructure in 1914 was impressive and awarded major advantages in the conduct of the conflict (though, admittedly felt more beyond the European landmass than on the continent itself). More than simply allowing for British censors to intercept information about the Central Powers’ military maneuvering, the setup allowed for broad-scoped analysis of data about global commerce during the war years. The result was the interdiction of companies from Germany, Austro-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and even neutral countries acting to provide the Central Powers with the commodities, natural resources, and capital needed to wage total warfare in Europe. In shutting down many such operations, the British Empire was able to gain strategic advantages that may have prevented an early end to war on the continent prior to U.S. intervention in 1917.

Box 8.2 Semi-state actors, the Internet, and contested cyber sovereignty

The example of Britain’s cutting of German telegraph cables here illustrates a significant point, which we previously brought up in another form in Chapter 4. Private corporations play a critical role in the function of infrastructure that underwrites not only the function of national societies but also of militaries. In Chapter 4, we grappled with the notion that governments need to protect infrastructure and sophisticated information technologies from export in order to secure certain national security imperatives. Here, though, it is worth considering another element of the issue, namely that private control of information infrastructure presents as a limitation on state sovereignty.

Sovereignty is often defined, in reference to Max Weber’s discussions on the nature of the thing, as something that exists where there is a legitimate monopoly on the use of violence within a given territory and over a given population. Simply put, this means that an authority able to effectively police its borders and to ensure that no other domestic force is able to raise an armed force with impunity is the sovereign authority.

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With cyber conflict, it is simply not true that states have a legitimate monopoly on the use of force online. There are two elements of this that we should break apart. The first is about the “monopoly” element of sovereignty. More than 95% of military and intelligence actions online occur on civilian networks owned and operated by various backbone operators and information product vendors. Though they tend not to do so in the West, these private operators could quite easily blunt or block offensive or exploitative cyber operations undertaken by state actors. The corollary for a more primitive era would be a landowner or aristocrat that legitimately operates infrastructure and has, as a result, a *de facto* ability to block the military operations of the government by, say, blocking off a major road.

Naturally, the crux of the matter here is what private actors might be compelled to do in support of state cyber operations. If the state can compel these actors not to interfere, then there is no violation of the *legitimate* monopoly on force held by the state. The state, in other words, retains the full claim on sovereign control of its territory and population.

And yet, it is not clear that the state—at least, the United States and similar democratic Western countries—have this power. Indeed, as incidents like the well-known Apple vs. the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) case demonstrate, there is at least some clear tendency among private actors to interpret their actions as legitimate via direct reference to public interests and not to government procedures. The question becomes, quite simply, one of the origins of legitimacy. If a private set of actors wanted to blunt the ability of their government to engage in cyber warfighting by simply not allowing actions of that kind to take place on their private systems, would they be in the right by referencing public interest that might be harmed by government action? In other words, even if the government is legitimate because of its election by the people, could private stakeholders claim like legitimacy in defending public interests against government wishes? If yes, the implications for state power and cyber conflict are immense.

The parallel to modern global information infrastructure here is obvious. The function of global commerce, society, and politics is enabled and underwritten by an immense apparatus of physical information technology infrastructure. But the vignette about British efforts at the outset of World War I is incomplete. The reason for this has to do with the nature of the most recent information revolution as not fundamentally about connecting people directly, but rather about connecting people *via* their use of computerized systems. As intelligence organizations across the West and the Soviet bloc realized in the 1970s and 1980s, espionage in the world of the Internet is not merely about the encryption of information during transmission; it is about direct acts of espionage that can occur in the system itself (i.e. in the remote usage of networked computer systems). Thus, whereas a degree of control over global societal functions in aid of the Allies’ cause came in the form of British interception of communications and subsequent actions taken in the real world, today it also occurs via direct interaction with global information systems. Past communications technology

allowed global powers better ways to coordinate industrial and commercial systems; today, the Internet and the computers that connect to it have essentially become these control systems. Given this, it's clear to see why cyber operations have so organically become part-and-parcel of security strategies designed to interfere with, manipulate, and contest the status quo.

The Internet as a societal subconscious

As the last chapter described in some detail in its discussion of the sources and nature of power in the digital age, another reason that the digital domain presents as an attractive operational prospect for those interested in contesting the status quo without going to war has to do with the transforming effect of the Internet on the substance of human society. In many ways, it's best to think about this effect as a sort of transformation of societal subconscious. The human subconscious is the part of the mind that is active and impactful on human operation but is not really something that we're aware of. The subconscious regulates our reactions to the world around us, how we digest and process information, and those parts of our bodies that operate as a matter of routine (from blinking and breathing through automatically looking left and right without thinking about it while standing at a road crossing).

In societal terms, much of what we talk about in describing the global information environment qualifies as a component part of humankind's subconscious. Even where sizable tracts of society, industry, government, or politics are aware of different elements of the information environment's functions, the function of the whole is nevertheless dependent on background systems and processes that fall below the conscious gaze of the average citizen. Specifically, the unique way in which people access information, are conditioned to analyze incoming information, have information framed for them, and then themselves communicate with others stems from a complex range of externalities related to the setup of industry, culture, and politics. Exposure to differing kinds of bias in news reporting, for instance, often emerges from the interacting interests of those organizations that fund media companies. And knowledge of politics and social issues, which affects how people respond in public opinion polls and in political participation, often differs depending on the platform via which one receives their news (e.g. social media users tend to create echo chambers by subscribing to sources that offer agreeable perspectives at the expense of those offering more objective or competing ones). The result of such a dynamic is that the manipulation of informational content and of the underlying infrastructure of the global information environment (by, for instance, incentivizing talking heads to shill one perspective, or bribing ISPs with favorable legal status in exchange for adherence to censorship guidelines) is not merely attractive, as it has always been; in the Internet age, subversion and information manipulation are often directly attainable from cyber actions.

Muddied waters: the Internet's special characteristics at work

Finally, though most simply, another reason that cyberspace and cyber conflict techniques appear as an attractive option for those interested in contesting the status quo without going to war, is that operation in the digital domain allows one to take advantage of various special characteristics of the thing. We discuss many such

characteristics in past chapters, but, briefly, those operating online to undertake disruptive cyber attacks, engage in espionage or information manipulation activities, or otherwise attempt to engage in information warfare particularly benefit from the enduring problem in linking online action to kinetic inputs. The attribution problem for defenders and investigators incentivizes cyber aggression because the risks of exposure are mitigated by (1) the challenge of gathering evidence about such actions and (2) the enduring mismatch between the possible scope of such evidence gathering and evidentiary standards for invoking international law. The incentive to take advantage of cyber options for disruption is further enhanced by the fact that few constraining political frameworks exist that might punish such action anyway (which we discuss in later chapters). Moreover, the costs of entry to operation in the domain are low, and state actors can enhance their deniability in cheap, effective ways by sponsoring the operations of spy agencies, mercenaries, and “patriotic hackers.”

Making sense of cyber conflict in the “grey zone”

Asymmetric warfare, political warfare, hybrid warfare. These forms of political contention are the regular background noise of IR and have been so for untold centuries. The Roman Empire fought insurgent forces in areas now within Germany, Great Britain, Syria, Israel, and Jordan frequently across decades-long periods of expansion. Both Louis XIV and Ivan the Terrible employed, in their different respective eras, innumerable spies, mercenaries, and agitators to work subversively in central Europe to pave the way for later military conquest. And much of what constituted the European imperial race to conquer African territory in the 1800s, where bribery of local elites and early versions of gunship diplomacy allowed for predatory colonization arrangements, is essentially the story of hybrid warfare employed in line with grand strategic ambitions.

In the twenty-first century, however, it is worth differentiating these forms of conflict short of war from what many are now calling **grey zone conflict**. Conflict in the “grey zone” between war and peace is often described as contention that involves two (or more) state actors but primarily avoids the direct use of anything more than limited military force. Of course, using the term in this way suggests little different than those others (hybrid warfare, etc.). But while “grey zone conflict” is colloquially used to describe any form of “not war” contention, the reality is that it indicates something relatively unique about the dynamic of “not war” conflicts in the twenty-first century.

Specifically, grey zone conflict refers to conflict under the threshold of declared or officially observed warfare that happens between two states of similar power, influence, and capabilities.¹⁴ This kind of conflict between war and peace is much more unusual in the landscape of recent world history, at least insofar as we’re talking about the immediate interests, territory, and resources of a country and not its extended colonial holdings. Most often, incidence of asymmetric warfare occurs as a function of the strategic choice by weak actors to, for obvious reasons (i.e. they wouldn’t be able to win otherwise), engage stronger actors unconventionally. Likewise, though the Cold War saw well-documented, extensive political warfare campaigns between countries of the Western and Soviet blocs, the scope of most remained limited, arguably so as to avoid escalation towards “hot” conflict. Where hybrid warfare did occur during the Cold War (i.e. where information warfare was married to limited military confrontation, the use of proxy forces to irritate an entrenched target, or diplomatic pressure), the dynamic was again most often one of strong states targeting weaker ones.

So far in the opening years of the twenty-first century, we’ve seen the prosecution of hybrid warfare between states that, while not necessarily equal in military terms, are fully capable of engaging one another in open hostilities on relatively even ground. Russia, in 2014, employed pro-rebel propaganda and unmarked military assets—a body of soldiers, dubbed “little green men,” operating in Eastern Ukraine without uniforms or other markings to identify them as Russian—to support the outbreak of civil war and the secession of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine.¹⁵ China has regularly turned to the use of unconventional techniques, including the employment of merchant shipping vessels to hassle foreign naval assets and the construction of sand islands in the South China Sea, to expand influence and provoke limited confrontation with the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea.¹⁶ And Russian security services have engaged in yet broader-scoped campaigns to interfere with the political process of peer competitors in Europe and North America via a combination of cyber operations and information warfare efforts.¹⁷

Box 8.3 Beyond cyber: automated, informational, and industrial conflict in the grey zone

Though it is not the main point of this book, it is important to note that grey zone conflict manifests beyond just the use of cyber tools. Briefly, a series of new technological developments have enhanced the ability of state actors to engage in conflict short of war with their peer competitors. Advances in automation have enabled state usage of drones to engage in low-intensity kinetic operations against adversaries and against non-state actors. In the future, there is great concern about **swarm warfare**, wherein large numbers of small drones coordinated by sophisticated machine learning processes might make grey zone conflict even more attractive given the extreme efficiencies in its execution. Likewise, there are obvious information advances related to the rise of the Internet and to emergent information technologies that offer states advantages. We discuss these more in later chapters. And finally, new techniques for construction and extraction of resources have made grey zone operations an attractive option for states looking to antagonize without engaging in conventional warfighting. The People’s Republic of China, for instance, has employed island-constructing platforms to the South China Sea to build sand-based territory for the purposes of enhancing their claim to parts of the ocean.

The incidence of so much grey zone conflict involving strong state actors in the twenty-first century is interesting, not least because it presents as something of a theoretical puzzle for international security scholars and practitioners. It’s not immediately clear as to why states of relative parity in economic, military, and political power terms would push one another consistently in a highly aggressive fashion without indicating an interest in broader conflict. Certainly, states spy on one another constantly and engage in limited military contestation without triggering the outbreak of broader warfighting. As bargaining theorists and others in the IR field might explain, such actions make a great deal of sense as a means of trying to better secure state

interests by testing a competitor’s resolve. But it’s not clear that this is what is happening with grey zone conflict. Aside from the fact that such contention often targets specific political or security processes while the attacker is openly involved in conciliatory efforts on other fronts, it’s not clear why states would choose to leave much of their most potent assets at home. If the purpose of “not war” conflict is to bargain by demonstrating resolve and capability, wouldn’t states be incentivized to indicate their willingness to employ their full strength?

The remainder of this section is dedicated to describing why grey zone conflict might be increasingly attractive to states interested in contesting the power and influence of their peer competitors in international affairs. We offer five distinct arguments, though it is worth noting that many are compatible with one another. In most cases, to the benefit of our interest here in cyber conflict, digital dynamics play a central or otherwise significant role in supporting the logic of states’ emphasizing grey zone strategies.

Expanding space for limited contention in the digital age

One reason that grey zone conflict may be more prevalent in the twenty-first century than it has been in decades and centuries past may have to do directly with the most recent information revolution. In an age where international affairs is defined by industries, social trends, political institutions, and more than have grown up around the Internet, there exists an expanded space for contention in the possibilities of network-supported communications and control infrastructure. As has been the theme of sections and chapters before this, the Internet and related technologies provide an immense set of new coordinative, disruptive, and persuasive options for those interested in participation and contestation of all kinds. The next chapter goes into this in yet further detail in describing the manner in which Internet technologies have revolutionized the activist enterprise. Simply put, however, cyber actions—from disruptive attack to manipulation of data and the use of broad-scoped, diverse types of information-sharing resources—constitute a toolkit of contention that is expansive and fits between the thresholds of legitimate political participation and violent protest. In terms of state efforts to interfere with the interests of their competitors, this translates to an expansion of the toolkit of hybrid warfare, broadly writ.

The problem with this explanation of why grey zone conflict is more readily apparent in the twenty-first century than it has been in the past is that it does little to explain the rising incidence of such conflict where it is not primarily or even at all characterized by digital actions. This, of course, makes some substantial sense as digital actions are limited in their ability to affect kinetic dynamics (i.e. to wage physical warfare or achieve a kinetic disruption). As such, it may be fairer to simply say that ICT and the special characteristics of the cyber domain have multiplied the incentives for states to use cyber techniques insofar as new information technologies pertain to the informational aspects of conflict.

Information affordances in the age of the Internet

Though it carries with it the same problem of not fundamentally being able to explain the broader trend towards engagement in grey zone conflict seen so far in the twenty-first century, an interesting corollary rationale for the thing lies in the

argument that the Internet era has brought with it unique and uniquely manipulable affordances. An affordance is a dynamic that exists wherein particular environmental characteristics—objects, people, technologies, etc.—permit specific kinds of social actions at the expense (or at least at the non-occurrence) of others. The term was first used by social psychologists seeking to explain how human (and animal) action and thought is defined by environmental conditions.¹⁸

We discuss the idea of affordances with regards to the Internet in part in the last chapter, specifically describing the manner in which changes in how humans access, frame, and consume information translate to behavioral—and subsequent institutional—changes in how people engage in society and politics. Here, the idea is no different, but is perhaps worth revisiting the case of the Gutenberg printing press—a seminal example in scholarship on comparative politics and sociology—as an example of how information revolutions have regularly resulted in micro-motivated changes to the global social and political environment.

Johannes Gutenberg’s movable type printing press was developed in the mid-fifteenth century (c.1439).¹⁹ The original machine was a remarkable innovation that incorporated new technologies and materials into a novel design that allowed for the mass production of books (and records, proclamations, etc.). Prior to the invention of Gutenberg’s printing press, the ability of governments and companies to mass produce text was limited. Existing methods for duplicating text were poor, and so the task of recreating original work fell to dedicated armies of bureaucrats and, in the case of books, clergymen.

Gutenberg’s invention and its subsequent spread across Europe had a profound impact on the political and social fabric of the continent. Quite arguably, the printing press is one of the developments most responsible for the turn in Europe towards national polities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In large part, the reason for this has to do with the fact that the limited ability to systematically duplicate text supported the perpetuation of systems that separated the aristocracy from lower segments of society and failed to incentivize the emergence of non-local communities (i.e. people rarely thought about life beyond their town or local region). Benedict Anderson, in his now-famous work on “imagined communities,” describes three broad-scoped changes in particular that came about in Europe as a result of the printing press.²⁰

The first of these was that the ability to mass produce text prompted an unprecedented shift away from the primary usage of Latin as the written language of choice in Europe. Instead, the vernacular tongue—Italian, German, French, etc.—was embraced as new forms of publication were created and multiplied.²¹ This, in turn, led to greater interest in literacy for ordinary folk, as much social and economic activity turned to revolve around new kinds of entertainment (i.e. newspapers, pamphlets, etc.) and reporting.²² The result of all of this was the development of affordances coming from a sort of nationalization of the worldview of even the lowest of Europe’s general population. The development of newspapers allowed for regular news from distant parts of the continent and encouraged a centralization of perspective on societal and political issues as being about national—rather than local or urban—identity. Much as the development of papyrus scrolls for record-keeping did in ancient Egypt, texts mass produced in the age of the printing press also encouraged the further standardization of concepts and measures of the world around Europe’s citizenry, including of time and value.²³ And, as all of this encouraged the rise of commerce and a workforce more comfortable with the idea of prosperity emerging from non-local opportunities,

governments were incentivized to organize and enable their populations around the goal of greater economic power. Thus, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europe experienced the proliferation of national education programs, centralized banking, and conscription-based militaries.²⁴

Box 8.4 Is the Internet an imperial force?

Of the various affordances the Internet brings to activist and subversive efforts, none is perhaps quite as meaningful as the opportunity for actors to inject some means of ideational influence over far flung populations. However, in thinking about this, it is worth considering implications beyond the operational. That is to say that it is worth thinking about more than just the implications of the Internet for specific social movements or for information warfare. Clearly, information that is distributed and then proliferates online leads to broad-scoped societal effects over and above what is intended by those who attempt to influence. It has, in many ways, a mind of its own. This is not new in the information age, but it is certainly more noticeable.

The question we should then consider is whether or not the Internet is an “imperial” force. By “imperial,” we mean to invoke the image of colonial European powers spreading their empires around the world and, as a result, influencing the development of non-European civilizations in line with European economic, political, and social systems. We must ask if something similar is happening in the age of the Internet given the way in which the thing is structured. Certainly, usage of the web has become more evenly distributed across countries in the past 20 years as the developing world has come online. Whereas in the 1980s and even 1990s it might have been fair to say that the Internet was largely U.S. or Western, that is simply not informationally true anymore, at least in a basic sense. The bulk of content stored online is increasingly less and less in English; it is in Mandarin, Urdu, Hindi, Russian, Spanish, and more.

However, it is certainly first movers in the Western world who dominate content production and distribution in meaningful ways. And more than just the fact that Disney, Netflix, and Amazon are some of the most prolific content platforms across even the non-English speaking worlds, search engine giants like Google and Microsoft are behind the design of search and distribution algorithms that determine what information individuals find when they go online. Given this, is it possible that the Internet represents a new form of imperialism?

The information environment defines what affordances—i.e. what behaviors and resulting institutional developments—exist. The Internet age undoubtedly includes a series of affordances that are having a profound impact on the shape of global commerce, politics, and society. A broad range of scholarly projects in recent years have identified many such affordances, including that individuals that use social media platforms extensively become inclined towards network-oriented problem solving techniques and that shared stylistic preferences across distinct cultural sub-groups vary directly in line with the prevalence of prominent examples with viral exposure.

The implication of all of this for incidence of grey zone conflict is, again, quite simple. The unprecedented, systematic emergence of affordances linked with the function of Internet infrastructure implies that there are immense opportunities to be had from interfering with and manipulating those underlying systems. We expand this in discussing constitutive power strategies, but it is worth considering more simply this argument; that the development of new affordances linked with information infrastructure in the digital age itself incentivizes interference—whether via digital or non-digital techniques—of those societal functions that now depend on the Internet.

The stability-instability paradox, deterrence, and grey zone conflicts

A main element of the puzzle about grey zone conflict upheld in debate by security practitioners is that such conflict implies a failure of deterrence.²⁵ In other words, if one country is being successfully deterred from attacking another, then any new form of limited conflict beyond “normal” espionage and non-confrontational military developments would be considered a failure of the dynamic. After all, the purpose of deterrence is essentially a sort of temporary holding action (even when deterrence is affected over long periods of time) wherein an adversary is incentivized to sideline any plans (that wouldn’t be considered “normal” diplomatic or economic behavior, that is) for bettering the strategic situation. Thus, grey zone conflict implies that deterrence has largely failed.

The issue is that prominent instances of grey zone conflict don’t seem to exhibit such a loss of deterrent relationship characteristics. Where Ukraine was verbally offered some measure of commitment of protection from other European countries in 2014 and 2015, the Russian Federation appeared to take active steps to limit its military position in the eastern parts of the country while still continuing clandestine and asymmetric support for rebel forces. Likewise, China made various diplomatic concessions in the interest of better partnerships with regional stakeholders while supporting low-level efforts to advance territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. So what’s happening?

Scholars have increasingly turned to the notion of the **stability-instability paradox** to explain grey zone conflict in the context of deterrent dynamics of interstate relationships.²⁶ The paradox is most often used in IR scholarship to explain the propensity that nuclear weapons’ states have to engage in low-intensity conflict with one another, most often through the use of proxy non-state actors and allied governments. The logic here is fairly simple. States with nuclear weapons—and specifically with the ability to launch a retaliatory **second strike** in the event that they are nuked themselves—tend towards reasonably peaceful relationships, even where the countries involved are entrenched geopolitical or historical rivals. However, the strength of the deterrent force involved—i.e. the nuclear arsenal of the opposing side—actually offers a credible sense of security in that your adversary has limited incentive to use their capability short of the appearance of an existential threat. The result is a threshold past which military action would be unwise, but under which confrontation is excusable. So long as that threshold is not breached, major warfare will not materialize. Thus, successful nuclear deterrence leads to a paradox wherein high-level peace incentivizes low-intensity conflict as a relatively consequence-free way to incrementally improve one’s strategic position.

With grey zone conflict, scholars have increasingly recognized (as the two sections above do) that an expansion of the space between war and peace in the digital

age likely means that there are more opportunities for contention that don't violate the deterrent threshold. Particularly where nuclear weapons are involved, we might expect states to embrace the notion of broad-scoped grey zone conflict as a substitute for normal competition below the threshold of war. In this way, grey zone conflicts might be perceived as a net positive development in IR, as they emerge from strategic success in deterring a foreign adversary.²⁷ The challenge for states in coping with such conflict will be twofold insofar as the aim is to avoid massive destabilization of a broadly peaceful status quo condition in the global system. First, states that are the targets of grey zone conflict must decide where and when to respond with major force or threat of force.²⁸ In essence, states must describe what kinds of hybrid warfare push too close to the threshold of what is permissible short of war and then act to raise the costs of adversaries emphasizing such approaches. If done effectively, this would again be a net positive for international affairs, as grey zone conflict could be normalized in relation to prevailing views on the balance of global power. Second, the same set of decisions must be made where grey zone conflict emerges between non-nuclear states (either without nuclear weapons or not under a nuclear umbrella). In those situations, the threat of nuclear retaliation does not exist and so the nature of such “not war” conflict plays more into the question of appropriate retaliation.²⁹

A logic of circumstances

Apart from some prevailing condition of deterrence between states or the implications of the information revolution, a notable—if simple—reason for the rising incidence of grey zone conflict in the twenty-first century may have to do with circumstantial effectiveness.³⁰ Scholars and security practitioners think of conflict between war and peace as sub-optimal, because states are essentially opting not to bring their best assets into the contest. The argument above posits that there is a strategic logic of certain situations where the established payoff structure of possible outcomes makes grey zone conflict a viable option, essentially by reducing the likely costs of retaliation. That said, it is worth noting that grey zone conflict may be an attractive option because of situational cost-benefit calculations. Though the argument might appear very similar, it differs from the idea that limited costs from potential retaliation systematically incentivizes grey zone conflict. Rather, states simply sometimes don't feel like risking the costs of lost military assets, personnel, and resources; alternatively, some may be comfortable with risking and perhaps forfeiting military equipment because its value has circumstantially diminished.³¹

These types of cost-benefit analyses are most often a function of institutional or strategic variables that directly impact upon the ability of a military to fight. If an army has just been withdrawn from a decade-long conflict in another country—as occurred with the Soviet Union after Afghanistan, the United States following Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.—then it may be unwilling to launch into a conflict because personnel and equipment attrition has reduced the effectiveness of the fighting force in the near term. Here, grey zone conflict simply may present as the most efficient option for confrontation and contestation, just as it might if a political administration funded an unprecedented expansion of a state's intelligence or special forces apparatus. Conversely, a state five years removed from such a decade-long conflict may be more incentivized to engage in a conventional war, as the replenishment of personnel and equipment has left its military with a surplus of expendable,

battle-worn hardware. In short, grey zone conflict—and particularly cyber and cyber-enabled conflict—may occur simply where a state or an element of a state’s security services finds itself well suited to the task.

“Not war” strategies as constitutive power challenges

For most security practitioners, explaining grey zone conflict involves understanding why and when it might materialize as a form of contention in some interstate relationships. Most explanations of “not war” strategies, however, do a poor job speaking to the conduct of grey zone conflict beyond timing. In other words, most explanations do little to explain the construction of a given campaign and the targeting choices made by “not war” belligerents.

One set of explanations for the rising incidence of grey zone conflict addresses *both* the significance of the information revolution and the specific shape of how contention takes place between war and peace. In Chapter 7, we engaged with the question of what it means for a state to be cyber powerful and what power itself looks like in the information age. In doing so, we invoke Barnett and Duvall’s famous taxonomy of the sources and facets of power (compulsory, structural, institutional, and productive).³² In this breakdown of what kinds of resources, processes, and strategies should matter to state actors, we locate yet another argument about the nature of grey zone conflict between peer competitors.

In discussing the competing incentives and capabilities of states vying for security and influence in world affairs, most IR scholars locate their understanding of what matters to states in the first three of Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power. Power is understood to emerge from the material military capabilities of states, the latent economic and societal resources that produce those capabilities, the institutional influence over rules of the road that governs much international behavior, and the norms of behavior that exist in normal interstate relationships. These facets of power are addressed in most major IR theories in some sense and are variably—depending on the degree to which scholars argue that one part of the thing has more explanatory power than others—the prominent features of the field’s main macro-theoretical schools of thought.

Often left out of direct consideration is the fourth and final facet of power, what Barnett and Duvall call the productive facet. To quote the last chapter, “productive power describes indirect constitutive control over others in the context and construction of those broader socio-technical relationships within which all states are embedded.” In short, productive power involves the ability to shape and direct the constitutive processes that lead to manifestations of power in all the other categories.³³ In reference to the arguments addressed earlier, constitutive power might thus be said to include the ability to influence how social affordances are created and felt across broad populations. Constitutive power strategies manifest in some elements of information warfare. Whereas information operations designed to mislead people and institutions take aim at the integrity and viability of mechanisms of compulsory, structural, and institutional power, those intended to affect how people interact with their environment—by, say, reducing the credibility of particular sources of information or forcing changes in how people think about the information they’re receiving—organically address the constitutive power of an adversary. In the next chapter’s description of non-state actors interested in affecting broad-scoped

normative changes in prevailing societal sentiment, we describe such actions as being about subversion.

Subversion in the form of constitutive power strategies falls generally outside the scope of this discussion about deterrence and grey zone conflict between states operating on roughly equal footing. And yet, it provides a compelling reason as to why states might act to interfere with the machinations of foreign competitors’ societies without directly addressing those competitors via directly contentious actions. In particular, taken in tandem with the argument that the information revolution has opened up new space for non-violent contestation and been the source of new global affordances that are shaping societal trends, it’s easy to see why grey zone conflict has become a favored strategy for states on certain fronts. Even where the approach does not involve direct manipulation of information technologies for disruptive and manipulative purposes, the notion that states should be incentivized to engage others in limited fashion in order to affect constitutive processes, wherein the approach taken does not interfere with prevailing deterrent dynamics, explains why occasional “not war” conflicts between peers should be expected. The bulk of other incidents that constitute the twenty-first century’s bulging number of grey zone conflicts thus might be explained by the advent of Internet-aided opportunities for manipulation of underlying constitutive conditions. Moreover, the idea that constitutive power strategies are not uncommon beyond the scope of deterrent relationships and are increasingly common in the form of grey zone campaigns, makes substantial sense when one considers the range of targets and methods employed in paradigmatic cases since 2010, including information operations conducted against Ukraine, Germany, France, the United States, the UK, and more.

Future trends

The next chapter, in dealing with non-state actors and cyber conflict, extends much of what we’ve talked about here. This is particularly the case when it comes to our discussion of “patriotic hackers,” non-state proxies and cyber mercenaries, and subversive non-state actors. The connection between this chapter and the next is significant, however, in that cyber conflict organically implies a blurring of the lines between state agency and the actions of non-state actors. The information revolution has affected both state and non-state actors, not only separately but in terms of the mutual interactions of relevant security stakeholders—state militaries, intelligence organizations, organized criminal syndicates, and self-motivated proxies of national interest—in international affairs. Thus, as we move to discussing non-state actors it is important to keep in mind the varying security calculations made by states. In doing so, the objectives and payoff structures of non-state actors, insofar as they matter to state security interests, might be better understood.

Notes

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- 3 Such conceptualizations of conflict have been commonplace since at least the 1980s. See *inter alia* Schultz Jr, Richard H. “Low-Intensity Conflict: Future Challenges and Lessons from the Reagan Years.” *Survival*, Vol. 31 (1989), 359; Kornbluh, Peter, and Joy Hackel. “Low-Intensity Conflict: Is It Live or Is It Memorex?” *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1986), 8–11; Kober, Avi. “Low-Intensity Conflicts: Why the Gap Between Theory and Practise?” *Defense and Security Analysis*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2002), 15–38; Hammond, Grant T. “Low-Intensity Conflict: War by Another Name.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1990), 226–238; and Kinross, Stuart. “Clausewitz and Low-Intensity Conflict.” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2004), 35–58.
- 4 Votel, Joseph, Charles Cleveland, Charles Connnett, and Will Irwin. *Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone*. Technical Report. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2016. See also Wright, Nicholas D. “From Control to Influence: Cognition in the Grey Zone.” (2017). http://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Wright2017_CognitionGreyZone_v2.pdf.
- 5 Bragg, Belinda. *Integration Report: Gray Zone Conflicts, Challenges, and Opportunities*. Technical Report. Arlington, VA, 2017.
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- 7 See *inter alia* Laqueur, Walter. *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study*. Oxford, UK and New York: Routledge, 2017; Jensen, Benjamin. “The Cyber Character of Political Warfare.” *Brown J. World Aff.*, Vol. 24 (2017), 159; and Robinson, Linda, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, and Katya Migacheva. *Modern Political Warfare*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018.
- 8 See *inter alia* Chivvis, Christopher S. *Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare.”* Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2017, 2–4; Chivvis, Christopher S. “Hybrid War: Russian Contemporary Political Warfare.” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 73, No. 5 (2017), 316–321; and Fox, Amos C., and Andrew J. Rossow. *Making Sense of Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Brief Assessment of the Russo-Ukrainian War*. Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 2017.
- 9 For cyber-relevant discussions of information warfare, see *inter alia* Libicki, Martin C. “The Convergence of Information Warfare.” *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2017); Nathan, Andrew J. “Cyber Dragon: Inside China’s Information Warfare and Cyber Operations.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 96, No. 5 (2017), 193; Siegel, Alexandra A., and Joshua A. Tucker. “The Islamic State’s Information Warfare.” *Journal of Language and Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2017), 258–280; and U.S. Army. *Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Information Warfare, Report on the PLA, Network-Centric Warfare, Electronic and Cyber Warfare, China Espionage, Implications for US, and Psychological Warfare*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2017.
- 10 See *inter alia* Parker, Emily. “Hack Job: How America Invented Cyberwar.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 96 (2017), 133; Kaplan, Fred. *Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016; and Segal, Adam. *The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age*. London: Hachette, 2016.
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- 13 Messenger, Gary S. *British Propaganda and the State in the First World War*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1992.
- 14 See J. Andres Gannon, Erik Gartzke, and Jon Lindsay. *After Deterrence: Explaining Conflict Short of War*. Working Paper (2018).
- 15 Ibid. Also see Altman, Dan. “Advancing without Attacking: The Strategic Game around the Use of Force.” *Security Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2017), 58–88.
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- 17 See *inter alia* Franzén, Simon. “Russian Information Warfare.” (2017) <http://fhs.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1127531&dsid=-6992>; Darczewska, Jolanta. “The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare. The Crimean Operation, a Case Study.” (2014) www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2014-05-22/anatomy-russian-information-warfare-crimean-operation-a-case-study; Thornton, Rod. “The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare: Responding to Russian Information Warfare.” *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 160, No. 4 (2015), 40–48; and Giles, Keir. *The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare*. Vol. 20. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2016.
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- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Ibid.
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- 25 This is the main argument made by Gannon, Gartzke and Lindsay, *After Deterrence: Explaining Conflict Short of War* (2018).
- 26 For notable descriptions of the paradox, see Krepon, Michael. “The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia.” *Prospects for Peace in South Asia* (2003), 261–279; Cohen, Michael D. “How Nuclear South Asia is Like Cold War Europe: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited.” *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2013), 433–451; and Ganguly, Sumit. “Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Issues and the Stability/Instability Paradox.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1995), 325–334.
- 27 Gannon, Gartzke and Lindsay, *After Deterrence: Explaining Conflict Short of War*, (2018).
- 28 Ibid.
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Further reading

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9 Non-state actors

Terrorism, subversion, and activism online

Though states have been behind many of the most visible and disruptive incidents involving the use of ICT, comprehending the global cyber conflict ecosystem inherently means understanding the actions of non-state actors. From well-meaning developers to petty criminals and terrorist organizations, non-state threats to national security in the digital age are far more numerous and diverse in their potential for disruption than are those from foreign governments. Moreover, no understanding of interstate cyber conflict is complete without some understanding of the non-state corollaries of states' digital arsenals—"patriot" hackers, criminal proxies, and more. In many ways, it would be fair to say that non-state actors thematically dominate the global cyber threat ecosystem, as non-governmental entities—from hacker collectives to ISPs—inevitably play some role in even interstate conflict episodes.

This chapter describes the various ways in which non-state actors use information technologies in world affairs. Naturally, as with most primers on non-state threats to national security in the digital age, this means engagement with well-known episodes in which the actions of individuals compromised the security of military or government systems. The Morris Worm incident in 1988, for instance, involved the release of a computer worm by a programmer that ended with disruption of network access affecting a significant percentage of all computers connected to the nascent Internet.¹ A decade later, the ILOVEYOU worm—investigation of which led to the arrest of two Filipino amateur programmers—attacked millions of Microsoft Windows computers across industry and governments around the world with similar effect.² And with Solar Sunrise, broad-scoped hacking of unsecured U.S. government systems ended up being the work of teenage hackers and an Israeli accomplice. However, understanding security threats and dynamics as they emerge from non-state actors' use of the web demands knowledge of more than just the adjunct role of individuals in state security crises. Likewise, no survey of digital age security topics would be complete if the focus were only on *malicious* non-state actors. As any researcher of democratization trends or counterculture will attest to, ICTs have also fundamentally shifted the balance of capabilities to disrupt in favor of non-state actors interested in social or political change. As such, this chapter describes a range of areas where ICT has altered the nature of operations for non-state actors, including social activism, terrorism, and criminal enterprise.

Non-state actors and cyber security: some terminology

Non-state actors are more common in the digital domain than they are in any other. In any of the other traditional domains of conflict—land, air, sea, or space—there are

significant barriers to entry for even the most highly organized and well-funded non-state groups (such as private companies or terrorist organizations). On land, non-state threats to national security take well-understood forms, from terrorist organizations to insurgent groups and organized criminal syndicates. At sea, non-state actors threaten national security in highly specific ways, such as through piracy and smuggling. In the air and in space, non-state actions that affect national security calculations are few and far between, largely because the costs of operating effectively in those domains is staggeringly high. With cyberspace, few restrictions on entry exist because of the common availability of pre-packaged tools, talent-for-hire, and educational resources that impart the basic knowledge needed for misbehaving online.

As importantly, the architecture of the digital domain and the numerous strata of governance dynamics that relate to different parts of the online world is so complex as to *magnify* the incentives non-state actors have to be disobedient on the web. Whereas a naval pirate might be deterred by the high combined costs of ship upkeep and active counter-piracy measures in place in a given region, barriers to operation are less clear for hackers. The lack of physicality associated with entering the domain (i.e. acting online is not particularly shaped in any way by where a hacker is located) is particularly important in that, alongside low technical costs to operations, hackers have a broad range of options for avoiding the attention of authorities with viable criminal jurisdiction. The disconnect between physical location and cyber operation is also the source of magnified incentives to antagonistic digital actions because the international community has mostly yet to effectively apply international law to criminal acts involving persons and information interacting across international boundaries. In short, the fact that barriers to prevent or prosecute malicious action online is both technically and legally complicated makes it so that hacking is a pretty viable option for all manner of criminally motivated non-state actors.

But who are these non-state actors? The sections that follow describe different kinds of non-state actors that operate online in traditional terms—i.e. in terms of their political or economic distinguishing features. But more generally, what kinds of actors hack beyond the purview of state-directed cyber security efforts? And what roles do non-state actors play in the global cyber conflict ecosystem?

Generically, we might split malicious (or, at least, antagonistic) non-state cyber actors into two categories. First among these are (1) **hackers**. Though the term “hackers” is often used generically to describe individuals that act maliciously online, it actually describes a person with specialized knowledge of computer systems. In this way, hackers are distinct from those without technical knowledge of how their tools work, but rather engage in cyber conflict using pre-designed instruments and procedures. Hackers have programming skills and tend to fall into one of three sub-categories. **Black hat hackers** are persons that employ their hacking talents for personal or political gain. When a practitioner or journalist outlines steps taken by “hackers,” they most often mean black hat hackers who are interested in causing disruption or stealing information that brings some economic or political benefit. By contrast, **white hat hackers** employ their skills for legitimate purposes, often the identification of security loopholes in existing systems. Companies around the world like Google, Facebook, Baidu, and Weibo regularly hold competitions wherein participating hackers are encouraged to find unique vulnerabilities in existing IT infrastructure. In doing so (and in retaining white hat hackers to aid in design and development of products), governments and the private sector are able to shore up faults that might otherwise allow black hat hackers

opportunities for gain. Finally, **grey hat hackers** are white hat hackers that sometimes undertake actions beyond the legal scope of pre-planned disruption. The term most often refers to digital vigilantes, such as individuals or groups that have been linked with the Anonymous hacking collective. Such hackers tend to be well intentioned but are not against resorting to technically illegal methods, such as the disruption of offensive websites or the theft of information from extremist organizations, to achieve their goals. Examples of grey hat hacker actions might include Anonymous-sponsored vandalism of Israeli government websites to protest against settlement construction in the West Bank, and left-wing vigilantes in 2005 in Germany that hacked the mailing list of a neo-Nazi organization in an attempt to expose the group's extremist supporter base.

By contrast with hackers, (2) **script kiddies** are people who use scripts and programs *developed* by hackers to prosecute cyber attacks. Script kiddies—a term emerging from the often-inaccurate assumption that teenagers are the primary demographic interested in hacking by lacking true technical skills—are generally uneducated in rudimentary programming skills. However, the proliferation of pre-packaged tools for malicious behavior since the late 1990s has meant that script kiddies are certainly capable of inflicting large-scale damage against government, industry, and civil society. In particular, hacker development of toolkits that streamline the process of developing unique malicious code means that script kiddies are able to be specific in who they target and how they approach their objective. Thus, while it is true that the use of pre-packaged design tools means that detection and interdiction by authorities is often easier than it might be with true hackers, script kiddies represent an enormous potential threat to national security and prosperity.

Moving beyond this distinction, it is common to think of non-state actors in cyberspace in terms of traditional social, political, or economic classifications. “Hackers” and “script kiddies” might obviously be grouped given any number of classifying factors, but the most common categories we might consider include (3) **cyberterrorists**, (4) state spies/proxies, (5) **hactivists**, (6) **subversives**, (7) criminals, and (8) **vicious employees**. As will become clear in the remaining sections of this chapter, the lines between these categories can be extremely fuzzy. State proxies and spies, which are discussed in past chapters, are worthy of mention as non-state actors largely because of the attribution problem. States often hire mercenary hackers or incorporate technical practices designed to distance official functions from malicious actions taken online, thus ensuring a degree of plausible deniability in the event of an outcry. Hactivists are social activists that employ cyber attacks and digital circumvention to further political objectives. And yet, social activists (often activist “script kiddies”) that don't particularly meet a threshold standard for hacking capabilities are not uncommon elements of localized cyber conflict episodes, particularly in authoritarian states. Likewise, subversive organizations might look remarkably like traditional interest groups or political parties but tend towards online actions that are antagonistic *explicitly because* the group or cause faces widespread opposition. And the difference between criminals and vicious employees is only meaningful insofar as the latter term describes a specific instance where crime is enacted by individuals with pre-existing access to systems. This often changes the nature of a given cyber attack episode, but the outcome is the same—crime involving either “property” damage or personal gain from information theft.

More specifically, these categories are useful for thinking about the substance of cyber conflict involving non-state actors and the preventative efforts of governments,

but they link actors to digital actions remarkably poorly. Some hactivism, for instance, is malicious. However, given that cyber actions tend not to be inherently violent even when they are aggressive, it is not necessarily fair to describe all forms of digital protest as such. From LGBT rights groups in Africa that employ off-the-shelf encryption to mask group communications to far left groups in Germany that vandalize the websites of their social adversaries, many activists might better be thought of as disobedient than criminal. Some literature on cyberspace and international security differentiates between such actors by pointing out that some undertake attacks focused on achieving technical disruption (i.e. **syntactic objectives**) and others take actions focused on the informational content of a given system (i.e. **semantic objectives**). However, even that characterization leads to imprecision when trying to understand different kinds of non-state actors. For instance, the lack of potential for violence *also* means that “cyber terrorism” only partially describes the traditional toolkit and set of objectives held by terrorists. In reality, cyberterrorism largely describes the use of the Internet to recruit, communicate, and organize in preparation for traditional kinetic efforts. And though the end goals are different, the same might be said of subversives and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have an interest in avoiding government gaze.

In the remaining sections of this chapter, we discuss non-state uses of ICT in terms of the substantive categories outlined earlier. Though there will always be problems with thinking about non-state actors in cyberspace in terms of traditional definitions, the fact of the matter is that any attempt to categorize in extremely general terms can only take us so far. Describing non-state actors as responders or hosts or targets is valuable insofar as such designations let analysts quickly understand the contours of a given attack episode. But the truth is that there are no uniform sets of techniques or tactics unique to the different kinds of non-state actors outlined. Inevitably, it is necessary to think about different forms of non-state cyber conflict in the context of different political, economic, and social actors, regardless of the analytic difficulties that might emerge from their many shared features.

Social activism in the digital age

For anyone thinking about non-state actors involved in conflict in the digital age, the first thought is likely to be of organized hactivists like the Anonymous hacking collective or criminal hackers aimed at the theft of intellectual property. However, as previous chapters argued, it would be inappropriate to think of cyber conflict only in terms of aggression prosecuted online. Rather, we need to think about conflict and security *that has been impacted by the information revolution*—even if said conflict does not necessarily include malicious hacking for the most part—if we are to understand the degree to which ICTs have magnified the potential of non-state to affect political and economic systems.

Social activism is perhaps the most widespread and easy-to-understand category of activity in which non-state actors have felt augmented effects of the information revolution. Social contention and protest are also inherently conflictual, but are rarely violent in an organized sense. Likewise, the shape of protest and activist efforts around the world has transformed in line with new abilities wrought from the rise of cyberspace, but they seldom involve sophisticated cyber attacks. Rather, ICT presents as a powerful toolkit for coordinating activities, for mobilizing resources, and for reaching global audiences in unprecedented ways. This section describes the ways in

which activists have benefited from the use of the web and additional problems that activists now face as a result of the information revolution.

Who are digital activists?

To be clear, “activism” refers to all efforts to advocate a position or a course of action. By talking about ICT and *social* activism here, we are making the argument that new advocacy abilities brought about by the information revolution are most meaningful for national and international security in the context of those seeking social (and requisite political) change. Though businesses have clearly enjoyed massive success directly from new abilities to advertise to audiences online and to use a remarkable number of diverse IT services to highlight products for consumption, it is political interest groups, NGOs, student movements, and other similar social fronts that have, since the late 1990s, increasingly been able to affect real political change through the use of the Internet.

Social activism augmented by use of the web has many names—“**digital activism**,” “cyber dissidence,” “digital disobedience,” etc.—and has been a relevant feature of world politics since the early 1990s.³ Throughout the 1990s, a range of dissidents and political activists around the world set about constructing websites and sponsoring email newsletters to more efficiently reach their supporter base. Daniel Mengara, a Gabonese dissident living in exile in the United States, is well known for his early efforts to create a structured space on the web for advancing his perspectives on the national regime in Gabon. Mengara created a series of websites that were strongly inter-connected and could be used to coordinate supporters coming to the cause from a wide range of places and perspectives. In essence, Mengara created the first blogosphere and demonstrated that a distributed web presence could go a long way to cost-efficiently centralizing the efforts of diverse social movements.

Another secondary feature of digital activism is often the use of old and modified telecommunications technologies by dissidents—even some labeled insurgents by the governments of countries like Chad, Botswana, Mexico, and Peru—to connect to the realm of websites, blogs, and social media-supported networks often thought of as the domain of true cyber dissidents.⁴ In China, for instance, Falun Gong practitioners have developed sophisticated programs to allow the banned community to directly utilize the uncensored Internet against the wishes of the Chinese government. Before such capabilities were developed, however, the group used cell phones, telegrams, and even pagers to communicate ideas and content that could then be published by a foreign-based web of online repositories and mouthpieces. The Zapatista Army of National Liberation in Mexico (EZLN) and the Earth Liberation Front founded in the UK have had similar experiences in using basic telecommunications technology as a tool to support more sophisticated global web-based activist efforts.⁵

Of course, perhaps the best known examples of digital activism enabling highly impactful social and political change are those social movements whose digital efforts have either caused or significantly contributed to the coalescing of a globally visible protest episode. Three of the most well known are the events of the Arab Spring in 2011, the Occupy Movement (also in 2011) and, emerging as an offshoot of Occupy in Hong Kong, the Umbrella Movement in 2014. Different from digital activism throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, these protest movements exemplify the organizing potential of messaging enabled through social networking services like Facebook

and Twitter. These services support tens of millions of users around the world and, more importantly, function in such a way that information can become globally visible (1) very quickly and (2) without reference to traditional “gatekeepers” of global news (like traditional news media outlets and, in authoritarian countries, state-run information services).⁶

In each of these cases, the activism of a veritable multitude of dissident organizations and interest groups coalesced around responses to specific developments on social media into real-world protest incidents. With the Arab Spring and Umbrella specifically, social media was effectively leveraged to produce weeks-long events that saw real political concessions from a range of state entities. With the Arab Spring, pro-democracy protests in Tunisia and Egypt in particular gained global attention and, though researchers debate the causal role of social media, were certainly fueled by a tidal wave of citizen journalism that saw human rights information distributed via Facebook and organizing information published on Twitter. In Libya, where government forces fought a bloody campaign against revolutionary groups attempting to overthrow Muammar Ghaddafi, social media was uniquely useful in preventing harm to civilians caught in war torn cities in the country’s eastern regions. Famously, dissidents tweeted at NATO’s official Twitter account about the advance of armored government vehicles on rebel-held check points and, within an hour, were the beneficiaries of an airstrike by French planes against the approaching column. And in Hong Kong, Umbrella protesters made extensive use of (often banned) programs to bypass government censorship efforts and publish information about police interactions with those marching in the streets. Again, though causality is hotly debated here, a range of analysts argue that such publication demonstrably restrained China’s crackdown on protests across the period of the movement. In short, ICT has emerged as a tool for social activists not only to reach global audiences with rhetoric and messaging but has also seen the development of a digital toolkit that allows for an unprecedented degree of influence over interactions with governments.

How do activists use the Internet?

Activists use the Internet—and, more broadly, web technologies—in a number of ways. Generically, we might think about digitally aided actions taken by activists as falling into one of three categories that line up with the general campaign goals of such actors (see Figure 9.1). First, web technologies help activists *mobilize*. Through the use of email and simple online messaging systems, activists are able to reach members and potential supporters in a way that is inexpensive and efficient. Falun Gong, for instance, succeeded in organizing a march on Beijing by 10,000 people in protest at the quiet exile of Li Hongzhi (the group’s founder) in 1999 on only a few days’ notice. Up until that point, such coordination would have taken much longer and would have been significantly more complicated. Removing the need to use telephones or physical messaging systems cuts down on restraints that limit the ability of activists to quickly organize and take action. Moreover, use of social media and more advanced messaging platforms allows activists to reach audiences beyond those already connected to an organization. These tools provide a forum for expansive information sharing and the mechanisms needed to link activists with broader domestic or global populations for the purpose of, for instance, finding new opportunities for financing and support.




Figure 9.1 Operational elements of subversive campaigns

Second, the Internet cedes activists new tools to *mitigate* threats to their cause. In some cases, this might mean the ability to disrupt the operations of governments or social groups opposed to a given activist outfit through denial of service attacks or vandalism. More commonly, for activists this can simply mean the means to counter disinformation and oppressive narrative with an alternative perspective.

Finally, web technologies give activists new abilities to *actualize* their campaign objectives. Though the line between mobilization and actualization is fuzzy insofar as both can involve persuading audiences, this is an important conceptual difference. Where activists are often trying to persuade a broader population to see their point of view and taken relevant action, it is the *way in which the digital revolution has changed the information environment* that activists operate in which dictates the impact of ICT on efforts to actualize objectives (i.e. not simply the mechanics of operation). The web logistically improves the ability of activists to mobilize, but it has also changed the nature of the task involved in influencing broader populations. The average global citizen produces, consumes, and accesses information in new and unique ways relative to in the 1980s. Activists, in attempting to actualize their campaign objectives, are simultaneously able to reach large audiences and face new barriers to those audiences' attention.

More specifically, two new modes of using the Internet stand out as having dramatically altered the prospects of activists that choose to employ ICT. First, as Dorothy Denning notes, the development of the web has meant the construction of unique collection systems and procedures that make the job of the activist easier than it has ever historically been.⁷ Denning asks us to think about the Internet as a vast library filled with information of every kind and organized in relation to the multitude of distinct sociopolitical and economic entities (governments, companies, social organizations, etc.) that use the web. Immediately, it is easy to see how great volumes of information on all manner of subjects is of particular use to those with a policy grievance or

to actors interested in modifying some element of contemporary society. In short, the construction of an easy-to-access digital repository of human knowledge reduces or destroys many of the traditional educational barriers to informed sociopolitical operation that can stymie activist efforts.⁸

But the nature of the Internet as a kind of massive information repository is actually broadly significant for activists because of a secondary feature—the *distributed* nature of the repository itself.⁹ In the digital age, it is almost inappropriate to talk of information access and availability without considering the role of governments as censors of information. In authoritarian regimes particularly (but not exclusively), the relationship between activism and sociopolitical change—in terms of the potential for success in activist efforts—has often been determined by the capacity of the government to block or redirect disobedient efforts into something harmless to the prevailing system. Since the late 1980s, numerous authoritarian governments have constructed the apparatus of digital censorship wherein access to certain kinds of information or the use of the Internet for particular types of political activity are limited by government intervention.¹⁰ This is discussed in the section below. However, it is broadly necessary to note that even the most effective censor is constrained by the distributed and technologically diverse nature of web technologies. Beyond even common search engines and email distribution lists, web technologies allow groups to develop their own ways to store and share information. Against the efforts of censors, activists benefit from the ability to store information in servers abroad beyond the reach of a particular government. They gain from the ability of unique programs to bypass traditional, controlled methods of accessing the Internet. And they are substantially advantaged by the existence of a global marketplace for innovation of new techniques that enable individuals to hide from authoritarian forces, bypass censors, and *de facto* assert freedoms of expression.

Alongside the construction of unique collection systems, of course, the rise of cyberspace has also brought with it new formats and opportunities for publication of information.¹¹ More than just providing yet another new medium for publishing opinions and data about goings on in the world, the disaggregated design of the digital domain means flexibility for activists looking to publish specific kinds of information to be seen by particular audiences. Using blogs, vlogs, chat platforms, email, and much more, activists can publish information in a cost-effective and controlled fashion. There are few barriers to publishing in the digital age, and the toolkit for tailoring information presentation is great. Naturally, this also provides activists with unprecedented potential for publishing disinformation and for taking advantage of the fragmentation of a global information environment where consumers of information are asked to pass judgment on sources based on fewer credentials than ever before.

The experience of activists in the information age

Activists are simultaneously aided and constrained by the dynamics of operation in the digital age. As described earlier, the potential for organization, mobilization, and actualization of desired sociopolitical changes through the use of ICT is enormous. And, over and above the immediate benefits of online operation for activists, ICT undoubtedly helps solve the kind of issues of global accountability that Anne Marie Slaughter has talked about. Greater connectivity, in short, allows non-state actors

to observe elite activities, publish information on global governance processes, and call global attention to distinct problems. At the same time, however, the toolkit of repression held by authoritarian states has been enhanced by both the development of specific technologies and, more broadly, by the emergence of a complex informational ecosystem that itself dictates new challenges for operation by dissidents.

The literature on democratization and democratic governance has broadly labeled ICT that aids activists in expanding their normative footprint as **liberation technologies**.¹² Jared Diamond first described this category of new technologies as any network system, service, or piece of hardware that allows activists to bypass the traditional shackles of authoritarian rule and affect meaningful change. Liberation technologies are those that particularly allow for coordination in restrictive digital environments and coordination across national borders without reference to the controlling role of state-governed institutions (immigration control, news media organizations, etc.). The inspiration for this categorization of ICT lies with the role played by web technologies in the Arab Spring and, prior to the events of 2011, the popular revolutions in Central Asia, Ukraine, Iran, and elsewhere from the mid-2000s onwards. What is not clear about this categorization of ICT usage is whether or not liberation technologies include the broad repertoire of digital disobedience, from malware to denial of service attacks, not tactically focused on the traditional aims of activists (i.e. protest and persuasion). This is discussed further in the next section on hactivism.

For activists, information technologies present two clear sets of new challenges to operation. One of the key advantages of usage of social media networking platforms and websites is the way in which it is possible to speak to a wide audience with incredible speed. However, the digital world is not exactly uncluttered. In reality, activists face issues with both mobilization and actualization that stem from the complexity of the global information environment. With regards to mobilization, the publication of information does not necessarily mean that said information will reach the intended audience. It certainly does not mean that information will go viral simply because the message is clearly important. The amount of information shared by billions of users of the web each day present as a sea of competing data points that activists must contend with when crafting their publications. Publishing at the wrong time, in the wrong medium, or (most often) without enough pre-planned connectivity means that information critical to activist success can easily be “lost in the crowd.” Even if attention is paid to an activist’s messaging, the half-life of that attention is likely to be exceedingly short as other stories/data quickly appear on a given user’s digital horizon.

This limited window within which attention might be paid to a particular issue or organization presents a range of problems beyond simply the inability to get a message heard. Advertisers, news agencies, and other activist organizations often adopt “clicktivism” approaches to staying relevant, abandoning quality of publication in favor of rapid-fire posting of content designed to consistently invite temporary attention. This competition for attention makes genuine activism difficult; it also means that co-option of messaging and the production of inaccurate information can occur as third parties attempt to capitalize on sudden visibility. This diversity of the global information environment also bring issues of coordination and actualization. It blunts the power of activist messaging in that potential supporters of an activist cause must self-adjudicate on the spectrum of information before them, rather than trust a single voice. Moreover, it makes the translation from digital interest to physical activism (i.e. protest activism) much more difficult, as communities of supporters are prone to

moving from one cause to the next based on the short cycle of new information being made available online.

The other challenge activists face is less a natural development of the digital age and more a customized set of capabilities developed by those interested in stymying socio-political dissent. In the literature on authoritarianism and democratization efforts, it is often noted that, since around 2005 to 2007, governments across the Middle East and Asia have developed sophisticated censorship regimes that pose significant challenges for attempts to subvert non-democratic authority. Typically, this has been referred to as “upgraded authoritarianism” but, in actual fact, is not as overtly oppressive as the term suggests.¹³ Yes, influence over ISPs and the use of massive government resources to develop tools of censorship have allowed governments like that of the People’s Republic of China to directly mute the voices of pro-democracy activists. However, the use of ICT for control by authoritarian governments is increasingly far more insidious and focused on misdirection than it is on clear repression.

Box 9.1 Twitter, Facebook, Apple. . . is corporate policy foreign policy?

The digital world—and the prospects for contention and conflict therein—is based on private enterprise and technological innovation beyond government control. This is true regardless of whether the focus of one’s attention is authoritarian or liberal democratic states. Even where authoritarian governments have direct oversight authority over technology companies and ISPs, the fact of the matter is still that cyberspace is functionally shaped by the actions of corporate entities.

Given this, it seems prudent to consider the question of whether or not corporate policy constitutes foreign policy of a sort. After all, the way that companies opt to operate can reflect foreign policy preferences. When Google took a position against the Chinese government and stated that they would no longer censor searches in mainland China, they took a stand based on values intrinsic to Western political systems. They acted, in other words, to defend the principle of freedom even if, as was inevitable, they lost the favor of the Chinese government. Apple similarly took a stand against the U.S. government when it objected to an FBI writ demanding help in cracking open an iOS device found after a terrorist attack. Apple did so because cracking one phone would mean redesigning the security architecture involved such that compromise would be more broadly possible. In doing so, their corporate policy essentially became a public policy of sorts, reflecting the core values of liberal democracy and backing up their expression of a particular point of view with a credible stay on government power.

Perhaps more importantly, the way that a private firm chooses to approach the design and functionality of their network systems and other information products essentially determines—in admittedly greater or lesser ways depending on the context—the nature of the environment in which interstate and inter-societal interactions occur. How YouTube implements sharing and viewing algorithms massively determines the degree to which some content goes viral across international boundaries and some doesn’t, therefore determining the

shape of ideational diffusion around the world. More directly, the design of Facebook's platform and the rules of conduct around how Twitter users can use their account are key considerations for anyone wanting to understand the manner in which revolutionaries across the Arab world organized despite attempts at government repression during the Arab Spring. Likewise, the same design and operational considerations are critical variables in any attempt to understand the success of Russian-based information warfare efforts aimed at Western democracies since at least 2014.

In essence, ICTs have increasingly allowed authoritarian (and even semi-democratic) governments to appropriate civil society. In addition to new regulations on the kinds of civil society actors that can legally operate—a step that allows governments to stamp out more informal activist efforts while maintaining the illusion of permitting contestation—authoritarian regimes regularly act to manipulate and direct civic dialogue online. By censoring calls to assembly but allowing anti-government speech in general, such governments can prevent the coalescing of protest movements that capture global attention while at the same time permitting a “pressure valve” for dissent. Such allowance of free speech without the opportunity for mobilization prevents instantaneous revolution, such as the continental revolutions that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989, and simultaneously functions to mitigate the potential for more organized protest. At the same time, censorship of legitimate criticism following clear democratic failures in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states (i.e. allowing the publication of accusations regarding vote fixing) has allowed countries like Russia, Belarus, and China to direct national conversations about the state of current political systems. Specifically, such narrative manipulation can actually reduce faith in democratic processes while still allowing for the illusion that opportunities for contestation in contemporary civil society are relatively robust. In short, governments' use of ICT to counter the advocacy of non-state actors is, in many countries, sophisticated and effective in preventing activist efforts to mobilize and actualize change.

Hactivism

By contrast with simple digital activism wherein advocacy groups and individuals employ ICT to magnify the reach of their message, “hactivism” is a term often used to describe a set of activities and tactics beyond the traditional focus of activists on persuasion and citizen mobilization. Again, the line between activism and hactivism—and subversion, discussed later, for that matter—is extremely fuzzy. Nevertheless, hactivism most often denotes protest actions that are antagonistic and unlawful, even in the most liberal democracy where speech and assembly are protected rights. In other words, hactivism describes civil disobedience—from website vandalism to more sophisticated cyber attacks—powered by web technologies.

The process and problem of hactivism

Hactivism is the process of malicious hacking for the purposes of civic activism.¹⁴ Hacktivists are the archetypical grey hat hackers in that they break into computer

systems and disrupt the function of services in order to advocate a particular point of view. And yet, hactivists do not undertake advocacy operations in the same sense as do traditional activists. Hactivists seldom publish persuasive arguments about specific issues and almost never aim to actualize their advocacy in the form of civic protest. So what is the logic of hactivism?

The fuzziest part of the line between hactivism and digital activism surrounds the development of tools to circumvent what is seen to be unfair regulation and censorship by governments. The development of programs and platforms like Freenet.org are, in many ways, the plainest kind of digital antagonism practiced by hactivists aimed at affecting social change. But hactivists also engage in cyber attacks on government websites, take down state and private sector services, and more. In doing so, hactivists do not seek to communicate a nuanced perspective on a social or political wrong. Rather, the basic logic of hactivism is that overt antagonism costs targeted entities in several distinct ways. First, digital interference causes companies, governments, and individuals to divert resources from other areas of operation to protect against further attack. Second, antagonistic hacks draw attention to a hactivist's cause via the logic of serious disruption. Media organizations and social networks are far more likely to pay attention to unique conflict episodes than they are to the average activist message that contends with the multitude of alternative information in circulation in the modern global information environment. In many ways, hactivists follow a similar logic to that of terrorist organizations, though physical harm from disruptive actions is not intended or particularly likely. Finally, hactivism is demonstrative. Though the barriers to operation in the cyber domain are exceedingly low insofar as access to both talent and techniques is remarkably unlimited by market or government dynamics, hacking as social or political advocacy is still a relatively rare occurrence in world politics. Hacks prosecuted against government services or the websites of specific political elites, for instance, is exemplary in that observers are able to draw parallels with existing grievances and technical capabilities beyond the immediate situation.

Box 9.2 What is Anonymous?

Anonymous is a collective of online activists and hackers that have been responsible for a range of high-profile digital attacks since the early 2000s. It would be imprecise to call Anonymous a group; rather, Anonymous lacks real leadership, though there are certainly individuals more responsible for driving the movement towards particular actions than others. Nevertheless, the collective takes the form of a community that is sometimes motivated towards collective action usually aimed at addressing some sort of societal wrong or excess. Though Anonymous was not the first “hactivist” outfit, it has arguably been the most impactful on global society in the first two decades of the twenty-first century.¹⁵

Anonymous has its roots in the online discussion board site 4chan and can be traced back to a series of postings (and subsequent discussions) in 2003. The motivation for Anonymous's vigilante antagonism—which most often takes the form of denial of service attacks against targets, vandalism of websites, or the theft and release of private information—is not always clear. Like many hactivist outfits, the group has variously attacked both state and

non-state actors in support of social justice and “for the lulz” (meaning for the fun involved in doing so). The group has been behind attacks on the Church of Scientology, the Tunisian and Egyptian governments during the Arab Spring, the Israeli government, the Islamic State, PayPal, Sony Pictures, Inc., the Westboro Baptist Church, and even government agencies in the United States. They have regularly espoused support for WikiLeaks and for protesters involved in the Occupy, Umbrella, and Pussy Riot movements.

The question of whether or not Anonymous is either a positive or negative force in the global cyber ecosystem is up to the individual. There is little doubt that Anonymous has, at times, acted in support of status quo forces fighting extremism around the world. The “Operation Paris” attacks on Islamic State following the Paris attacks in 2015 are an example of such activities. At the same time, individuals associated with the collective, many of whom have been arrested, have attacked conservative civil society organizations and elected politicians. While there is a clear argument in most cases that victims violated modern social norms in an egregious fashion, Anonymous obviously operates outside of and against the rule of law. Thus, opinion is almost enduringly split between calling the collective modern day “Robin Hoods” and labeling them merely as a sort of digital angry mob determined to brutalize those it is offended by.

Whereas digital activism is often applied to describe—even where the scope of protests, like with the Arab Spring, is transnational—the actions of groups operating in a specific domestic context, hactivism has no such connotation. In fact, most problems that governments and inter-governmental agencies have in investigating and cracking down on criminal acts by hactivists emerge from the fact that participants in such efforts are commonly distributed around the world. Such a dynamic makes crackdowns tricky for a number of reasons. Most significantly, authorities face the extended attribution problem acutely with transnational hactivists that often don’t exist with simple digital activism. The technical ability to disguise agency in online actions is enhanced by the distributed footprint of hactivists in that government influence over ISPs and domestic civil society factions is much less complete. And authorities face unique legal issues in dealing with the threat posed by hactivists insofar as legal standards for prosecution are highly variable across global jurisdictions. In many countries and localities, prosecution of particular types of cyber attack is not forbidden, or evidentiary standards for prosecution are inappropriately extensive. In short, even where hactivists are locatable, they benefit from the fact that legal systems around the world are perpetually playing catch-up in regulatory terms.

The tools and tactics of hactivism

With hactivists, tools and tactics might be broken into three categories—tools of (1) advocacy, (2) disruption, and (3) information redistribution. Tools of *advocacy* in some ways differ little from those used by social activists more broadly to enact meaningful change. From the use of blogs to social media, the Internet provides activists with a number of ways to reach out and shape how large numbers of people make decisions about pressing issues. Specific to hactivists, however, is the use of advanced

spamming techniques to reach large audiences beyond the scope of legitimate services and platforms for Internet communication. Spamming programs are a common feature of world affairs and can support the ability to send messages via email, common instant messaging applications, and more at very little cost to the user. Spamming is illegal around the world, as unauthorized sending of content to entire online communities is commonly against the terms of use of different web platforms and is often tied to service disruptions.

Tools of *disruption* are more diverse than are tools of advocacy and might be understood in two ways. First, we might think about tools of disruption in terms of the actual vehicles of attack used by hactivists. As noted in Chapter 2, these might include trojans, worms, viruses, logic bombs, or the various methods of disruption (DDoS) attacks, which include *inter alia* SQL injection and cross-site scripting. Perhaps more usefully, we might think about disruption in terms of the strategic shape of different kinds of assaults. Generally, these fall into two categories. *Vandalism* refers to simple attacks that involve either the deletion or manipulation of content on a website. With defacements, site content can be altered to reflect a nuanced manipulation of existing information, to portray alternative content introduced by the hacker, or to show nonsense content, such as randomized links or links to obscene material. *Blockades*, also known as “cyber sit-ins,” are a form of denial of service attack that overwhelms legitimate systems with traffic over a defined period of time. The distinction to be made here between DDoS as a technique and blockades as a strategy is that the latter are designed to maximize economic or reputational harm to the target through either repeated attacks or attacks timed to affect the most users of target services.

Finally, tools of *information redistribution* are really the combined ability hactivists have to steal and then strategically publish information, an act commonly known as “doxxing.” In part, intrusion is accomplished in no different manner than it might be if the end goal is systems’ disruption. However, with the exfiltration of data, hactivists are able to undermine the efforts of oppressive (or simply opposition) elements of global society in a unique fashion. Whereas the conventional wisdom is that activists rarely publish information not broadly available in the public sphere, hactivists often aim to publish private details that will incriminate targets in illicit or immoral activities. In this way, much as the more general logic of hactivism is to draw attention to societal opponents through severe actions, hactivist redistribution of private information to the public sphere—an activity popularized by organizations like Wikileaks—aims to change the course of contemporary politics by presenting large audiences with shocking or salacious private information.

Terrorism and information technologies

For terrorist groups around the world, web technologies have become part and parcel of upgraded efforts to more effectively prosecute violent campaigns.¹⁶ Information technologies allow terrorist groups to undertake specialized recruitment, to distribute information both widely and secretly, to publicize terror activities, and—though few such incidents have yet taken place—to terrorize via the prosecution of disruptive cyber attacks. In short, much as is the case with other kinds of non-state actors, ICTs present as a powerful tool for terrorists to improve the effectiveness of their campaign efforts.

The shape and causes of terrorism in the digital age

Much in the same way that cyberspace has enabled activism of all kinds by deconstructing barriers to non-violent sociopolitical advocacy, so too has it amplified the efforts of terrorists operating both locally and transnationally. The next section outlines the ways in which terrorists have generally turned to using the Internet (and web technologies broadly writ). However, it is first worthwhile thinking about the ways in which the information revolution has fundamentally affected terrorism today.

If one enters a phrase like ‘digital terrorism’ or ‘cyberterrorists’ into a search engine, they are likely to come across news articles, websites, and social media focused on the threat posed to the international community by transnational Islamic terrorism. The reasons for this are numerous, not least the fact that the Western world has engaged groups like Boko Haram, al Qaeda, and the Islamic State prominently since the late 1990s. Though it would be entirely disingenuous to say that fanatical Islamic-motivated terrorist outfits are the primary terrorist threat facing Western societies (indeed, at the time of writing more than 70% of all violent terrorist incidents that took place in the United States or Western Europe were prosecuted by neo-fascist or racial supremacy groups), it is certainly the case that the structure of such organizations is archetypal examples of a form of transnational, religiously motivated “fourth wave” of terrorism that has only coalesced over the past few decades.

Likewise, while it would be disingenuous to say that ICTs are causally linked to the emergence of such groups, it is certainly the case that cyberspace has augmented and greatly enhanced the ability of such groups to function effectively around the world in efforts to mobilize, recruit, and terrorize. From Islamic State’s “Digital Islamic Caliphate” to al Qaeda’s trademark use of encryption for specialized recruitment and knowledge dissemination, such groups reflect a modern version of traditional terrorist efforts wherein cost efficiencies and coordinative boons from ICTs enable expanded outreach and hamper counterterrorism efforts. Of particular note, the information revolution has had distinct effects on the underlying causes of terrorism. Again, though we can’t go so far as to say that information technologies have specifically, *causally* prompted the emergence of transnational terrorist threats over the past few decades, we do know that the online world and web technologies exacerbate the underlying development of the phenomenon.

Scholars of terrorism tend to consider three “levels” or categories of driving factors that produce terrorist campaigns. We might label types of explanations included in these categories as (1) *system-level*, (2) *state-level*, or (3) *individual-level*.¹⁷ Students of IR will recognize these categories as synonymous with the “levels of analysis” commonly outlined in introductory coursework on world affairs. Here, we simply extend to terrorism the general notion that political behavior emerges from either the setup of international affairs, the structure of national systems, or the psychology of individuals.

System-level explanations about terrorism rest on the notion that the structure of macro world events provides the motivation for the development of groups and campaigns. One popular meme that links the emergence of new terrorist groups to the world system—only partially an academic theory—is that of the “clash of civilizations.”¹⁸ First suggested by Samuel Huntington, the theory suggests that the “victory” of liberal capitalism over communism at the end of the Cold War has produced a

world devoid of the political ideological conflict (in the global sense) for the first time in more than a century. As a result, fault lines for global conflict are increasingly likely to emerge on the boundaries between different “civilizations”—Western states, the Islamic world, Russia, etc. Here, terrorism emerges as the product of the encroachment of one set of civilizational values and influences into others. The actions of al Qaeda, for instance, can be understood as a rebellion against the encroachment of Western values into traditional Islamic cultures.

State-level explanations for terrorism emphasize national characteristics. For instance, failed states that boast no economy and perpetual poverty for segments of the population might be more likely to produce terrorist groups. As one vein of thought has it, this is particularly likely for a number of reasons. Failed states imply no ability on the part of the government to govern, and so terrorist recruitment and training are relatively unhindered. For the same reason, transnational terrorist organizations are likely to invest in such countries as a base for more easily moving material and personnel around without being caught. Likewise, failed states provide individual members of the population with both economic and social incentives to join extremist groups.

Finally, individual-level explanations for terrorism hold that membership of such organizations emerges from psychological conditions. On the one hand, membership of a terrorist organization might be of unique value to particular kinds of individuals that seek economic benefit or social status. On the other, terrorism often presents as an attractive choice for those who feel themselves distant and detached from mainstream society. Feelings of isolation, oppression, and abandonment often make for ease in recruitment by terrorist organizations.

Naturally, these various categories of analysis explain some elements of the terrorist enterprise better than others. Typically, individual-level explanations focus on membership dynamics and recruitment in terrorist organizations, while the others attempt to explain strategic developments. Regardless of their individual utility, explanations across each category are affected by the dynamics of the information revolution. Though the “clash of civilizations” is not a direct result of the information revolution, for instance, it is certainly magnified by changes in the way that information is accessed, presented, and framed in international affairs. Development of new information infrastructure allows the “degradation” of traditional societies at an accelerated rate, as individuals (1) are more easily able to find information about other cultures, (2) are more readily influenced by content produced from alternative cultural perspectives, and (3) are incentivized to engage in parts of the global system to thrive. Likewise, ICTs allow terrorist groups to more easily target ostracized communities and individuals to expand their membership, and to articulate an alternative vision of contemporary society that is easy accessible by those vulnerable to terrorists’ influence.

How terrorists use the Internet

Beyond the broad effect that the information revolution has had on the underlying causes of terrorism, of course, web technologies have significantly enhanced the ability of terrorist groups to achieve campaign objectives.¹⁹ But how do terrorists specifically use the Internet to their advantage? A great deal has been written about the ways in which terrorist causes have been enhanced and made more efficient by the Internet. Such studies extoll several specific characteristics of cyberspace and of network technologies as being of particular utility to terrorist groups. Besides the low barriers

of cost to enter the domain, there has traditionally been little to no regulation of cyberspace by comparison with other domains. Likewise, the potential for anonymity protects terrorists online to a degree, and the potential ability to rapidly reach large audiences and to manipulate a complex media environment through low-cost methods incentivizes risk-taking in integrating web activities into terrorist campaigns.²⁰ More specifically, however, we might think of eight specific types of activities that terrorists are able to undertake online.

Much of what terrorists do online is logistical. Information technologies enhance the ability of terrorist groups to plan operations and to develop the resources needed for a campaign. Specifically, just as noted earlier in the case of activists, terrorists (1) *data mine*—essentially taking advantage of the repository nature of the Internet to gather intelligence that can be used to strategically and tactically plan operations.²¹ More than ever before, terrorist cells are able to compile and organize massive amounts of information off the web for use in planning. Databases available to terrorist groups function much like an information list or product database might for a private company. They allow individual members (employees, in the case of private companies) to more quickly adapt their behavior while doing their job. Terrorist cells can more effectively identify weak spots in security procedures or optimal times for a bombing attack based on information freely available on the web, such as traffic metrics or government-published schedules for local government operations. The nature of the Internet as a large library also allows terrorist groups to introduce operation insurance in a way that has rarely been possible before. Where bomb attacks might traditionally have stood a high chance of failure due to equipment malfunction, for instance, standardized procedures for communicating design instructions improves the eventual effectiveness of the tools that terrorists make use of.

Terrorists also use the Internet to reach out to specialized audiences. This takes one of two formats. On the one hand, the web allows terrorists to more effectively (2) *fundraise* in two ways. First, easy access to off-the-shelf methods of encrypting communications and coordinating with foreign counterparts ensures a degree of secrecy in financial interactions between terrorist outfits. Likewise, data mining efforts provide more accurate demographic information about potential sympathizers and citizen funders, which are then relatively easy to contact in discrete ways via the use of the Internet (and particularly through darknets, off-the-shelf encrypted messaging applications, etc.). On the other hand, terrorists are able to use the Internet to more effectively (3) *recruit and mobilize* audiences sympathetic to their cause.²² In some cases, the Internet facilitates recruitment of new members simply by allowing for quick communication across long distances. Would-be adherents are more capable than ever before when it comes to making contact with active terrorist groups. However, the web has also made targeted recruitment across an unbounded geographic area—essentially worldwide—quite simple. Again, data mining efforts allow terrorist groups to not only solicit donations from potential sympathizers but also to shape sympathizers' worldviews and invite different kinds of participation with the cause. Terrorists that operate on social media, for instance, can customize their informational offering such that those with minimal sympathies become inured in the narrative of struggle and political change forwarded by the group. Moreover, terrorist groups can promote their own narrative to counter that of governments, thus protecting their access to the demographic that constitutes their potential supporters (and, in some cases, future members).

Box 9.3 The Dark Web, cryptocurrencies. . . what are they?

Today, much online activity is enabled by cryptographic protections embedded in information transmission mechanisms. The Dark Web and cryptocurrencies are two examples of this that are invariably brought up in the context of cyber crime and the actions of terrorists online. This is because these developments award netizens abilities to hide online actions—particularly transactions and speech—in ways that are naturally attractive to those interested in avoiding the scrutiny of governments and intergovernmental actors.

The Dark Web, which is described in brief in Chapter 2, is easy enough to understand. Darknet sites are no different from other websites except that they cannot be accessed in the way that other sites on the Internet can be. They are not indexable by web crawlers and so cannot be found using traditional search engines. Instead, to reach a darknet site, one must use specialized software that is designed to anonymize user actions online. One popular piece of software, **The Onion Browser (TOR)**,²³ accomplishes this by creating a peer-to-peer network of nodes that a user's traffic is redirected through. Within this network, nodes online know the address of nodes on either side of it—in essence, they do not know the full shape of the network. The result is that, with enough redirections, it is basically impossible for an investigator to track web traffic to the point of originations. This leaves users free to engage in activities absent concerns about identification by authorities.

The Dark Web, which, because it is not indexed by web crawlers is not really a unified web of sites, is naturally of interest to those wanting to avoid government oversight. From dissident citizens to criminals and terrorists, the ability to operate without worry about compromising one's identity enables a broad range of illicit activities. The Dark Web is full of sites dedicated to the sale of narcotics, child pornography, weapons, malware exploits, and more.

On the Dark Web, a common means of transaction is **cryptocurrencies**, particularly Bitcoin (the first cryptocurrency). To some degree, it is immensely unfair to suggest that cryptocurrencies intrinsically have something to do with terrorism or criminal enterprise. They were developed to solve an underlying problem with global financial institutions, namely that much financial transaction involves trusting gatekeeping entities like PayPal, often to the average citizen's loss. Cryptocurrencies are based on **blockchain** technology (and variations thereon). Blockchain technologies are a peer-to-peer method for ensuring record keeping of transactions. The heart of the thing is a database of transactions *held by every member of a cryptocurrency network*. Transactions are verified by multiple "peers" so that there is almost no opportunity for fraudulent or mistaken outcomes in financial exchanges. The *distributed ledger* of all transactions is then updated for everybody in the network so that cheating the system is impossible.²⁴

Cryptocurrencies are of obvious utility for illicit transactions, the type of which are commonplace on the Dark Web. Part of the point of cryptocurrencies is that they do away with gatekeepers of traditional value exchange—banks, governments, and similar financial institutions. Again, though there are a massive number of legitimate purposes to which blockchain-based technologies might be (and are being) applied, the lack of required oversight is a boon to those seeking to fly under the radar.

Staying with the logistical advantages of using the Internet to enhance a terrorist campaign, terror operations and the units that undertake them directly benefit. At the tactical level, new and advanced communications technologies allow for unprecedented (4) *coordination* on the battlefield. Terrorists can plan attacks with greater precision in timing than ever before and can furthermore more effectively adapt plans to evolving circumstances (such as the unexpected presence of military forces or the move a crowd might make away from a hidden bomb). In direct support of operations, terrorist groups benefit from new abilities to (5) *network* and (6) *share information* with counterparts around the world.²⁵ Networking means not only that groups are more easily able to talk with one another, but that it is increasingly easy for terrorist groups to fashion themselves as highly decentralized cell-based organizations. Here, the point is that terrorists are more easily able to coordinate various elements of their campaign *beyond* individual attacks to optimize strategic gains. By sharing information, terrorist groups that are using the Internet to their advantage are able to overcome many of the traditional problems of coordination with other extremist groups—inequalities of capability and talent, uneven access to resources, etc. Terrorists that effectively mine data relevant to their particular domestic situation, for instance, are able to extend the effectiveness of *national* opposition to the sitting government by sharing that information with other resistance groups easily and relatively risk-free over the Internet.

Finally, terrorists are able to more effectively engage with national and broader global information environments for the purposes of (7) *propaganda* and (8) engaging in *psychological warfare*. Much as is the case with activists, terrorist use of the Internet naturally involves an enhanced ability to speak to audiences distributed both locally and around the world. This allows terrorists to expose relatively large populations to information that they might rarely have been presented with before. Use of social media, email, wiki sites, and more allows terrorists to apply their own frame and method of presentation to information about their cause, hopefully bypassing traditional government and media framing of terrorist efforts to reach sympathetic audiences. Moreover, messaging about terrorist causes need not come directly from known terrorist outlets. The Internet both allows for anonymity in publication of information and, quite commonly, the use of proxy mouthpieces for such a purpose. Diffuse networks of outlets can act to advocate and debate pro-terrorist positions while terrorists can more directly attempt to psychologically influence populations. Images of destruction, hostage executions, and more receive close scrutiny and attention by media outlets around the world. This can serve the dual purpose of inflicting psychological harm on opposition audiences—for instance, executing soldiers to convince a Western public that the costs of intervention are too high—or convincing sympathetic audiences that a particular action has succeeded in repelling the forces against which terrorists are arrayed.

Box 9.4 Terrorism and the threat to critical infrastructure

Countries are, from a security perspective, incredibly complex. While scholars often oversimplify their descriptions of warfighting capabilities or national power by pointing to the strength of military forces, the attractiveness of economic or

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social mechanisms, or the degree to which governments hold sway over the rules of international regimes, it is hard to escape the reality that state security is fundamentally bound up in those functional systems that enable these things. From the educational preparedness of human resources to access to natural resources, national security planners invariably have to take into consideration *infrastructural* vulnerabilities when assessing the scope of threats facing a given country.

In the United States, high-level investigations following the Oklahoma City Bombings and the September 11 attacks outlined a range of vulnerabilities that exist in the regular operations of **critical infrastructure (CI)**. Critical infrastructure includes those elements of national industry that are significant to the ordinary functioning of traditional measures of national power—the economy, military capacity, etc. The Clinton administration outlined, in Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), 16 sectors of CI in 1998. These include the energy sector, healthcare and public safety, nuclear reactors and facilities, financial services, etc.

As discussed in Chapter 10, critical infrastructure pose a particular security concern for national governments. The management of CI is addressed in more detail in Chapter 12. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning here that primary concern about cyber-based assaults on CI pivot on potential terrorist motivations for doing so. As Chapter 7 outlines, major state-sponsored attacks on CI hold little in the way of strategic value outside of broader conflict scenarios. Though there may be reasons for states to target the infrastructure of competitors in an irregular conflict scenario, it seems unlikely that major powers would sponsor such attacks.

Terrorists, on the other hand, may seize upon the ability to attack CI remotely as a potential method of coercing changes to government policy or drawing attention to a cause. Though there has yet to be such an attack, the FBI famously outlined evidence of al Qaeda cyber reconnaissance efforts aimed at mapping CI vulnerabilities in 2001. While traditional means of instilling fear in target populations might be cheaper and simpler to affect, there is little doubt that there is strategic value in terrorists' cyber attacking CI that does not exist for states.

Not among these eight approaches to Internet usage by terrorists is the use of cyber “weapons” to disrupt or inflict damage on a target. Much as is discussed in Chapter 7, the reason for this largely lies with the nature of cyber attacks as aggressive without being violent. As the case of Stuxnet demonstrates, of course, it is not entirely out of the realm of possibility that physical damage can result from a cyber attack. Moreover, a core concern of analysts interested in terrorists' use of the Internet is the potential for attacks on CI. By disrupting industrial control systems in the energy sector, for instance, cyber terrorists could feasibly knock out a national electrical grid over a sizable geographic area. The resulting disruption of social and industrial services could well result in death—indirectly, in all likelihood, from a sudden inability to call an ambulance or from traffic lights suddenly going out. But, just as is the case with state-instigated cyber attack, any “victory” gained from such an attack is

temporary in that systems can be restored in a relatively short amount of time. And unlike foreign governments, terrorists are inherently limited in their ability to mount a meaningful attack to coincide with cyber disruption. Certainly terrorists might engage in disruptive cyber attacks in the future, though few have yet to do so, but the reality of the possibility is that such actions would be motivated by a desire to cause harm beyond the physical. Targets of successful cyber terror attacks could suffer from loss of reputation for effective information security and would necessarily start paying more to deter such efforts. Likewise, cyber attacks by terrorists could be used to enhance visibility among a particular demographic or achieve that rare physical disruption of a politically meaningful target, such as a nuclear power plant or enrichment facility. That said, the bottom line is that terrorists' use of the Internet largely remains constrained to logistical and coordinative considerations.

Subversion

Whereas the distinction between digital activists and hactivists largely lies with the portfolios of cyber contention each utilizes, the line between activists and subversives instead lies with the scope of the outcomes desired. The same is true with the difference between terrorists and actors that primarily focus on subversion. Understanding the nature of subversive non-state actors and their approach to the use of information technologies is important for two reasons. First, subversives represent an intermediate step on the spectrum of advocacy that stretches from general political activism to militant terrorism. Second, and relatedly, the subversive enterprise has benefited from the developments of the information revolution to such a degree that the number of countercultural and broadly seditious *non-violent* organizations operating in world politics is on the rise for the first time since the 1960s. From cult organizations like Eastern Lightning in China to religious social groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and liberal action groups in authoritarian states, the world is full of non-state actors that don't fit neatly into the activist or terrorist (or insurgent or criminal group) categorizations outlined earlier. Most abhor the notion of violent revolution but are occasionally violent. Almost all aim for normative change, but only engage in advocacy under specific conditions. Thus, subversion is worthy of understanding as a distinct category of non-state actor beyond the traditional dichotomous view of civil disobedience as either violent or peaceful.

What is subversion?

The word "subversion" describes a particular kind of outcome. In the broadest sense, subversion is the successful manipulation of expectations and sociopolitical processes such that previously taboo issues and outcomes—or those beyond reproach in contemporary society—become legitimately considerable. Subversion is about hearts and minds insofar as it describes persuasion of a population to a position radically juxtaposed to what was formerly the norm. Though the definitional boundary is certainly somewhat fuzzy, the main distinction between subversion and more common forms of citizen activism is that the term describes a *wholesale* change in the way a society operates in normative terms. The traditional example offered for what successful subversion looks like is that of the Nazi Party in Germany from the

time of the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923—where the party failed to violently overthrow the German government—to Hitler’s democratic ascension to the chancellorship a decade later. Over the course of that period, changing national conditions and the narrative sales pitch of Hitler’s party machine succeeded in persuading a large part of the German population to a position of staunch irredentism and tolerance of discrimination that would have seemed anathema to someone in Germany *circa* 1920.

Subversion is somewhat difficult to define. Studies of subversive actors often take place as a component part of projects focused primarily on political extremism, civil militancy, terrorism, and insurgency. But while it is certainly the case that there are common linkages between such phenomena and subversion, it would be inaccurate to assume that these political activities are synonymous with subversive activities. Terrorists, for example, do attempt subversion. However, subversive behavior is relatively rare, and terrorists, focused as they often are on forcing policy changes on the part of national or international authorities, must often undertake activities broadly designed to alienate—rather than persuade—elements of a population.

Paul Blackstock²⁶ offers the definition of subversion perhaps most free of the assumption that subversives are terrorists or inherently seditious in arguing that it “is the undermining or detachment of the loyalties of significant political and social groups within the victimized state, and their transference, under ideal conditions, to the symbols and institutions of the aggressor.”²⁷ Blackstock’s definition is well articulated for a number of reasons. First, it detaches an understanding of subversion as being explicitly tied to the overthrow—violent or otherwise—of governments or sub-governmental institutions. This is important because, as noted earlier, subversion is not always seditious. Modern history is full of cases—from LGBT movements in culturally oppressive regimes to white supremacist movements in Central and Eastern Europe—in which subversion either occurs or is attempted without a stated ambition for structural transformation or violence. Subversion is about ideas and perspectives that are often, but not necessarily, reflected in structures. Second, in referencing the loyalties of individuals, Blackstock links ideational perspectives to a population’s preferences. Again, this is critical because subversion takes place under conditions of contestation. New ideas that are tolerable given the progressive nature of a particular society or culture are not subversive, even if they are controversial. Subversive activities are inherently undertaken in an effort to affect a polar shift in the political and social preferences of a population. In short, there must be contest; otherwise, there is no struggle. Finally, Blackstock’s definition does well to describe the transformation of ideational conditions and the transfer of normative loyalties to the “symbols and institutions” of the subversive force insofar as it describes subversive efforts as bound up in the unique sociopolitical spaces of particular cultures and nations. No subversive effort is identical to another, even when the cause and the argument are the same. Even in the over-connected world of the twenty-first century, attempts at subversion naturally take place across different theaters of the global public sphere that boast unique characteristics and challenges.

In sum, subversion describes ideational transformation via the specific—but broadly interpretable—process of preference transference reflected in loyalty to new alternative symbols or institutions. Subversives are activists, but in the most extreme sense of the word. In a given context, subversives are labeled as such *specifically because they are seen to eschew legitimate modes of advocacy*.

How subversion happens

Subversion takes place in a range of different formats. Scholars who have studied government-sponsored subversion scholars break the subversive enterprise out into two broad categories. **Internal subversion** involves attempts to affect the conditions necessary for subversive transformation by dissidents residing within a country,²⁸ while **external subversion** describes the actions of states in attempting to influence conditions abroad.²⁹ External subversion is a common tool of statecraft and is often used to achieve ancillary aims for states (or specific rulers) interested in affecting political change abroad through more traditional means, including conquest and the securing of favorable treaty arrangements. Louis XIV, for instance, employed subversion via the encouragement of corruption and the manipulation of cultural practices for years in advance of his military campaigns in central Europe. Centuries before, the competing leaderships of the fragmented Eastern and Western Roman Empires did much the same, extending influence into less well-connected parts of the European continent in an attempt to subvert both cultural and formal political loyalties along the frontier. Ivan III encouraged sedition in Russia in the sixteenth century from abroad as a preparation for the internal campaign to throw off the Mongol yoke, as would the Habsburgs, the English, the British, the Nazis, the Bolsheviks, and others at various times over the past several hundred years as an aid to broader strategies of domination. The logic, in each case, was fairly simple—conquest and/or superior positions in international relations is made much easier by the acquiescence of a target's population and ruling elites. And the employment of subversive tactics by governments is not merely an artifact of the pre-modern international system. Forcible regime promotion through subversive (among other) techniques has received some recent attention by scholars³⁰ inspired by events in, *inter alia*, Iraq (2003), Afghanistan (in both 1979 and 2001), Panama (1989), Angola (1975), Lebanon (1975–76), and Cambodia (1970).³¹ External subversion is a common feature of the modern international system and, in the context of this chapter's focus on non-state participants in cyber conflicts, yet another source of state sponsorship of non-state belligerents that employ ICT.

What does subversion look like in action? Work on subversion in the context of terrorism, insurgency, and militant activism—particularly Kitson's famous treatise on irregular and information warfare, Rosenau's discussion of modern sedition,³² and Rid's summation of modern hactivism³³—does well in describing the various modes of activities undertaken by subversive campaigns in propagandizing, persuading, and corroding the legitimacy of status quo symbols and institutions. Rosenau, in particular, takes cues from a range of past works in summarizing three different kinds of subversive activity in line with distinct categories of strategic function.³⁴

First, the subversive enterprise is commonly composed of *front operations*. Subversion is countercultural and naturally originates from a position set apart from mainstream norms and expectations of political behavior. Subversive groups require arms that appear unattached to the countercultural core in order to achieve both logistical and activist goals. In general, there are two types of front organization—(1) those knowingly linked to the subversive group and (2) those unwittingly or only informally operating as an agent of counterculture. The redirection of resources by pro-LGBT groups to religious organizations and education programs in countries like Chad, Burkino Faso, Iran, and Sudan serves as good examples of the latter type of front group, where broad advocacy for one position is masked in the charitable

operations of other, more permissible activities. By contrast, the function of entities like the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, Union of Good, or North American Islamic Trust by affiliated members of branch elements of the Muslim Brotherhood movement—which, in some countries, might be characterized as subversive—provides a good example of the former type of group, in which representation of more extreme perspectives is knowingly maintained through informal and interpersonal connections.

Second, subversion often involves *infiltration* and espionage-like activities to place sources of influence within the institutions of the prevailing status quo position. This means the placement of individuals either belonging to or sympathetic to the cause of a subversive organization in either government, opposition, or civil society institutions. The role of such agents is twofold. First, it is often the responsibility of such an operative to sabotage or divert organization processes that would otherwise hamper the subversive cause. Second, it is occasionally the role of the agent to affect institutional subversion in changing the shape and nature of an organization such that conflict with the subversive cause is reduced. For situations where the organization or community is not directly opposed to the function of the subversive enterprise, infiltration is often about persuasion and recruitment. This type of activity is not unique to subversion, of course, insofar as violent and legitimate political actors place operatives in locations of opportunity as commonplace practice. There exists an extensive set of cases where al Qaeda and affiliate groups have placed operatives in Muslim communities, organizations, and mosques across the West in an effort to either mobilize support or to target specific recruitment needs,³⁵ as did the IRA, Nepal's Maoist insurgency, Aum Shinrikyo, and more in decades past. Islamic State agents likewise filled the ranks of Iraqi security forces in limited numbers prior to the initial push against Baghdad in 2014–16,³⁶ much as had happened in 2003–04,³⁷ and much as did the Viet Cong in the 1960s and 1970s in South Vietnam.³⁸

Finally, subversive groups functionally act to frame the contentious issue or broader normative conflict that motivates their campaign through active efforts to *generate public upheaval*. Civil unrest provides an important role for subversive organizations in setting the stage for normative contention in the public limelight and not entirely because civil incidents accurately reflect a tension between the mainstream and counterculture. Indeed, civil protests and unrest largely pivot on secondary issues bound up in the construction of the current status quo rather than on the main platform advocated by the subversive movement. Causing civil unrest can be beneficial for subversive organizations for a number of reasons. First of all, large-scale disruptions can consume valuable state and non-state opposition resources. Second, the side effects of upheaval can exacerbate the exact society-government relations that subversive groups necessarily need to weaken in order to bring about a seachange in perspective on a given issue. Third, civil unrest is a source of new allies valuable to the subversive enterprise. Though often uncompromising in the integrity of the subversive cause, countercultural organizations have regularly benefited from the patronage or partnership of sympathetic actors motivated by related concerns (such as the alliance between elements linked to Hamas and branch organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe). Public upheaval and disruption produces a crucible from which such relationships can emerge. Finally, encouragement of civil unrest is one way to shutdown a national system that does not revert to violence as a tool for

structural transformation.³⁹ Much as might be the case with an old computer system, disruption to key functional processes can cause a national system to freeze up. This creates temporary political space in which subversive transformation of fundamental policy, process, or system norms might be affected.

How subversives use the Internet

In some ways, the narrative of how subversives use the Internet is entirely similar to the various ways that activists, hactivists, and terrorists do. The web is a powerful tool for those aiming to subvert—i.e. for those that aim to advocate and affect normative transformation in extreme, but unusual ways. However, it seems fair to say that the information revolution is relevant for subversives more because of the way in which it has changed the global information environment than because of the development of new technologies for enhancing *logistical* functions. Subversion is the manipulation of hearts and minds, and the fragmentation and complexification of the modern media environment presents subversives with both new opportunities and new challenges to bring countercultural perspectives into the societal mainstream.

Subversives' use of the Internet is remarkably low-intensity. Though there are certainly elements in common with the online strategies of terrorist groups and activist organizations, subversives' web usage is characterized by minimal willingness to provoke either countersubversive forces (i.e. governments) or the broader population. While subversive organizations *have* been known to undertake disruptive cyber attacks, they almost always do so against non-governmental targets, such as opposition civil society groups. In Germany, for instance, far right activists have attacked the servers and websites of far left groups several times since 2004. Likewise, while subversive actors do steal information and illegally publish it, the clear aim of such acts is often to appear to be performing a public service. Data theft and publication in various instances in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Italy between 2010 and 2014, for instance, sought to expose elite corruption in the lead up to state elections.

This approach to the use of the Internet is one that has received a number of names in recent scholarship on non-violent extremism. From “twilight tactics” to operations undertaken in the “grey zone” of contention, the purpose of such light-footed digital antagonism in strategic terms is the maximization of gains for a subversive cause in ways that take minimal risks. Indeed, research has shown that subversive groups have flocked to the Internet in unprecedented fashion particularly because of the utility of web technologies for such low-risk/high-potential gain activities. While attempting to engage a broader population to promote a counterculture cause, subversives are simultaneously able to engage in low-level civil disobedience that is unlikely to turn public opinion against them. Quite divorced from the way in which activists, hactivists, or terrorists might choose to publicize controversial information and frame discourse accordingly, subversives aim to enrich the informational environment they function within so that their ideas and actions become acceptable over time. In this way, we might think of subversives' use of the Internet as being the employment of *information enrichment techniques* that aim, among other things, to create echo chambers and question established norms such that countercultural perspectives can gradually enter the mainstream.

Criminal and political hacking

Though criminals and agents of countries are not always thought of as belonging in the same category, the context of the information revolution makes such a grouping appropriate insofar as new dynamics of behavior with both kinds of non-state actors emerge from the development of new markets for digital crime. In short, the information revolution has augured massive changes in the infrastructure of global finance, public sector functions, and more. As a result, there today exists great potential for the redistribution of resources (money, intellectual property, etc.) through disruptive cyber actions for all manner of self-interested actor. Self-motivated non-state criminals or those acting on behalf of national governments constitute an extensive emergent ecosystem of threat to national prosperity and security.⁴⁰ The sections below discuss different elements of the threat, including simple cyber criminals, malware developers, cyber mercenaries “patriot hackers,” and state spies.

Cyber crime, cyber criminals, and why they matter

Cyber criminal activity is an enormous problem for global society. Though in many ways hard to measure because victims have strong incentives to not reveal information about attacks so as not to suffer further reputation and income losses, cyber crime is demonstrably bad for national economies on a number of fronts. At the lowest end, where individual citizens are targets, **cyber crime** is responsible for hundreds of millions of dollars lost from economic circulation every year.⁴¹ Ransomware attacks where hackers encrypt user information and demand payment for decryption, for instance, succeeds in earning malicious cyber actors tens of millions of dollars per annum just in the United States. At the higher end, where private firms are the targets of criminal activity, national economies suffer from *loss of intellectual property* (IP) and confidential business information. This direct cost then incurs various indirect costs and presents extended challenges for national cyber security. Lost business information increases opportunities for *stock market manipulation* and further business-oriented hacking. Likewise, successful data theft attacks—or even knowledge of such attacks—forces firms to *redistribute resources to securing information*. In doing so, the economy pays *opportunity costs* as firms spend less on innovation and more on the cost of operation. The same is true when firms, aware of the possibility of IP theft, select not to innovate. And national economies also suffer when companies’ *reputations suffer*, as consumer confidence in one firm tends to reflect sectoral measures of consumer desire to spend money and invest.

Direct economic loss from cyber crime occurs in a number of ways. A business knocked offline for a day will lose tens of thousands of dollars (or more). A hack against another business that is made public might result in significantly reduced sales due to lack of trust, particularly if the business in question is in the technology sector. Again, however, the history of cyber crime and the losses incurred by national economies are hard to outline with any degree of accuracy. Nevertheless, there exist some estimates about the degree to which malicious online activity affects national productivity. In 2014, estimated monetary losses to the global economy were anywhere between \$300 billion and \$1 trillion dollars. For the United States in the same year, losses ranged from \$24 billion to \$120 billion dollars.⁴² In reality, the U.S. number was likely somewhere in the middle of that range. However, at time of

writing, consensus holds that cyber crime losses in the United States have certainly hit \$100 billion. This represents nearly 1% of the country's Gross Domestic Product and is the most severe criminal problem by impact behind drug trafficking and non-narcotics smuggling.

Fortunately, the dollar figure of losses is actually of secondary importance. The real threat to national prosperity *and to national security* comes from second order effects, namely the loss of a competitive edge from criminal activity. For instance, where a firm suffers the loss of valuable IP, it increasingly finds itself forced to compete in an international marketplace where, at best, competitors are able to take advantage of the firm's disrupted work. At worst, competitors may benefit directly (from the theft of IP) or indirectly (as stolen IP dilutes the marketplace for innovation in a certain sector). For countries, this is a particularly worrisome dynamic because national economic potential tends to undergird more concrete machinations of diplomacy and national power. The ability to attract favorable trade relationships, to sanction rogue states, to promise to support an international coalition, or to coerce opponents extends from a country's ability to innovate and sustain a robust economy. Strong economies provide the hard means of national power—an ability to spend on the military, for instance—and underwrite the “soft” power a country has (i.e. the attractiveness of a country to foreign powers). Thus, both economic losses from cyber criminal activity and ineffectiveness in dealing with it—or even the perception that government regulation and attention to the health of public-private relationships is ineffective—stand to harm national security on a number of fronts.

But who are cyber criminals? Just as is the case with hactivism, one way to divide up the population of non-state actors involved in the cyber crime ecosystem is by differentiating between hackers and script kiddies. Again, hackers are those with specialized skills that break into computer systems. Black hat hackers do so for malicious purposes, while white hat hackers are the employees (often freelance) of actors that want to improve their own information security. In the middle, grey hat hackers—a term less meaningful when economic crime is the subject of focus—tend to be vigilante actors that break laws for ostensibly laudable purposes (i.e. exposing corruption or drawing attention to objectionable political perspectives). By contrast, script kiddies often hack for the thrill of the thing and have no specialized skillset. Instead, script kiddies use pre-designed and implemented instruments to prosecute cyber attacks.

With regards to economic cyber crime, however, three additional kinds of actors are worthy of note. We might use the term ‘hacker’ or ‘script kiddy’ to simply describe those involved in relative unorganized criminal actions. That said, several additional terms are commonly used to denote specialized roles within the cyber crime ecosystem. **Cyber spammers** seek financial gain specifically through acts of social engineering online. Using email (or, occasionally, SMS, IM, web forums, etc.) spammers send fake information to large numbers of web users. In many cases, spamming is demographically targeted at vulnerable demographics, such as older users. The purposes of spam messages is to start a dialogue wherein the spammer can manipulate a user into giving up valuable assets—money, user information for email accounts, bank login information, etc. Spammers either directly make money from such efforts or sell information gained from spam attacks onto other criminals.

Just as spammers are a specialized form of hacker, so too are **malware** developers. Where spammers might be differentiated from other black hat hackers by their tools and methods of choice, malware developers are different insofar as they are

focused on producing hacking tools. Likewise, whereas spammers tend to have limited technical knowledge in line with the simplicity of their chosen approach, malware developers tend to be highly skilled. Developers produce programs that allow other hackers and script kiddies to evade detection when operating, to more effectively intrude into target systems and to fool victims of spamming attempts more readily. They also produce “creation kits,” which are themselves programs designed to let unskilled criminals customize their tools prior to the launch of an attack.

Organized cyber criminals are yet another category of cyber criminal. Organized networks in this vein tend to mirror their real-world counterparts in that members are geographically distributed around the globe. In a great number of cases, traditional organized crime groups directly control transnational cyber crime networks. According to a 2014 report, organized cyber criminals are behind the bulk (~80% globally) of serious economic loss from data theft. This is, in many ways, unsurprising. This statistic conjures an image of mafia organizations running massive online criminal empires and it is the case that large criminal efforts exist that have great impact on the global economy (and on international security). Famously, Russian organizations controlling massive botnets were hired for the purposes of creating massive disruption in Estonia in 2007. But there is no clear evidence that this kind of organized criminal network with global reach is the norm. Rather, the nature of the cyber crime ecosystem simply links a massive number of otherwise unaffiliated hackers to organized crime. These networks are a primary source of tools that can be bought for use by petty criminals to attack bank accounts, company servers, and more. Likewise, organized criminal networks can be quite small. Some are no more than a dozen people and essentially constitute the efforts of petty criminals to pool resources and amplify revenue gains.

Box 9.5 Trolls, troll farms, and bot warfare

With **external subversion** campaigns wherein the aim is to manipulate public opinion and information conditions from abroad to achieve some sort of strategically favorable outcome, few methods have received as much attention as has trolling and bot-based disinformation. Though the general impression of **trolls** is that they are internet personas created for the specific purpose of attacking the credibility and substance of existing content, the reality is that trolls are simply any such persona that plays a part in manipulating the information environment around a particular topic. Trolling can include positive propagandist activities to spread enthusiastic content, often falsified or shaped to present a particular narrative, about a person or cause.

Russia is perhaps the best known employer of trolls as a component part of broad-scoped information warfare efforts to interfere in the social and political processes of states in the former Soviet sphere, in the European Union, and in North America. Since at least 2003, Russia has been regularly linked to what are often called **web brigades** made up of an indeterminate number of paid trolls that work to manipulate online discourse on a given topic. During the influence operation campaigns against Ukraine, Germany, the UK, and the United States in the 2010s—campaigns that are, according to public disclosures from Western

defense communities, still underway—Russia was linked specifically to **troll farms**, which are specialized locations where a number of paid commentators create disinformation and work to spread it in strategically advantageous ways.

Trolling is not always instigated directly by human operators. Alongside such efforts, **bots** are employed to spread content in much the same way that robo-calls might be directed to automatically make calls to unsuspecting names in the phone book. Bots, which are increasingly sophisticated, are fake accounts that engage target audiences via reference to a specific series of instructions. Often the point is simply to spread content as far and as wide as possible. At other times, the idea is to actively convince an audience of the existence of hostility towards or support for a particular cause to encourage individuals to take steps on their own that serve the broader trolling strategy.

Finally, it would not do to fail to mention *corporations* as critical actors in cyber crime episodes. Naturally, corporations often take the role of defender and victim. However, corporations in authoritarian states are sometimes the cause of illegal intrusions authorized or prompted by national governments. Moreover, it is worth considering the arguably criminal role that corporations fill in the aftermath of cyber attacks. Though firms tend not to engage in overt acts of cyber crime (as doing so would incur the wrath of national governments and lead to economic sanctions), the right of a corporation to “hack-back” is less clearly defined in most countries. Does a corporation have the right to “follow” a hacker back to the source and either attempt to delete information stolen or take down a hacker’s computer entirely (as discussed previously)? If so, at what point does hacking back cease to be an act of extended self-defense and become a retaliatory criminal act? And what if the hacker is, as is often the case, operating from another country? Who has jurisdiction to decide whether or not the corporation’s action is legal? This dynamic constitutes a major debate in the development of national responses to cyber crime regulation and in international efforts to coordinate. Ultimately, this is a particularly pressing issue, as many of the most innovative and productive firms in any country have an international footprint. Such non-state actors face the possibility of operating on two sides of potential interstate cyber conflicts.

For king and country: the non-state proxies of interstate cyber conflict

Again, though economic crime and political “crime” are remarkably different threats faced by the international community, they share similarities in the context of cyberspace in that they both somewhat emerge from distinct marketplaces for intrusion skills and technologies. They also both, with the unique exception of *cyber spies*, emerge from the self-interest of the non-state actors involved. “Cyber spies” is a term broadly used to describe non-state actors that intrude into the networks of foreign states, monitor developments, and steal information useful to their state sponsor. Here, we are going to use the term to more specifically refer to direct employees of a state that are engaged in espionage activities. That we might consider these employees non-state actors in a meaningful sense—different, for example, from listing individual soldiers or diplomats as non-state actors—is a unique condition of the way in

which countries set up their cyber espionage programs. Beyond even the traditional detachment spies have from their state controllers, at least some countries actively try to distance themselves from the actions of their employees. China, for instance, has reportedly gone so far as to issue false identification information across a number of formats for state-employed cyber spies and devotes resources to maintaining distance (i.e. paying for off-site facilities and equipment, etc.) for the purposes of being able to deny liability when espionage activities are detected.

That said, non-state proxies—i.e. non-state actors that act in line with the directions and strategic motivations of state actors—are more commonly at least one step further detached from the apparatus of governments. Proxies generally fall into one of two categories. First, **cyber mercenaries** are for-hire hackers that serve as extended cyber forces of a national military, intelligence community, or paramilitary organization.⁴³ Here, there are perhaps the strongest parallels with economic cyber criminals insofar as the incentive to hack is financial gain for the self. Different from criminals that seek to steal information or money, mercenaries hire out their abilities to states (or other state proxies). Of note, transnational organized criminal networks might situationally be described as mercenaries. This is largely due to the fact that such networks often control botnets and other resources useful to the realization of political objectives. Though even authoritarian states rarely contract criminal elements, there are demonstrable connections between individuals in government and in organized crime networks in countries like Russia that have clearly—as in the case of Estonia in 2007—led to the employment of criminal hacking resources for state objectives. Corruption and nepotism, in short, often link states to criminals for mercenary purposes. Additionally, groups of mercenaries are often referred to as *cyber militias*. Even where the opportunities for financial gain are minimal, mercenaries often work in broader groups for the purpose of undertaking additional criminal acts that are “protected” by the aura of the state relationship.

Second, **patriot hackers** are malicious non-state cyber actors whose motivations stem from the desire to help their country during a conflict or crisis.⁴⁴ Patriot hackers most often aim to disrupt the operations of those perceived to be enemies of the state. A number of patriot hacker collectives are fairly well known today. A Serbian group called the Black Hand (named after the group that assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 and sparked World War I) vandalized websites in Albania during the Kosovo conflict.⁴⁵ A large number of other such collectives are based in Russia and China. Though no official statement of state patronage exists, both governments have been permissive of the actions of such groups in the past. Specifically, the Russian government has appeared broadly permissive of actions taken by patriot hackers during the Kosovo conflict, the 2014–17 Ukraine conflict, and the 2007 Estonian conflict to vandalize the websites of foreign governments and prosecute denial of service attacks against media outlets. And the Chinese government has appeared supportive of nationalistic citizen antagonism since at least 1997, when patriotic hackers protested the Indonesian government’s persecution of Chinese citizens.⁴⁶

Political hackers, when not directly employed by the state, are motivated by self-interest in the form of economic gain, self-defined patriotic duty, or thrill seeking. But why might states choose to employ non-employee non-state actors in their operation? In reality, states stand to benefit from various elements of such relationships. First, though cyber aggression broadly benefits from secrecy and mechanisms that ensure degrees of anonymity, states are extensively invested in surveillance designed to mitigate

foreign cyber threats. Thus, in hiring or encouraging non-state belligerents to act on their behalf, states gain the potential for additional surprise in launching cyber operations. Second, and perhaps most obviously, states can plausibly deny involvement in aggressive cyber operations if the direct belligerents are not officially tied to the government. Third, non-state actors bring unique abilities to states' portfolios of cyber contention. Where a particular country's cyber arsenal is well understood, non-state actors stand to offer unique means for expanding the scope of potential disruption. Fourth, state use of non-state proxies means that resources need not necessarily be diverted to developing a country's own cyber offense portfolio. Tapping existing talent beyond the public sector negates the need to train employees, retain them, and provide the infrastructural resources for success. Relatedly, states can often magnify their capabilities by employing non-state actors in a way that is simply not possible with in-house capabilities. Given that patriot hackers and mercenaries alike emerge from diverse market environments—online social spaces (forums, etc.) as well as marketplaces full of collaborators and competitors—the opportunities for rapidly scalable mobilization of resources is immense. States can retain a technically competent force that can act reliably and rapidly at little cost. And finally, the use of non-state proxies takes advantage of the ambiguous context of international law on the use of such belligerents in interstate relations. This ambiguity is a useful shield against the scrutiny of others in the international community.

Naturally, there are a great many drawbacks to the use of non-state proxies for political hacking. Most obviously, states do not directly control their proxies in the way that they might affect control over military forces. At best, non-state proxies function like contractors with diminished oversight. At worst, they are the result of intangible connections between the state and patriotic elements of society (i.e. encouraging rhetoric). This lack of direct control means that states are taking on a number of risks when they employ proxies. Lack of oversight or familiarity with methods means that a state might give the go-ahead for an operation that ends up producing unintended collateral damage. More specifically, if proxies are operating in close proximity to the country employing them—i.e. to help put down protests or to attack targets in a bordering country—it is possible that networks and services related to the initiating state might be affected (for instance, unintended localized Internet outages that affect citizens of the initiating government). And governments might make themselves vulnerable to non-state aggression in the future through current employment, particularly if non-state actors are in possession of information that could implicate state actions that are either illegal or diplomatically problematic.

Finally, states employing proxies for the purposes of political hacking actually do risk legal action. Though the use of non-state actors allows states to take advantage of the current ambiguities of international law, attribution is not entirely outside the realm of possibility, and the potential exists for double-cross by a non-state actor. If a state uses non-state proxies to launch cyber attacks, whether aimed at vandalism, information theft, or disruption, being caught could be disastrous on a number of fronts. The Law of Armed Conflict is hazy on what kinds of non-kinetic attack produce a violation of international law, but cyber attacks by one country against another definitely violate the spirit of the treaty. Moreover, the use of non-state actors in conflict essentially constitutes the endorsement of "non-privileged combatants" in warfare. This term denotes a distinction between soldiers employed by a state who are protected from persecution from various forms of aggression in conflict and

non-affiliated criminals. Use of non-state proxies could, in short, allow for a charge of supporting terrorism to be levied against a state. And beyond the technicalities of international law, where there are presently few precedents to refer to, high level attribution of the kind that could convince the international community of a country's complicity in cyber attacks risks escalation to kinetic forms of conflict. Particularly in situations where there are deaths from the employment of cyber attacks—for instance, caused by the inability of emergency services to respond following a power outage—clear aggression could lead to conflict spirals wherein armed forces are mobilized beyond cyberspace.

Making sense of the global cyber ecosystem

Having catalogued various issues, actors, and incentives bound up in different cyber threats to national security, the next chapters take up the challenge of making sense of countries' approaches to cyber-security issues. Chapter 10 discusses issues of Internet governance and the diverse national experiences that have prompted differing opinion among major actors in world affairs on how to deal with cyber-security problems. Then, Chapter 11 looks at cyber conflict issues from the perspective of the international community and debates both the ethics of cyber warfare and the possibility that norms might be developed to constrain malicious actions via the web.

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10 National experiences with cyber-security

Realization and institutional development

Since the late 1980s, countries around the world have experienced the effects of the information revolution in radically different ways. National responses to cyber threats and to transformations of both economy and infrastructure brought about by the information revolution have been uniquely affected by different developmental episodes over time. In the United States, periods of relative calm punctuated by unique cyber threat crises have driven cyber policy development in an incremental fashion. Often, whole-of-government solutions to cyber-security issues became the focus of the federal government only after intra-government agencies and service branches had configured themselves to deal with cyber threats in line with parochial interests. Elsewhere, where the experience of policy development has been only minimally affected by national crises of different kinds, whole-of-government approaches have resulted in alternative conceptualizations of policy and doctrine.

As a whole, however, it is probably reasonable to say that most countries around the world are still caught up in the throes of responding to the various challenges that the digitization of national infrastructure poses and scrambling to develop appropriate institutional, legal, and regulatory responses for the broad range of issues brought about by the crosscutting intrusion of information technologies. As such, no chapter can outline the shape of national cyber developments in a way that allows for nuanced generalization or even commentary on the broad range of national circumstances that countries face with cyber-security. However, it is possible to outline the shape of what has appeared to be common trajectories of development with regards to cyber-security policy and, specifically, national responses to the potential for different forms of cyber conflict. This chapter does just that, first by outlining the broad shape of cyber policy efforts and then by describing the national experiences of countries often at the heart of discourse on international security and the digital domain.

The shape of cyber-security policymaking

What does it mean to develop policy and doctrine regarding security threats in cyberspace? This question has no easy answer. In many ways, an understanding of what national cyber-security policy and approach looks like has to come from a deconstruction of the nature of cyber policy and a subsequent attempt to reconcile said policy with traditional government approaches to security issues. This section briefly attempts to do just that in order to give context to subsequent sections' narrative outline of different country's experiences with cyber-security policymaking.

Before asking what cyber policy is, it is perhaps more prudent to try and imagine who and what cyber policy affects. Network technologies are crosscutting insofar as the information revolution has radically transformed most societal functions, and the Internet, broadly construed, functions as the interconnecting medium for logistical communications across any given nation's industrial sectors. Thus, policy, doctrine, and practice across relatively broad segments of government functions and civil society might be said to qualify as related to cyber-security efforts.

We might think of cyber policy as a potential impact across five categories.¹ First, and foremost, it goes almost without question that cyber policy constitutes any regulatory effort to shape the governing mechanisms of cyberspace. This might refer to either the technical processes or institutions with authority over those processes that determine the actual shape of the web. This category of things is what some have called the logical layer of cyberspace insofar as it includes the informational infrastructure for assigning domain names (the Domain Name System and the entities that are responsible for assigning IP addresses and registering URLs), the routing procedures for packets of information, and the systems that attempt to ensure the integrity of those packets. We might think of this category of cyber policy as *functional* policy.

Box 10.1 The point of policy

What is policy? Policies are an enumerated set of principles and directions that are put in place to guide decision making. Contrary to what some may believe, policymaking is not the sole domain of government. Though we focus largely on government policymaking in this chapter, the truth of the matter is that any organization can and does issue policy designed to guide the actions of those it is responsible for.

It is often best to think of policy as the generic term that we might use to categorize all constraining frameworks, from laws and constitutional documents to the guidelines of, say, a private company's human resources division. In this way, we naturally are led to recognize that policy environments are actually multi-layered and hierarchical (i.e. policies at one level must reference, even if tacitly, the framework of policy at higher levels). In all countries, there is a highest level of policy formulation, a source of policymaking that frames what policies might be constructed by entities that fall under that source's jurisdiction. In the United States, that fundamental source is the Constitution, a set of articles and amendments that define the role of the government in relation to the people and states of the nation. In other countries, other documents provide this overarching framework. In authoritarian states, such documents often take the form of religious scripture or the writings of key leadership.

Policy naturally leads to the practice of governance, regardless of whether the policy involved is all-encompassing or extremely limited in scope. Specifically, policy leads to the formation of enforcement entities or to changes in the way such entities behave. The Constitution of the United States outlines the responsibilities of government and the broad guidelines within which the rule of law

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must function. In order that the document has meaning, it established the various wings of the federal government, which in turn established sub-organizations to undertake tasks implied but not directly listed in high-level policy (again, meaning the Constitution).

Unlike many other security areas, cyber policy is arguably most often formulated by non-government actors. The exception, and the main focus of this chapter's description of various national experiences, is with policy focused on the cyber-security of states' national security apparatuses—i.e. of military systems and core national assets. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering up front that much of what constitutes cyber policy is the purview of private firms, non-profit governing forums, and, often, ad hoc groups of technology professionals. Governance (functional) policy is, outside of authoritarian states at least, largely the domain of companies that own the logical infrastructure of Internet data routing and groups like the Internet Architecture Board that have a say in standards development. Likewise, industrial policy—or what is often labeled “enterprise management”—is the domain of technology operators who must construct decision-making regimes and best practices from an assessment of legal requirements, ethical responsibilities, and business interests. This last point is worth bearing in mind below where we discuss U.S. efforts to protect critical infrastructure—most of which is not government owned—from major cyber threats.

Second, cyber policy is naturally constituted of those regulations and protections that affect how individual and incorporated users (i.e. both citizens and organizations, from interest groups to private companies) use the web. From protection of the identity of Internet users to laws designed to ensure full compliance with civil rights to privacy and speech, user-oriented cyber policy is a broad, catch-all phrase that denotes a complex ecosystem of approaches to civil society shared by law enforcement, national executives, the intelligence community, and more. In other words, cyber policy is any regulation or law that seeks to protect the rights of consumers and citizens. We might think of this category of cyber policy as *constitutional* or *user* policy.

Third, the development of doctrine regarding conflict in cyberspace and the policies that underwrite national efforts to cope with new threats in the digital age might be referred to as cyber policy. Cyber policy in this setting is nothing less than the diplomacy and strategic approach of states to international interactions. It includes the practices of intelligence communities in conducting espionage operations, military efforts to safeguard government networks, efforts to combat irregular cyber threats beyond the domestic context, and the relationship between governments and non-state proxies. Here, cyber policy is doctrine and practice formed in response to pressing digital threats to the function of a state's national security apparatus. From ensuring an ability to employ cyber weapons effectively in conflict to enabling the defense of government networks, cyber policy might quite clearly be considered synonymous with the traditional functions of military and civilian arms of government devoted to addressing warfare. We might think of this category of cyber policy, even though it also covers regulation affecting quasi-military elements of intelligence and police communities, as *military* policy.

Fourth, cyber policy might be said to be any governmental approach or explicit legal action that impacts upon the management (different from the function) of industry and society online. Here, cyber policy affects the information infrastructure of web usage beyond the logical layer. Instead of focusing on the infrastructural function of the web (e.g. domain name assignment processes, packet security assurance, etc.), policy here is concerned with the actual security of network systems and platforms. In other words, cyber policy is the regulation and practice of enterprise procedures regarding information security. Cyber policy in this vein is about risk management, procedure, and complicity with rules of production among industrial users of the web. We might think of this category of cyber policy as *law enforcement* policy.

And finally, since information technology is critical to the functioning of all sectors of national critical infrastructure (CI), cyber policy might be any regulation that pertains to the function of different infrastructural sectors, from agriculture to energy, as well as the function of the national economy as a whole. This involves policies that, for instance, pertain to the requirements for industrial control systems or the procedures for encrypting access to medical data just as it does to efforts to safeguard intellectual property across national industrial sectors. Specifically, cyber policy is the business of regulating telecommunications infrastructure. This is quite simply because telecommunications infrastructure is first and foremost the information technology basis for broad-scoped inter-connectedness that underwrites the functions of all other CI sectors. We might think of this category of cyber policy as *industrial* policy.

Naturally, these different areas of focus and effect are in no way indicative of a common role for cyber policy in governing the world around us. Indeed, policy implications and recommendations that emerge from scholarship on issues within any of these categories will inevitably differ in shape, and the categories described above simply proxy for more common policy issue area labels, from enterprise management to technology configuration. Scholars of IR interested in cyber conflict issues might be most interested, for instance, in patterns of usage of cyber “weapons” employed during interstate crises, or in the shape of espionage operations conducted via the web by foreign powers. By contrast, legal scholars interested in the national security implications of web technology developments might focus their efforts on the right of private firms to deny law enforcement oversight of user encryption (arguably desirable for counterterrorism operations) in new products. Naturally, both research programs speak to governance institutions and mechanisms that play radically different goals in bolstering national security efforts (military doctrine vs. constitutional law).

Thus, though cyber policy is in the broadest sense intended to provide the means by which we might effectively govern the cyber domain, it cannot do so in a concise manner. Effective cyber policy ideally means a set of approaches that make for efficient governance of the logical functionality of cyberspace, facilitates user security online, anticipates cyber conflict issues, steers the management of IT activities towards productive ends, and drives infrastructural development. And, to be fair, cyber policy in any of these domains is intended to aid in effective regulation of the others. Cyber governance policy supports robust user protectionism, which engenders greater or lesser propensity of conflict in the international system. Propensity for conflict then determines the degree to which management processes—and, by extension, infrastructural functions—are prone to disruption. But cyber policy is inherently a complex and highly diffuse concept insofar as it must inevitably be constituted of a large ecosystem of regulations and practices that reflect the crosscutting nature of information technologies.

This book is focused on the contours of cyber conflict. This chapter is an effort to outline the experiences different states have had in developing cyber policy regimes. As such, both here and in other chapters, we focus closely on issues linked with the third domain of policy impact outlined earlier—that of *military policy*. However, it should be clear from the start that policy relevant to national security can manifest in any of the areas outlined earlier. Indeed, this basic fact highlights an integral truth of cyber policy development, namely that efforts to “secure cyberspace” by national security establishments have enduringly involved policy creep into non-traditional areas of government regulation. This has, at times, stymied the abilities of states to effectively adapt to the implications of the information revolution. It has, in other instances, served as the catalyst for broad-scoped changes to the infrastructure of government regulation. And it enduringly serves as a barrier to effective international cooperation on cyber-security issues, as the complexity of regulatory efforts across countries has failed to interface well with the nuanced design of the contemporary international community.

Realization, fragmentation, and militarization

The long and short of the previous section’s outline of the shape of “cyber policy” is that the efforts of national security establishments to confront a broad range of cyber threats are invariably prone to fragmentation and policy creep. From product design to enterprise management, cyber-security issues that relate to national security imperatives manifest across a large number of governance areas *not* traditionally linked to such processes. Thus, as a whole, cyber-security policy on conflict and state security cannot help but be characterized by growing pains associated with governments’ relatively sudden need to regulate the web.

But what dictates the experience a given country will have in developing the institutions, policies, and relationships to address cyber-security problems? Naturally, the answer is different across cases. Generically, however, Jason Healey—the Director for Cyber Infrastructure Protection at the White House under George W. Bush—and his colleagues suggest an interesting framework for understanding national experiences with cyber-security challenges.² In an ideal world, strategic planners and policymakers might undertake broad exploratory work to outline the shape of potential challenges that might face a country, both contemporarily and out into the future. From that assessment, national institutions and policymakers can set about adapting existing procedures such that effective, streamlined responses to different potential crises are possible.

In reality, however, the impact of the information revolution on different countries has rarely been limited or felt equally across the various domains outlined in the previous section. Healey outlines one potential trajectory for national cyber policy development in discussing the case of the United States.³ Experiences with cyber terrorism, espionage, or consumer insecurity, for instance, might dictate the development of responsive policy and practices only among a country’s law enforcement or domestic intelligence institutions. Over time, many “realization” episodes spread out among different arms of the state and of civil society produce a fragmented policy ecosystem wherein interactions between institutions of governance across different domains emerge from procedures designed reactively (i.e. without the benefit of ideal-world strategic planning). Of course, cohesive national cyber policy can be constructed from this fragmentation. But such a fragmented antecedent to efforts to coordinate in a

holistic fashion can introduce risks to the subsequent cyber-security regime. Foremost among these, a fragmented national cyber policy environment virtually ensures that some stakeholders are more interested and better equipped than others to shoulder authoritative roles in a whole-of-government/society regime. As the Department of Defense has played such a role in the United States, Healey labels this final phase that of “militarization,” where the defense establishment arguably dominates the emerging policy regime.⁴

Again, this general trajectory emerges from Healey’s discussion of the United States’ developmental experiences and is not a representation of what all countries experience.⁵ But this story *does* tell us much about what factors dictate the experience a given country will have in developing the institutions, policies, and relationships to address cyber-security problems. Specifically, a country’s eventual policy approach to cyber-security challenges seems to come from the interaction of two variables—(1) the diversity and magnitude of different incipient cyber threat crises and (2) the shape of existing mechanisms of security governance. How a country’s institutions respond to challenges and codify the ability to act in the future largely obviously comes from the shape of the problem. But it also comes from established procedures and the bureaucratic perspective of the stakeholders affected. In an attempt to justify their relevance and maximize access to resources, government sub-agencies may seek to develop new capabilities in-house instead of collaborating with existing capacity elsewhere. Likewise, the context of a given crisis at a time when national leaders are developing holistic approaches might skew developments such that one set of stakeholders is seen as more relevant than others. A country facing legal battles over industry unwillingness to unlock a terrorist’s smartphone (for fear of giving the government unconstitutional power for search and seizure) might be far more likely to let a justice ministry lead development of initial language for national cyber-security standards than might one reeling from state-based attacks against military networks. In either case, responses to realization episodes undoubtedly have implications for the shape of subsequent public-private relationships, international diplomacy, and more.

Naturally, there is no deterministic framework being described here. And yet, more so than has been the case with any other developing arena of national security issues—such as nuclear weapons development, for instance—it seems clear that the shape of different crises drives how countries develop national portfolios for cyber-security policy beyond what we might expect to emerge from a given state’s pre-existing policy development bureaucracy. The next sections pick up this flexible narrative broadly in describing the shape of national experiences in the United States and several international counterparts that are of particular relevance to the United States—partners like the UK and the intergovernmental **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO), and adversaries like Russia, Iran, and China.

U.S. cyber experience

The history of the U.S. effort to confront cyber threats to national security is, as noted earlier, one of fragmentation and stuttering coordination between stakeholders both inside and outside government. Today, the approach of the national security establishment towards cyber-security is largely captured by efforts in two veins. Emerging cyber strategy articulated by the Department of Defense (DoD) eschews the longstanding position held by stakeholders in the U.S. government that cyberspace is a domain

to be “dominated.”⁶ Rather, the most recent DoD strategy statements emphasize a limited portfolio of objectives for the military and corresponding support agencies, including the defense of DoD networks, the need to counter “meaningful” cyber threats to the country, and the need to support conventional military operations.⁷ In doing so, the military claims only a limited role in overseeing and protected non-traditional elements of the national security apparatus, such as CI. Cyber-security policy and governance efforts that *do* address non-military functions are bound up in several executive orders and the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) cyber-security framework.⁸ These outline intended government responses to large-scale cyber incidents, suggest standards for public-private interactions, and address affected entities (like individual citizens). Of particular note, actual lawmaking on cyber issues remains minimal at the time of writing this book. To some degree, this is a function of the fact that U.S. approaches to cyber challenges are extensive but, at least insofar as early experiences produced a fragmented coordinative environment, not yet truly comprehensive.

Early experiences. Described in more detail in Chapter 7, incidents like the Cuckoo’s Egg, Morris Worm, and Solar Sunrise forced the United States over the course of a decade to develop institutions and procedures for dealing with cyber threats that crosscut traditional areas of jurisdiction. In the Cuckoo’s Egg in 1986, where German hackers intruded on computer systems at a range of government institutions looking for information about Star Wars (the Strategic Defense Initiative), law enforcement and intelligence agencies were consistently at odds about resource allocation and jurisdiction in the investigation of possible break-ins. Cliff Stoll, whose name is now famous in the cyber-security field, was forced to conduct his own investigation of the break-ins with the aid of only a few sympathetic Air Force personnel.⁹ Only after enough evidence was uncovered were government agencies moved to action. In particular, intelligence agencies were uninterested in the case, encouraging Stoll and his partners to think of the attacks as larceny despite the fact that highly sensitive national security information was in danger of compromise. Only after investigators liaised with partners in Europe to track the hackers’ connection did involvement go beyond federal law enforcement to involve the military and intelligence community. Even then, as Stoll’s own account notes, disagreements between the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) about resource allocation prevented a military presence at the hackers’ trial, an outcome that possibly resulted in a significantly reduced (and less symbolic) verdict.¹⁰

With the Morris Worm’s takedown of almost a tenth of the computers connected to the Internet in 1988 (then the ARPANET), the U.S. government faced a far more insidious problem than had been the case with Cuckoo’s Egg. The worm demonstrated how quickly cyber attacks could take out large sections of national information technology functionality.¹¹ In this case, however, rapid response and success in quickly mitigating the threat came down to two factors not related to the abilities of government institutions. Large-scale assaults on cyber infrastructure are inherently difficult to maintain over long periods of time and, though the worm propagated quickly, the specific nature of the problem was not difficult to diagnose over a matter of a few days. At the same time, private sector responders were uniquely able to identify threats like the Morris Worm such that, even without pre-established coordination procedures, they were able to trace the infection and mitigate its effects. In part seeing this reaction, the government took a number of initial steps to bolster effectiveness for future

crisis scenarios. Carnegie Mellon University was funded by DoD to become the first Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) in an effort to improve information-sharing capabilities, and several departments opened centers to diagnose security problems.¹² These responses were intended to make sure future crises would not rely on *ad hoc* solutions, and Congress began to pass law designed to extend legal authority into the cyber domain (including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, the Computer Security Act of 1987, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986).¹³ However, government responses and the development of security institutions were not inherently multi-stakeholder from the start. Hacking collectives and conferences that emerged in the early 1990s often eschewed government interest in developing national resiliency and focused on industry practices. Likewise, the greatest resources were allocated to elements of the government—like Air Force Electronic Warfare Center and the joint-agency Information Operations Technology Center—focused on cyberspace as it intersects with traditional security concerns. The U.S. government, in short, entered the final decade of the twentieth century concerned with the notion but not necessarily the full scope of cyber threats to national security.

Initial responses. This dynamic would not last forever. With Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) in 1998, the Clinton administration acted to implement a range of suggestions by intra-government stakeholders based on arguments about the degree to which national security increasingly depended upon information infrastructure.¹⁴ Foremost among these suggestions was an upgraded institutional infrastructure for coordinating the means of defense of industry systems across the financial, medical, energy, and other sectors. Specifically, PDD-63 aimed to actualize a sophisticated hub that could coordinate analysis, investigation, and responses to threats across the gamut by 2003. Centerpieces of this effort were the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) and the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) at the FBI. Both through these centers and in other ways, government departments could offer expertise and information to the private sector such that the country could efficiently mitigate risks associated with different cyber threats without intrusive regulation.

Though efforts resulting from PDD-63 faltered somewhat, U.S. efforts continued to evolve off the back of increasing awareness that government networks—and those of the military, in particular—were uniquely vulnerable to cyber disruption. In 1997, the NSA collaborated with the DoD to run a red teaming exercise called Eligible Receiver (ER97)—i.e. an exercise designed to simulate the conditions of an actual attack for learning purposes—that was focused on DoD network security.¹⁵ Different teams from the NSA stationed in the United States and abroad systematically deconstructed Pentagon security measures and accessed classified systems. The exercise gave DoD first-hand experience in the kind of attack they might expect to face from a “well-armed” foreign force and prompted new planning for cyber incident resilience. Unfortunately, few such measures were in place before the U.S. government faced an actual incident of large-scale foreign-based cyber attack. Solar Sunrise in 1998, described in greater detail in Chapter 7, seemed to be the work of a foreign power that broadly broke into government systems over a matter of days. Popular strategic thought was that Iraqi infowarriors operating under orders from Saddam Hussein were responsible for conducting attacks in response to U.S. bombing. That turned out not to be the case, but the sudden crisis—in which Pentagon departments found themselves operating without a clear chain of command—demonstrated that the lessons of ER97 needed to move policy and organizational developments with

some urgency. This led to the creation of the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND) at the end of 1998 as a means of ensuring centralized authority for coordinating network defense across DoD.

Box 10.2 U.S. CERT

The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) is an organization that operates under DHS that is mandated to protect the Internet infrastructure of the country from disruption and exploitation. The job of U.S. CERT is fairly varied. Much of what U.S. CERT does, which looks much like other CERTs do across different regions and sectors of international society, is preventive work that includes providing advice to private (and government) entities, maintaining a cyber attack alert system, constructing resources for such entities, and more. On the back end, U.S. CERT provides much of the forensic support for analyzing malware instances and deconstructing cyber incidents. The organization also represents the United States in interactions with other CERTs from other countries.

And yet, the United States' rapid institutional pivot to cyber threats in the late 1990s would remain remarkably focused on warfighting and the direct threat to government information systems posed by foreign adversaries. To be sure, U.S. experiences through the 1990s led to the creation of the first joint cyber command in the world. But the purview of JTF-CND (later JTF-CNO, with the "Defense" changed to "Operations," housed at the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)), was extremely broad and there was a clear emphasis on purely defensive measures to be taken by the Pentagon. As such, interest in the possibilities for cyber offense was not realized in institutional actions, perhaps except at the CIA, until the early 2000s. Instead, JTF-CND and the NIPC at the FBI (which was later disbanded) coordinated in the late 1990s to primarily address two potential crises on the horizon—one that could emerge from a large-scale assault on U.S. information infrastructure and another that might see cyber espionage bear strategically meaningful fruits for a foreign adversary.

Inter-agency efforts to prepare for threats in either category were quickly tested with Moonlight Maze (discussed in Chapter 7). The episode, which lasted around two years, was an unprecedented intrusion into U.S. government networks and computers. Much like the case of Cuckoo's Egg, foreign-based hackers maliciously broke into hundreds of computers across government and government-funded organizations looking for strategically valuable information. Attacks, which were difficult to group together as part of a single concerted campaign targeted against the U.S. government, were persistent, organized in their selection strategy for intrusions, and technically sophisticated. An outcome of the episode, and of subsequent experiences with computer worms and the actions of patriot hackers that targeted U.S. government systems from China around the time of the Kosovo conflict, was a shift in the way that unclassified information could be stored and accessed within government networks. Whereas classified information was somewhat easy to track given

the required procedures for access, unclassified data could exist on any computer or server without security cataloguing. Thus, in the late 1990s, the government mandated that transfer of unclassified information had to be routed through one of eight core gateways that could be easily monitored by incident first responders and investigators. Unfortunately, progress through the early 2000s was limited to a growing cohesion among defense establishment practitioners and procedures. Private sector outreach and relationships continued to include the gradual standup of ISACs, but few other developments are notable in the United States with regards to public-private cyber-security initiatives until much later.

One-sided development. The post-9/11 period in the United States has particularly been characterized by the degree to which military organizations began to dominate the landscape of cyber threat response processes in the government. The newly formed **Department of Homeland Security** (DHS) was guided by two major policy developments in 2003 (the Homeland Security Policy Directive 7 and the White House's National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace)¹⁶ to coordinate cyber policy holistically for the civilian elements of the U.S. government. It largely did not succeed. Certainly, DHS took a number of important steps to shore up critical infrastructure coordination capabilities and launched Einstein, the intrusion detection network that acts to protect federal systems from attack. But much of the government's mission to construct the apparatus of effective cyber operability for conflict scenarios was siloed away from DHS's own under-supported effort to coordinate with foreign partners and reconcile whole-of-government policy intentions with the complexity of the cyber threat horizon. In essence, DHS—a government department mashed together after 9/11 via the act of seconding any existing unit with any responsibility for counterterrorism to one, new banner—simply didn't have the resources or procedural abilities needed to address the full spectrum of threat and governance challenges. Likewise, by making the spectrum of responsibility for DHS so massive, the department became *not* the obvious choice of vehicle for responding to the most critical challenges. That role remained the province of U.S. military and intelligence personnel, most specifically the NSA.

Over the few years following 9/11, the military and the intelligence communities began to flesh out their portfolio of capabilities with regards to cyber defense and offense. The NSA had, for many years, invested in new cyber capacity to the point that the organization was the sole vendor of effective Internet-age information gathering (i.e. the agency's traditional signals intelligence role) and exploitative offensive capabilities for U.S. government security services. But events in the years immediately following 9/11, such as Buckshot Yankee, added to the pressures of supporting two wars in Southwest Asia and prompted several rethinks of the DoD's approach to operations in what was increasingly thought of as a new warfighting domain. Initially, in order to effectively develop and direct cyber efforts, the DoD decided to split missions among existing institutions and to house defensive and offensive units in different locations. JTF-CND, which became JTF-CNO and later the Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), was originally the hub of all cyber operations' planning and execution at the Pentagon. However, it simply was not well suited to cover the range of actions required of its resources. Therefore, responsibility for maintaining and conducting offensive cyber operations in line with strategic and conflict objectives (particularly related to the Iraq War) fell in 2004 to the Joint Functional Component Command—Network Warfare (JFCC-NW), which was under

the control of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) but directly run in large part by the NSA. This left the newly renamed JTF-GNO free to focus on network maintenance and defense operations.

U.S. experiences in siloing different parts of the national cyber-security mission, first under military/intelligence auspices and then further within different command units for offense and defense, was eventually adapted to compensate for a lack of oversight on the need to defend a broad range of non-military and non-government systems in the name of national security. However, action was not taken in this vein to reverse the one-sided development of cyber institutions until almost 2008, quite possibly because of the general distraction to other security arenas caused by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of interest, though inspired by a range of emergent cyber incidents around the world, when the Bush administration returned in 2007 and 2008 to the shape of the government's cyber-security institutions, it still largely did so via reference to the events of Moonlight Maze and scares endured with Chinese hacks between 1999 and 2004. Noting the potential for broad-scoped intrusions undertaken with strategic persistence by a dedicated state opponent, military/intelligence establishment planners and Bush officials sought to address *both* threats to government networks (civilian *and* military) and the private sector in a centralized fashion.

Much as was the case in years past, however, the Bush administration ultimately found that it was easier to address information security problems linked with government function. Thus, the result of renewed debate in 2005–08 was the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). CNCI focused *only* on government network operations and protection and saw several tens of billions of dollars funneled to the DoD. In actual fact, whereas the effort to make headway on cyber-security issues was driven by enduring concerns about sophisticated foreign threats to the country, the specific decision to launch CNCI instead of a more holistic strategic act that considered the private sector resulted from four incidents that drove fear into the minds of strategic planners. Operation Orchard in 2007, where Israeli hackers successfully took down part of Syria's air defense network in order to facilitate a kinetic strike against an under-construction nuclear reactor,¹⁷ worried military officers who were suddenly given an example of how similar cyber attacks could be employed as force multipliers in conflict. The other, actually a series of incidents (Titan Rain né Byzantine Hades, Ghostnet, and Night Dragon), took the form of intrusions by Chinese cyber spies against a large number of DoD, Department of Energy, Department of State, Air Force, and defense contractor targets.¹⁸ Though the scale of attacks and their coordination was less pronounced than Moonlight Maze had been, the threat of Chinese espionage signaled to operators at the Pentagon that further steps to coordinate the defense of government networks were absolutely critical. Similar conclusions were reached in observing the 2007 cyber campaign against Estonian websites by Russian hackers. Moreover, Russian actions in Estonia and later in Georgia emphasized the need for better U.S. leadership in international interactions, particularly in coordinating CERT interactions and countering non-state cyber threats. And Buckshot Yankee, where a malicious piece of software spread across a large number of military systems after being delivered via USB stick, demonstrated to military planners that operational separation of capabilities only made sense if better coordination between units during crises was achievable. Thus, CNCI was pushed out to direct massive financial resources to the defense and intelligence community, and the Pentagon took further steps to centralize command and control by establishing U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).

Box 10.3 Cyber command and the cyber mission force

Cyber Command is one of the United States' unified combatant commands and has full purview over cyber operations aimed at aiding conventional military operations, protecting DoD networks, and acting to disrupt foreign-based efforts to harm U.S. national security. As of 2018, Cyber Command's primary operational force structure (the Cyber Mission Force) includes 133 teams of personnel tasked with specific mission pertaining to USCYBERCOM's guiding priorities. Each of these teams of cyber operators has between a dozen and about 80 personnel. While the Cyber Mission Force achieved operational capacity in 2018, many teams are, at the time of writing, still being grown with the goal of a total personnel count of around 6,000.

The structure of the Cyber Mission Force is an adaptation of previous inter-service cooperation and coordination under Joint Task Force Computer Network Defense (and, later, JTF-CNO and JTF-GNO). Each of the service branches is responsible for a certain number of Cyber Command's operator teams. The Army, for instance, is responsible for 41 teams, the function of which is determined at the unified command level. Each service-specific element of the Cyber Mission force contains teams that are functionally the same. These include teams focusing on the defense of DoD networks (Cyber Protection Teams), undertaking offensive operations or supporting conventional military operations (Cyber Combat Mission and Support Teams), and defending the homeland against major threats (National Mission Teams alongside National Support Teams).

USCYBERCOM has, since its founding in 2009, functioned as the directional heart of the U.S. government's efforts to address threats to government networks, mitigate "meaningful" threats to national security online, and support conventional military operations in the cyber domain. Cyber Command is a combatant command. Prior to 2017, it was a joint operational unit that operated under the purview of United States Strategic Command. The founding of Cyber Command has been paralleled by other centralizing efforts beyond the DoD, such as the founding of discrete units for cyber criminal investigation under the Department of Justice and the creation of several coordinating offices—the DoD's Coordinator for Cyber Issues and a new Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, for instance—that both report on distributed efforts to departmental heads and liaise with the National Security Council at the White House. These developments have been at the heart of attempts to ensure interoperability of different military functions and government network defense efforts, and Obama administration actions in 2016 further put USCYBERCOM on a path to separate itself from other areas of NSA operation towards becoming a truly separate combatant command.

Enduring challenges. The result of U.S. experiences with cyber conflict since the late 1980s has been the development of a reasonably centralized system of institutions to underwrite government strategy on cyber-security issues. But major developments, from Cyber Command to the creation of new departmental offices, only speak to one of the two primary government imperatives to secure the nation online. While DoD

and close collaborators in the Department of Justice are arguably more effective than ever at meeting the requirements of executive strategy on cyber conflict functionality, the ability of government to provide for the defense of non-governmental elements of the country's national security apparatus is questionable. Certainly, programs like the Defense Industrial Base Cyber Pilot program have allowed for greater coordination between DoD and elements of the critical community of defense contractors and critical infrastructure operators. But mechanisms for effective involvement of the government in the defense of the private sector and of civilian organizations remain largely non-existent. Indeed, the formation of Cyber Command itself has driven concerns beyond the government that the DoD and the NSA might essentially discount civilian efforts to organize for cyber defense. This has, according to some commentators, had the clear effective of reducing interest in public-private initiatives for protecting civilian networks.

Box 10.4 The defense of federal networks

Just as the Pentagon and the intelligence community historically ran into problems of authority and direction—i.e. figuring out who was in charge of what—when it came to the defense of DoD and linked networks, the IT efforts of the government's civilian agencies were, prior to about 2003, fragmented and lacking in cohesive policy or access to resources. In the late 1990s, Solar Sunrise, Moonlight Maze, and other events sparked a rapid move towards institutionalization of cyber capacity in a joint task force in the DoD. About three years later, the events of September 11, 2001 prompted a series of similar reviews, critiques, and remedies aimed at simplifying the cyber-security enterprise across other government departments.

The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, under the leadership of Melissa Hathaway, proposed a series of measures to be taken to better affect the protection of federal networks. Two developments emerging from CNCI are particularly noteworthy. First, alongside a series of executive directives to standardize authentication systems and IT practices, the federal government developed and implemented an **intrusion detection system** called Einstein.¹⁹ The idea behind Einstein, as is the case with all intrusion detection systems, is that software placed strategically at exchange points (i.e. the point of information transfer between federal networks and the outside Internet) can scan incoming data packets to look for abnormal, potentially malicious activity and then notify IT administrators where needed.

Second, the work done for CNCI motivated further optimization of federal network features with the Trusted Internet Connections Initiative (TICI) in 2007. The idea behind TICI was simple. Federal cyberspace was incredibly cluttered, and the task of protection mechanisms like Einstein was made more difficult by the existence of network bloat. As such, under TICI, the number of exchange points between federal networks and the outside Internet was massively reduced from ~4,300 to under 50.

At time of writing, all non-DoD United States' government agencies employ, by mandate, Einstein 2.0 in their network defense efforts. Einstein 2.0 is an updated version of the earlier software, which was not mandated for use across all departments, that performs a more sophisticated analysis of incoming data packets. Whereas the 1.0 version simply analyzed header data (as a pen register/trap and trace device might), 2.0 performs a limited scan of packet content to see if there is a match for known malware signatures. Because real-time analysis is not possible, data is copied temporarily for near-real-time assessment before either being deleted or (if malicious content is found) reviewed by an IT operator. A future version, Einstein 3.0, is being developed to perform yet more sophisticated analysis of groups of data packet content as they come in.

Naturally, one might think that there are some potential legal issues with the federal government's employment of a system like Einstein. Specifically, the Department of Justice recognizes (and dismisses) two potential concerns. First, an argument could be made that Einstein violates the 4th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which guarantees protections from unreasonable search and seizure of property, communications, etc. The Department of Justice admits that Einstein probably violates the rights of federal employees because all communication is being monitored as it transits federal networks. Second, an argument could be made that Einstein is statutorily unlawful. Specifically, temporarily copying data packets constitutes surveillance of U.S. persons in a limited fashion, as outlawed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as well as a warrant-less review of private communications as outlawed by the WireTap Act.

The legality of systems like Einstein rests on a few fronts. In general, much of what the Department of Justice relies on in justifying such a monitoring system is the tendency of U.S. courts to emphasize technical realities when assessing the applicability of law to new technology. In addition to the fact that federal employees agree to having their Internet communications monitored when they sign that banner agreement to the terms of federal service upon accepting employment, the Department of Justice asserts that the technology doesn't really allow for a better kind of defensive monitoring and so should be permitted as an alternative to absolutely no security. More importantly, getting warrants to search all traffic on an ongoing basis is entirely infeasible and, since FISA defines surveillance as being a targeted action and Einstein reviews all traffic entering federal networks, FISA doesn't apply.

The cornerstone of existing efforts to address the challenge of civilian network defense pertaining to national security is a focus on the protection of critical infrastructure. The Obama administration—and presumably administrations to follow—in 2009 made the uncontroversial statement that CI was a “strategic national asset” that required deft government collaboration with private industry to ensure systems security, particularly when it comes to the national telecommunications infrastructure that underwrites IT functionality across every other sector. Specifically, the cornerstone of such efforts

emerged from an Obama administration executive order in 2013 that established the NIST Framework for ensuring best practices by CI providers.²⁰ The NIST Framework essentially has three component parts. First, the Framework outlines different kinds of cyber-security activities that relate to the function of private sector entities. The goal in doing so is largely (1) the setting of a standard “common language” surrounding practices and procedures in public-private dialogue and (2) the identification of a series of specific best practices for the kinds of private firms the Framework is aimed at. Second, the Framework includes a methodology for figuring out how compliant a specific actor is with the best practices outlined in the first part. Finally, the Framework provides a flexible roadmap for “underperforming” actors to reach higher levels of security capabilities as described in earlier sections of the Framework.

The NIST Framework *does* fill a gap in the U.S. government’s focus on security of civilian elements (i.e. non-traditional elements) of the infrastructure of national security. And, in truth, the condition of the Framework as one that outlines profiles for private sector actors that can be improved upon over time is broadly attractive. Though it faces the criticism of establishing U.S. jurisdiction via government decisions and legal procedures, there is even reasonable support for the Framework as a possible template for standardizing international cyber-security efforts. However, the Framework has clear drawbacks. A number of private sector leaders point out the document is technically daunting, and any firms that commit to functioning in line with the guidelines are likely to focus on actuarial threats at the expense of attempting to understand unique threat profiles of potential attackers. Moreover, there is a complete lack of incentives offered by the Framework for private actors to adopt its provisions. While it may serve as a good set of guidelines, the notion that it cannot possibly be adaptive enough to consider the morphing of cyber threats leaves private sector actors without any motivation to commit to the approach. When combined with the traditional disincentives industry actors have when it comes to information sharing (leaking of intellectual property or potential loss of reputation from admission of disruption, for instance), this dynamic places government efforts in a position of restrained progress—civilian engagement is better than ever but remarkably still constrained in the potential for meaningful threat mitigation *in the long term*.

Moreover, Russian cyber espionage and influence operations during the period leading up to elections in the United States in 2016 continue to expand the notional footprint of critical national security assets that require the protection of the government.²¹ Beyond the industrial and infrastructural targets that are the primary concern of the U.S. government under current procedures, data stolen from civil society organizations—in this case the Democratic National Committee—was used in efforts to meddle with the political processes of the nation. Regardless of the degree to which such operations were successful (something as yet unknown), the contours of such an event suggest that societal functionality beyond CI require government oversight as part of a mission to ensure the integrity of national political processes. Particularly given the focus of the NIST Framework on actuarial categories for determining risk, it seems reasonable to say that the United States remains relatively underdeveloped in terms of its ability to safeguard civilian networks. Certainly, U.S. governmental efforts have improved the prospects for CI protection in recent years, and there is a clear, enhanced ability to achieve traditional military objectives in cyberspace in the function of USCYBERCOM and related actors. But a large number of questions remain, from how to safeguard important civil society

networks and information to how to treat attribution in the context of international diplomacy, which demonstrate that existing approaches to cyber-security are still a number of steps from addressing evolving threats to national security online.

Europe, NATO, and cyber-security

All national experiences with cyber conflict or upheaval are, regardless of similarities between incidents, inherently different from all others. This is quite simply because governments and, more broadly, national society copes with crises in different ways. States possess governments that take on a range of electoral formats and host unique arrays of institutions for ensuring national security. Perhaps more significantly, different countries approach questions of national security theorization, policy, and practice in remarkably different ways.

Authoritarian states represent a stark departure from the United States in terms of how cyber-security imperatives have been viewed and how cyber capabilities have been developed. Such states—in this case Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—are discussed in the sections below. By contrast with such a stark departure, however, have been the cyber conflict experiences of U.S. partners in the West. Such states have not necessarily viewed cyber-security at times acutely through the lens of global security commitments—the war against terrorism, actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, or the standoff with North Korea, for instance—in the way that U.S. military and government stakeholders have. Likewise, many U.S. partners have approached cyber-security issues with international cooperation more organically intended than has been the case with the U.S. DoD. Particularly in Europe, common defense is the cornerstone of national security policymaking. And U.S. partners have rarely—at least in the early days in the 1980s and 1990s—been faced with large-scale threats to the national security establishment. Instead, from France to the UK and Japan, threats have usually been highly specific in their potential impact.

This section describes the experiences of two Western security actors—the UK and the NATO. The point in doing so is to highlight the less tumultuous development of U.S. partners and Western democracies in general. The UK's experiences with cyberspace roughly parallel those of other major U.S. allies, like Japan, Germany, South Korea, and France. At the same time, the UK's efforts reflect the transnational focus that is arguably more common among non-U.S. Western states. Discussion of NATO, thus, is intended to illustrate how national efforts have culminated in unique and evolving mechanisms for cyberspace governance and conflict prevention by the international community.

The UK's experiences in cyberspace

The UK has a strong institutional heritage when it comes to technology and cryptanalysis. Whereas many other countries have incorporated cyber-security procedures and abilities into national intelligence and counterintelligence missions, the UK has, since the mid-1900s, been able to rapidly and almost seamlessly meld intelligence service capabilities with advanced information systems operations by borrowing from legacy institutional mechanisms and practices. This ability stems from the strong traditions of ensuring inter-service operability going back to the efforts of researchers at Bletchley Park during World War II, who worked to crack the encryption of Nazi Germany's

Enigma devices and give the Allies a critical edge in the war effort.²² Moreover, this legacy has not only led to the maintenance of mechanisms for the rapid blending of capabilities between different arms of the security services; additionally, there has arguably been a more organic institutional and cultural awareness beyond even cyber-security practitioners of the need to update regulations and operating dynamics over time within the UK.

The UK has faced less in the way of highly visible or disruptive realization episodes that have shaped national policy and institutional development than has the United States. Specifically, the 1980s and 1990s saw remarkably few direct threats to the informational function of national security institutions and no threats to infrastructure. The first major engagement of the UK government with cyber conflict topics took place in 1998 in a Defense Review.²³ The first national Cyber Strategy was not published until 2009. Moreover, a more complete threat analysis of cyber threats was not incorporated into the National Security Strategy document until the following year, the first inclusion of the topic that led directly to initial funding for cyber-security programming within the government. In short, the UK's experiences with cyber threats have been limited to such a degree that the government—as a whole, rather than the enduring efforts of intelligence outfits like the **Government Communications Headquarters** (GCHQ)—has only turned to consider cyber-security a national security imperative since the late 2000s.

Again, this does not mean that the government of the UK has not acknowledged the importance of the digital domain until recently. Rather, it has focused on cyber-security much more in terms of low-level political and economic challenges than as a major conflict modifier. In many ways, the revolution in information technologies that initially drove economic growth through the 1980s actually links directly to the UK's heritage of technology-focused intelligence and production work during World War II. Not only did code breakers in the UK successfully break Germany's Enigma encryption to give the Allies an unprecedented advantage in the later years of the war, but elements of the scientific and military research communities funded or directed by the government during the war produced, among other things, new radar technology that revolutionized aerial combat. Following the war, personnel leaving government development programs continued to innovate and provide the country with unique advances in information technology. One officer's (Arthur Clarke) discovery of geosynchronous orbits enabled the development of satellites for commercial and military purposes, and others helped develop guided munitions technologies. The information-driven military ecosystem that emerged from such advances would help the UK quickly end the Falklands War and provided unprecedented command and control abilities to allied forces fighting in the First Gulf War in 1991. Following the Gulf War, information-driven military operations became so operationally synonymous with military functionality that the UK's abilities in this vein were officially labeled the "Network Enabled Capability." Though the end of the Cold War initially prompted military planners to think that the need for advanced warfighting capabilities was diminished, new challenges led to programming and procurement efforts to continue to upgrade the country's electronic and information warfare arsenal.

Most of these upgrades remained in the research and analysis phase throughout the 1990s. Arguably as a result of both the lessons of Eligible Receiver and U.S. crises experiences with Moonlight Maze and Solar Sunrise, policy documentation was not produced to address the need for information technology modernization of

the UK's military until the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 1998. The SDR sought to centralize network defense and warfighting capabilities. In actions that mirrored those being taken across the Atlantic, institutional authority for cyber operations was centralized in the Permanent Joint Headquarters that controlled a joint budget for a number of sub-agencies. The Defence Communications Services Agency (DCSA) was set up in a fashion similar to DISA in the United States to coordinate operator activities spread across different services.²⁴ Likewise, the UK set up the Defence Computer Incident Response Team (DCIRT) to undertake a cyber defense mission. Specifically, DCIRT helped coordinate changes to the architecture of government information systems through the early 2000s to make accountability and threat assessment a simpler prospect. The task was not easy. In reality, a series of initiatives through the 2000s demonstrated that use of information systems and hardware across the government was incredibly fragmented. Particularly as the consumer market for ICT grew more sophisticated, different institutions pushed back against efforts to streamline architecture in a holistic sense for the government. This eventually prompted the government to appoint Chief Information Officers across agencies in an attempt to improve interoperability within the UK and in collaborations with the other four of the five "eyes"—intelligence counterparts in the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.²⁵

The UK's cyber-security efforts in the era following this initial set of institutional developments have been shaped by cyber conflict incidents. However, again, they have largely been either low-intensity or those directly affecting other countries. Events like Russian attacks on Estonia and Georgia, Moonlight Maze and Buckshot Yankee in the United States, and the relative success of the Stuxnet worm have all provided narrative lessons to policy elites in the UK, namely that threats to national infrastructure and secrets are increasingly sophisticated. Direct institutional adaptation, however, has largely emerged from low-level challenges important enough to demand executive-level responses. Prior to the turn of the new millennium, for instance, concerns among military and industry practitioners that anomalies with computer clocks in control systems could lead to catastrophic failures at midnight on December 31, 1999—nicknamed the "Y2k bug"—forced the government to improve the ability of CIOs to (1) recommend collaboration between areas of industry functioning on wildly different architectural foundations, (2) better identify what infrastructure might be considered critical to national function, and (3) suggest best practices moving forward.²⁶ The infection of a large number of Ministry of Defence (MOD) computers in 2003 with the Lovgate virus—a basic virus that hid in email servers and impeded basic computer usage—was caught by the DCIRT, and was publicized and used as the basis for driving conversation in Parliament about needed upgrades to national technology standards frameworks.²⁷ The MOD's experience with a self-imposed denial of service attack—inaccurately dubbed the "Amarillo virus" that was actually a viral video email circulated throughout the MOD—led to new programs for training of users and coordination between network managers across service branches.²⁸ These lessons were reinforced again in 2009 when the MOD was hit with the "Conficker" virus, a minimally disruptive virus that compromised unclassified computers across the Royal Air Force and that might have been prevented with better software updating protocols.

Arguably, the UK is where the United States was circa the early 2000s. That is to say that the UK has a strong heritage and robust institutional foundation for developing cyber-security standards and best practices. At present, national cyber capabilities focus largely on information technology support for traditional operations under

DCSA, protection of government networks, and national assessment of threats by the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC). CSOC is the result of enduring calls to better define infrastructure critical to national security and to better provide for government protection of those resources. However, in reality, the building of comprehensive public-private initiatives in the UK is, as of the time of writing this chapter, still a work in progress.²⁹ The Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA) was set up between 2011 and 2013 with a budget in excess of half a billion pounds to drive national cyber strategy on several fronts.³⁰ This includes focus on cyber crime, and the UK has certainly had some success with the incorporation of organizations like the Police Electronic Crime Unit (PECU). Moreover, the UK has increasingly focused on international coordination. The UK was a signatory to the Council of Europe's Convention of Cybercrime that outlines cross-border standards for cooperation and legal expectations on a spectrum of ICT-aided criminal activities. And the UK's experience as the target of Russian influence operations during the 2015–16 Brexit referendum campaign has led to increased inter-service cooperation with both NATO and EU partners. But, at present, it might be fair to say that the UK's capacity to deal with incipient cyber threats out into the future is dependent on a growing range of variables, and that the UK has yet to achieve a measure of cohesion in its approach to mitigating risks associated with the digital domain.

NATO and cyberspace

NATO is a mutual defense organization with roots in the needs of Western democracies to counter the threat of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. NATO is constituted of 28 member states and has formal relations with more than 30 others through dialogue and extended partnership programs. The Alliance stipulates a number of requirements for its signatories that underwrite the collective defense mission of the community. Most significantly, the NATO charter stipulates that all member states spend at least 2% of their GDP on national defense and that—as outlined in Article 5—aggressive action against one member necessitates a response (though not necessarily a military one) by all others. This second feature of the Alliance is particularly important, as it provides the mechanical trappings of collective defense beyond mere rhetoric that might otherwise characterize strong relationships between international partners in saying that an attack on one will, generally speaking, be interpreted as an attack on all. This element of the NATO charter has only been invoked a single time, following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States by members of al Qaeda, in the history of the Alliance.

NATO's policy and practitioner purview is broad. The Alliance supports national defense efforts, expeditionary capabilities when required, and acts to streamline the ability of companies to provide for the common defense. This includes acting as an advisor and active voice for the purpose of improving regulatory conditions for defense industry actors and critical infrastructure stakeholders across the community. Thus, while the Alliance's focus on cyber-security issues is certainly on military capabilities and mitigating threats to member governments, so too is it on a crosscutting set of missions ranging from the inter-operability of military services to protection of national economic assets.

Much like individual countries have implemented policy and adapted institutions in the context of unique wake-up calls, so too has NATO seen the use of

ICT in different conflicts and taken distinct lessons to heart. Several such conflicts and resultant inter-member responses, in particular, are worthy of note. Foremost among these are the conflicts in Chechnya in 1994–95, which did not involve NATO directly, and operations in Kosovo by NATO members operating under the auspices of the Alliance. In the Chechen war, Chechen rebels fought a bloody independence war against Russian forces. The conflict lasted much longer than Russian military planners originally thought it might, and ICT usage was a primary contributing factor to the end of the war. Specifically, Chechen forces uploaded gruesome pictures of the conflict to the Internet. In addition to creating international sympathy for their cause, the web campaign shifted Russian public opinion away from support for the conflict. From this, NATO, alongside member states and the Russian government, became aware of the potential for new information dynamics to alter the course of a conflict entirely through manipulation of social thought.

NATO's experiences during the Kosovo conflict, where the Alliance undertook airstrikes against Serbian targets in order to protect Kosovar civilians during the country's fight for independence, emphasized the need for improvements in interoperability in the use of ICT between member forces. In a famous incident, NATO aircraft accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Serbia as a result of information poorly compiled and presented to pilots via PowerPoint presentation. More significantly, retaliatory cyber attacks by both Chinese and Serbian hackers over the course of the conflict struck at NATO servers and prevented the effective use of information services to coordinate actions between member forces engaged in airstrikes. In short, NATO's first experience in a conflict that involved the use of ICT for combat augmentation resulted in a somewhat humiliating lesson in the limits of Alliance abilities to organize and act effectively in the digital domain.

For the Alliance, perhaps the two most significant watershed moments that led to distinct institutional reorganizations around cyber-security challenges are also arguably the two most significant assaults on member states by outside forces—the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the 2007 Russia-Estonia conflict. The aftermath of 9/11 saw the mobilization of Alliance resources in support of a coalition action in Afghanistan against the Taliban. Given the nature of the strike against the United States, NATO response naturally included consideration of how terrorists and state sponsors of terror might use the web to cause widespread disruption targeting Alliance members. It was in this period that the phrase “cyber Pearl Harbor” began to circulate within Western defense communities to signify a possible large-scale attack on CI and security forces of a given member country. In response to such concerns, NATO initiated the Cyber Defence Program and the Computer Incident Response Capability in order to coordinate specific defense missions across member organizations. Soon thereafter, the Communication and Information System Services Agency was founded in Belgium as a headquarters unit with a mission of coordinating the actions of all national-level headquarters for cyber operations.

Whereas 9/11 led to the rapid development of institutions for conducting cyber defense missions at the level of the Alliance, the narrative of the Estonian conflict in 2007 is one of failure to respond. As the result of a feud between pro-Russian protesters and the Estonian government over the movement of a Soviet-era statue from Tallinn, Russian-based hackers launched a massive set of denial of service attacks against ISPs and government systems in Estonia. In effect, Russian hackers managed to substantially block Internet access to citizens and private companies in Estonia—which is,

in many ways, one of the most web-connected countries in Europe—for between three and four days. In reality, the attacks continued in various forms for around a month, and NATO, despite arguably being required to aid in response efforts surrounding such an attack, failed to provide intelligence or resources meaningful to the termination of the attacks.

The result of the Estonian conflict was a summit in Bucharest in April 2008. Despite the inability of NATO or the broader international community to sufficiently aid Estonian defense efforts in 2007, the effect of Russian-based attacks was monumental. The Bucharest Summit essentially resulted in the incorporation of two organizations designed to prevent another Estonia from taking place, at least from the perspective of NATO's relative impotence during the crisis. The first of these was the Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA). The CDMA was set up and located in Brussels to be a coordinative center of all cyber defense efforts for the Alliance. The second organization to emerge from the summit was the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) located in Tallinn, Estonia. In reality, the purpose of these organizations was much more than simply the coordination of incident response efforts. Together, the CDMA and the CCDCOE are tasked with implementing Alliance cyber defense policy and standards, sponsoring research, and undertaking training across military and civilian government services. The purpose of these organizations is, thus, to establish a measure of resilience in the ability of the Alliance and of individual members to prevent and respond to the kind of challenge observed in 2007. Major project sponsors by the two have included the annual International Conference on Cyber Conflict and an inter-member joint exercise for cyber defense operators, the International Locked Shields Exercises. Additionally, these organizations have produced the landmark *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare* (and an updated version in 2017) that brings together more than 30 cyber conflict experts in outlining common principles and legal opinion of the relationship between potential cyber conflict activities and existing international law.³¹

Though the Alliance has not faced another large-scale cyber assault on information infrastructure since 2007, NATO has continued to proactively improve its cyber defense and operations coordination capabilities. In particular, the cyber conflict between Russia and non-member Georgia in 2008 saw the provision of NATO advisors and technical assistance to the former Soviet republic. Though NATO could not directly aid Georgia, assistance has since led to several institutional reorganizations and a closer relationship between the Georgian and broader NATO defense community. And NATO members have variously taken it upon themselves to act off the back of NATO initiatives and dialogues for the further improvement of transnational cyber conflict coordination in recent years. Following the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO leaders agreed to the development of Rapid Action Teams to aid incident response teams located in individual member states. Following the Chicago Summit in 2012, five NATO members further established the Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development Project to the same end.³² And, significantly, the Alliance agreed to adopt the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy after the Newport Summit in 2014 that seeks to improve commitment to cyber defense initiatives by members and to coordinate security efforts with EU bodies where possible.³³

In many ways, the question that must be asked with regards to the Alliance is one of relevance. How important are efforts undertaken by a supra-national organization

like NATO when it comes to something like cyber-security, particularly given the unique contours of threat and opportunity faced by different national governance systems? NATO seeks to broadly involve itself in four areas—(1) the defense of NATO networks, (2) the coordination of data collection and consultation procedures, (3) the construction of useful coordination forums for member practitioners on various levels, and (4) the conceptualization of useful procedures for integrating Alliance approaches with member processes. The development of the organizations noted here and the development of projects under their auspices have entirely been in aid of these objectives.

From one perspective, NATO has been immensely useful for its member community when it comes to the development of cyber-security best practices and resources. Many member states would not have access to incident response capabilities as sophisticated as they do today without the efforts of the CDMA and the sponsorship of the CCDCOE. Moreover, NATO has effectively moved the ticker forward with regards to the conceptualization of rules of conflict and conflict remediation in cyberspace. The *Tallinn Manual*, in particular, is the gold standard for efforts to link aggression in the digital domain to the traditional legal tenets of international relations.³⁴ NATO, in short, has thus far done a magnificent job acting as a convener and intellectual organizer that underwrites the ability of Alliance members to innovate and to more effectively place cyber-security at the forefront of national security efforts.

And yet, NATO faces challenges that bring into question the ability of the Alliance to be effective out into the future. Naturally, as is true of all intergovernmental organizations, NATO requires member states to green-light standard-setting efforts across the gamut of possible activities. Though military cooperation and crises response are desirable areas of coordination for members, increased focus on protecting CI of member states is likely to run up against the problem of secular interests among non-state stakeholders across the Alliance. In particular, the recent manifestation of influence operation threats that target civil society organizations and political processes is likely to pose a significant problem for the Alliance insofar as involvement in coordinating the defense of non-government systems might run up against political opposition by anti-integrationist factions in different countries. And given that NATO's efforts to affect cyber-security cooperation such that all members benefit, it is enduringly likely that some states might prefer to buckpass and refuse resource commitments on the grounds that common defense steps taken will aid all members regardless of cost allocation. In short, NATO is enduringly limited in its ability to achieve progress on cyber-security because members and stakeholders within member states are variously incentivized to protect parochial interests or resist new costs across the gamut of possible future threats the Alliance might seek to address.

Polarizing perspectives: Russia and China's cyber experiences

Policy on cyber-security issues takes a similar form in countries around the world. Likewise, it seems fair to say, as noted earlier, that mechanisms for addressing different cyber challenges emerge from the unique responses of pre-existing institutions to country-specific realization episodes. This is no less true for countries like Russia and China—other states that lead the world in investment and development in cyber capabilities across the gamut of sociopolitical functions—than it is for the United States and her partners. However, while the experiences of the United States have, at

least until recently, encouraged the national security establishment to think of information security in terms of militarized threats to networks, systems, and critical pieces of content, both China and Russia have for some years now viewed the implications of the information revolution for national security processes in a remarkably different way. Specifically, both countries' notion of information security has more clearly embraced the ideas outlined in Chapter 10, namely that the information revolution has been *both* about the digitization of infrastructure and fundamental changes in the dynamics of the global informational environment. Thus, information security policy that aims to address issues of both national security and political stability must address ideas as much as it must consider technical security. This section outlines this perspective in greater detail following historical descriptions of both China and Russia's experiences in the cyber realm.³⁵

China's experiences in cyberspace

The People's Republic of China's investment in the ability to regulate domestic web usage and to employ the various tools of statecraft via cyberspace is arguably only second to that of the United States. Though use of the web and the development of government cyber institutions in China spiked as if from nowhere in the late 1990s, the country today boasts the most Internet users in the world. Moreover, the Chinese government's abilities to cultivate China-based elements of cyberspace and to conduct broad-scoped cyber operations in aid of national security objectives are considered by most Western analysts to be extremely advanced. The Great Firewall and related mechanisms of national digital censorship, in particular, are considered to be without parallel in terms of state capacity for shaping national social and political engagement.

But where has present policy and state cyber capacity come from? Just as with other countries, China's focus on the opportunities and risks of greater exposure to the digital world emerged from the distinct shape of perceived threats to the state. And, much as was the case for the UK and other European countries, focus on the web was limited even through the mid-1990s. Indeed, with China, public access to the Internet did not occur until 1995 and was in fact blocked by Western organizations as late as 1992.³⁶ Prior to 1995, information technology adoption was limited in China, despite government commitment (in 1987) to the goal of transforming the country's manufacturing economy into an information economy. The first email from China was not sent until 1987. The first domestic personal computer was only shipped in 1990. And the mobile phone market only really came into being in 1994 with the establishment of Unicom. Even post-1995, China experienced what we might think of as normal rates of ICT adoption. Through around 2000, Internet usage was limited to no more than a few million citizens. Chinese telecoms were allowed to partially privatize in 1997, and the government made initial investments in state-owned exploratory organizations, like the Great Wall Technology Group.

Not counting the actions of patriotic hackers attempting to disrupt and protest the actions of anti-Chinese mobs in Indonesia in 1994, arguably the main event that changed the trajectory of development in digital affairs in China was—somewhat like U.S. experiences with the Morris Worm or ILOVEYOU—a threat (in this case, a domestic one) from a non-state actor that manifested online. During the 1990s, a spiritualistic organization practicing a particular form of *qigong*—a breathing and exercise activity popular across China—rose to prominence in the country.

Named Falun Gong after the group's approach to meditation and exercise (Falun Dafa is often used synonymously in reports that name the group), membership in China blossomed from a few practitioners in 1992 to tens of millions in 1996–97. Naturally, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was wary of such an organization with large-scale social appeal and influence. However, for many years the CCP had simply sought to establish oversight of the group, and Falun Gong even benefited from direct state sponsorship (along with a number of other traditional *qigong* organizations). This all changed in 1998 following Falun Gong's rejection of new CCP regulations that would have established formal ties (and, thus, a degree of internal power to oversee) with the Party. Government response was swift. Prominent members were arrested on a range of charges, and Li Hongzhi, the group's founder, was quietly exiled abroad. In response, more than 10,000 Falun Gong protesters marched in Beijing. Protesters were peaceful and even helpful to police forces trying to minimize disruption. Protest organizers met China's Premier and disbanded after a seemingly successful attempt at retrenchment with the government. However, in the days and months that followed, direct orders from the Chairman of the Politburo translated into an official banning and the persecution of Falun Gong across China. That persecution continues to this day, and reference to Falun Gong remains the most closely censored terminology in China.³⁷

What is remarkable about Falun Gong and China's experience with cyberspace is that the group's march on Beijing, organized almost entirely online, was a complete surprise for a government quite capable of monitoring its own population. Use of email, web forums, and chat rooms allowed group organizers to mobilize thousands in a matter of days and force the government into a confrontation much covered by world media. Indeed, many scholars argue that it was the surprise nature of the confrontation that forced Chinese leadership to choose hardline repression over reconciliation. Following the main event and subsequent persecution orders, Falun Gong continued to use ICT to dramatic effect, managing to use the web to organize a clandestine press conference for foreign journalists that broadcast their plight to the world. And Falun Gong websites, prior to many takedowns in 1999 and 2000, were numerous and had proven to be a major driving factor in organizing recruitment efforts even after Beijing's initial move to persecute. In short, China learned that the web was a serious source of potential threats to state security.³⁸ Different from the United States and other Western countries, of course, such threats were really about the political stability of the communist regime, and Falun Gong's banning was an organized effort to eradicate a potential ideational threat to China's limited culture of civic engagement.

The lessons of Falun Gong were twofold. First and most importantly, the episode demonstrated to the Chinese government that influence and capability in the digital world was a necessity from the point of view of the survival of the CCP. Second, the particular manifestation of the threat in the form of a social irritant implanted in the heads of strategic planners the notion that information security threats were ideational and content-based as much as they were logistical or technically disruptive. While the first lesson drove what we might think of as the digitization of infrastructure and institutions that has produced the modern Chinese cyber apparatus, the second has critically influenced the shape of doctrine and policy in a way that simply has not been the case in the West—perhaps until recently where the effect of Russian influence in operations has garnered broad public attention in Europe and North America.

China's steps to ramp up cyber-security capabilities have come in a number of forms, and Chinese strategy has a number of component parts. Cyber warfare

capabilities are distributed across a range of different military and paramilitary organizations.³⁹ Much like in the United States, these can generally be broken up into categories based on different objective portfolios—military units to defend military networks and undertake offensive operations, civilian government units under the Ministry of State Security (MSS) for the same, and non-governmental proxies that are retained for operations that are specialized or fall outside of those bounds. Given this, it seems fair to say that the country's capabilities are reasonably centralized around the strategic perspectives and machinations of two entities—the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the MSS.⁴⁰ Indeed, the centralization of cyber capabilities in these two actors has in recent years been, to some degree, a source of friction between the civilian government and the military that acts as a complicating factor when it comes to analyzing Chinese cyber activities. In short, this operational tension between civilian and military organizations stems from the fact that civilians have only limited opportunity to amend actions taken by military strategists that might disagree (sometimes by taking actions) with approaches to foreign policy issues. This dynamic emerges from the nature of interconnectivity between the military and China's civilian government wherein formal contact is limited to high-level executive contact between the Politburo and an exceedingly small number of military officers jointly operating as service chiefs.⁴¹ Because this is the case, only limited oversight of all military-side cyber functions by the civilian government exists. Particularly given the nature of cyber operations wherein authority to act often comes from managerial operators by necessity (i.e. not from executives), this can be troubling for those trying to analyze intention and authorization surrounding Chinese cyber belligerence.⁴²

Box 10.5 Net neutrality

Should a network operator have the right to determine what content is and is not allowed to flow across its networks? With some obvious criminal exceptions, the answer generally given in the Western world is no. Given the broad interpretation of the web as a public resource, the fact that it is based on privately owned infrastructure matters little in the face of government-backed interest in protecting consumer rights and in sheltering freedom of speech. This principle is called *net neutrality*. At the time of writing, regardless of some recent volatility in debate within the United States, most Western countries actively protect consumers from biased network practices on the part of network operators or are, at the very least, actively pursuing legislation. Naturally, the principle is not operational in authoritarian states like China, where there is strong government control of the information ecosystem. Here, we have one main reason for continued international disagreement on the ideal shape of global Internet governance procedures as working better when determined from *multilateral* forums as opposed to *multi-stakeholder* ones.

That cyber capabilities are concentrated in the security services of the government is unsurprising, as the need to rapidly develop information security protocols and abilities in China evolved in an environment where the balance of potential to act

was even more lopsided than it has been in the West. In essence, the PLA and the modernization programs undertaken since the 1990s constituted the only opportunity for government development of appropriate cyber defense and conflict instruments. Moreover, government motivation to invest in the digital domain occurred against a backdrop of extremely limited private enterprise operations in the mid- to late-1990s. The prevalence of state-owned and -directed enterprises in the 1990s provided the public-private bridge for network security coordination that is so difficult to build in capitalist states, and this continues even today where China's significantly more private economy is subject to extreme oversight.

Whereas the MSS largely focuses on civilian government networks, the other two elements of China's cyber force—i.e. the military and irregular “patriot hackers” or contracted mercenaries—are responsible for undertaking offensive operations both domestically and externally. Within the military, most relevant cyber actors fall under the PLA General Staff Department's Third Department, an organization that broadly parallels the functions of the NSA in the United States. Beyond the Third Department's traditional intelligence missions and functions, computer network defense, exploitation, and offense capabilities are employed by subdivisions of the Beijing North Computer Center (PLA Unit 61539). Other important units include the Second Bureau of the Third Army, which functions as a center for operations coordination, and the PLA General Staff Department's Fourth Department in conjunction with broader electronic warfare efforts. More specifically, in terms of actions undertaken, units spread across the PLA and what we might think of as the government's direct sphere of directive influence beyond state organizations, engage in (1) information domination activities, (2) espionage, and (3) disruption and degradation operations.

Information domination activities are those cyber actions taken to disrupt or direct the narrative environment surrounding China's security interests. These actions are rarely sophisticated and often emerge from the PRC's irregular cyber forces—non-state patriotic hackers or, reportedly, mercenaries acting as proxies for state interests. Examples of such activities include vandalism of websites and denial of service attacks undertaken in conjunction with a particular security issue. For instance, Chinese hackers vandalized a range of websites in the United States and Europe following the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia during the Kosovo conflict.⁴³ Likewise, PRC-based hackers launched a range of DDoS attacks against Taiwanese government and civilian services during cross-Straits standoffs in the 1990s.⁴⁴ China's abilities and approach in this sphere emerge organically from domestic experiences, where low-intensity cyber attacks and operations have historically played a role in disrupting the coalescing of anti-state narratives around, among other episodes, Uighur separatism, Tibetan rebellion, and alleged social dissidence by members of Falun Gong.

Espionage activities include efforts to exploit and access networks for the purposes of observing foreign operators and stealing information. Such activities are covered more fully in other chapters of this book, but suffice it to say that Chinese espionage efforts are without peer in terms of the scope of infiltration of Western networks. Since at least 2004, China has been the hub of more espionage behavior (insofar as large numbers of operators appear to be based in China) than any other country in the world.⁴⁵ Moreover, from Titan Rain to Ghostnet, China has reportedly been behind some of the most sophisticated, concentrated efforts to gather foreign intelligence on industry operations, military procedures, research and design, and more. Such information is then used for a range of purposes, from informing Chinese security efforts

and policy to offering state-owned enterprises in China illegitimate competitive benefits via the provision of stolen information.

Finally, disruption and degradation operations differ from information domination operations in a state seeking to impose real logistical costs on the ability of opponents to act in security affairs. Specifically, such operations can cover the spectrum of techniques from low-intensity vandalism and denial actions to sophisticated malware seeding and network attack. The aims of such operations vary but can include denying foreign adversaries the ability to control information systems and direct their own operations. In rare instances, aims might include physical damage, such as occurred in the much-described case of Stuxnet in 2010–11.

Broadly, the China's cyber strategy revolves around uniquely Chinese understandings of the relationship between information systems and national welfare on three fronts. First, in terms of the potential for using cyber weaponry in conflict for a range of purposes, the Chinese approach to strategy and development of resources has emerged from (1) the country's unique doctrinal history with asymmetric warfare following the communist revolution in 1949 and (2) PLA observations of how information technologies have enhanced the U.S. competitive military edge in conflicts since the Vietnam War. The result, even beyond consideration of the digital domain, has been the consistent development of doctrine that emphasizes joint operation and coordination between service branches. Particularly when it comes to scenarios related to engaging either the United States or regional neighbors (most often in relation to the Taiwan Strait or disputes in China's near seas to the south and east), PLA doctrine has pivoted on the development of operating principles that situationally meld the best options available on land, at sea, and in the air. This has extended to the cyber domain in that the Chinese leadership has consistently codified approaches to cyber operations in strategic documents as being entirely about supporting strategic objectives. Cyber operations are arguably not intrinsically valuable in terms of geopolitical gain, and China appears to have embraced this notion. Instead, the development and employment of cyber resources is exclusively employed to better national position. This might explain why China has largely refrained from interfering in the politics of foreign nations, as Russia has done since the late 2000s, but is the most prolific state sponsor of espionage and low-level disruption attacks during diplomatic crises in the Asia-Pacific.

Box 10.6 China's "informationization" of conflict in the digital age

There is, at least until the mid-2010s, a significant difference in the way that non-Western countries view information technologies' impact on warfighting. Whereas the U.S. defense community and those of her close partners often view cyber conflict as a series of interactions that occur on a new plane of operation and can affect the function of security assets on other planes (i.e. the fifth domain), China, Russia, and others have consistently articulated an approach to doctrinal and asset development that views the advent of new information technologies as something that fundamentally changes the character—if not the actual underlying nature—of war.

China, in particular, has since 2004 emphasized the need to “informationize” military forces and to approach questions of strategy, doctrine, and tactics from more holistic perspectives.⁴⁶ This means, in essence, that China’s military leaders and planners view evolving information technologies as systems and platforms that don’t just enable new modes of action and reaction, but rather as forces that can change the nature of the warfighting environment. ICTs do not just augment and enhance traditional military power in their implementation; they force service personnel to alter their approaches to problem solving, national populations to react to aggression differently, and more.

In reality, China’s “informationized” warfare concept is simply a poor translation for something more akin to “industrialization” than anything else. The PLA simply recognizes explicitly that information technologies in the Internet age constitute a system shock to the global system that has both obvious impacts and recursive, amplifiable consequences for national societies. As such, military doctrine increasingly recognizes not only the need to counter conventional forces or the imperative to protect their cyber operations but also the value of disrupting information systems and deceiving foreign militaries for strategic gain.

Second, China sees the web and network technologies as a multiplier for the country’s modernization efforts. Economic growth, resilience to global financial shocks, and potential for innovation are all intrinsically tied to the effective integration and utilization of the web by citizens, industry, and government. Thus, all manifestations of cyber strategy in China reflect an effort to accelerate retention of advantages from network integration. In non-security terms, this means effective enterprise management support and oversight, effective regulation of users, protection of end users, and more. From a security perspective, this means the protection of intellectual property and the compromise of foreign advantages in both economics *and* security matters. In essence, cyber abilities present as a useful tool for leveling the playing field through the theft of IP from foreign companies and the mitigation of growth costs for Chinese companies. Though such actions do not easily allow Chinese industry to absorb information and bypass the process of innovation, cyber espionage *does* help to offset development costs, unfairly inform Chinese actors about their operating environment, and discourage foreign competition where espionage means increased costs to investment.

Finally, and related to the focus of Chinese strategy on improving national welfare, China’s approach to cyber-security cooperation in an international sense reflects the belief that governments should remain the gatekeepers of operation in cyberspace. In contrast to the “multi-stakeholder” approach advocated by Western countries, where non-state actors are considered equal partners for purposes of cyberspace governance, China is one of the leading voices in the international community advocating for a multilateral approach to governing the web. For China, the conclusion that states should be the final arbiters of policy and practice emerges again from the unique manner in which the communist government articulates governance goals and has experienced conflict online. Since social dissidence is seen as a direct threat to state security and political stability in a way it is simply not in democratic states, cyber-security policy emerging from core national security imperatives inevitably touches on the issue of

sovereignty in a different format than it might in the West. Assurance of sovereignty in the United States and European countries, for instance, tends to manifest in government approach as the desire to protect domestic consumers, companies, and assets in accordance with established legal precedent. For China, sovereignty more specifically means a flexible right to regulate and oversee societal functions. Doing so means denying the equal say of non-governmental stakeholders. Thus, China has enduringly supported international compacts and norms that de-emphasize the right of non-state actors to govern elements of the web free of direct government oversight.

Russia's experiences in cyberspace

Russia's development of cyber capabilities and the incorporation of cyber warfare into Russian foreign policy might seem, to the casual observer, to parallel China's experiences. And yet, in many ways, to think of Russia and China's presence in the digital domain as similar is to think of their approaches in terms of their similarities as authoritarian states facing a range of potential security competitors in their near abroad. Both countries have invested heavily in the digital methods of sociopolitical control. Likewise, both countries view cyber capabilities as a means to obtaining geopolitical objectives and have adopted cyber techniques as low-intensity tools of preference in manipulating foreign affairs. But there are distinct differences in the sources of cyber strategy and practice between the two countries.

Specifically, to understand the way that Russia has approached the digital domain is to understand the country's unique relationship with organized crime and the geopolitical nature of the country's resurgence following the end of the Cold War. These dissimilarities to China's experiences explain various differences in approach in cyber operations between the two countries, including emphasis on economic vs. political information in information theft operations between China and Russia—respectively—and the relative lack of interest in Beijing in the influence operations that have so clearly characterized Russia's cyber conflict approaches in recent years. Indeed, when it comes down to it, the two countries' only real agreement on approach emerges from the mutual desire to mitigate sources of social and political upheaval in censorship efforts.

Rather than attempt to understand Russian institutional and doctrinal commitment to cyber-security efforts through the lens of distinct realization episodes, many of which are unclear or under-researched in Western analysis, it is instead best to think of Russia's approach as stemming from three dynamics—(1) pre-existing doctrine and strategic approaches to foreign security interactions, (2) experiences with social unrest, and (3) the country's extensive criminal ecosystem. On the first count, Russia's approach to statecraft and politicking in Eurasia has—much as is the case with China—enduringly emphasized the important role of asymmetric operations in helping to cultivate favorable conditions for Russian government, culture, and economics. Going back as far as the 1880s, the Russian empire and its communist and semi-democratic descendants have seen the cultivation of instability and sociopolitical subversion among neighbors as the key to unimpeded development of Russian interests. Thus, cyber techniques have been embraced by Russian security forces and by the Russian military as a toolkit for causing instability.

Perhaps more significantly, the importance of such operations has been reified by the geostrategic perspective—an enduring driver of security doctrine—of the Putin

administration, which sees the instability of the current international community as a necessary condition for the resurgence of Russia as a major stakeholder in world affairs and for offsetting the natural vulnerabilities of the resource industry-dependent national economy. Specifically, Russian state strategy emerges not only from traditions driven by geographic location but also from the unique conditions the country faces post-Cold War. Again, the country has a contracting population, a lagging economy, economic vulnerability based on dependence on commodity prices, a contracted sphere of political influence since the fall of the Soviet Union, and, until recently at least, a military in dire need of modernization. Given these circumstances, the clear path to the high reputation, expansive influence, and cultural supremacy that Putin's government desires lies with the destabilization of contemporary geopolitical alignments. The retrenchment of countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) within the Russian sphere of influence requires the disorganization of foreign resistance to Moscow's overtures. And the reassertion of Russian influence in global terms requires the undermining of international institutions and norms. In all of these endeavors, cyber techniques are seen as powerful tools for augmenting Russia's traditional tools of statecraft.

At the same time, it is perhaps unsurprising—particularly given the authoritarian turn politics in the Russian Federation has taken since the late 1990s—that the government's presence online has been influenced by experiences with social unrest. In particular, the Pussy Riot collective—a large, decentralized network of anti-Putin, pro-democracy, and anarchist groups—has been a constant thorn in the side of the Russian government since 2012, when the band Pussy Riot was put on trial for a range of crimes related to violation of public decency laws. Groups and individuals linked with the movement have used social media to organize mass protests and have been known to undertake low-intensity cyber attacks to vandalize the websites of political elites. Moreover, the movement has more recently been connected with the efforts of legitimate oppositions to the Putin government. The result of such experiences with opposition to the rule of the Putin administration and the current structure of Russian political processes has been the application of cyber force by the Russian government in a range of mitigation operations. Specifically, Russian security forces and non-state proxies have attacked opposition websites on hundreds of occasions, have planted incriminating information on the computers of opposition leadership, and have actively censored social media communications between Russian citizens seeking to organize protest.

Finally, Russia's cyber conflict approach has significantly been influenced by the existence of a robust criminal ecosystem and set of traditions within the country. In particular, the government's development of cyber institutions and the specific modulation of capabilities between different units are linked to the enduring relationship between national oligarchs—most of whom benefit directly from government patronage or specific positions within government—and organized criminal enterprise.

Though Russian strategic imperatives are relatively simple to understand, the factors that go into the planning of specific cyber operations are complex. In general, much as has been the case for China, a primary motivation of Russia finds itself requiring consistent and extensive access to foreign information. Intelligence on foreign companies, governments, and civil society organizations are useful for a range of purposes, but specifically for (1) subversion of foreign political processes and (2) as fuel for necessary economic diversification in Russia. Likewise, much as is the

case with China, Russian cyber capabilities are concentrated in three arms of government influence—a civil-military arm called the Federal Protective Service (FPO) dedicated mainly to government network protection, military-intelligence services, and a large sphere of non-state proxies. Military and intelligence cyber responsibilities are split between those of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Military Intelligence apparatus (GRU). These organizations collectively undertake a range of espionage, disruption, and information operations directed through cyberspace.

The third arm of Russian cyber capabilities is a broad sphere of non-state actors whose services are employed in times of particular crisis. In many ways, Russian use of non-state proxies is unique insofar as the ecosystem of both criminals and patriotic hackers that respond to state direction is mostly independent. It is also highly organized around criminal syndicates that control botnets and underwrite the marketplace of malicious code globally. The logic behind massive reliance on non-state proxies for foreign cyber operations is twofold. First, as described in Chapter 10, non-state actors are cost-effective in that the state involved need not commit institutional resources to equipment or training. Moreover, they need not be maintained at all times and actually make money for themselves through criminal enterprise, mitigating the need for the government to funnel in resources to ensure quality of abilities. Second, and relatedly, non-state proxies are themselves highly qualified in the context of Russia's organized criminal ecosystem. Involvement in global malware markets and the cyber mercenary industry ensure consistent updating of skills and equipment. Thus, when needed, non-state proxies can be employed effectively and rapidly.

In efforts to destabilize foreign powers and to undermine the institutions of the prevailing world order (as led by Western democracies), Russia has broadly been tied to three formats of large-scale cyber attack aimed beyond its borders in recent years. First of all, Russia engaged in 2007 and 2008 in what we might call cyber blockade behavior in disputes with Estonia and Georgia. In both cases, Russia became tangled in disputes with former Soviet countries over issues pertaining to the wishes of ethnic Russians in either country—regarding the removal of a Soviet-era statue in Estonia and over the wishes of two provinces to secede in Georgia. In both instances, Russian hackers, many of whom were clearly non-state patriotic hackers and criminals, undertook days-long assaults against both countries' information infrastructures. For the most part, these attacks took the form of widespread denial of service attacks against government services and vandalism of government websites. But the massive and persistent nature of the attacks partially succeeded in both cases in hampering the ability of citizens and governments to access the Internet. This had the effect of hampering the function of national economies and caused significant problems for state efforts to deal with non-cyber elements of each crisis.

Russia has also been behind more highly targeted cyber attacks aimed at disrupting specific services or infrastructure in FSU states. Specifically, Russia is known among military and intelligence analysts for the development of complex malware that, often when enabled by low-level techniques like spearphishing emailing or direction from Twitter accounts, allow for espionage against hardened targets and direct disruption of infrastructure. An example of one such employment is Black Energy, where a piece of malicious code—a trojan—was employed in 2015 and 2016 against Ukrainian electricity infrastructure. This action, though notable as the first cyber attack to actually take out part of a national energy grid, is one of dozens of cyber attacks undertaken by Russian security services and affiliated hackers in support of

Russian-aligned forces fighting in the ongoing Ukrainian civil conflict. These attacks are less concerted in terms of strategic objectives than were Russian actions in 2007 and 2008. Nevertheless, they are a common feature of Russian relations with those FSU and nearby countries not aligned with Moscow's interests.

Finally, Russia has broadly engaged in information warfare operations augmented by various kinds of cyber attacks in recent years. While these operations have certainly taken place in FSU countries, primary targets of interest for Western analysts have included the United States, France, and the UK in 2015–16, 2015–2017, and 2016, respectively. Strategically, the purpose of attacks in these countries has been to destabilize the tenets of political operation among democratic leaders of the international community. Tactically, such operations target the operation of legitimate political actors and manipulate events so as to produce outcomes favorable for Russian foreign policy. Broadly, information operations undertaken by Russia in these cases have aimed (1) to establish sources of disinformation, (2) to use social media for targeted subversion, and (3) to create crises of credibility around traditional countervailing institutions of democratic operations (i.e. traditional media outlets, political parties, and expert voices). Primary methods for doing this have included cyber attacks to steal sensitive information, which is then leaked, monitoring of political stakeholders, and the creation of false information outlets. Though the effects of such meddling is unclear and under-researched still at the time of writing, such operations against election processes in the United States and France—and against the Brexit referendum process in the UK—Russia has shown itself adept at engendering broad-scoped instability through immensely simple uses of ICT. While most attacks in these efforts consist of simple phishing followed by the delivery of Remote Access Trojan (RATs) that allow hackers to evade detection and steal information from email accounts/databases, the results have variously been paradigm-shifting national debates about both political events and—even where subversion directly fails—the viability of institutions previously considered inviolable. In short, even where Russia has failed to tamper with elections, there is clear evidence of crises of constitutionality and fundamental political function emerging from information operations since 2014. Naturally, particularly wherein the reputation of Russia as villainous is already partially cemented in Western debate on foreign affairs (and therefore not at stake), these outcomes are as desirable to the Putin administration as the direct election of pro-Russian elements in the West might be.

On the periphery: the experiences of Iran and North Korea

Beyond states and regions we might think of as traditional hubs of power and influence in world affairs, governments across the full gamut of interests and alignments are moving into the cyber sphere and developing conflict capabilities. In particular, countries that we often consider to be rogue or at least ardently opposed to the present state of international order have increasingly utilized the digital domain to combat forces, from regional opponents to India, the United States, and China, they perceive as arrayed against them. Two of the more notable states in this category are Iran and North Korea. These states occupy what is arguably a unique position of opposition to mainstream world politics. This section describes both countries' experiences with developing cyber capabilities, though it does not describe in-depth the geopolitical positioning or historical motivations of these countries in regional affairs.

It should be noted up front that knowledge about the experiences of these countries and their approach to cyber-security operations and governance is incomplete. To a degree, this is unsurprising for two reasons. First, these countries, like China and Russia to lesser degrees, operate from belligerent foreign policy positions and are constituted of authoritarian institutions far less open than counterparts in Western democracies. Second, as is broadly the case in countries around the world, cyber-security responsibilities are difficult to gauge. In part, this is because information technology issues are crosscutting and states incorporate the development of cyber approaches into existing institutional infrastructure. This produces a fog of operational approach that is hard to pierce for analysts abroad, particularly where there are no constitutional stipulations regarding transparency.

Iran's experiences in cyberspace

Iran is a country of major concern to the United States, European partners, and regional opponents like Israel and Saudi Arabia. Though adoption of and investment in information technology for military purposes was limited through the 1980s, 1990s and even the 2000s, Iran seems notably capable of using cyber instruments to further its interests in the Middle East.

Three distinct episodes constitute the Iran's use of cyber weapons to aid geopolitical objectives. First among these is the takedown of a U.S. drone in 2011. In December of that year, an unmanned RQ-170 Sentinel aircraft was brought to the ground near Kashmar in northern Iran "with minimal damage" sustained. The government of Iran announced that the takedown was the work of its "cyber warfare unit" and that the drone had violated sovereign airspace. Regardless of the veracity of that claim (most likely true), the incident demonstrated that Iran had a clear interest in communicating cyber warfare capabilities. In truth, it is unclear as to what caused the drone to go down in Iran. The possibility that a cyber electronic warfare attack took the plane down is distinct, but there are a number of problems with the most common explanations in this vein. For one thing, the drone seems to have landed itself (and was subsequently damaged from having to land on irregular terrain), suggesting the GPS system on board could have been spoofed by cyber attack. And yet, the RQ-170 is not entirely reliant on GPS and would likely not have needed to make such a landing. Another possibility is that the drone's command and control systems simply malfunctioned. Regardless, the incident signaled Iran's clear interest in making their abilities in this vein known.

More specifically relevant to the development of state cyber capabilities, U.S. reports point to the Iranian government as having been behind a series of denial of service attacks between 2011 and 2013 against U.S. banks. The attacks consumed significant resources and inflicted unknown financial costs on the banks involved. Responsibility for the attacks was claimed by the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters, but U.S. government reports quickly pointed the finger at Iran claiming that the attacks were in retaliation for Stuxnet.⁴⁷ Regardless of motivation, the attacks demonstrated Iran's nascent abilities to organize a series of cyber attacks—though, admittedly, unsophisticated ones—against foreign targets.

Finally, and most notably, Iran allegedly launched a virus called Shamoon against the computers of Saudi Aramco, an oil conglomerate based in Saudi Arabia (Iran's most significant regional competitor).⁴⁸ The Shamoon virus was nowhere near as

sophisticated as Flame or the sections of that program that were tailored to produce Stuxnet. However, the virus struck tens of thousands of computers, wiping data from nearly 30,000, destroying system files, and preventing the reboot of a great number of machines. The infrastructural costs were significant, as were losses from data deletion. Perhaps more importantly, Shamoon was indigenously developed in Iran. Not only did unknown government operators manage to successfully launch a viral attack of this nature but the 2012 Saudi Aramco incident demonstrated again Iran's rapidly maturing domestic capability to develop relatively sophisticated cyber capabilities.

Strategically, Shamoon also demonstrated Iran's willingness to use cyber weapons more freely in securing geopolitical objectives than they might employ other mechanisms of state power. Indeed, each of these three major cyber conflict episodes involving Iran fit with the strategic perspective on cyber operations that it—following China, in particular—seems to have adopted. Namely, this includes a focus on cyber weapons as aids to asymmetric warfare against entrenched opponents that allows for belligerent behavior without risking violent retaliation. Cyber capabilities allow for unique disruption akin to that practiced by Iranian state proxies spread throughout the Middle East—destruction and disruption of infrastructure with only plausibly deniable linkages to the Iranian state. Likewise, cyber capabilities are particularly useful for information domination and cultivation purposes, and allow Iran to signal and drive favorable normative conditions through the tailored employment of cyber attacks.

The parallel between Iran and China is actually particularly noteworthy insofar as it helps explain similar approaches to the incorporation of cyber capabilities into foreign and military policy. As is broadly true of all states, focus on the potential of information technology for political purposes in Iran was absent until the government was faced with unique crises in which the dynamics of the digital domain became part and parcel of state abilities to ensure national stability. Much like China, the first real episode of this kind had to do with the potential for social and political unrest. In Iran, this took the form of the actions of the Iranian Green Movement, a civil movement that mobilized around calls to remove the President of Iran from office in 2009–10. Much as happened in the case of Falun Gong in China, the Green Movement relied heavily on social networks supported by information infrastructure. Indeed, prior to the late 2000s, the country's main claim to cyber fame actually lay in the existence of Iranian hacker collectives and the massive adoption of programs like Dynaweb (ironically developed by Falun Gong exiles in the West) that allowed individuals to bypass what limited state restrictions on Internet access existed in the 2000s.⁴⁹ These elements came to bear on the legitimacy of the Iranian state following Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's election in that protesters were able to mobilize and march in Tehran with relative ease against the efforts of state security services. Moreover, more so than had been the case with Falun Gong, the Green Movement was able to broadcast its message and gained support from Iranians and others both around the country and around the world. Naturally, this episode was a wake-up call to the country's rulers, who saw such civil actions as a potential threat to national political instability.

Unlike China, Iran quickly experienced realization episodes linked with the integrity of and dangers to national security infrastructure in addition to the threat to political stability. In particular, the cyber campaign of the United States and Western allies (plus Israel) against Iran's nuclear weapons development infrastructure—known as Olympic Games—came to a head in 2010 when a malicious computer worm named

Stuxnet physically damaged a number of centrifuges at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. Stuxnet, discovered in Europe by a forensic computer scientist called Sergey Ulasen, was spread via Microsoft Windows using known vulnerabilities to exploitation and targeted the Siemens industrial control systems in use at Natanz. Over time, Stuxnet was able to silently proliferate such that it was introduced (likely via USB) to the computers at Natanz. Introduction in this way defeated the facilities air gap defenses, which quite simply defend a network through a lack of connection to the broader Internet.⁵⁰ Once inside, Stuxnet altered the operational parameters of centrifuges and, by most estimates, caused damaged to about 10% of the facility's machines.⁵¹

Iran's response to these wake-up calls has been diverse. Much like China, Iran's cyber capabilities are split between three arms of state operators—civilian government actors, military actors, and non-state proxy agents. Likewise, the latter two actors are those most worthy of interest for students of cyber conflict, largely because civilian capabilities are limited to intra-department functions (i.e. even government network defense falls to the military). Since the early 2010s, Iran has developed reasonably sophisticated cyber conflict capabilities. Saudi Aramco, which is likely the incident most widely known to those interested in Iran's cyber conflict portfolio, was actually a reasonably unsophisticated operation to disrupt the capabilities of a regional opponent. Since 2012, Iranian hackers have struck at targets in Israel repeatedly, defacing websites and intruding to disrupt service and set up backdoors for future operations. In some cases, culprits have appeared to be Iranian government operators—so assumed given forensic evidence linking intrusions to IP addresses near Iranian government facilities—and non-state proxies.

Iran's technical capabilities are hard to gauge beyond a general trend towards greater sophistication. The development of institutional infrastructure in Iran focused on cyber warfare capabilities is somewhat easier to deduce. At the highest level, cyber policy in Iran is driven by the dictates of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, set up by Ayatollah Khamenei for the express purpose of coordinating ICT governance approaches across a range of areas. The Council's membership broadly includes the President of Iran alongside representatives of the judiciary and legislature and the leaders of Iran's police forces, intelligence community, and departments of telecommunications, science, and culture. In the military, Iran's primary cyber force is organized under the Cyber Defense Command, which was also established by Ayatollah Khamenei in 2010. The CDC in Iran specifically began life with the goal of responding to Stuxnet.

Iran's future ability to employ cyber techniques for political and geopolitical gain is unclear. However, responses to Stuxnet and the social unrest around the 2009–10 election season have clearly included some development of a capacity to act in the digital domain. In addition to cyber strikes against regional opponents, Iran's censorship regime has borrowed from the lessons learned by Gulf states during the Arab Spring. The country's approach increasingly incorporates a mixed approach to social expression that seeks to provide a pressure valve for dissident sentiment alongside strict censorship of speech that advocates assembly and protest. Combined with a clear focus on using cyber weapons for disruption and destruction detached from the traditional risks of using state assets to attack regional opponents, it is clear that Iran has at least notionally committed to becoming a first order cyber power in world affairs.

North Korea's experiences in cyberspace

Whereas the realization episodes experienced by most countries are reasonably clear to the casual analyst, the drivers of North Korea's programmatic development of cyber conflict capabilities are not clear. More than is the case even with other authoritarian regimes, information about the institutions and internal functionality of the Hermit Kingdom is extremely hard to come by. Though some information exists about how cyber institutions are organized, what is known about North Korea's cyber arsenal and strategic approach to ICT usage for conflict purposes emerges entirely from the experiences of those attacked by North Korea online since the late 2000s.

Unlike other countries, where there is a distinct division of focus between military matters and the regulation/repression of civil society, North Korea's cyber institutions almost entirely focus on military and intelligence matters.⁵² In large part, this emerges from the poor ICT penetration in North Korea. Simply put, few members of the population have access to the Internet, and those non-state proxies employed by the government are either directly employed at military facilities or abroad in China. According to a number of Western intelligence and academic analyses, cyber operations undertaken by North Korea are generally overseen by two entities that employ around 5,900 "cyber warriors"—the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) and Korean People's Army General Staff Department (GSD).⁵³ RGB was formed in 2009 as an amalgamation of a range of intelligence units and special operations organizations. The RGB is the primary organization tasked with foreign operations, specifically influence operations and the provocation of foreign governments. RGB directly answers to the North Korean leader. By contrast, the GSD is primarily tasked with network defense operations and is somewhat less clearly organized. By comparison with the relatively centralized RGB, GSD is somewhat like the Department of Defense in the United States circa 1995—operationally able to bring network defense resources to bear on incipient challenges, but relatively decentralized. The primary way that GSD and RGB work together is in the provision of intelligence information from GSD to RGB for the purposes of planning cyber operations abroad.⁵⁴

North Korea is a notable cyber power largely because of the degree to which the country has effectively incorporated operations in the digital domain into its existing doctrine. Nestled in Northeastern Asia between U.S. allies and a friendly China that is nevertheless a major stakeholder in the international community, the Hermit Kingdom has for many decades resisted any form of liberalization and domestically encourages a cultural narrative of national victimization. North Korea, in the words of the country's leaders, is a bastion of cultural purity and security amid foreign powers that seek to destroy Korean culture. In reality, North Korea's isolation is the result of a standoff between moral and security considerations on the part of Western and Western-backed opponents. The country's brutal repression of its own people is unacceptable. At the same time, the country's militaristic stance—particularly its development of nuclear weapons—means that few world leaders have advocated forced regime change.

Given this dynamic, North Korea's foreign policy doctrine has always been one of foreign destabilization, low-risk provocation, and deniability. The degree to which the country provokes versus joining other states at the bargaining table traditionally

oscillates in direct proportion to the country's economic woes. Where North Korea's struggling economy portends a real threat to the regime's rule, the Kim dynasty uses the promise of receding provocation as a means for obtaining international aid and release of long-term sanctions. Upon relief, provocation—at least insofar as the country can avoid major conflict—continues.

Cyber techniques have enabled North Korea increasingly to strike out against foreign states in low-risk/high-gain ways and have even been the object of new efforts to drive different informational narratives related to North Korea in international affairs. Of note, North Korean hackers have prosecuted a range of attacks against South Korean and Japanese entities since the 1960s. In 2013, North Korean hackers hit South Korean banks with denial of service attacks and vandalized websites. In the same episode, North Korean hackers were behind attacks on South Korean media stations, and malware named “DarkSeoul” was discovered across a range of financial services firms. In 2014, North Korean hackers were, according to the President of the United States and U.S. intelligence, behind an attempt to coerce Sony Pictures into not releasing *The Interview*, a comedy about an attempt to assassinate the leader of North Korea. In that episode, North Korea threatened cyber attacks against Sony if demands were not met, an effort that was ultimately unsuccessful and resulted in a major ten-hour-long cyber assault against North Korean ISPs by U.S. government operators.⁵⁵

Ultimately, whereas Iran might be considered to be a rising cyber power, the increasing sophistication of North Korea's cyber conflict capabilities must be considered in the context of North Korea's geopolitical position. Cyber capabilities reflect a unique addition to the North Korean arsenal of provocation and destabilization. However, disruption abilities lend little additional to North Korea in terms of the geopolitical dynamics of East Asia. North Korea remains a pariah state and even minimal evidence of its belligerence is met with universal condemnation. Thus, the potential for anything more than annoying actions is nearly zero. Rather, it is likely that the main threat potential accrued by North Korea's continuing development of online capabilities comes from the rising potential for success in espionage operations. North Korean operators have shown a limited ability to exfiltrate information during cyber attacks, as well as a proclivity for coercive blackmail as a viable tool of statecraft. Greater sophistication in cyber techniques could, out into the future, provide North Korea with access to technologies or the resources of other global belligerents to enhance state power in meaningful ways.

Notes

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11 Norms, ethics, and international law for offensive cyber operations

Norms, which are shared expectations of appropriate behavior, exist at various levels and can apply to different actors.¹ In the international arena, these nonbinding shared expectations can, to some degree, constrain and regulate the behavior of international actors and, in that sense, have a structural impact on the international system as a whole. For example, early in the age of nuclear weapons, Lt. Gen. James Gavin expressed the contemporary wisdom when he wrote, “Nuclear weapons will become conventional for several reasons, among them cost, effectiveness against enemy weapons, and ease of handling.”² However, as the nuclear era advanced, a constraining norm developed that made states reluctant to possess or use nuclear weapons. International security and U.S. national security may be enhanced by the emergence of regulative norms for offensive cyber operations (OCOs), similar to norms that developed in the past for these emerging-technology weapons such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In February 2016 Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified that many actors “remain undeterred from conducting reconnaissance, espionage, and even attacks in cyberspace because of the relatively low costs of entry, the perceived payoff, and the lack of significant consequences.”³ This is likely due in part to the current lack of consensus on constraining international norms, which will be discussed in detail in this chapter. Previously, former Director Clapper testified that the growing international use of these emerging-technology weapons to achieve strategic objectives was outpacing the development of a shared understanding or norms of behavior and thus increasing the prospects for miscalculations and escalation.⁴

Today, relatively early into the age of cyber conflict, many hold a view regarding the inevitability of significant use of force in cyberspace similar to that held early in the nuclear era. In expectation that norms will emerge, in May 2011 the Obama administration issued the *International Strategy for Cyberspace*.⁵ One pillar of this strategy recognizes the “borderless” international dimension of cyberspace and identifies the need to achieve stability and address cyber threats through the development of international norms. In 2013 Michael Daniel, the former White House cyber security coordinator, told computer security practitioners that diplomacy, including fostering international norms and shared expectations, is essential to prevent OCOs against U.S. economic interests. This chapter discusses how constraining norms for OCOs are actually developing and offers some predictions—based on norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons—for how they will develop in the future.⁶

This chapter does so by first introducing key concepts regarding norms and international law, then examining available evidence that offers clues as to the current

state of norms, followed by a discussion of current organizational platforms and norm leaders' efforts to reach consensus and codify norms, and finally offering some predictions and conclusions based on norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons.

Key concepts

Norms are standards of right and wrong that form a prescription or proscription for behavior.⁷ Essentially norms are nonbinding, shared expectations that can be helpful in constraining and regulating the behavior of international actors and, in that sense, have a structural impact on the international system. International norms cover a wide range of issues, from the practice of dueling to human rights. Specific to warfare, multiple regulative norms have emerged regarding particular categories of weapons and modes of warfare, such as weapons of mass destruction, strategic bombing, anti-personnel land mines, leadership assassination, and dueling. Norms for weapons and warfare can affect a variety of functions and activities, such as weapon possession and use. While not always successful (with the demise of the constraining strategic bombing norm in World War II being perhaps one of the better examples), some of these norms for warfare have helped restrain the widespread development, proliferation, and use of various weapons. Norms are obviously one of many variables impacting state behavior and the international system, with material state interests and power dynamics also playing a major, perhaps dominant role. Norms also provide the foundation for international law, which is the set of rules generally regarded and accepted as binding in relations between states. When international law is based on shared expectations of behavior, its source is considered "peremptory norms" or *jus cogens/ius cogens*. Consistent state practice or customs and eventually codification in agreements or treaties serve as additional sources of international law.

Indicators of early norms in the age of cyber conflict

There are some CNA-style OCOs that provide insight into the emerging customary practice of states and related emerging norms in regard to this most serious type of hostile cyber operation. Consciously or unconsciously, early cyber actors are acting as the early norm leaders as they help establish customary practice for hostile operations in cyberspace. Many small CNA-style operations involve DDoS attacks to degrade access to websites, such as the Code Red attack in 2001, which involved malware that launched a DDoS attack against White House computers.⁸ It is believed that approximately 100 million to 150 million botnets are utilized to conduct these frequent DDoS attacks.⁹ However, there are few examples of major OCOs. Nine are summarized in Table 11.1 for the purposes of evaluating the norms and contemporary state practice of OCOs: the purported attacks on a Siberian gas pipeline in 1982, the DDoS attacks on Estonia in 2007, the Israeli Operation Orchard attacks on Syria in 2007, the attacks on Georgia in 2008, the notorious Stuxnet attack on Iran disclosed in 2010, the Shamoon virus attack on Saudi Aramco in 2012, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam's Operation Ababil attack against financial institutions in 2012, North Korea's attack on Sony Corp. in 2014, and the Russian attack on Ukrainian power utilities in 2015. The table identifies the nature and target of the attacks.

Table 11.1 Selected cyber attacks and implications for norm emergence

<i>Attack name</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Effect</i>	<i>Suspected sponsor</i>
Trans-Siberian Gas Pipeline Estonia	June 1982 April–May 2007	Soviet gas pipeline (civilian target) Commercial and governmental web services (civilian target)	Massive explosion Major denial of service	United States Russia
Syrian Air Defense System as part of Operation Orchard Georgia	September 2007 July 2008	Military air defense system (military target) Commercial and governmental web services (civilian target)	Degradation of air defense capabilities allowing kinetic strike Major denial of service	Israel Russia
Stuxnet	Late 2009–2010, possibly as early as 2007	Iranian centrifuges (military target)	Physical destruction of Iranian centrifuges	United States
Saudi Aramco	August 2012	State-owned commercial enterprise (civilian target)	Large-scale destruction of data and attempted physical disruption of oil production	Iran
Operation Ababil	September 2012–March 2013	Large financial institutions (civilian target)	Major denial of service	Iran
Sony	November 2014	Commercial networks and data (civilian target)	Large-scale disruption of access to networks and loss of confidentiality of information due to public disclosures	North Korea
Ukrainian Power Utilities	December 2015	Civilian critical infrastructure (civilian target)	Temporary loss of power for 230,000 civilians, permanent damage to SCADA systems	Russia

These nine cyber attacks collectively provide some insight into the emergence of international norms through the customary practice of OCOs. There are three main conclusions from the attacks. First, the majority (seven of nine) of the attacks were aimed at civilian targets, showing that a norm constraining targeting to explicitly military targets or objectives has not yet arisen. Second, to the extent attacks did strike exclusively military targets, they were suspected to have been launched by Western nations (the United States and Israel). This seems to indicate there may be competing, and in some cases more permissive norms regarding OCOs depending on which nation is associated with it. This is consistent with the expected competitive environment in the early days of norm emergence. Third, experience with OCOs is very limited at this point. No known deaths or casualties have yet resulted from cyber attacks, and the physical damage caused, while impacting strategically significant items such as Iranian centrifuges or Ukrainian power utilities, has not been particularly widespread or severe.

Norms and recent examples of total restraint

In addition to actual attacks, decisions *not* to employ OCOs also indicate an emerging customary practice and potential nascent norm. Fear of collateral damage of civilian targets and an inability to discriminate target military objectives have led some OCO plans to be called off. For example, in advance of a physical invasion in 2003, the United States was planning a massive CNA-style cyber attack on Iraq to freeze bank accounts and cripple and disrupt government systems. Despite possessing the ability to carry out such attacks, the Bush administration canceled the plan out of a concern that the effects would not be contained to Iraq but instead would also have a negative effect on the civilian networks of allies across the region and in Europe.¹⁰ In 2011 the United States allegedly considered using cyber weapons to disrupt Libya's air defenses but chose not to, in part due to the limited time available and greater suitability of conventional weapons to achieve the desired effects.¹¹ The United States again declined to launch kinetic or cyber attacks against the Syrian regime in August and September 2013, in part due to concerns about causing unintentional collateral damage as well as concerns regarding Syria's and Iran's ability to retaliate in cyberspace against U.S. banks and other targets (which Iran did following Stuxnet).¹² This restraint offers a glimmer of hope for the emergence of constraining norms for OCOs, although other factors and practical considerations likely played a role in these examples of nonuse. Healey identifies this restraint against engaging in "full-scale strategic OCOs" as a *de facto* norm.¹³ That said, no state has protested any of these CNA-style cyber attacks as a violation of international law, although Georgia did protest the ongoing physical invasion of their country by Russian forces.¹⁴ This further suggests that this level of OCO is permitted by existing norms.

Overall, it appears cyber conflict is becoming more destructive, remaining largely covert with limited public discussion, involving an increasing and continued mix of state and non-state actors, and more U.S., Russian, Chinese, and Iranian offensive cyber operations (among others).¹⁵ More destructive and sophisticated cyber weapons are likely in part due to the success and example provided by Stuxnet and the interest in and proliferation of cyber weapons it has spawned along with the absence of constraining norms on developing such weapons. The United States, in spite of its interest in developing constraining cyber norms, has continued to pursue secretive military

and intelligence CNA capabilities since the 2000s.¹⁶ Thus, cyber conflict capabilities will play an increasingly decisive role in military conflicts and are becoming deeply integrated into states' doctrine and military capabilities. Over 30 countries have taken steps to incorporate OCO capabilities into their military planning and organizations, and the use of OCOs as a "brute force" weapon is likely to increase.¹⁷

Organizational platforms and norm leaders' efforts to reach consensus

While the preceding information makes it apparent that few, if any, normative constraints governing OCOs exist, increased attention and discussion have helped spur efforts to reach a consensus on and codify emerging norms for OCOs. Norm evolution theory indicates that norm emergence is more likely to occur when norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms and key states acting as norm leaders are involved.

Box 11.1 Cyberspace and the law of armed conflict: the *Tallinn Manual*

When selecting material to include in this book, we opted to write this chapter on the nature of constraining norms around conflict and the likelihood that cyber conflict norms might come into existence for a few reasons. More than anything else, we sought here to write about cyber warfare and not simply about what many have called cyberpolitics or just Internet governance. As a result, it seemed more important that we describe international effects pertaining to conflict than simply focus, as many other resources do, on how the networked world is governed and regulated.

Secondarily, we chose to focus on norms here instead of the formal trappings of international law, because it is the case that the applicability of international law to cyber conflict issues quite simply remains a hazy area at this time. There are, at present, only two major cyber-security agreements between states that seek to constrain particular kinds of behavior. Both focus on criminal activity. Other bilateral behavior where there has been agreement on the relevance of particular legal standards has largely taken the form of informal arrangements, often arranged at leadership summits behind closed doors. In short, while it is certainly true that there are obvious issue areas of legal applicability to discuss, there is not much of a landscape to overview at this time.

That said, it would not do to move through this chapter without at least some notion of the close-in issues of cyber conflict in the eyes of international law. We do that in this and subsequent breakout boxes across the rest of this chapter.

Broadly, international law as it pertains to interstate warfare takes the form of the **law of armed conflict** (LOAC, or law of war), which is constituted of all elements of international law that pertain to the conduct of states during wartime and the role of both combatants and non-combatants. With cyber conflict, the landmark effort to assess the applicability of the LOAC has taken the form of the *Tallinn Manual* (and an updated version). This document is a

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nonbinding effort by practitioners from NATO countries to assess how certain forms of cyber attack—disruptive, degradative, etc.—should be either permitted or constrained under international law.

Specifically, the *Tallinn Manual* attempts to slot what is known about different forms of cyber operations into the framework provided by **just war theory**. Just war theory is a doctrine on the ethical use of force that serves as the benchmark and progenitor framework for much international law as it appears in the **Geneva and Hague Conventions**, in the wording of the United Nations Charter, etc. The doctrine addresses criteria that should be consulted both prior to going to war (*jus ad bellum*) and during wartime (*jus in bello*). Criteria that must be met for a war to be considered justified include the need for just cause, the exhaustion of other options, a probability of success, and that a decision to wage war be made legitimately. For a war to be fought justly, the use of force should be strategically appropriate, proportionate, not cruel, and not against those who surrender.

Important to note, the *Tallinn Manual* does not necessarily attempt to address all cyber-enabled conflict. As such, its scope is limited and, though one might think from reading Chapter 8 in this book that such a document could not possibly be written with realistic conditions of interstate conflict in mind, is defensible in its remit. In the remaining breakout boxes in this chapter, we address a few specific prominent issues that are proving particularly difficult to grapple with in the international arena.

The two primary intergovernmental bodies and organizational platforms currently being used to promote emerging norms for OCOs are the UN and NATO. Other key multilateral efforts to encourage the development of cyber norms are the London Conference on Cyberspace (and subsequent conferences) and academic cyber norm workshops. Efforts in the UN have primarily been led by Russia, while efforts in NATO have been led by the United States. In addition to these two main forums focused on OCOs, the EU's Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime is a regional yet important treaty that came into force in 2004.¹⁸ The convention criminalizes nonstate cyber crime and obliges state parties to prevent nonstate actors from launching cyber attacks from their territory.¹⁹ Additionally, the UN has organized a series of events under the umbrella of the World Summit on the Information Society, which, like the EU's efforts, includes actions against cyber crime.²⁰ However, these other efforts are only indirectly focused on the issue of OCOs conducted between nation states.

The UN as an organizational platform for cyber norm emergence

Since the UN Charter entered into force in 1945, international law and norms have been based on Article 2(4), which directs that “all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.”²¹ How do OCOs fit into this construct? Within the UN the main focus on OCOs has occurred in the UN General Assembly's First

Committee (Disarmament and International Security Committee) as well as various subsidiary organs and specialized agencies, particularly the ITU, UNIDIR, and the CTITF working group.²² Serious focus on OCOs began in 1998 with the Russian resolution in the First Committee, “Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of Security,” to establish cyber arms control similar to other arms control agreements.²³ Richard Clarke, a former senior official who led the U.S. government opposition to the treaty, “viewed the Russian proposal as largely a propaganda tool, as so many of their multilateral arms control initiatives have been for decades.”²⁴ The U.S. position is that the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) apply to state behavior in cyberspace, and so a prohibition on offensive cyber weapons is unnecessary.²⁵ Interestingly, China, another key actor in cyberspace, has largely been quiet on the Russian proposals and efforts within the UN to develop and codify cyber norms, and has supported them only in recent years.²⁶ While the Russian proposal in 1998 was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote every year between 1998 and 2004 (a sign of a lack of consensus and weak reception), in 2005 a vote was taken; 14 other nations, including China, signed on as co-sponsors, and the United States was the only country voting against the resolution.²⁷ The proposal established a group of government experts (GGE) in 2004, which raised the profile of the issue of OCOs but failed to achieve consensus on whether the LOAC were sufficient to address the threat. Perhaps due to the cyber attacks in Estonia and Georgia, the Russian proposal reverted back to being adopted without a vote in 2009.²⁸ Then, in 2010, the United States reversed its opposition and supported adoption, perhaps a tactical move by the Obama administration’s “reset” with Russia.²⁹ The United States also began co-sponsoring the proposal in 2010, along with 35 other nations. Clearly momentum is building.

Box 11.2 Protected entities in cyberspace

One major issue under constant debate in international conversations about the applicability of the LOAC to cyberspace is the status of protected entities and the practicality of awarding a protected status. Traditionally, there is a category of actors and types of infrastructure that would be considered as off-limits for targeting during a conventional conflict. This would include civilian infrastructure associated with a particular humanitarian prohibition, such as a hospital or a school. The question with regards to cyber conflict is fairly simple: should these targets be off-limits as targets of CNA?

The answer that all states involved in debate over the applicability of international law to cyber conflict is yes. However, the practicalities of the matter are not clear cut. What constitutes an attack on the networks and computers at such institutions? Surely if there is a deleterious effect on the operations of, say, a hospital from a cyber attack, then offensive action can be said to have taken place. However, is it the case that a cyber attack has occurred if a computer on a school or library network has been compromised, not for disruptive purposes but to enable further intrusive activity elsewhere? As we discussed in Chapter 7,

(continued)

(continued)

both the early Cuckoo's Egg and Moonlight Maze cases included initial attacks against secondary targets for the purpose of gaining access and then elevating the attack towards other targets. Russian hackers in the late 1990s compromised a library computer in an effort to evade the detection of the FBI, while East German hackers in the 1980s attacked the Berkeley National Labs before jumping off into the MILNET. Were these the kinds of attacks covered by international law?

Even beyond the definitional issue, there is the challenge of designating protected entities such that they would not be attacked. In the physical world, a standard approach would be to use an emblem or badge that denotes an entity's protected status. Russian and U.S. interlocutors have suggested that hospitals, schools, etc. might consider using specialized domain registries to do the same thing (i.e. to be "generichospital.un" or "generichospital.protected"). The problem here is that not all network activity related to the business of protected entities occurs on local networks (e.g. inside a hospital or school structure). Would distance learners not enjoy the same protections in an ideal world? What about medical telepresence, where doctors use Skype- or FaceTime-like applications to provide medical services to remote locations? Would those activities not be protected? Again, the answer is obviously yes. But how would their protected status be noted in a meaningful fashion? Furthermore, who bears the costs of monitoring such actions and enabling such protections? These questions are, at present, unresolved.

The draft UN cyber resolution the United States supported in 2010 lacked the important reference to the need to develop definitions of key terms, which would be the first real step in developing a cyber arms control treaty.³⁰ While momentum in favor of the Russian proposal is clearly building, this change also weakens the tangible effect of the resolution insofar as it could actually lead to a binding agreement for OCOs. In addition to this annual cyber resolution, in 2011 Russia and China offered an additional proposal, "International Code of Conduct for Information Security," which has the "aim of achieving the earliest possible consensus on international norms and rules guiding the behavior of States in the information space."³¹ This proposed code, which has eleven main points, seems to tack back against U.S. and Western concerns regarding Russian interests in limiting Internet freedom by prohibiting not only CNA-style attacks but also "information warfare" and the free exchange of ideas.³²

In addition to growing support for the Russian cyber resolution (as amended) in the First Committee, there are other indicators of activity to address OCOs in the UN. Unlike the 2004 GGE, which failed to achieve consensus, more recent GGEs have had far greater success. In 2010 and 2013 the GGEs established by the First Committee cyber resolutions were able to achieve consensus and generate several recommendations.³³ For example, the 2010 GGE consensus report called for a sustained dialogue on "norms for state use of information and communications technologies to reduce risk and protect critical infrastructures" and "confidence-building and risk reduction measures, including discussion of information and communication

technologies in conflict.”³⁴ The GGE’s 2013 report broke new ground in affirming that “the application of norms derived from existing international law” was relevant to OCOs and “essential to reduce risks to international peace, security and stability.” This seems to represent a break towards the long-standing U.S. position that existing international law and agreements regarding the use of force are sufficient to address the new challenge of OCOs. The 2013 GGE report also recommends additional study to promote shared understanding regarding how this existing international law and norms apply to state behavior in cyberspace given the unique characteristics of OCOs, noting that “additional norms could be developed over time.” This last component could be a nod towards the Russian position that new and more constraining and specific norms (such as an outright ban or prohibition on first use) could eventually be adopted. Finally, the 2013 GGE offered voluntary confidence-building measures (CBMs) to promote trust, increase predictability, and reduce misperception. These include measures such as exchanging views and information on national strategies, policies, and organizations as well as the creation of bilateral and multilateral consultative frameworks such as seminars and workshops.³⁵ In 2016 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also agreed to a range of cyber CBMs.³⁶ This echoes the conclusions of the Security Defense Agenda’s 2012 report, which called for cyber CBMs as an alternative to a global treaty or at least as a near-term stopgap measure.³⁷ ICT4Peace, an international organization that spun off the UN’s World Summit on the Information Society activities, has taken a leadership role in developing cyber CBMs and issued a report in October 2013 identifying a process to do so.³⁸ The 2015 GGE reaffirmed the discussion on CBMs in the 2013 GGE report and made some modest strides towards the U.S. position through the inclusion of a mention that states should respond to requests for assistance and refrain from cyber activity that intentionally damages or impairs CI or CERTs.³⁹ However, there is no firm definition of CI, which limits the utility of this new language. Later GGEs made no additional major progress. Additionally, the fact that the 2015 GGE report also included language asserting that the fact that an attack originated from a state’s territory is insufficient for attributing the attack to the state, may be a step backwards in regard to constraining norms that inculcate responsible behavior in cyberspace.

In addition to the efforts of the First Committee, the ITU, UNIDIR, and CTITF working group have also taken steps to promote the emergence of norms for OCOs. Of these, the ITU, as a treaty-level UN organization, is perhaps the most significant organizational platform for norm emergence. The ITU, partnering with the World Federation of Scientists, initially approached OCOs at the request of various states but has since acted autonomously as a norm entrepreneur in pursuit of its own “cyber peace” agenda seeking to prevent the use of force in cyberspace.⁴⁰ The ITU secretary-general submits quarterly cyber threat assessments to the UN secretary-general and maintains a database of experts to be consulted in the event of a major cyber attack.⁴¹ Much of the ITU’s cyber efforts are focused more on general cyber hygiene and cyber crime, but it has advocated for norms related to OCOs. At the 2010 World Telecom Development Conference, the ITU secretary-general proposed a “no first attack vow” for OCOs as well as an obligation of states to prevent independent or nonstate attacks from originating from their territory.⁴² With the World Federation of Scientists, the ITU helped develop various declarations, such as the Quest for Cyberpeace, which advocate for these two norms.⁴³

UNIDIR has also played a role in fostering cyber norms. Germany has acted as a key norm leader by sponsoring ongoing UNIDIR research titled “Perspectives on Cyber War: Legal Frameworks and Transparency and Confidence Building.”⁴⁴ Russia previously sponsored much of UNIDIR’s OCO-related activities. UNIDIR’s effort seeks to raise general awareness of OCOs and generate multilateral discourse through publications and various meetings and conferences. UNIDIR staff also serve the GGE sessions supporting the First Committee’s efforts. Within the overarching UN framework, the CTITF Working Group on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes provides an organizational platform for examining OCO issues, albeit from a nonstate actor focus. The group’s initial report in February 2009 included the concerns of two states (out of 31 participating) regarding nonstate actor OCOs.⁴⁵

NATO as an organizational platform for cyber norm emergence

Following the major cyber attacks on Estonia (a NATO member) in 2007 and Georgia (an aspiring NATO member) in 2008, NATO began to focus more seriously on the threat of OCOs.⁴⁶ In 2008 NATO established the NATO CCD COE, located in Tallinn, Estonia.⁴⁷ Its mission is to enhance NATO’s cyber defense through research, education, and consulting. In 2012 the organization published the *National Cyber Security Framework Manual* to help member nations better develop national policies for cyber defense. In 2016 the organization published *International Cyber Norms: Legal, Policy, and Industry Perspectives* to assist efforts to agree on common norms in the cyber domain.⁴⁸ NATO’s commitment to addressing OCOs extends beyond this center of excellence. In November 2010, NATO adopted a new strategic concept which recognized that OCOs “can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability.”⁴⁹ In general, NATO, led by the United States, has approached OCOs from a perspective that seeks to apply the existing LOAC to cyber attacks rather than pursue more comprehensive and new restrictions like those proposed by Russia in the UN.

Box 11.3 Should non-state netizens be involved or considered?

As previous chapters have discussed, non-state actors—as well as what we’ve called “semi-state” actors, such as cyber-security vendors or backbone operators—are immensely important stakeholders in cyberspace. Traditionally, the LOAC is applied only to state actors. Given the relative asymmetry of power in cyberspace, two issues arise.

The first—and, we would argue, lesser—issue pertains to the applicability of legal standards bound up in the LOAC for responsible stakeholders. We return here to the notion of contested sovereignty in the digital age where a number of semi-state stakeholders have unprecedented power to block state cyber conflict actions and an unusual potential claim to legitimacy in doing so if such actions go against public interests. Given this dynamic, should international law apply to such actors and compel them to interfere in state cyber operations if, for instance, they observe a violation of the stipulation that protected entities should not be targeted? In other words, if a state actor is observed (given some

high degree of attribution) to attack a hospital in order to create a stepping stone towards a more disruptive attack, should an ISP intervene and block the attack?

Second, how should states treat non-state actors caught hacking state systems? Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention outlines humanitarian protections to be given to prisoners of war (POWs). Following the events of September 11, 2001, the United States argued that the article did not apply to certain terrorist actors as they had disavowed national allegiances and had engaged in hostile conflict actions. Therefore, they did not have the same rights as POWs. Would hackers acting as a proxy for state authorities fall into the same category? States often use proxy agents to extend their plausible deniability, to take advantage of external resources, and to engage a broader political movement. Part and parcel of this kind of activity, however, is a disavowal of the use of proxy hackers. So, if a hacker claimed to be acting on behalf of a state but that state denies the claim, does international law apply?

NATO's most important activity in this effort was the development of the *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare*. The *Tallinn Manual*, which does not reflect official NATO opinion, but rather the personal opinion of the authors (an "international group of experts"), was sponsored by the NATO CCD COE and three organizations acting as observers: NATO, U.S. Cyber Command, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.⁵⁰ Also noteworthy is an independent yet similar effort by Israel, led by Col. Sharon Afek, which reached similar conclusions regarding the LOAC and OCOs in early 2014.⁵¹ The *Tallinn Manual* represents not only the consensus view of these NATO-affiliated participants but also the main positions of the U.S. government.⁵² This is based on a September 2012 speech by a U.S. State Department legal advisor, Harold Koh, who articulated the U.S. positions on international law and cyberspace, which are consistent with the positions articulated in the *Tallinn Manual*.⁵³ In addition, the 2011 "International Strategy for Cyberspace" specified that the "long-standing international norms guiding state behavior—in times of peace and conflict—also apply in cyberspace."⁵⁴ Both the Koh speech and the *Tallinn Manual* go further to flesh out the U.S.-NATO position that the international LOAC are adequate and applicable to OCOs and reject the Russian position that OCOs require new and distinct international norms and agreements.

This argument was made in the past by other U.S. leaders, including Gen. Keith Alexander, commander of U.S. Cyber Command, who testified that military operations in cyberspace "must comply with international law that governs military operations," essentially equating cyber weapons with guns and bombs and implying that the rules that apply to those also apply to OCOs.⁵⁵ The interpretation of the LOAC to OCOs can be challenging, and a consensus on application needs to be developed.⁵⁶ This lack of clarity is similar to the confusion over definitions and applications of norms for airpower in the early part of the twentieth century. The following areas of application are currently being resolved: What constitutes the use of force in cyberspace? What constitutes an armed attack in cyberspace? What constitutes legitimate military objectives in cyberspace? How does the principle of distinction and noncombatant immunity apply? What role does state sovereignty play in cyberspace?⁵⁷ Both the United States (as interpreted through the Koh speech) and the group of experts that

developed the *Tallinn Manual* attempt to clarify these issues. For example, they identify cyber attacks that “result in death, injury, or significant destruction” as the use of force in cyberspace, and they determined that “whether a cyber use of force qualifies as an armed attack” depends on its “scale and effects” and that cyber attacks must exercise distinction and be aimed at legitimate military objectives, although defining a military objective in cyberspace is particularly complicated.⁵⁸ This last point is an area where the United States may stand apart from the authors of the *Tallinn Manual* in supporting a fairly broad definition of military objectives that includes “war-sustaining” objectives in addition to “war-fighting” objectives.⁵⁹ Media response to the *Tallinn Manual* has varied. Some have misinterpreted and twisted its conclusions to claim that it justifies “killing hackers.”⁶⁰ However, it represents a significant step forward in developing the emerging OCO norm tied to the existing war-fighting norms codified in the LOAC. Today all major powers except China agree that the LOAC apply to OCOs.⁶¹

Other multilateral forums acting as organizational platforms for cyber norm emergence

The UK has been the most active individual norm entrepreneur. Its Foreign and Commonwealth Office hosted the London Conference on Cyberspace in November 2011 to “discuss the vital issues posed for us all by a networked world connected ever more closely together in cyberspace.” The conference involved over 700 participants from 60 nations, including then UK Prime Minister David Cameron and then U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden. Among the many cyber topics addressed, discussions included international security and OCOs. The conference chair reported that:

[a]ll delegates underlined the importance of the principle that governments act proportionately in cyberspace and that states should continue to comply with existing rules of international law and the traditional norms of behavior that govern interstate relations, the use of force and armed conflict, including the settlement by states of their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered.

The participants agreed the next steps should be to focus on further developing “shared understanding” (norms) through efforts such as the UN First Committee’s GGE and other organizations. However, the participants did not have the “appetite . . . to expend effort on legally-binding international instruments.”⁶² Following the conference in London, a follow-up conference was held in Budapest in October 2012, and then in Seoul in October 2013.⁶³ The conference in Seoul had over 1,000 participants from approximately 90 countries and generated the “Seoul Framework for and Commitment to Open and Secure Cyberspace” as well as plans for the fourth conference held in 2015 in The Hague.⁶⁴ The “Seoul Framework” reaffirmed the conclusion of the London conference that existing norms and international law apply to OCOs and that states should prevent nonstate actors from launching attacks from their territory. The framework also noted that additional norms could be developed over time.⁶⁵

In addition to this UK-initiated global multilateral effort to address cyber issues, including OCOs, regional multilateral efforts have included efforts at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations Regional Forum.⁶⁶ These groups began discussions on “cyber confidence-building measures” heading into 2014.⁶⁷ CBMs have been used to reduce uncertainty and potential for miscalculation with other weapons. As part of the 1986 Second Review Conference of the BWC, states agreed to implement a number of CBMs in order to “prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and in order to improve international co-operation in the field of peaceful biological activities.”⁶⁸ Another example of a regional multilateral effort to cultivate norms for OCOs is a group of government leaders and security experts (80 senior military officials from 23 Asia-Pacific nations), met in Seoul less than a month after the 2013 Seoul Cybersecurity Conference for the Seoul Defense Dialogue, which also addressed OCOs.⁶⁹ Chinese professor Jia Qingguo summarized the results of the defense dialogue, saying that clearer definitions of OCOs and rules of engagement were needed and that:

[t]hose who engage in OCO should make necessary efforts to avoid attacking civilian infrastructures that may harm the civilians . . . [and] major countries should work together to develop an agreement on a code of conduct in cyberspace and a set standards.⁷⁰

There are also numerous bilateral dialogues that involve key cyber actors, such as China, the United States, and Russia.⁷¹ This includes activities such as the cyber agreement Russia and the United States signed in June 2013, which established a communication hotline for a cyber crisis. In light of North Korea’s increasingly bellicose cyber posture, South Korea and the United States established a Cyber Cooperation Working Group in early 2014 to discuss cooperation on OCO issues.⁷²

Table 11.2 summarizes some of the key emerging candidate norms being promoted in various organizational platforms and by norm entrepreneurs and/or leaders.

Predicting norm evolution going forward

OCO pose a real and growing threat, a threat that is growing faster than the development of constraining international norms, increasing the prospects for miscalculations and escalation.⁷³ Some scholars think that great powers will inevitably cooperate and establish rules, norms, and standards for cyberspace.⁷⁴ While it is true increased competition may create incentives for cooperation on constraining norms, norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons leads one to conclude that constraining norms for OCOs will face many challenges and may never successfully emerge.

Some of these challenges were also presented by the advent of the other emerging-technology weapons, in historic cases such as chemical and biological weapons, strategic bombing, and nuclear weapons. An analysis of these three historic examples offers valuable lessons that led to the development of norm evolution theory tailored for emerging-technology weapons, which can then be applied to OCOs to better evaluate whether or not the authors’ conclusions are well founded. This chapter does exactly that, first by defining emerging-technology weapons and norm evolution theory, then briefly reviewing the current state of international norms for OCOs. Next it illustrates norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons—grounded in the three historic case studies—and prospects for current norms between China, Russia,

Table 11.2 Emerging candidate norms for OCOs

<i>Norm</i>	<i>Organizational platform(s)</i>	<i>Entrepreneur(s)/leader(s)</i>
Targeting civilian and commercial objectives is acceptable	N/A; State practice, doctrine/strategy	Russia(?), China(?), Iran
Total prohibition on cyber weapons and OCOs	UN First Committee	Russia, China
No first use of cyber weapons	UN First Committee, ITU	Russia, China
Responsibility to prevent cyber attacks from a state's territory (undermined in 2015 GGE report)	ITU; London, Budapest, Seoul conferences	China, the United States, the UK, South Korea, NATO
Cyber CBMs are necessary to prevent misunderstanding	UN GGE, ICT4Peace, World Summit on the Information Society, MIT Cyber Norm Workshops, NATO	Russia, China, the United States, the UK, South Korea
Existing LOAC apply to OCOs (including limiting targets to narrow military objectives)	UN GGE; NATO; London, Budapest, Seoul conferences; state practice (for limiting targets to military objectives)	U.S. U.K., Germany, NATO, Israel

and the United States. Third, it presents a refined theory of norm development as a framework to evaluate norm emergence that contradicts the authors' thesis. This argument leads to the conclusion that a constraining international order in cyberspace is far from inevitable.

Emerging-technology weapons and norm evolution theory

Emerging-technology weapons are weapons based on new technology or a novel employment of older technologies to achieve certain effects. Given that technology is constantly advancing, weapons that initially fall into this category will eventually no longer be considered emergent. For example, the gunpowder-based weapons that began to spread in fourteenth-century Europe would clearly be classified as emerging-technology weapons in that century and perhaps in the fifteenth century, but eventually these weapons were no longer novel and became fairly ubiquitous.⁷⁵ Chemical weapons up to the early twentieth century could be considered an emerging-technology weapon. Likewise, strategic bombing up to World War II also falls into this category. Nuclear and biological weapons could be considered emerging-technology weapons during World War II and the immediate years that followed. Today cyber weapons used to conduct CNA are emerging-technology weapons. In general, norm evolution theory identifies three major stages in a norm's potential life-cycle. These three stages

are (1) norm emergence, (2) norm cascade, and (3) norm internalization.⁷⁶ The primary hypothesis of norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons is that a state's self-interest will play a significant role, and a norm's convergence with perceived state self-interest will be important to achieving norm emergence and a state acting as a norm leader. It further states that norms are more likely to emerge when vital actors are involved, specifically key states acting as norm leaders, and norm entrepreneurs within organizations. The two primary intergovernmental bodies and organizations currently being used to promote emerging norms for OCOs are the UN and NATO. Additionally, there are some other key multilateral efforts to encourage the development of cyber norms, such as the London Conference on Cyberspace and academic cyber norm workshops.

The case for norm evolution theory

What does norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons predict regarding the development of constrictive international norms? The three examples of chemical and biological weapons, strategic bombing, and nuclear weapons are particularly salient historic case studies when considering norm evolution for OCOs due to a variety of reasons.

Chemical and biological weapons and cyber weapons are both non-conventional weapons that share many of the same special characteristics with significant international security implications. They include challenges of attribution following their use, attractiveness to weaker powers and non-state actors as asymmetric weapons, use as a force multiplier for conventional military operations, questionable deterrence value, target and weapon unpredictability, potential for major collateral damage or unintended consequences due to "borderless" domains, multi-use nature of the associated technologies, and the frequent use of covert programs to develop such weapons.⁷⁷ Due to these characteristics, both of these weapons are also attractive to non-state actors or those seeking anonymity resulting in a lack of clarity regarding the responsible party.

Strategic bombing—particularly with the advent of airpower as an emerging-technology weapon and the early use of airplanes to drop bombs on cities—forced states to grapple with a brand new technology and approach to warfare; as is now the case with OCOs. As with chemical and biological weapons, strategic bombing shares some special characteristics with OCOs. Strategic bombing made civilian populations highly vulnerable, was difficult to defend against, and used technology which also had peaceful applications (air travel and transport)—all of which can also be said about OCOs today. The effort to constrain strategic bombing through normative influences was mixed and at times completely unsuccessful, which makes it particularly well suited as an exemplar of the limits of norms and how other factors may impede or reverse norm development.

Finally, nuclear weapons, like airpower before them and perhaps cyber weapons today, presented states with a challenge of a completely new and emerging war fighting technology. Nuclear weapons and cyber weapons, like the other emerging-technology case studies, share many of the same special characteristics with significant international security implications. These include the potential for major collateral damage or unintended consequences (due to fallout, in the case of nuclear weapons) and covert development programs. Because of these common attributes,

lessons regarding norm development can be learned and a framework developed that is applicable to predicting the prospects of constraining norms as a tool to address the use of cyber weapons.

Box 11.4 Restricting cyber “weaponry”: what would qualify?

A final point worthy of discussion regarding the applicability of international law to cyber conflict revolves around the notion that some weapons of war are inhumane and cruel and therefore subject to a global moratorium on their use. Generally, banned weapons are those that cause unnecessary suffering or widespread and long-term damage to the natural environment. The list is long and its contents would be largely unsurprising to the average global citizen, including various kinds of booby trap, anti-personnel landmines, poisonous gases, dum-dum bullets, and various forms of incendiary weapons.

The obvious question here is whether or not certain forms of cyber “weaponry” should be included under international law. The obvious problem is that such weaponry is not uniform. At the heart of the thing, we’re talking about code that can be maliciously weaponized and employed to nefarious effect. As such, cyber analogues to the kinds of weapons described here are unclear. One might certainly conceive of a scenario wherein a cyber attack leads to the release of, say, nuclear or otherwise toxic waste that causes massive damage to natural habitats. But the form of the attack, tailored as it would surely be in the details, is not substantially different from what might be used to less inhumane effect elsewhere. If the answer is that certain effects should be off-limits, then how do we define such effects so as to capture all future threat scenarios effectively? If the answer is that certain targets should be off-limits, we have the same issues of protected status that we have previously discussed.

Examining how norm evolution theory, informed by the three historic case studies mentioned, specifically applies to norms for emerging-technology weapons allows for a more informed prediction regarding the prospects of norm emergence for OCOs.⁷⁸ When these three case studies are considered, the primary reason for developing constraining norms for emerging-technology weapons is the perception among powerful or relevant states that such norms are in their national self-interest. That is, a direct or indirect alignment of national self-interest with a constraining norm leads to norm emergence. The extent to which it is aligned with key or powerful states’ perception of self-interest will determine how rapidly and effectively the norm emerges. The role of national self-interest as the primary ingredient leading to norm emergence also helps explain why, when challenged with violations of a young and not-yet-internalized norm, a state is quick to abandon the norm and pursue its material interest by using the previously constrained emerging-technology weapon, as was seen with both chemical and biological weapons and strategic bombing in World War I and strategic bombing in World War II.

Prospects for OCO norms

The key principle of norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons is that norm emergence is more likely to occur when powerful, relevant actors are involved, specifically key states acting as norm leaders and norm entrepreneurs within organizations. There are a variety of intergovernmental bodies and organizations currently being used by a variety of states to promote various emerging norms for OCOs. Through these organizations a variety of actors, motivated by a number of factors and employing a range of mechanisms, have promoted various candidate cyber norms, ranging from a total prohibition on cyber weapons and warfare, to a no first-use policy, or the applicability of the existing LOAC to OCOs. Norm evolution theory would thus seem to interpret this as a sign of progress for norm emergence. However, if one examines these efforts more closely, the prospects are less hopeful.

Powerful states, constraining norms, and self-interest. Powerful self-interested state actors will play a significant role in norm emergence. Additionally, the perceived state self-interest will be important for norms to emerge and for a state to become a leader of a particular norm. Successful norm emergence requires states as norm leaders and increasing multipolarity is unlikely to help. After all, there were eight great powers in 1910 and that complicated rather than fueled the convergence of a constraining norm for strategic bombing. Since there is generally less exposure and understanding surrounding cyber weapons as well as different rates of weapon adoption and cyber vulnerability, states will be reluctant to lead on the issue of norms because they may be unable to determine the utility of such weapons relative to their own interests. However, such calculations are essential if important and powerful states are going to become a strong norm leader and help promote the emerging norm. Additionally, specific to China, Russia, and the United States—the preeminent cyber actors—an analysis of their respective cyber doctrines indicates that there appears to be a perspective that each nation has more to gain from engaging in OCOs than from significantly restricting it or giving it up entirely. National investments in OCO capabilities and the development of doctrine and strategies for OCOs provide insight into state perceptions of self-interest and the expectations for behavior and emerging norms for OCOs. So where do state OCO programs stand today in China, Russia, and the United States? The three key states discussed here are the most significant, both due to the breadth and sophistication of their capabilities and activities as well as the likelihood that they are serving as the model for many other nations preparing to operate in cyberspace.

Chinese interest in OCOs. China's early activity and interest in OCOs indicate that it likely does not consider the emergence of constraining norms in its self-interest. It has been largely unconstrained by cyber norms and is preparing to use cyber weapons to cause economic harm, damage critical infrastructure, and influence kinetic armed conflict. As such, it is unlikely to be a vocal norm leader. China is best known for its expansive efforts conducting espionage-style cyber operations. For example, in February 2013, the U.S. cyber security firm Mandiant released a study detailing extensive and systematic cyber attacks, originating from Chinese military facilities, of at least 141 separate U.S.-affiliated commercial and government targets. In May 2014 the Department of Justice indicted five Chinese military hackers for CNE activity in the United States.⁷⁹ These attacks have led the U.S. DoD to classify China as “the world's most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage” and point out

that they are also “looking at ways to use cyber for offensive operations.”⁸⁰ It is this latter point that is of most interest to this chapter. China is increasingly developing and fielding advanced capabilities in cyberspace, while its interests in OCOs appear to be asymmetric and strategic. While China and the United States agreed in September 2015 to not knowingly conduct CNE theft of intellectual property for commercial advantage, there is evidence China is not living up to its end of the bargain.⁸¹ Recent deterioration of the broader U.S.-Sino relationship and President Trump’s efforts to address perceived trade imbalances with China are likely to only further destabilize the situation.

Russian interest in OCOs. Like China, Russia’s early OCO activity—especially the attacks on Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine—indicates that it is largely unconstrained by restrictive cyber norms and is preparing to use cyber weapons in a wide range of conflicts and against a variety of targets. It likely does not consider the emergence of constraining norms in its self-interest. As such, one would think it unlikely to be a vocal norm leader. However, Russia has been a leading proponent of a total ban on cyber weapons. This is similar to the Soviet Union’s efforts early in the nuclear era to demonize U.S. possession of nuclear weapons while simultaneously pursuing such weapons themselves. It helps illustrate how powerful states acting in their own self-interest can inadvertently act as norm leaders despite flouting the candidate norm themselves. However, Russia’s confusing support for fully constraining norms for OCOs (based on its behavior in the UN and its proposal for an “International Code of Conduct for Information Security”) may be based on its broader definition of OCOs and its interest in using a constraining norm to prevent what it perceives as “propaganda” inside Russia and in its near abroad.⁸² But, its position may also be disingenuous, as it was when supporting the Biological Weapons Convention while simultaneously launching a massive, illicit, biological weapons program. To achieve any real convergence among the main cyber actors the authoritarian interest in constraining free speech must be addressed, which could deflate Russian support. Further, Russian doctrine now states that future conflict will entail the “early implementation of measures of information warfare to achieve political objectives without the use of military force, and in the future to generate a favorable reaction of the international community to use military force.”⁸³ Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election is only one more example of Russia’s bellicose nature in cyberspace and elsewhere.

U.S. interest in OCOs. While China is perhaps the noisiest and Russia the most secretive when it comes to OCOs, the United States is the most sophisticated. The United States is in the process of dramatically expanding its military organization committed to engaging in OCOs and regularly engages in “offensive cyber operations.”⁸⁴ However, unlike Russian attacks and Chinese planning, it appears to exercise restraint and avoid targeting non-military targets. This seems to indicate that the United States is acting as a norm leader for at least a certain category of constraining cyber norms, although its general “militarization” of cyberspace may be negating the norm-promoting effects of this restraint. While the United States has recently developed classified rules of engagement for OCOs, it has articulated few, if any, limits on its use of force in cyberspace or response to hostile cyber attacks. For example, the May 2011 *International Strategy for Cyberspace* states that the United States “reserves the right to use all necessary means” to defend itself and its allies and partners, but that it will “exhaust all options before [the use of] military force.”⁸⁵ Additionally, the former

U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Lynn, clearly asserted that “the United States reserves the right, under the law of armed conflict, to respond to serious cyber attacks with an appropriate, proportional, and justified military response.”⁸⁶ Further, U.S. Cyber Command was recently established as a full-fledged combatant command. Ultimately, the U.S. behavior and interest in OCOs indicate that it does not consider the emergence of robust constraining norms in its self-interest.

Secondary factors affecting norm emergence

Norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons also recognizes secondary reasons for development.⁸⁷ This comprehensive theory of norm evolution for emerging-technology weapons is a framework for predicting the likelihood of norm development for cyber-related weapons and warfare and will be used in the remainder of this chapter to offer additional predictions for cyber norms.

Coherence with existing dominant norms unlikely. Should current trends continue, the outlook for coherence with exiting norms is not favorable when applied to OCOs. First, cyber norms will have difficulty achieving coherence with and grafting onto existing norms. Unfortunately, the success of a norm candidate for emerging-technology weapons also will depend in large part on the ability to achieve coherence by connecting the new weapon type to an existing category and thus beginning the process of grafting the new norm onto existing norms. While cyber weapons and OCOs have some commonalities with certain weapons, particularly unconventional and emerging-technology weapons, overall they are truly unique. In fact, they are so unique as to operate in their own new, man-made domain outside the normal domains of land, sea, air, and space. As such, cyber norms lack obvious coherence with many prominent norms, and thus it is difficult for norm entrepreneurs to graft the candidate norms to existing norms. Perhaps the best option for success is the humanitarian norm underlying the existing LOAC, particularly the norm regarding the protection of civilians and minimization of collateral damage.⁸⁸ This is precisely what NATO’s *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare* attempts to achieve by arguing that the LOAC apply to OCOs.⁸⁹ However, the lack of agreement on key terms and confusion over the spectrum of hostile cyber operations make coherence and grafting complex and difficult.⁹⁰

Too late to preemptively establish norms for OCOs. Another challenge for norm emergence is that it will be more successful if the candidate norm can be permanently and preemptively established before the weapon exists or is fully capable or widespread. With OCOs, the train has already left the station so to speak. Between 2006 and 2013, James Lewis and CSIS identify 16 significant CNA-style cyber attacks.⁹¹ These include major attacks across the globe, occurring in the former Soviet states of Estonia and Georgia to Iran and Saudi Arabia. The opportunity for permanent preemptive establishment of a norm has long since passed.

Differing perspectives on future capability and threat inflation. There will be challenges arising from both differing perspectives as to future capability as well as the prospect for threat inflation. While it is true OCOs have been demonstrated to some degree (e.g. Stuxnet, etc.), the hidden and secretive nature of cyberspace make the actors and their intent unclear and thus limit the true demonstrative value of recent cyber attacks. This has the effect of creating competing theories and arguments as to future effectiveness and strategic impact. A case in point, some argue (including

former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta) that OCOs pose a major threat and warn of a cyber “Pearl Harbor” or “cyber 9/11” moment when CI is attacked. Others have argued that statements such as Panetta’s are pure hyperbole and that OCOs pose no such dire threat and that it in fact may not even constitute warfare as properly defined.⁹² In the December 2013 edition of *Foreign Affairs*, Thomas Rid argued that not only is cyber attack not a major threat but that it will in fact “diminish rather than accentuate political violence” by offering states and other actors a new mechanism to engage in aggression below the threshold of war,⁹³ and Erik Gartzke argued further that OCOs are “unlikely to prove as pivotal in world affairs . . . as many observers seem to believe.”⁹⁴ However, cyber security is a huge and booming business for IT-security firms, with industry market research firms predicting the global cyber security market will grow from \$106.32 billion in 2015 to \$170.21 billion by 2020.⁹⁵ IT-security expert Bruce Schneier has alleged that these firms benefitting from cyber growth have, along with their government customers, artificially hyped the cyber threat.⁹⁶ Some critics have gone so far as to refer to this dynamic as “cyber doom” rhetoric or a “cyber security-industrial complex” similar to the oft-derided “defense-industrial complex.”⁹⁷ Norm evolution theory applied in this case indicates that these vastly different perceptions as to the impact and role of OCOs in international relations and conflict will impair norm emergence, as was the case early in the twentieth century when the role and impact of strategic airpower was highly contested.

Defenseless perception impact. The idea that cyber weapons cannot be defended against will fuel interest in a constraining norm but also limits the effectiveness of reciprocal agreements and can lead to weapon proliferation. As a result, once convention-dependent norms are violated, intense domestic pressure can build for retaliatory violations of the norm. Defenses against cyber weapons are largely viewed as inadequate. A report from the DoD’s Defense Science Board reported in January 2013 that the United States “cannot be confident” critical IT systems can be defended from a well-resourced cyber adversary.⁹⁸ The nature of cyberspace, with intense secrecy and “zero-day” vulnerabilities makes defense particularly difficult and fuels interest in other strategies to manage the threat, including constraining international norms. This explains the broad range of actors and organizations involved in early norm promotion and is a positive factor for the successful emergence of norms for OCOs. However, the experience of norms for emerging-technology weapons with similar perceptions regarding the weakness of defenses also indicates that while this may fuel interest in cultivating norms, they will be fragile and largely apply to use and not proliferation, as actors will continue to develop and pursue the weapons because they believe they cannot rely on defenses and seek deterrence-in-kind capabilities. Further, if the early norm is violated, given the inability to defend against continued violations, there may be domestic pressure to respond-in-kind, leading to a rapid erosion of the norm. Should early cyber norms be violated, such domestic pressure for an in-kind response could build. In fact, the Iranian attack on Saudi Aramco in August 2012 is largely viewed as one of Iran’s responses to Stuxnet.⁹⁹ The challenge of attribution in cyberspace may accentuate this dynamic by making retaliatory responses even easier than with prior emerging-technology weapons.

Unitary dominance and delayed proliferation and adoption. Finally, weapon proliferation and adoption will play a significant role in norm emergence as it will influence state interest in constraining norms. For OCOs, there is not the kind of

unitary dominance of a single actor as there was with the U.S. nuclear monopoly early in the age of nuclear—giving the United States significant influence on norm emergence regarding nuclear restraint. Additionally, given the ongoing proliferation of cyber weapons, the multi-use nature of the technology, and the relatively low cost of entry, delays in proliferating cyber weapons is unlikely. However, there will likely be varied rates of adoption of cyber weapons, with some nations such as the United States, China, Russia, and Israel possessing the most sophisticated cyber warheads.¹⁰⁰ Experience with norm development for emerging-technology weapons indicates that states with powerful cyber weapons are more likely to resist the emergence of any constraining norms. This is especially true with strong bureaucratic actors, such as the NSA in the United States or the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information in Russia, potentially advocating for permissive norms. While the Russians have been major advocates in the UN for a total prohibition on cyber weapons, their interest may be driven by a perception that the United States is the dominant cyber power or, perhaps more cynically, it could be akin to the Soviet Union's disingenuous early promotion of the constraining biological weapon and nuclear norms while simultaneously pursuing biological and nuclear weapons. Regardless, the varied rates of adoption and development of cyber capabilities indicates that there will be divergent perspectives on constraining norms, making consensus difficult. This helps explain why despite the many actors and organizations involved in developing candidate norms for OCOs, they have not been successful in achieving any broad consensus beyond perhaps the budding consensus regarding the theoretical application of the LOAC.

Ultimately, if current trends continue, norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons predicts that the emergence and early development of constraining norms will be challenged and may not occur at all. Key states—especially China, Russia, and the United States—are unlikely to perceive the emergence of robust constraining norms in their self-interest. Further, limited options for coherence and grafting, inability to preemptively establish a prohibition, lack of unitary dominance, increased proliferation and adoption of cyber weapons, and the lack of powerful self-interested state actors converging on a candidate norm present serious hurdles for norm emergence. However, the connection with the idea that cyber weapons cannot be adequately defended against as well as industry and government hyping of the threat have spurned significant general interest in constraining norms for OCOs—leading to a rise of many actors and organizational platforms. To move past this point and achieve success, a consensus on cyber norms will need to build, and such a consensus does not seem inevitable at this point or in the near future.

Prospects for OCO norm cascade and internalization. While norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons predicts low odds for constraining OCO norms, should norms emerge it is worth briefly examining what the theory predicts about achieving a norm cascade and internalization. These latter two phases in the norm life-cycle are important if a norm is to have a structural impact on the international system. If a constraining cyber norm emerges and approaches a norm cascade, then a tipping point may actually be more likely. Certain indicators are important to achieving a norm cascade, such as potential technological improvements that mitigate the attribution challenge, the unconventional characterization afforded cyber weapons, and the expansive international arms control and disarmament bureaucracy. However, should the norm cascade occur, internalizing it will be less likely largely

due to secrecy and the multi-use nature of cyber technologies which pose their own barriers to internalization and blunt international pressure for conformity and private sector support. As a result, norm internalization is likely to be most successful for norms governing usage rather than development, proliferation, and disarmament. Table 11.3 summarizes the implications of the various hypotheses of norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons when applied to OCOs.

Table 11.3 Norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons' implications for norms for OCOs¹⁰¹

<i>Primary hypothesis</i>		<i>Implications for cyber norms</i>
Direct or indirect alignment of national self-interest with a constraining norm leads to norm emergence, and the extent to which it is aligned with key or powerful states perception of self-interest will determine how rapidly and effectively the norm emerges.		Negative
<i>Secondary hypotheses for norm emergence</i>		<i>Implications for cyber norms</i>
1	Coherence and grafting with existing norms.	Negative
2	Permanently establishing a norm before the weapon exists or is fully capable or widespread.	Negative
3	Undemonstrated emerging-technology weapons.	Negative
4	Connections with the idea that the weapon can't be defended against.	Positive
5	Initial weapon proliferation/adoption.	Negative
<i>Secondary hypotheses for norm cascade</i>		<i>Implications for cyber norms</i>
1	Improvements in technology.	Positive
2	Characterizing the weapon type as unconventional or otherwise granting it a special status.	Positive
3	Public demonstrations of the weapon type, enabled by real-time media.	Negative
4	The international arms control and disarmament bureaucracy and the increasing regulation and legalization of armed conflict.	Positive
<i>Secondary hypotheses for norm internalization</i>		<i>Implications for cyber norms</i>
1	Internalization of aspects of a norm governing usage rather than aspects governing development, proliferation, and disarmament.	Positive
2	Congruent support and involvement from the public and private sectors.	Negative
3	Secrecy and the multiuse nature of the technology.	Negative
4	International pressure for conformity, enabled by real-time media coverage of the weapon's use.	Negative

Conclusions

Cyber conflict is still in its relative infancy, and there are multiple possibilities for how this new mode of warfare will evolve over the coming decades. However, reasonable conclusions can be drawn regarding the prospects for the emergence of a constraining norm for OCOs based on norm evolution theory for emerging-technology weapons.¹⁰² The theory indicates that there are many hurdles facing development of constraining norms for OCOs and predicts that if current trends continue, constraining norms for OCOs will have trouble emerging and may not ever reach a norm cascade. This is principally due to the fact that powerful state actors are unlikely to perceive a convergence between a robust constraining norm and their self-interest.

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12 The future of cyber conflict

This book was intended as a primer on cyber conflict issues for students studying cyberspace in the context of IR. We hope that we have accomplished what we set out to do in providing content that is focused on manifestations of cyber-security in this way, at least in some way. We close with three sets of thoughts regarding the present and the future of cyber conflict issues.

The shape of global cyber conflict

What is the shape and scope of cyber conflict? Though we have provided a great deal of content focusing on the conduct and the dynamics of cyber warfare up to this point, we have yet to really assert that certain trends exist in the frequency or intensity of the thing. One reason for this is that limited data exists with which we might systematically offer evidence on the incidence of cyber conflict, at least in the quantitative fashion commonly found among IR scholars who are attempting to problematize the full scope of some security phenomenon. Another is simply that there is stark disagreement among some prominent thinkers about what we are actually looking at with cyber conflict. This disagreement mirrors, to some degree, the more parochial division among IR scholars who argue over whether or not cyberspace is a revolution in military affairs.

On one side of this debate, a series of IR scholars argue that we're in a period of what might be called "cyber peace" where cyber conflicts occur beneath the threshold of traditional war and rarely provoke states towards major warfighting.¹ In the defense of those on this side of the debate, there is significant empirical evidence to back up this point of view. Though the sheer volume of major cyber conflict campaigns has blossomed in recent years, there is limited evidence that cyber attacks are used by states in order to extract concessions from their opponents (i.e. to coerce them into changing their behavior in some way).² Major degradative attacks against military and critical/government infrastructure *have* occasionally led to some policy shifts that favor the attacker, which makes some sense.³ Major attacks against such targets tend to be extremely costly to develop and implement, which sends a signal about resolve from the attacker to the victim. However, such incidents are still rare, and no other form of cyber campaign (i.e. low-intensity disruptive attacks or espionage operations) is demonstrably linked to concessionary behavior. Thus, cyber conflict appears to be linked to major interstate conflict in a remarkably minor way. Everything that remains is simply political warfare below the threshold of declared conflict and a continuation of the kinds of friction that have defined interstate relations in peacetime since time immemorial.

The other side of the debate disagrees not by disputing evidence on the relationship between cyber actions and major interstate conflict, but rather by arguing that the intensification and diversification of what we are calling cyber conflict in recent years is sufficiently unprecedented that we should fundamentally re-assess what we know about how states achieve their objectives. In particular, it seems clear from events in the 2010s that cyber techniques have acted to upgrade the potential for successful observation of non-traditional conflict methods.⁴ Russian information warfare efforts targeting North American and European political systems have caused extensive chaos since at least 2014.⁵ Attacks on critical infrastructure by both state-sponsored and non-state threat actors have multiplied since the start of the 2010s.⁶ And state intelligence apparatuses have variously been linked to organized criminal enterprise as it is linked to the development and sale of malware. Regardless of the evidence that states seem to be relatively restrained in how they respond to cyber assaults by their peers, it is certainly the case that cyber conflict has gone from the domain of select defense communities to the recourse of threat actors across the full landscape of international security. Thus, the label “cyber peace” just seems inappropriate as a descriptor for the current era.

We do not agree or disagree with either position. Rather, we note that neither side’s arguments have to be incorrect for the other to be right. The disagreement, which characterizes much scholarly and practitioner debate in cyber conflict forums, largely revolves around a discussion of what actually matters about cyber-security in the broader context of world politics. The restraint advocates tend to include those IR scholars whose view of international affairs centers on major diplomatic and conflict actions taken by states. What occurs beneath the level of state agency is background noise, significant to understand for questions of positioning and conflict potential but not intrinsically linked to prevailing security dynamics in the global system. On the other side, one often finds practitioners who spend their life observing the tumult of cyber-enabled aggression in one domain or the other. In short, it is easy to see where each camp is coming from in arguing that the scope of cyber conflict is variably either towards restrained international interactions or chaotic proliferation of disruptive effects. It is our hope that, with the content presented in this book, we’ve given students of cyber conflict the foundations from which to make their own assessments.

More wrenches in the works: revisiting exogenous development

Before closing, we want to return to one of the themes introduced in the introductory chapter. There, we argued that much of what needs to be understood about cyber conflict relates to the notion of exogenous development. That is to say that much of what has changed about the character of warfare in the Internet age stems directly from the technical manner in which computer and network technologies have come into being and been globally adopted since the 1960s. It is important for us to return to this notion of exogenous development particularly because it would be foolhardy to think that the current information revolution is over or that the Internet today will look anything like the Internet of two, three or more decades from now.

Indeed, as of the time of writing of this book, we appear to be on the brink of at least four further information revolutions centered on unique technological developments that have substantially come into their own over the past few years. Each of these areas of technology development stand to potentially transform the nature of

conflict in the same way that the initial development of the Internet did in the 1960s. Simply put, it seems likely that each will have profound implications for the conduct of conflict in the digital domain as well. Both of the first two areas of technological development are linked to the way in which the digital world currently operates in informational and logical terms. One is the turn towards decentralization technologies; the other is the cloud.

Decentralization technologies. At this point in time, decentralization technologies might be said to be roughly synonymous with blockchain and related cryptographic means for securing information transmission. We describe cryptocurrencies and the blockchain in earlier chapters but generally stayed away from the common argument that we are at the start of another information revolution centered on encrypted communications. The notion that these technologies might have a significant impact on the shape of the Internet and on global conflict issues is pretty easy to understand. Technologies like the blockchain essentially empower individuals to communicate and to engage in transactions of all manner without the authorization of some stakeholders. Gatekeeping entities like ISPs, product and application developers, and even national governments currently have disproportionate say in the function of the Internet. Even though regulation and governance of the Internet is not presently a multilateral set of activities, it would be foolish to argue against the idea that those in control of the physical and logical infrastructure of the thing have disproportionate control over how people are able to use networked technologies. Authoritarian states have regularly leant on ISPs to restrict Internet access during periods of social unrest. Likewise, cybersecurity vendors and backbone operators have de facto power to blunt the effectiveness of state-prosecuted cyber operations—95% of which passes through commercial networks—simply via their direct control of the relevant infrastructure.

Decentralization technologies promised to change that in substantial ways, largely via the promise of encryption and cryptographically enabled techniques for bypassing the traditional controlling institutions of the Internet. For cyber conflict, the implications are several, but one bears particular mention. Blockchain and related technologies might provide the basis for greater international cooperation on cyber conflict issues. The rationale for this is fairly straightforward. If some sort of collaborative set of institutions is able to provide the international community with the ability to gather non-repudiable evidence on the sources of cyber aggression, then attribution challenges preventing broad-scoped adherence to constraining cyber conflict treaties might be minimized. The current diplomatic and strategic playbook, in other words, would have to be re-thought, hopefully for the better, because of a particular technological development.

Cloud computing. While the emergence of cloud computing is certainly not anything new, it does seem fair to say that the cloud service providing industry has massively taken off only in the last few years. At this time, cloud service providers operate an industry worth more than \$100 billion globally, and many major technology firms, like Google and Amazon, use massive proprietary cloud service systems to underwrite their own products and service offerings. The thing about the cloud that is arguably revolutionary, which is mentioned in previous chapters, is the manner in which content and applications are re-distributed away from the traditional targets of cyber conflict incidents. The result is essentially a minimization of the physicality of the digital domain as it pertains to security concerns. One might think of

security considerations in cyberspace as pertaining to the architecture of the thing, both physically and logically as well as in informational terms. With a large-scale move to the cloud, the architecture of cyberspace changes and the security calculations for individual entities—from private companies to social organizations and government institutions—change dramatically. With cyber conflict, this is not necessarily a good thing. While the cloud has the potential to alleviate security concerns among Internet-using actors of all kinds, it might also reinforce negative behavior tendencies (i.e. those who subscribe to cloud services might be increasingly disinclined to invest in in-house cyber-security capabilities) and introduce new paradigms of insecurity (i.e. where cloud service providers, despite their role in decentralizing the target environment, present as an obvious target for broad-scoped disruption).

The Internet of Things. Another area of technological development that arguably constitutes a burgeoning information revolution is that of the Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT is not one technology so much as it is the continued trend of computerization of the world in novel, unique ways. Specifically, the IoT is the expanding universe of devices that are Internet-connected and functionally specific.⁷ The IoT includes implanted medical devices that communicate with hospital servers, appliances that are programmable via the web, wearable computer devices, and more. The idea of the IoT, quite simply, is that the digital world is increasingly no longer made up of just the traditional physical infrastructure of the Internet as we described it in Chapter 2 (i.e. submarine and fiber optic cables, satellites, personal computers, etc.); rather, the Internet is physically constituted of devices that enable all manner of social, political, economic, or health-based function. Whereas the Internet metaphorically rewired the international system in the 1960s, the IoT represents a literal rewiring of how the world works. Quite obviously, the implications for cyber conflict in a world possessed of the IoT are numerous, not least because of the proliferation of targets for disruption and information manipulation.

Artificial intelligence. Finally, it would not do to conclude this book without briefly discussing artificial intelligence (AI). What is AI? Simply put, AI is a label that we give to a basket of technologies that are broadly linkable to one another because they are fundamentally about teaching machines to mimic human intelligence. Just as with cyberspace, there are informational, logical, and physical dimensions of AI. Neural networks can be built to help computers perform deep reasoning tasks, essentially establishing inference around complex issues that mimic not only the basic human capacity to act but also advanced subject-matter expertise. Big data, which involves the generation and treatment of large volumes of information, feed such intelligent processes, while the development of sophisticated sensor technologies allow for the capture of more metadata about the world than has ever been possible. On the back end, machine learning—particularly natural language processing—enables machines not only to reason about the world around us but to more effectively interpret big data inputs that take the form of text, images, sound, and other sensory outputs. And in application, advances in robotics enable the harnessing of machine intelligence towards novel tasks beyond the virtual domain.⁸

We are at the very start of a revolution in AI technologies. What began a century ago in the form of scientific ruminations and abstract suggestion—see our description of Alan Turing's work on machine intelligence in Chapter 4—has benefited from the broad-scoped computerization of international infrastructure and recent advances in

science and mathematics. The result is an immensely broad horizon of possible applications of AI. For cyber conflict, and indeed for military and intelligence operations more broadly, AI capabilities offer great opportunities for efficiency and effectiveness on the battlefield (virtual or otherwise).⁹ But there are serious challenges that will need to be considered. Uncertainty and friction are the logical outcomes of any process where complexity in application is joined with the potential for human error in incorporating new technologies into conflict processes. In particular, security planners will inevitably be challenged by the “ghost in the machine” effect that will undoubtedly manifest with AI, where the actions that humans take in designing AI systems will lead to unpredicted and potentially negative outcomes of machine intelligence. This could come from bias inherent in certain data that are used to train algorithms; it could just as easily emerge as the result of logical processes failing to account for the appropriate social or political context of actions being taken. Where AI may be used to automate cyber conflict, in particular, the risk is that efforts to improve security will simply reify the problems of complexity and in-built humanity that have enduringly been the cause of enduring insecurity from the use of information technologies.

Where to from here?

Unfortunately, we have no bottom line on what cyber conflict is and what the future holds for warfare in the digital domain. It was tricky to decide what note to end the book on, particularly because cyber conflict is a phenomenon that is being shaped and reshaped by developments on an almost daily basis. Thus, instead of attempting to come up with some profound takeaway that would probably be more bluster than wisdom, we have chosen to end by reinforcing exactly that point—that the character of conflict is in a more extreme form of fluctuation and transformation than it has been, arguably, at any time past in human history. Network-connected information technologies have transformed the basis of warfighting and of political contestation in notable ways just since the late 2000s, and the new areas of development outlined here promise to further alter the terrain of global conflict in years to come.

In that point, however, there is a clarification and some solace to be found. We say that the *character* of conflict is changing more rapidly and unpredictably than it ever has. That said, we do not argue that the *nature* of conflict is in any way in flux. Indeed, we would argue that the opposite is true. In the global transformations since the 1960s, new conflict dynamics and characteristics have forced us—arguably more than anything else—to recognize an underlying fact of international security, namely that emergent technologies do not cause conflict so much as they modify the innate human pathologies that lead to conflict and enable us to engage in novel fashion. This fact—that the nature of human conflict is immutable, but that the character of our engagement with others depends on a great deal of conditions beyond human nature—should be comforting for a number of reasons. Foremost among those, it suggests that past experiences with information revolutions can help prepare us for current and future conflict based around information technologies. If it’s happened before, it will happen again; and if we can learn from the world around us, then we can shape it towards progress and peace.

Notes

- 1 See, particularly, Valeriano, Brandon, and Ryan C. Maness. *Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. Another well-known perspective is forwarded by Thomas Rid, who argues not necessarily that there is no propensity towards warfighting online among states, but rather that cyber actions do not constitute warfighting at all. Rather, they are sabotage, intelligence operations, subversion, and activism. See Rid, Thomas. "Cyber War Will Not Take Place." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2012), 5–32; and Rid, Thomas. *Cyber War Will Not Take Place*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- 2 Valeriano, Brandon, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan C. Maness. *Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- 3 Ibid., pp. 72–87.
- 4 See, for instance, Libicki, Martin C. "The Convergence of Information Warfare." *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2017).
- 5 Giles, Keir. *The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare*, Vol. 20. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2016.
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- 7 See Xia, Feng, Laurence T. Yang, Lizhe Wang, and Alexey Vinel. "Internet of Things." *International Journal of Communication Systems*, Vol. 25, No. 9 (2012), 1101–1102.
- 8 For more on the nature of artificial intelligence, see Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, *Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach*, 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2009; and Calum McClelland, "The Difference Between Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Deep Learning." *Medium.com*, December 4, 2017, <https://medium.com/iotforall/the-difference-between-artificial-intelligence-machine-learning-and-deep-learning-3aa67bff5991>.
- 9 See Daniel S. Hoadley and Nathan J. Lucas, "Artificial Intelligence and National Security." *Congressional Research Service*, April 26, 2018. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf>. Also see Benjamin Jensen, Chris Whyte, and Scott Cuomo, *Algorithms at War: The Promise, Peril, and Limits of Artificial Intelligence*, Working Paper (2018).

Glossary

- Advanced persistent threat (APT)** Any set of hacking processes that involve a dedicated, often sophisticated adversary and their tools.
- ARPANET** An early network system, funded by the U.S. Department of Defense, that was the first to utilize TCP/IP packet switching procedures.
- Asymmetric encryption** The practice of using two “keys,” one privately held by an interlocutor and another publicly available to all, to securely encrypt and decrypt communications.
- Asymmetric warfare** Warfare that occurs between actors possessed of remarkably different levels of capability.
- Attribution** The responsibility of an actor for a particular action.
- Authenticity** Making sure that the person(s) sending a message are who they say they are.
- Autonomous systems** A collection of connected routing systems that ascribe to a single approach to routing policy online.
- Availability** The notion that any information system is not entirely functional unless it is able to ensure that authorized users can always access it, even when it is under attack.
- Balkanized Internet** A scenario wherein Internet access potential, policy, and service offerings are wildly variable across different parts of the world, determined by sociopolitical or commercial interests.
- Bell LaPadula model** A security model for enforcing certain patterns of access control among users with shared access to an information system. The model is specifically designed to prevent the violation of permissions-based restrictions on accessing information by dictating the actions allowed to be taken by users at different clearance levels.
- Black hat hacker** A hacker whose intentions are malicious.
- Blockchain** The technology underlying cryptocurrencies, based on the concept of a distributed ledger of records that is held in common across a community of peers who validate all transactions to ensure high Byzantine fault tolerance.
- Bomba** The name given to an electromagnetic device, first developed by Polish engineers and then further updated by Alan Turing, to mimic the workings of the Enigma machines.
- Bot** Short for “robot”; an automated program that runs over the Internet. Some bots run automatically, while others only execute commands when they receive specific input. There are many different types of bots, but some common examples include web crawlers, chat room bots, and malicious bots.

- Brute force attack** An information attack wherein the attacker attempts to guess every single possible combination of variables that make up a “key.”
- Byzantine fault tolerance** The development of a system wherein a Byzantine fault, meaning a fault that is impossible to distinguish from normal conditions, is unlikely to occur.
- Byzantine General’s Problem** A game theoretical scenario wherein multiple generals, who must cooperate and communicate accurately in order to successfully invade a city, must figure out how to overcome treacherous messaging options so that they might act with certainty.
- CIA Triad** The name given to the three pillars of information assurance—confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
- Ciphertext** The garbled output text of a message involved in cryptographic communications.
- Circuit-switching** A method of communications that dedicates specific bandwidth to the transmission of entire information packages.
- Classical realism** An IR school of thought that holds that states are the primary actors in international affairs and that their actions are motivated by the fact that human nature is intrinsically concerned with gaining power.
- Client** Any device that accesses online services made available via a server.
- Cloud service provider** Any organization that offers access to cloud-based services and storage.
- Coercion** The practice of using force or threat of force to either prompt an opponent to change their behavior (compellence) or to maintain their current behavior (deterrence).
- Common pool resource** A resource that benefits an entire population but that can be diminished by self-interested consumption behavior.
- Compulsory power** Power that manifests in the active relationships of actors in international affairs.
- Computer** Traditionally a human worker whose job it was to “compute,” now a name given to any device that mimics human intelligence by virtue of its reprogrammable design.
- Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)** Any expert group that handles computer security events for a nation, region, sector, state, or other regulatory subdivision.
- Confidentiality** Making sure that information is not viewed by those who are not authorized to do so as it is transmitted.
- Constructivism** An IR school of thought that holds that the fabric of international politics is best understood as social above anything else, wherein socially constructed perceptions of identity and interests shape intentions and actions.
- Critical infrastructure** The name given to describe national industrial sectors that function as core assets for the workings of national economies and society.
- Cryptocurrencies** The name given to blockchain-based platforms that offer some kind of value services to decentralized communities.
- Cryptography** The study and practice of ensuring secrecy and security in communications/information transmission.
- Cyber blockade** A type of large-scale offensive cyber operation that aims to deny service to a given region or country for a period of time.

- Cyber conflict** A term used to describe all manifestations of cyber conflict, including and beyond cyberwar.
- Cyber crime** Criminal activities that are enabled by the Internet
- Cyber hygiene** The development and maintenance of routines that ensure good computer security awareness and practices.
- Cyber mercenary** A non-state actor that hacks as part of a contract arrangement.
- Cybernetic model of decision making** The basic analysis of the cybernetic model is about individual decision makers and their tendency to reduce uncertainty, using simple techniques of information processing in order to deal with complex decision making problems.
- Cyber spammers** A category of cyber criminal that make money from spam content.
- Cyberspace** The name given to the domain in which humans operate when they interact via the Internet.
- Cyberterrorism** A term used to describe either the use of computer network attack for terroristic coercion or the use of the Internet to upgrade all parts of the terrorist enterprise.
- Cyberwar** Generally, any scenario wherein two states (or otherwise powerful near-state actors) fight one another entirely via cyber means.
- Dark Web** The name given to those parts of the networked world that exist on darknet overlay networks.
- darknet site** A location on an overlay network, access to which requires specialized software.
- Deep Web** The name given to those parts of the Internet that exist behind a restricted access lockout (i.e. something like a paywall or email service that requires user credentials to access).
- Denial of service** The disruption of legitimate network access, most often at the application level, via flooding target applications and programs with requests.
- Department of Defense** The federal agency in the United States responsible for the governance and maintenance of U.S. military and intelligence policy and operations.
- Department of Homeland Security** The federal agency in the United States responsible for public security matters, including civilian government and civilian-facing cyber-security issues.
- Diamond Model** A non-linear model that envisions cyber intrusions as multi-event campaigns wherein different stages are best understood in terms of the linkages between different parts of a target organization(s).
- Digital activism** Social activism upgraded via use of Internet technologies.
- Digital signature encryption** Utilizing the public and private keys of asymmetric encryption in reverse to as to append an un-replicable “signature” to a message.
- Distributed denial of service (DDoS)** The disruption of legitimate network access at the network level by flooding a computer with connection requests from numerous sources.
- Domain Name System** A hierarchical naming system for Internet-connected devices and services that functions in a decentralized manner.
- Electronic warfare** Warfare that involves the use of electromagnetic weaponry or occurs within that spectrum.
- Enigma** The name given to a machine developed in Germany in the interwar period that would later become the primary means of encrypting German military communications.

- Excludible resource** Any resource for which it is possible to restrict access.
- External subversion** The name given to subversive campaigns and efforts resulting from the influence and direct interference of foreign governments.
- Fault tolerance** Fault tolerance is the idea that a system will be able to function even in the event of disruption, compromise or component failure.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation** The federal agency in the United States responsible for domestic security, intelligence, and counterterrorism operations.
- Fifth domain of warfare** The term applied to cyberspace by the U.S. military to signify its shape as a piece of terrain, alongside the traditional domains of land, space, sea, and air, wherein warfighting can occur.
- Firewall** A type of defensive program that sits on information exchange points and lets traffic in (or not) via reference to a specific set of rules.
- Freigate** A type of software developed by Chinese dissidents that uses a series of proxy servers to allow individuals to bypass state censorship Internet restrictions.
- General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)** The signals intelligence and information assurance organization operating under the auspices of the government of the United Kingdom.
- Geneva and Hague Conventions** Treaties and protocols that have established rules of conduct and international law on the humanitarian conduct of warfighting.
- Geospatial intelligence** Intelligence collated from sensory data and demographic information about the interaction of humans and terrain.
- Grey hat hacker** A hacker who undertakes computer network attack for idealistic reasons.
- Grey zone conflict** Conflict that occurs between war and peace but most often between actors that could otherwise fight on the battlefield with some degree of parity of capabilities.
- Hacker** A generic term used to describe those with specialized skills needed to construct malicious code and employ it.
- Hactivism** The use of malicious code and basic web vulnerabilities to hack in support of a social or political cause.
- Handshake protocol** A protocol type that dictates pre-transmission granting of permission for communication by two or more nodes.
- Hash function** A unique series of letters and numbers that results from any mathematical function that is easy to compute one direction but not the other.
- Human intelligence** Intelligence gathered by inter-human contact and connections.
- Hybrid warfare** The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects.
- HyperText Transfer Protocol** A protocol that allows for seamless multimedia data communication.
- Imagery intelligence** Intelligence gathered via the use of image capture techniques, including cameras, infrared sensors, and satellites.
- Information assurance** The practice of securing and assuring access to information via the management of risks involved in producing, storing, analyzing, and transmitting data.
- Information collection** Any operation aimed at stealing information from adversary systems.
- Information disinformation** Any operation that involved doctoring or otherwise manipulation information content to achieve psychological effects.

- Information disruption** Any operation that aims to prevent enemies from achieving full information on their strategic environment.
- Information exfiltration** The theft of data resulting from a computer network intrusion.
- Information layer of the Internet** The name given to all content accessible via the Internet.
- Information manipulation** An approach by which the sender might assemble information packages (in the form of messages) to a receiver in order to give an impression that is false from the perspective of the sender.
- Information protection** Any operation designed to prevent negative consequences from military deception, psychological, or propaganda operations.
- Information transportation** Any operation designed to shape how adversaries communicate with one another.
- Information warfare** Warfare that emerges from the manipulation and control of information systems for purposes of sowing disruption and misdirection among opponents.
- Institutional power** Power that manifests in the rules of international interactions.
- Integrity** Maintaining the accuracy of information within a message as it is transmitted.
- Internal security measures** Actions taken to prevent negative consequences from military deception, psychological, or propaganda operations.
- Internal subversion** The name given to subversive campaigns and efforts waged by dissidents operating inside a given state.
- International relations** The name given to the study of world politics as a distinct sub-field of study within Political Science.
- International Telecommunication Union** An organization originally developed to help provide multilateral oversight for telephone communications.
- Internet** The global system of networks and network-connected computers that utilize packet-switching technologies for communications.
- Internet Architecture Board** A deliberative and organizing forum that provides outreach functions for the IETF under the auspices of the ISOC.
- Internet backbone** The routing infrastructure of the Internet, constituted of the cables, satellites, and servers needed to maintain Internet functionality.
- Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers** A nonprofit organization, originally set up under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Commerce, responsible for maintaining databases of Internet names and addresses.
- Internet Engineering Steering Group** A group that is responsible for the day-to-day management of the IETF.
- Internet Engineering Task Force** A nonprofit wing of the Internet Society that offers advice and sets standards on Internet routing technologies and protocols.
- Internet protocol** The primary data transmission protocol for relaying data across network boundaries.
- Internet service provider** Any organization that offers services for accessing the Internet.
- Internet Society** A nonprofit organization set up to provide leadership on Internet technology issues.
- Intrusion detection system** A type of defensive program that monitors data traffic within a network for anomalous behavior, which is then flagged to an administrator.

- IP spoofing** The creation of data packets with false Internet Protocol address information for the purposes of spoofing target systems into redirecting responses to malicious sources.
- Just war theory** An ethical doctrine dictating the appropriate use of force and the declaration of warfare.
- Kernel** A piece of software that sits at the heart of a computer's operating system, often intended to be made up of only the most critical and secure system programs.
- Key** A physical or informational device used to encipher and decipher data.
- Kill Chain** A model that linearly tracks the stages involved in a successful cyber intrusion.
- Law of armed conflict** All parts of international public law that deal with conflict, with major elements including the provisions of the Geneva and Hague Conventions and those articulations of just right to wage war included in the United Nations charter.
- Liberalism** An IR school of thought that holds that states are inclined towards cooperation in the long run, either because democratic and liberal systems impel such judgements (classical liberalism) or because repeated interactions even in an anarchic world prompt cooperative inclinations to develop over time (neoliberalism).
- Liberation technologies** The term often used to describe Internet technologies in the context of the affordances provided to non-state activists.
- Logical layer of the Internet** The name given to all routing features of networked systems involved in Internet functionality.
- Malware** "Malicious software"
- Measurement and signature intelligence** Intelligence gathered from non-optical sensors, such as seismographs.
- Message authentication code** A small piece of information appended to a message that is used to verify the identity of the sender.
- Metamorphism** Code that is added to viruses that allow the program to entirely recreate itself to achieve the same functions but to technically appear unrelated to previous versions.
- Military deception** Operations that are undertaken to mislead the military planning and observation efforts of foreign militaries.
- MILNET** The part of the ARPANET that was specifically dedicated to U.S. military usage.
- Multi-stakeholderism** The notion that global governance issues should be debated and decided upon by both state and relevant non-state stakeholders.
- Multilateralism** The notion that global governance issues should primarily be the remit of states.
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration** The federal agency in the United States responsible for the administration of space exploration and transportation programming.
- National Security Agency** The organization within the U.S. intelligence community responsible for the signals intelligence mission of the defense establishment.
- Neorealism** An IR school of thought that holds that states are the primary actors in international affairs and that their actions are motivated by a concern about the power and intentions of other states.
- Non-repudiation** The notion that one party cannot deny having taken an action with regards to communications.

- North Atlantic Treaty Organization** The transatlantic alliance formed during the Cold War to combat the threat of the Soviet Union.
- Offense-defense balance** The idea that technological potential manifests over different eras in either inclinations towards offensive behavior or defensive behavior, depending on the value of specific military technologies for either.
- Offensive cyber operations** Any offensive actions enabled via the use of cyber instruments.
- One-time pad** A type of symmetrical cryptographic device that uses two unique and completely randomly-selected algorithms—built into a physical disc—to allow secure communications.
- Open source intelligence** Intelligence gathered and collated from publicly available information sources.
- Packet sniffing** The intercept and analysis of packet traffic across networks so as to glean information about would-be targets and/or attackers.
- Packet-switching** A method of communications wherein information is deconstructed to be packaged inside datagrams, constituted of a header and payload, before being sent across networks and reconstructed on a destination computer.
- Patriot hacker** A non-state actor that hacks on behalf of a state entity for nationalistic or civic motivations.
- Payload** A term used to describe malware that is functionally linked to a major objective and delivered via the use of other malware or computer network attack/exploitation techniques.
- Phishing** A large-scale technique for gathering private information by spamming groups of people with misleading content.
- Physical layer of the Internet** The name given to all physical infrastructural elements involved in Internet functionality.
- Plaintext** The normal input text of a message involved in cryptographic communications.
- Political warfare** The use of any political means to compel changes in the behavior of opponents, most often via the targeting of foreign populations or information systems.
- Polymorphism** Code that is added to viruses to allow the program to rewrite itself in ways that might help in avoiding detection.
- Port** Functionally, a communications endpoint that is linked to a specific information transmission process or protocol.
- Productive power** Power that manifests in the processes that shape all other forms of power.
- Propaganda** The use of false or misleading information to manipulate the preferences of foreign leaders and populations.
- Protocol** In communications, a set of rules governing how information systems should communicate with one another.
- Protocol stack** A group of protocols that allow the seamless transmission of information from computer hardware to another computer via a network connection.
- Proxy** Any actor who presents as the primary belligerent but is in actual fact operating on behalf of another.
- Psychological operations** Operations that are undertaken to communicate selectively with target populations or foreign leaders for purposes of misleading them.
- Public key encryption** Another name for asymmetric encryption.

- Response actions** Procedures that dictate how actors go about responding to different intrusion scenarios and conflict incidents.
- Rivalrous resource** Any resource the consumption of which prevents others from consuming it.
- Root server** The set of high level name servers that answer queries for domain records among country-level domains.
- Script kiddy** A term used to denote those who employ malicious code but lack the specialized skills needed to construct it.
- Second strike** A retaliatory attack conducted with weapons designed to withstand an initial nuclear attack.
- Security dilemma** The notion that security actions by one actors will prompt balancing mobilization by other actors, regardless of prior intention towards conflict.
- Self-modifying code** Computer code that is designed to alter its underlying structure as a component of its execution, usually for the purpose of detection evasion.
- Semantic objectives** Objectives focusing on achieving an informational objective.
- Semi-state actor** Any entity that plays a significant role in governing and controlling the networked world that is not a state, such as an ISP or major cyber-security vendor.
- Server** Any device, program, or piece of computer hardware that offers a specific functional service to clients.
- Signals intelligence** Intelligence gathered from the communications of enemies and from commercial information transmission infrastructure.
- Social engineering** The manipulation of individuals intended to force them to divulge private information related to accessing information systems.
- Spearphishing** A more targeted technique for gathering private information than phishing that makes use of specific information on an individual to craft a more believable hook.
- Stability-instability paradox** A situation that results from the possession of nuclear weapons where the threshold for nuclear retaliation is well known, thus allowing for low-intensity conflict to occur with frequency in the absence of major warfighting.
- Structural power** Power that manifests in the norms of interaction and the inclinations of actors towards certain courses of action.
- Subversion** The undermining or detachment of the loyalties of significant political and social groups within a target state and their transference, under ideal conditions, to the symbols and institutions of the aggressor.
- Surface web** The name given to those parts of the Internet fully discoverable by web crawlers and, resultantly, searchable by individuals with only an Internet connected device.
- Swarm warfare** A battlefield tactic designed to maximize target saturation and thereby overwhelm or saturate the defenses of the principal target or objective.
- Symmetric encryption** The practice of using a “key,” shared between interlocutors, that can encrypt and decrypt communications to ensure secret information transmission.
- SYN flood** A common type of denial of service attack wherein attackers take advantage of common handshake protocol procedures to force a target to devote too much memory to anticipated incoming connections.
- Syntactic objectives** Objectives focused on achieving a technical, or logical, disruption.

- The cloud** Virtual servers and storage systems that simulate the function of dedicated hardware and software run locally.
- The Onion Router (TOR)** The most well-known software that allows access to darknet sites via anonymization of data traffic.
- Tragedy of the Commons** A situation wherein a number of individuals have access to a shared resource and where rational individual action unfortunately incentivizes predatory behavior with regards to that resource's use.
- Transport Control Protocol** An element of the Internet protocol suite that ensures effective transmission of data from applications to Internet communications, and vice versa.
- Trojan Horse** A type of malware that masquerades as a legitimate program so as to trick users into downloading it.
- Troll** One who posts a deliberately provocative message to a newsgroup or message board with the intention of causing maximum disruption and argument.
- Troll farms** An organized operation of many trolls who may work together in a "factory" or from different places across a distributed network to generate online traffic aimed at affecting public opinion, and to spread misinformation and disinformation.
- User layer of the Internet** The name given to all human users of the Internet.
- Vicious employees** A term used to describe insider threats.
- Virus** A type of malware that replicates itself via reference to some human action and then takes steps to avoid detection so as to deliver a payload held within.
- Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies** An export control regime voluntarily set up between 42 nations to communicate about and regulate the transfer of arms, both conventional and otherwise.
- Waterhole attack** A type of attack that occurs from online locations compromised because they are commonly visited.
- Web brigade** An indeterminate number of paid trolls that work to manipulate online discourse on a given topic.
- White hat hacker** A hacker who aids governments and commercial vendors by finding security loopholes in their systems/products.
- World Summit on the Information Society** A two-part world summit on information systems in 21st-century society meant to address issues of Internet standards, governance, and access.
- World Wide Web** The name given to all parts of the Internet underwritten by the HyperText Transfer Protocol.
- Worm** A type of malware that replicates itself without reference to human actions and can be used to deliver a payload.
- Zombie computer** A computer that has been compromised and is controlled most often in aid of DDoS attacks.

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